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SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT IN TURKEY: TOWARD CONVERGENCE?

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Studies on Western democracies have shown that deep-seated social cleavages stabilize the electoral behavior and thus reduce electoral volatility. But how do social cleavages affect a party system that is undergoing democratic consolidation, such as in Turkey? In this study, investigations were carried out on long- and short-term relationships between social cleavages (religiosity, ethnicity, and sectarism) and electoral volatility in Turkey during the 1961–2002 period. Cross-sectional multiple regressions were applied to electoral and demographic data at the provincial level. The results showed that in the long-term, social cleavages on the whole have increased volatility rather than reduced it. The cleavage-volatility relationship, however, has changed over time. Repeated elections have mitigated the volatile effect of social cleavages on the voting behavior, as political parties have become more representative of the existent social cleavages.

INTRODUCTION

STUDIES on Western democracies have shown that deep-seated social cleavages stabilize electoral behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and thus reduce electoral volatility (Bartolini and Mair 1990). While social cleavages have become less able to account for changes in the electoral behavior since the late 1960s (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Ersson and Lane 1998; Mair 2001), in most of these studies, it was agreed that the strength of social cleavages *did* explain variations in electoral volatility. But how do social cleavages affect a party system that is undergoing democratic consolidation, such as in Turkey?

In this study, investigations were carried out on long- and short-term relationships between social cleavages (represented by Sunni religiosity, Kurdish ethnicity, and Alevi sectarism) and electoral volatility in Turkey during the 1961–2002 period at the provincial level. There are two theoretical contentions. First, while (total) electoral volatility is a useful measurement of party system instability, it lumps together

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vote swings of different dimensions. It is possible, however, to reduce its vagueness by disaggregating electoral volatility into inter-bloc volatilities. Second, it is necessary objectively to choose social cleavages that are most valid for testing given hypotheses. One such way is to choose the social cleavages that account for factor-analyzed voting patterns.

The results of multiple regressions showed that in the long-term, social cleavages on the whole have increased volatility rather than reduced it. The cleavage-volatility relationship, however, has changed over time. Repeated elections since each civilian transition (in 1961 and 1983) have mitigated the volatile effect of social cleavages on the voting behavior, as political parties have become more representative of the existent social cleavages.

I. RESEARCH DESIGN

Conceptually, the objective of this study was to analyze the behavior of a collectivity of individuals with different sociopolitical characteristics. Cross-sectional multiple regressions[1] were run with the province as the unit of analysis.[2] The basic advantage of treating a collectivity of individuals as the unit of analysis lies in that behavioral outcomes include social interactions in the shared cultural and geographical environment. As Agnew pointed out, place is where individuals with various socioeconomic variables interact before making their own decisions (Agnew 1987; Agnew and Duncan 1989). In the case of the Kurds in Turkey, the feudalistic social structure in southeastern Turkey, rather than Kurdish ethnicity, has led to the high electoral volatility among Kurdish voters in the long term.[3] In this study, the *combined* effect of sociopolitical variables attributed to individuals and interactions of such variables was analyzed.

In this study the dynamics of party system consolidation in democratization processes was also examined. While Turkey made a transition to a multi-party system in 1946, it experienced two military interventions in 1960 and 1980. In other words, electoral democracy is not new in Turkey but has not been very stable. At the same time, discontinuities of the Turkish party system associated with the two military interventions have resulted in two cycles of party system consolidation.[4] The period under study, 1961–2002, was thus divided into the pre-1980 period

[1] Statistical package programs of the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) have been used.

[2] The province is the largest administrative unit of local administration in Turkey. The number of provinces increased from sixty-seven to eighty-one between 1989 and 2000. When this study dealt with provincial socioeconomic data, the number of provinces analyzed was reduced to sixty-seven.

[3] See Section IV that follows.

[4] After the 1960 military intervention, the governing party was disbanded while the other parties remained intact. The parliamentary electoral system was changed from a plural-member majoritarian system to a proportional representation and the senate was established. These measures were intended to prevent the tyranny of the majority that led to the coup. A competitive transitional

(1961–77) and the post-1980 period (1987–2002).[5] The two years in each pair of parentheses indicate the first and the last free elections in each period.

The dependent variable consisted of the dimensions of electoral volatility that reflected vote swings across social cleavages, namely left-right volatility and systemic volatility. The concept and measurement of these inter-bloc volatilities will be discussed in the following third section of this study. The data were mainly derived from the provincial results of general elections of the Turkish Grand National Assembly from 1961 to 2002 (See Appendix). The independent variables were represented by social cleavages in Turkey. Instead of postulating certain cleavages, in the fourth section, the factors that potentially represent major social cleavages were extracted from the provincial voting patterns. These factors pointed to three major social cleavages represented by Sunni religiosity, Kurdish ethnicity, and Alevi sectarism, respectively. Demographic data on these social groups in Turkey were used to operationalize social cleavages (See Appendix and Appendix Table I).

The main hypothesis is that the provinces with stronger social cleavages display less cleavage-type volatility (left-right and systemic volatilities) than the provinces with weaker social cleavages do. In the fifth and sixth sections, the above hypothesis was tested using both long-term data (averaged and standardized for the entire 1961–2002 period) and short-term data (for each election). Period-mean data do not support the hypothesis but more recent data do, which indicates a consolidation of the Turkish party system.

While in this study inference of individual behavior from aggregate data (ecological inference) was not dealt with, the statistical method used here was identical with that of ecological inference. Problems with ecological inference have been extensively discussed especially since Robinson warned of ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950). Goodman shortly proposed the application of a regression model to the problem of aggregation bias that Robinson pointed out.[6] In the Goodman model (ecological regression), however, there was a shortcoming, in that the model assumed

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election was held in 1961. After the 1980 military intervention, all the political parties were disbanded and all their leaders were banned from politics until 1987. The transitional election in 1983 was thus not fully competitive besides the fact that the military government allowed only three of the newly formed parties to participate.

[5] Law on Election of the Members of Parliament (Law No. 2839), passed on June 10, 1983, made voting compulsory. Article 63 stipulates a fine, imposed by the sub-provincial electoral council chairman, on registered eligible voters who, without legitimate reasons, did not participate in either the general election or the by-election of the parliament. Actually, the author was unable to come across any reports or personal remarks indicating that the fine had been implemented. It is true, however, that compulsory voting raised the level of voter turnout. See Appendix Table IV.

[6] Aggregation bias is considered to occur when individual data are aggregated into collective data in certain forms of grouping (but not in others). These forms of grouping include (1) grouping by the dependent variable (For instance, students of different ethnicities are grouped by class achievement before their ethnicity is correlated with class achievement.) and (2) grouping by a variable related to both the independent and dependent variables (Langbein and Lichtman 1978, pp. 17–21).

constant variance in the error term of the regression, which is not necessarily met in reality (King 1997, Chaps. 3–4). This is a problem of heteroscedasticity most commonly found in cross-sectional data.[7] To alleviate this shortcoming, in this study, power transformations were used,[8] when necessary, to reduce the skewness of the distribution of the independent variables.[9] Then, each regression result was checked using the White test (Johnston and Dinardo 1997, pp. 166–67) for any sign of heteroscedasticity.

II. ELECTORAL VOLATILITY

Electoral volatility is a major conventional[10] measurement of the tendency for voters to change their support for parties from election to election. It is calculated as the sum of absolute differences in the party vote percentage between two consecutive elections divided by two.[11] Electoral volatility in Turkey, about 20 per cent in the 1990s (Figure 1), is much higher, compared with rates for southern European coun-

Fig. 1. Electoral Volatility in Turkey, 1965–2002



Source: Calculated by the author from Appendix.

[7] Heteroscedasticity occurs when the variance of the dependent variable for each value of the independent variable is not constant.

[8] Logarithmic transformations appeared to be the most appropriate method for the data used in this study.

[9] "Regression requires no assumptions about the distribution of *X* variables, but in practice skewed *X* distributions are often associated with statistical problems such as influence and heteroscedasticity." (Hamilton 1992, p. 55)

[10] It is conventional since it does not measure the gross shift but only the net shift of votes among parties. The measurement of the gross shift requires waves of panel surveys.

[11] Pederson (1983). Changes in the party vote percentage due to party mergers or splits are not counted. Nominal electoral volatility is thus excluded. For instance, if Party B splinters from Party A

tries, which together with Turkey form the Third-Wave (Huntington 1991) group of democratizing countries. After transitions from authoritarianism in these countries, electoral volatility began to decline. The electoral volatility score was 10.6 for Spain in 1993, 9.5 for Portugal in 1991, and 3.3 for Greece in 1990 (Morlino 1995). Turkey's electoral volatility after the Third Wave comes close to that of Latin American countries that have relatively institutionalized party systems such as Costa Rica, Mexico, and Chile (Mainwaring 1999, p. 29, Table 2-1).

Electoral volatility (= total electoral volatility) indicates the level of party system instability in general. It does not indicate, however, what constitutes such instability. In fact, various combinations of vote swings represent different dimensions of electoral volatility in the aggregate.[12] Bartolini and Mair (1990) divided total electoral volatility into inter-bloc volatility and within-bloc volatility.[13] For Bartolini and Mair, the term "bloc" referred to either the leftist parties or the rightist parties. The concept of "bloc," however, does not have to be confined to the left-right dimension, as they pointed out. This study expands the concept of "bloc" to analyze four inter-bloc volatilities (Table I). The first two inter-bloc volatilities that reflect cleavage structures (cleavage-type volatilities) include left-right volatility and systemic volatility. The two others that reflect voters' retrospective evaluation of government

TABLE I

INTER-BLOC VOLATILITIES DEFINED

Type of Volatility	Inter-bloc Volatility	Vote Swing
Cleavage (CV)	Left-right	Secularism and the public sector vs. religion and a market economy
	Systemic	Pro-systemic vs. anti-systemic
Retrospective (RV)	Incumbent	Government vs. opposition
	Traumatic	Former/present incumbents vs. others

Source: Compiled by the author.

between two consecutive elections, change in the party vote percentage stemming from Party A and Party B is calculated as (Combined vote percentage for Party A and Party B, Election$_t$) – (Vote percentage for Party A, Election$_{t-1}$). The above represents Bartolini and Mair's counting rule of electoral volatility. See Bartolini and Mair (1990, Appendix 1).

12 Total electoral volatility is synonymous with electoral volatility, which is used in more general contexts. Therefore, the term "total electoral volatility" will be used when discussed with various dimensions of electoral volatility.

13 Inter-bloc volatility is calculated as the absolute sum of differences in the vote percentage for the parties in either bloc between two consecutive elections. Inter-bloc volatility thus measures volatility between one bloc of parties and the other bloc. Within-bloc volatility is the residual of inter-bloc volatility in total volatility. Within-bloc volatility by definition consists of volatility within one bloc and volatility within the other bloc (Bartolini and Mair [1990], Chap. 1).

performance (retrospective-type volatilities) include incumbent volatility and traumatic volatility.[14]

First, *left-right* volatility consists of absolute net vote swings between the leftist votes and the rightist votes. It is calculated as the absolute sum of differences in the vote percentage for the parties in the left (or right) bloc between two consecutive elections. In Turkey, leftist parties are more secular and more supportive of the state's role in the economy than are rightist parties.[15] Rightist parties are more religious and more supportive of the free market.[16] (For the classification of political parties in Turkey, see Appendix Tables II and III.) Religiosity is a major definitive element of the left-right dimension not only in Turkey. Empirical findings showed that religiosity determined, more strongly than social class did, issue positions (economic and noneconomic) on the left-right scaling (Inglehart 1984; Lijphart 1979).

Second, *systemic* volatility is comprised of absolute net vote swings between the pro-systemic parties and the potentially anti-systemic parties. Potentially anti-systemic parties in Turkey include pro-Islamic, nationalistic, and pro-Kurdish parties. Since all these parties proclaim their abidance by the law, their anti-systemic nature is only potential.

Third, *incumbent* volatility is expressed as absolute net vote swings between the governing party/parties and the opposition parties. Governing parties are defined here as the parties in the last government, before the general election, that served for more than one year.

Fourth, *traumatic* volatility is represented by absolute net vote swings between the parties that have ever stayed in government for more than one year consecutively and those that have not.

As the above definitions have shown, cleavage-type volatilities and retrospective-type volatilities are qualitatively different in voters' criteria for their party choice. Cleavage-type volatilities are probably associated with voters' search for parties better representing their social grouping while retrospective-type volatilities are influenced by voter evaluation of the past performance of the incumbent(s) (and the former incumbents). The two types of inter-bloc volatilities therefore require separate analytical settings and different independent variables.

Figure 2 shows that cleavage-type volatilities (CVs) were nearly as strong as retrospective-type volatilities (RVs) during the pre-1980 period. During the post-1980

[14] In fact, the economic performance of the incumbent is the most important source of short-term electoral volatility. This relationship is called retrospective or economic voting and is measured by vote functions. See Bloom and Price (1975); Fiorina (1981); Norpoth, Lewis-Beck, and Lafay (1991); Powell and Whitten (1993); and Anderson (1995). There have been very few studies on Turkey but see Çarkoğlu (1997).

[15] Mango (1991). In this article, Mango suggested that the secular-religious divide, while parallel to the one in Europe, might be deeper in Turkey than in Europe (p. 173).

[16] Far-right parties, however, are less supportive of a free market economy than are center-right parties.

Fig. 2. Inter-bloc Volatilities, 1965–2002 ($N = 67$)



Source: Calculated by the author from Appendix.
Notes: 1. Four types of inter-bloc volatilities overlap with each other in one way or another.
2. CV: Cleavage-type volatility.
RV: Retrospective-type volatility.

period, however, cleavage-type volatilities became far less significant than retrospective-type volatilities. Total electoral volatility was more reflective of retrospective-type volatilities than cleavage-type volatilities during the post-1980 period than during the pre-1980 period.[17] One should be careful therefore not to relate total electoral volatility to social cleavages. Given the theme of this study, it would be more meaningful to gauge relationships between social cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities.

III. SOCIAL CLEAVAGES

Compared with cross-country studies, it is much more difficult to measure the strength of social cleavages across provinces in a single country, due to both practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, little information is available about how the level of group identification varies across provinces. Theoretically, if attitudinal variables such as group identification are to be approximated by socio-demographic variables, it is not very clear which socio-demographic features help to nurture strong social cleavages. And both practically and theoretically, the conventional index of cleavage, segmentation,[18] is more difficult to apply to a province than to

[17] At present, the author is preparing a paper that analyzes retrospective voting in Turkey.
[18] See Bartolini and Mair (1990, p. 226). The other cleavage index that Bartolini and Mair used was organizational strength measured by the unionization rate. This index is also both very difficult to obtain at the provincial level and restricted to the left-right cleavage.

the country as a whole. Even if the level of segmentation is the same between two provinces, the provincial majority may not always coincide with the national majority. If the party system underrepresents the provincial majority, a low level of segmentation may well lead to voting instability rather than stability. This is because a large bloc of votes lacks strong party loyalties.

For the analysis of cleavage strength at the provincial level, it makes more sense, therefore, to measure the strength of each major social cleavage by the relative population size of major national minorities in the province. Let us assume here that (1) each social cleavage in the province is formed by one of the major national minorities, on the one hand, and the residual groups (consisting of the national majority group and the less relevant minority groups), on the other and that (2) each social cleavage in the province becomes more prominent depending on whether a particular accounts for a large proportion of the population in the province. Then the strength of each social cleavage can be measured by the percentage of that minority population to the total population in the province.

It would be preferable to choose these major national minority groups as objectively as possible. Factor analysis of party votes by province enables to elicit potential social cleavages that include the most relevant minority groups. Table II shows factor patterns (i.e., configurations of factor loadings) of party votes for the post-1980 periods by pooled-factor analysis.[19] Three factors, i.e., secular-religious, Turks-Kurds, and Alevi factors were extracted to explain the variation in voting behavior.[20] Ergüder and Hofferbert (1988) already demonstrated for the pre-1980 (1965–77) period that voting variations across provinces in Turkey depended on the periphery-center, left-right, and anti-system factors. The "periphery" end of the first factor represented the less developed Kurdish region. The "left" end of the

[19] In order to delineate clear cleavage patterns, the results of the 2002 general election were not included in the analysis. In 2002, a great deal of punitive vote swings (See Figures 1 and 2) slightly blurred the consistent provincial voting pattern up to 1999. As the following analysis shows, however, the high electoral volatility for 2002 primarily stemmed from retrospective-type rather than cleavage-type volatilities. Provincial patterns of party support have not substantially changed along social cleavage dimensions. In this sense, it is too early to call the 2002 general election a dealignment/realignment election rather than an aberration.

[20] Three factors were extracted due to the following two criteria. First, if an eigenvalue falls steeply after the nth factor, then the $(n + 1)$th and the following factors should be excluded. For this study, n was four (See the table below). Second, each factor should contain at least three variables (= party votes in a given election) whose factor loadings are above 0.5 or below –0.5 and which have not been contained in the higher-order factors. Among the four factors extracted by the first criterion, the fourth factor was discarded due to the second criterion.

Eigenvalues of the Reduced Correlation Matrix

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Eigenvalue	6.79	4.59	4.03	3.12	1.67	1.22	0.78	0.62	0.35	0.23	0.17	0.13	0.11

Source: Compiled by the author. See Table II.

TABLE II

FACTOR ANALYSIS OF PROVINCIAL VOTING BEHAVIOR, 1987–99 ($N = 67$)

Factor 1: Secular-Religious		Factor 2: Turks-Kurds		Factor 3: Alevi	
Party	Factor Loading	Party	Factor Loading	Party	Factor Loading
DLP99	**0.87624**	**NAP99**	**0.84338**	**RPP99**	**0.86126**
DLP95	**0.81600**	**NAP95**	**0.60143**	**RPP95**	**0.80954**
DLP91	**0.71497**	**NWP87**	**0.54605**	**SDPP87**	**0.71218**
TPP95	**0.65199**	MP87	0.44614	**SDPP91**	**0.57165**
DLP87	**0.53914**	TPP91	0.36909	NAP95	0.34751
SDPP87	**0.49967**	TPP87	0.31533	NWP87	0.33344
TPP91	0.41076	WP91	0.28198	NAP99	0.24270
MP99	0.33919	TPP95	0.26906	MP87	0.10970
RPP95	0.27486	DLP91	0.26772	WP91	0.01570
RPP99	0.19559	DLP99	0.23034	DLP99	−0.00067
TPP87	0.16233	DLP95	0.22432	WP95	−0.03689
TPP99	0.08434	RPP95	0.19928	DLP95	−0.04389
SDPP91	0.05025	MP95	0.18374	DLP91	−0.05117
MP91	0.00554	VP99	0.17846	DLP87	−0.05909
MP95	−0.00188	WP95	0.16180	PDP95	−0.07834
PDP95	−0.20220	RPP99	0.07719	VP99	−0.11210
MP87	−0.21755	MP91	0.05306	PDP99	−0.13218
PDP99	−0.23597	TPP99	−0.01286	TPP95	−0.28033
NAP99	−0.25131	MP99	−0.03598	MP91	−0.29897
NAP95	−0.28891	DLP87	−0.27118	WP87	−0.31379
NWP87	**−0.55610**	SDPP87	−0.33160	TPP99	−0.36701
WP87	**−0.73020**	WP87	−0.39845	MP95	−0.43178
VP99	**−0.83050**	**SDPP91**	**−0.68310**	MP99	−0.49432
WP95	**−0.89650**	**PDP95**	**−0.86470**	**TPP91**	**−0.50850**
WP91	**−0.90760**	**PDP99**	**−0.86860**	**TPP87**	**−0.59760**
Percentage of variance explained					
28.27		19.08		16.76	

Source: Calculated by the author from Appendix.

Notes: 1. Entries are varimax factor loadings calculated from the percentages of votes that each political party received in the provinces during the 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, and 1999 general elections. Factor loadings equal to or above 0.50 (or below –0.50) are indicated in bold characters.

2. Acronyms of the political parties are as follows: WP = Welfare Party, pro-Islamist; VP = Virtue Party, pro-Islamist, succeeding the WP; MP = Motherland Party, center-right; TPP = True Path Party, center-right; DLP = Democratic Left Party, center-left; SDPP = Social Democratic Populist Party, center-left and supported by Alevi sect Muslims, succeeded by the RPP, allied with the pro-Kurdish People's Labor Party for the 1991 election; RPP = Republican People's Party, center-left, succeeding the SDPP; NWP = Nationalist Work Party, far right, succeeded by the NAP; NAP = Nationalist Action Party, far right, succeeding the NWP; and PDP = People's Democracy Party, pro-Kurdish.

second factor reflected support for the secular Republican People's Party coming from the Alevi sect. The one-tailed anti-system factor more strongly embodied far-right, i.e., religious and nationalistic votes than far-left votes.[21]

Thus, despite different wordings, both the pre- and post-1980 factors suggest that devout Sunnis, ethnic Kurds, and the Alevi sect form major social cleavages in Turkey. First, while the overwhelming majority of the Turks are Sunni Muslims, those who literally practice the Koran or who support the introduction of Islamic law form a small minority.[22] Second, ethnic Kurds are the largest ethnic group in Turkey. The majority of them are Muslims, while they are divided into Sunnis and Alevis just as non-Kurdish Turks are. Although no official statistics have been taken for ethnicity in Turkey since 1965, those whose mother tongue was the Kurdish language were estimated to account for about 12.6 per cent of the population as of 1990 (Mutlu 1996). Third, the Alevis are a mosaic of different unorthodox or secular Muslims. The majority of Alevis denies strict adherence to the Koran and also shows leniency to different religions.[23] Individual surveys give supportive evidence to the above relationships between voter characteristics and party preference.[24]

Demographic data indicated that the three social groups were the major determi-

[21] Ergüder and Hofferbert (1998, pp. 91–93). Çarkoğlu and Avcı conducted a factor analysis for the 1950–99 period, without distinguishing the pre- and post-1980 periods, and extracted five factors, i.e., (1) center-left vs. religious right, (2) center vs. periphery, (3) Turkish nationalist vs. Kurdish support, (4) marginalism, and (5) center-right vs. minor personalistic right-wing. See Çarkoğlu and Avcı (2002). Theoretically, this is a more logical approach. The characterization of each factor, however, seems to have become blurred. This is because the analysis included many parties of different inclinations that emerged and disappeared over the years. The definition of common denominators, or factors, thus became broad rather than specific.

[22] Results of the survey conducted in 1999 for 3,054 respondents in sixteen provinces showed that support for an Islamic state was 21.2 per cent. Support rates became even lower when concrete questions were asked such as Islamic-law divorce (14.0 per cent), a smaller inheritance share for daughters (13.9 per cent), polygamy (10.7 per cent), and Koranic punishment for adultery (1.4 per cent). See Toprak and Çarkoğlu (2000).

[23] Bilici categorized them into four groups. Mystic Aleviism emphasizes compassion over piety and accommodates people of different religious origins. The members of a second group consider themselves as within Islam but bring about a contemporary interpretation to the Koran. They also seek representation in the state organ for religious affairs. A third new group is closer to Shiism and Twelve Imams, partly influenced by Revolutionary Iran. The fourth group includes Marxist Alevis that also embraced Kurdish nationalism. The last two groups, however, form a small minority. See Bilici (1999). Bozarslan also emphasizes that Alevism is a community-based political formation that emerged due to competition with political Islam and Kurdish nationalism. See Bozarslan (2003, p. 13).

[24] Erder's survey in 1996 ($N = 2,396$) indicated that the Alevi voters most strongly supported the RPP (34.4 per cent) compared with the total average support of 5.5 per cent for the same party. The Kurdish voters distinctly and strongly supported the PDP (17.4 percent) compared with the total average support of 2.0 per cent for the same party. They also strongly supported the WP (28.8 per cent) but the total average support for the same party was also as high as 22.2 per cent. Devout Muslims predominantly supported the Welfare Party. Among the respondents who wanted Islamic law (22.2 per cent of the total respondents), 52.3 per cent supported the Welfare Party. See Erder (1996, pp. 117 and 162).

TABLE III
FACTOR STRUCTURES AND CLEAVAGES, 1961–99 ($N = 67$)

Dependent Variable		Independent Variables[a]			Regression Results		White Test:[b]
		Religiosity	Ethnicity	Sectness	Adj. R^2	F Value	$p <$ chi sq.
Pre-1980 Factors, 1961–77	Center-periphery	−0.802	−10.277***	2.297**	0.6257	37.777***	0.3627
	Left-right	−2.392**	−2.173**	3.143***	0.2112	6.890***	0.1458
	Anti-system[c]	2.977***	0.913	2.950***	0.1499	4.878***	0.2079
Post-1980 Factors, 1987–99	Secular-religious	−4.035***	−5.598***	0.073	0.3229	11.493***	0.7395
	Turkish-Kurdish	2.367**	−4.353***	2.864***	0.3809	14.537***	0.3589
	Alevi[c]	−2.028**	−0.499	5.946***	0.4277	17.440***	0.3559

Source: Calculated by the author from Appendix. For summary statistics, see Appendix Table I. The author calculated factor scores for the pre-1980 factors, which were not reported by Ergüder and Hofferbert (1988). Also, they did not include the results of the 1961 election.

Notes: Entries are t-values for multiple regression coefficients that were run with each of the six factors as the independent variable and the three social cleavages as independent variables.

[a] Multicolinearity was not detected for any of the independent variables. The largest value of the variance inflation factor (VIF) was 1.306. Multicolinearity is suspected if VIF exceeds 10.

[b] The White test (of first and second moment specification) rejected the null hypothesis (the presence of heteroscedasticity) for both regressions.

[c] One-tailed.

** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

nants of social cleavages in Turkey. Table III shows that religiosity, ethnicity, and sectarism were varyingly correlated with factors for the pre- and post-1980 voting patterns. The demographic data also showed that the relative distribution of social cleavages across provinces did not fundamentally change over time. It appears that the relative distribution of the logged Kurdish population by province, for instance, had remained very stable from 1965 to 1990 ($r = 0.8591$; $p < 0.0001$). Social cleavage data for the 1960s, such as the Alevi village data, would not appreciably mislead the inter-provincial analysis of electoral volatility in the 1990s. Similarly, previous studies treated social cleavages as a relatively long-term variable (the change of which is usually measured at intervals of one decade [Franklin 1992] or more [Bartolini and Mair 1990]).

IV. CLEAVAGES AND LONG-TERM VOLATILITY

Do social cleavages play an anchoring role in the electoral behavior in Turkey? Multiple regressions were run between the three social cleavages and each cleavage-type volatility that was standardized[25] and averaged out for the 1965–2002

[25] Standardization neutralized the variation of national electoral volatility from year to year. Volatility for each year thus had equal weight throughout the period under investigation.

TABLE IV

SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND CLEAVAGE-TYPE VOLATILITIES, 1965–2002 ($N = 67$)

Social Cleavages[a] (Independent Variables)	Cleavage-Type Volatilities[b] (Dependent Variable)		
	Left-Right	Systemic	VIF[c]
Sunni religiosity	–1.975*	2.835***	1.275
Kurdish ethnicity	1.882*	3.519***	1.239
Alevi sectarism	–3.844***	–0.258	1.064
Adjusted *R*-square	0.226	0.152	
F value	7.420***	4.943***	
White test:[d] $p <$ chi sq.	0.4757	0.8886	

Source: Calculated by the author from Appendix.

Note: Two multiple regressions were run. Entries are *t*-values for multiple regression coefficients.

[a] One pole of the social cleavage dimension. For instance, Sunni religiosity forms one end of the "devout Sunnis vs. others" cleavage dimension.

[b] Standardized period mean.

[c] Multicolinearity is suspected if the variance inflation factor (VIF) exceeds 10.

[d] The White test (of first and second moment specification) rejected the null hypothesis (the presence of heteroscedasticity) for both regressions.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

period. The results, shown in Table IV, revealed that (1) Sunni religiosity raised systemic volatility, (2) Kurdish ethnicity raised both left-right and systemic volatilities, and (3) Alevi sectarism reduced left-right volatility. These results seem to correspond to the political developments in Turkey for the last four decades.

First, the positive effect of Sunni religiosity on systemic volatility suggests that devout Sunni voters tend to shift their support from center-right parties to far-right (Islamic or nationalistic) parties and vice versa. In Turkey, most of the vote swings on the left-right dimension have been triggered by the emergence or decline of far-right parties such as the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Republican Peasant Nation Party, and the Nationalist Action Party during the pre-1980 period and the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party, the Justice and Development Party, the Happiness Party, the Nationalist Work Party, and the Nationalist Action Party, during the post-1980 period. The most significant split of the Turkish right, dominated until then by the Justice Party, arose when its religious conservatives formed the National Order Party, to be succeeded by the National Salvation Party. These parties represented the small bourgeoisie in Central Anatolia that increasingly felt neglected by the Justice Party representing the interests of large industrial capitalists (Ahmad 1977, p. 245).

In order to test the above interpretation, let us define (1) far-right volatility as the inter-bloc volatility between the far-right parties and the other parties and (2) far-left volatility as the inter-bloc volatility between the far-left parties and the other parties. Mean far-right/far-left volatility for the 1965–2002 period is used here as

the variable to be correlated with the Sunni-religiosity variable. The partial correlation analysis, applied to the above data with Kurdish ethnicity and Alevi sectarism controlled for, showed that Sunni religiosity was positively correlated with (period-mean) far-right volatility ($r = 0.284$, $p < 0.05$) but not with (period-mean) far-left volatility. In other words, the stronger the Sunni religiosity in the province, the more likely it is for religious or nationalistic parties to trigger electoral volatility.

Second, for the Kurdish ethnicity cleavage, no Kurdish party until 1990 had appealed to Kurdish ethnic identity. This lack of structural bondage to any political party, together with a significant size of bloc votes that Kurdish clans were able to mobilize, gave rise to large vote swings along both left-right and systemic dimensions. It has been claimed that Kurdish clans change support from one party to another depending on their own political and economic interests. Bruinessen (1992) using examples from Hakkari Province and Şırnak Municipality showed how clan rivalries affected voting practice in the Kurdish region. One alliance of clans would vote for one of the two rival parties while the other alliance would vote for the other party.[26] Clan leaders were sometimes elected as independents during the pre-1980 period (Özbudun 1976), when the electoral law allowed better chances for independents than during the post-1980 period.

Indeed, a cursory review of the pre-1980 electoral results indicated a significant size of bloc votes that local leaders were able to mobilize. There were more changes in the first party in the Kurd-populated provinces[27] than elsewhere (Table V). The results of the Wilcoxon test showed that the median number of defeats of the first party during the pre-1980 period was higher in the Kurd-populated provinces than in the other provinces ($Z = 2.8192$, $p < 0.0048$). This result does not necessarily contradict the assumption that the fewer seats[28] in the Kurd-populated (and sparsely populated) provinces than in the other provinces should give the incumbent representatives a greater advantage over their challengers.

Rather, more frequent changes in the first party *despite* the greater incumbent advantage in the Kurd-populated provinces than elsewhere, suggest that the incumbents, or the local power behind the incumbents, changed their support from one party to another.[29] For ideological fluidity in the Kurd-populated region, change of the first party in the Kurd-populated provinces reflected disarrays of parties, from

[26] Bruinessen (1992), see pp. 75–76 for Hakkari Province and pp. 313–14 for Şırnak Municipality.

[27] Kurdish-populated provinces were conventionally defined here as the provinces in which the Kurdish population accounted for more than 40 per cent of the total provincial population. The Turkish provinces classified by the percentage of the Kurdish population consist of two groups, one with a population below 30 per cent and the other with a population above 40 per cent.

[28] Under proportional representation in Turkey, the number of seats for the province is basically determined by the population size.

[29] In fact, the few cases of less frequent changes in the first party in the Kurdish-populated provinces are largely due to the reelection of independent candidates, which can seldom be found elsewhere. This fact confirms the incumbent advantage in the dominantly Kurdish provinces.

TABLE V

DEFEATS OF THE FIRST PARTY IN THE PROVINCE, 1965–77 ($N = 67$)

Population Kurdish (%)	N	Number of Defeats					
		0	1	2	3	4	Median
> 40	13	0	4	4	2	3	2
≦ 40	54	14	18	18	4	0	1
Total	67	14	22	22	6	3	1

Source: Calculated by the author from Appendix.
Note: $Z = 2.8192$; $p < 0.0048$ (Wilcoxon test for the difference between two medians).

TABLE VI

DEFEATS OF THE FIRST PARTY IN THE PROVINCE, 1991–2002 ($N = 67$)

Population Kurdish (%)	N	Number of Defeats					
		0	1	2	3	4	Median
> 40	13	1	3	4	4	1	2
≦ 40	54	0	5	6	30	13	3
Total	67	1	8	10	34	14	3

Source: Calculated by the author from Appendix.
Note: $Z = -2.7344$; $p < 0.0063$ (Wilcoxon test for the difference between two medians).

left to right and from large to small.[30] In particular, the first party of the province seldome coincided with the first party of the nation. In the other provinces, the patterns for the first party were more consistent. Their first parties either defied contenders or came and went due to the national electoral swing.

During the post-1980 period, however, bloc votes in the Kurd-populated region almost disappeared (Table VI). The results of the Wilcoxon test showed that the number of defeats of the first party in the province was *smaller* in the Kurd-populated region than elsewhere ($Z = -2.7344$, $p < 0.0063$). The pre-1980 tendency thus had been reversed, mainly due to the growing strength of the pro-Kurdish PDP/DPP that garnered consistent popular support since 1995, which will be discussed in the next section.

Third, the negative effect of Alevi sectarism on left-right volatility indicates the existence of a consistent Alevi support for secularist parties that are characterized as left. The Alevi sect of Islam in Turkey is known for its advocacy of secularism. Its creed, far from being bound to Islamic law (*sharia*), neither discriminates between men and women nor prohibits the consumption of alcohol. The Alevis have historically supported secular political parties as a protection against Sunni majority

[30] Tables of the first party by province during the 1961–2002 period are available from the author.

oppression. These secular parties consisted of the Republican People's Party (center-left), the Turkish Labor Party (far-left), the Turkish Union Party (far-left and pro-Alevi) during the pre-1980 period, the Social Democratic Populist Party/Republican People's Party (center-left) during the post-1980 period (Rustow 1991, p. 16; Schüler 1999, pp. 159–71; Bruinessen 1996, pp. 7–10; Ayata 1997). However, the Alevi vs. non-Alevi cleavage has not affected appreciably systemic volatility, since these secular parties included both pro-systemic (center-left) and anti-systemic (far-left) parties, as mentioned above.

V. CLEAVAGES AND SHORT-TERM VOLATILITY

The preceding long-term analysis showed, first, that left-right volatility increased by the Kurdish (ethnicity) cleavage but decreased by the Alevi (sectarism) cleavage. Second, systemic volatility increased by the Sunni (religiosity) cleavage as well as by the Kurdish (ethnicity) cleavage. Have these relationships been stable over the past four decades? Multiple regressions were run for each election between social cleavages and left-right volatility (Figure 3) as well as systemic volatility (Figure 4). These graphs seem to allow for both general and specific interpretations in terms of temporal changes in the relationship between cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities.

Generally, the pre-1980 period and the post-1980 period showed similar patterns. The positive (reinforcing) effect of cleavages on volatility was stronger in the second and/or third free election since each military intervention. In the subsequent elections, the effect of cleavages became either more weakly positive or insignificant,

Fig. 3. Left-Right Volatility and Social Cleavages 1965–2002 (N = 67)



Source: Calculated by the author from Appendix
Note: Entries are t-values for multiple regression coefficients. p (t = ±1.96) = 0.05.

Fig. 4. Systemic Volatility and Social Cleavages, 1965–2002 (N = 67)



Source: Calculated by the author from Appendix
Note: Entries are t-values for multiple regression coefficients. p (t = ±1.96) = 0.05.

or even negative. In other words, as elections were repeated, the party system seemed to become better able to accommodate and represent social cleavages. The most distinct examples of such elections were the last two elections in 1999 and 2002.

The last two elections, while being different from the other six cases, indicate a consolidating process for the Turkish party system. In both elections, first, left-right volatility was *reduced* (not increased) by the Sunni and Kurdish cleavages. Second, systemic volatility was *not* increased (either unaffected or even reduced) by either the Sunni or Kurdish cleavage. Third, the Alevi cleavage not only retained its stabilizing effect on left-right volatility but also more or less reduced *systemic* volatility. The emerging change in the relationships between cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities that became evident first in 1999, thus implies that the Turkish party system has become more anchored to major social cleavages than ever before.

Phenomenally speaking, the early 1990s saw the resurgence of the pro-Islamist party (Welfare Party/Virtue Party) and the emergence of the pro-Kurdish party (People's Labor Party, Democracy Party, and People's Democracy Party). Since the late 1990s, these parties have consolidated their electoral support from the provinces where Sunni religiosity and Kurdish ethnicity were strong, respectively. This electoral alignment took the form of the relative retreat of the Islamist party in the Kurd-populated provinces while concentrating its power in Central Anatolia where Sunni religiosity is strong. Since the late 1990s, Sunni religiosity and Kurdish ethnicity have thus each become more strongly associated with support for the Islamist party and the pro-Kurdish party, respectively, than before (Table VII). In the mean time, the center-left party with an Alevi constituency has renewed its strong reliance on the Alevi votes since the last half of the 1990s.

TABLE VII
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CLEAVAGES AND PARTY VOTES, 1987–2002 ($N = 67$)

Cleavage	Party Votes	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002
Religiosity	WP/VP/JDP+HP and NWP/NAP[a]	0.032	0.269**	0.234*	0.390***	0.507***
Ethnicity	SDPP/PDP[b]	—	0.468***	0.577***	0.615***	0.701***
Sectarism	SDPP/RPP[c]	0.503***	0.295**[d]	0.616***	0.669***	0.378***

Source: Calculated by the author from Appendix.
Notes: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients.
[a] The combined votes of (1) the pro-Islamic Welfare Party/Virtue Party/Justice and Development + Happiness Parties and (2) the nationalistic Nationalist Work Party/Nationalist Action Party. These parties appeal to religious voters though the former more strongly than the latter.
[b] For 1991, the Social Democratic Populist Party, which formed an electoral alliance with its splinter party, the People's Labor Party. For 1995 and 1999, the People's Democracy Party, which was formed after the successor to the People's Labor Party was disbanded. For 2002, Democratic People's Party, which was formed in anticipation of the abolition of its suc-cessor, the People's Democracy Party.
[c] For 1987 and 1991, the Social Democratic Populist Party and for 1995, 1999, and 2002, the Republican People's Party. It is true that part of the Alevi enclaves in Turkey, mainly those in Central Anatolia, overlap with strongholds of the Nationalist Work Party/Nationalist Action Party. But the correlation of the Alevi sectarism cleavage with SDPP/RPP votes was much stronger than its correlation with NWP/NAP votes. The latter relationship became statistically nonsignificant when the SDPP/RPP votes were controlled for. For all the post-1980 elections, DLP vote percentages and Alevi sectarism were not correlated at a statistically significant level.
[d] This temporary weakening in the correlation reflects the electoral alliance between the SDPP and the pro-Kurdish PLP. The DLP, the other center-left party, probably did not affect appreciably this relationship. While the DLP's vote percentage steadily rose from 1991 to 1999, the above relationship weakened only for 1991.
* $p < 0.10$.
** $p < 0.05$.
*** $p < 0.01$.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has shown that three major social cleavages in Turkey on the whole have increased cleavage-type volatility rather than reduced it during the last four decades. (1) Sunni religiosity raised systemic volatility and (2) Kurdish ethnicity raised both left-right and systemic volatilities while (3) Alevi sectarism reduced left-right volatility. These relationships, however, have changed over time. It appears that both during the pre-1980 (1961–77) period and the post-1980 (1987–2002) period, repeated elections since each civilian transition, had mitigated this general tendency by strengthening the ties between political parties and cleavage groups. Although the 1980 military intervention aborted the earlier development of party-cleavage nexus during the pre-1980 period, the post-1980 period has witnessed a stabilization

of the relationship between cleavages and political parties, especially since the late 1990s. In other words, social cleavages and the party system in Turkey seem to be heading for convergence.

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APPENDIX

DATA SOURCES AND COMPILATION

1. *Electoral Volatility and Party Votes*

Cited from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Elections of Representatives*, Ankara, various years.

2. *Social Cleavages: Large Minority Groups*

Cleavage strength was operationalized as follows.

Sunni religiosity was measured by the percentage of *imam-hatip lisesi* (clergy high school) junior students to the total junior high school students by province calculated from the SIS, *National Education Statistics: Formal Education, 1992–1993* (Ankara, 1995). It is true that statistics on *imam-hatip lisesi* or Koran school students as well as religious associations capture only the formal aspect of religiosity in Turkey.[a] The informal aspect of religiosity such as *tarikat* (Sufi) membership however, substantially overlaps with Kurdish ethnicity.[b] Thus, when a hierarchical linear model was run with Şeker's data on *tarikat* membership (by region) and Kurdish ethnicity (by province) as independent variables, the *tarikat* membership variable became a nonsignificant predictor of any inter-bloc volatility. It is thus more reasonable explicitly to treat formal religiosity as one of the three independent variables and then let the next Kurdish ethnicity variable implicitly reflect informal religiosity.

Kurdish ethnicity was measured by the logged percentage of the Kurdish population to the total population in a province as of 1965 and 1990. Mutlu[c] extrapolated the latter data from the former data and inter-provincial migration flows published

[a] Ahmet N. Yücekök, *Türkiye'de örgütlenmş dinin sosyo-ekonomik tabanı (1946–1968)* [The socioeconomic basis of organized religion in Turkey, 1946–1968]. Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, no. 323 (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1971); Şerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).

[b] Murat Şeker, "Türkiye'de tarikatlar" [Sufis in Turkey] [Ankara], [1998].

[c] Servet Mutlu, "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 4 (1996): 517–41.

by the SIS. (Since 1965, there have been no official statistics on mother tongues of the Turkish citizens.) On Mutlu's data, a logarithmic transformation was used to reduce the positive skew of the sample.[d] This step helps to bring possible heteroscedasticity under control. The 1965 statistic was used for the analysis of the pre-1980 period and the 1990 statistic for that of the post-1980 period. For the analysis of the entire period, the mean of the two statistics was used.

Alevi sectarism was measured by the log-transformed number of Alevi villages from the mid-1960s to the 1970s.[e] The author calculated the number of Alevi villages from various tables compiled by Andrews.[f] The major source of these tables is the Village Inventory Survey published in 1965 by the General Directorate of Rural Services. Since then, data that referred to the dominant ethnicity of the village have not been published. (The other sources are various village surveys by individual researchers.)

In twenty-one provinces, no Alevi villages were recorded. In most of these cases, such as Bolu, Bursa, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Hakkari, Kastamonu, Kocaeli, Rize, Sakarya, and Sinop, it appeared that there were really no or very few Alevi villages. In the other few cases, the Village Inventory Survey did not use the sectarian category that was used for other provinces. In these cases, the survey identified all the villages as Muslim villages. The lack of mention of Alevi villages in Çankırı and Muş, where a tangible proportion of the population is considered to consist of Alevis, makes one wonder whether authorities concerned avoided to supply this information due to the sensitivity of sectarian divisions in the province.[g]

In the current study, the lack of reporting was recorded as zero value for the following reasons. For the Alevi village data, intentional suppression of the Alevi identity of any village seemed relatively rare, except for about five provinces, or less than 10 per cent of the sample. A deletion of the provinces for which no Alevi villages were recorded thus would lead to a serious loss of information and, more specifically, to an overestimation of the number of Alevi villages.

[d] Rae R. Newton and Kjell Erik Rudestam, *Your Statistical Consultant: Answers to Your Data Analysis Questions* (Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage, 1999), pp. 173–77.

[e] In the process of transformation, a numerical value of one was added to the actual number of Alevi villages since a zero cannot be logged. The number of villages was not standardized by the total number of villages or the population in the province. Such standardization would overkill the original statistic.

[f] Peter Alford Andrews, ed., *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey* (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert, 1989).

[g] There is a solution to missing data problems in general. See Gary King, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve. "Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data," *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (2001): 49–69. Such a solution, however, is useful only when there are several variables in the data so that the missing value of any variable can be estimated from other variables that are more or less correlated with it. The problem for this study is that it is not certain whether the data were missing or had a zero value.

APPENDIX TABLE I

SOCIAL CLEAVAGE INDICES BY PROVINCE

No.	Province	Sunni Religiosity: *İmam-Hatip Lisesi* Students (%)	Kurdish Ethnicity: Kurdish Population (%)	Alevi Sectar-ism: No. of Alevi Villages	No.	Province	Sunni Religiosity: *İmam-Hatip Lisesi* Students (%)	Kurdish Ethnicity: Kurdish Population (%)	Alevi Sectar-ism: No. of Alevi Villages
1	Adana	6.74	0.02	14	35	İzmir	2.61	2.03	43
2	Adıyaman	10.63	0.03	93	36	Kars	4.00	2.17	125
3	Afyon	10.31	0.03	4	37	Kastamonu	19.01	2.27	0
4	Ağrı	14.47	0.04	0	38	Kayseri	10.35	3.34	22
5	Amasya	11.49	0.04	17	39	Kırklareli	1.11	4.70	25
6	Ankara	2.96	0.07	6	40	Kırşehir	5.15	3.80	1
7	Antalya	7.54	0.13	26	41	Kocaeli	7.43	6.61	0
8	Artvin	11.36	0.13	0	42	Konya	12.56	5.29	2
9	Aydın	4.84	0.14	18	43	Kütahya	11.98	3.98	0
10	Balıkesir	7.33	0.20	49	44	Malatya	5.40	4.22	223
11	Bilecik	8.28	0.22	4	45	Manisa	8.69	5.47	31
12	Bingöl	10.54	0.24	0	46	Kahramanmaraş	8.16	5.61	97
13	Bitlis	3.34	0.25	0	47	Mardin	1.90	7.32	0
14	Bolu	12.80	0.26	0	48	Muğla	8.39	11.73	12
15	Burdur	10.55	0.27	3	49	Muş	5.13	12.66	0
16	Bursa	12.03	0.58	0	50	Nevşehir	7.46	15.37	15
17	Çanakkale	11.10	0.61	3	51	Niğde	8.57	16.00	5
18	Çankırı	10.35	0.76	0	52	Ordu	15.47	17.20	46
19	Çorum	13.45	0.80	80	53	Rize	12.76	20.69	0
20	Denizli	8.10	1.26	10	54	Sakarya	12.86	19.74	0
21	Diyarbakır	2.47	1.71	8	55	Samsun	13.10	43.16	4
22	Edirne	2.65	1.05	6	56	Siirt	4.42	45.05	0
23	Elazğ	6.28	2.07	19	57	Sinop	17.24	47.84	0
24	Erzincan	6.89	2.10	218	58	Sivas	8.73	55.86	215
25	Erzurum	8.31	2.26	127	59	Tekirdağ	3.11	64.03	8
26	Eskişehir	3.71	1.28	4	60	Tokat	12.46	67.70	93
27	Gaziantep	6.52	2.81	83	61	Trabzon	11.54	70.45	3
28	Giresun	15.73	1.68	0	62	Tunceli	3.58	70.70	676
29	Gümüşhane	14.25	1.57	0	63	Şanlıurfa	8.49	72.78	2
30	Hakkari	11.36	1.82	0	64	Uşak	8.21	74.87	1
31	Hatay	5.65	1.63	84	65	Van	3.21	76.58	0
32	Isparta	13.45	1.75	23	66	Yozgat	12.04	78.78	55
33	İçel	5.76	1.77	15	67	Zonguldak	9.24	89.47	1
34	İstanbul	2.86	3.89	0					

Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix.

APPENDIX TABLE II

POLITICAL PARTIES FOR THE 1961–77 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Party Acronym	Foundation (Split from) / Succession	Abolition[a] (Merged into)	Ideology: L = left, R = right, P = pro-, A = anti-systemic	Incumbent Elections[b]
DP	1973 (JP)		R-P (Center-right)	
JP	1961		R-P (Center-right)	1969, 1973[c] 1977
NP	1962 (RPNP)		R-P (Conservative)	
NOP/NSP	1970/1972	1971	R-A (Religious)	1977
NTP	1961	1973 (JP)	R-P (Center-right)	
RP/RRP	1967 (RPP) / 1973		R-P (Center-right)	1977
RPNP/NAP	1958/1969		R-A (Nationalist)	1977
RPP	1923		L-P (Center-left)	1965
TLP	1961/1975	1971	L-A (Marxist)	
TUP	1966		L-A (Alevi)	
Ind.			R-P (Conservative)	

Source: Compiled by the author from Frank Tachau, ed., *Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994).

Note: DP = Democratic Party, JP = Justice Party, NOP/NSP = National Order Party/National Salvation Party, NP = Nation Party, NTP = New Turkey Party, RP/RRP = Reliance Party/ Republican Reliance Party, RPNP/NAP = Republican People's Nation Party/Nationalist Action Party, RPP = Republican People's Party, TLP = Turkish Labor Party, TUP = Turkish Unity Party, Ind. = Independents.

[a] Abolition by the Constitutional Court. All the political parties were disbanded in 1981 following the military intervention.

[b] Defined as an election until which the party stayed in government for more than one year.

[c] Excluding the above-party government during the 1971–73 period.

APPENDIX TABLE III

POLITICAL PARTIES FOR THE 1987–2002 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Party Acronym	Foundation (Split from) / Succession	Abolition[a] (Merged into)	Ideology: L = left, R = right, P = pro-, A = anti-systemic	Incumbent Elections[b]
DLP	1985		L-P (Center-left)	2002
HP	2001 (VP)		R-A (Religous)	
JDP	2001 (VP)		R-A (Religious)	
MP	1983		R-P (Center-right)	1987, 1991, 1999, 2002
NWP/NAP	1983/1993[c]		R-A (Nationalist)	2002
PDP/DPP	1995/1997[d]		L-A (Kurdish)	
SDPP/RPP	1985/1992		L-P (Center-left)	1995
TPP	1983		R-P (Center-right)	1995
WP/VP	1983/1997	1998, 2001	R-A (Religious)	1999
YP	2002		R-A (Nationalist)	

Source: Same as for Appendix Table II.

Note: DLP = Democratic Left Party, DPP = Democratic People's Party, HP = Happiness Party, JDP = Justice and Development Party, MP = Motherland Party, NWP/NAP = Nationalist Work Party/Nationalist Action Party, PDP = People's Democracy Party, SDPP/RPP = Social Democratic Populist Party/Republican People's Party, TPP = True Path Party, WP/VP = Welfare Party/Virtue Party, YP = Youth Party.

[a] Abolition by the Constitutional Court.

[b] Defined as an election until which the party stayed in government for more than one year.

[c] Change of name.

[d] Although the DPP was formed in 1997 in anticipation of the abolition of the PDP, the PDP was not disbanded until 2003. The PDP thus ran for the 1995 and 1999 general elections. For growing fear of abolition, it did not take part in the 2002 general election (See an interview with the party chairman, Murat Bozlak, in *Milliyet* [Istanbul Daily], October 21, 2002). Instead the DPP ran, in alliance with two small parties, one leftist and the other center-left.

APPENDIX

GENERAL ELECTION

Year	Registered Voters	Actual Voters and Rate	Valid Ballots Cast	JP	RPP	RRP	RPNP
1961	12,925,395	10,522,716	10,138,035	3,527,435	3,724,752	–	1,415,390
		(81.4)		(34.8)	(36.7)	–	(14.0)
1965	13,679,753	9,748,678	9,307,563	4,921,235	2,675,785	–	208,696
		(71.3)		(52.9)	(28.7)	–	(2.2)
1969	14,788,552	9,516,035	9,086,296	4,229,712	2,487,006	597,818	–
		(64.3)		(46.5)	(27.4)	(6.6)	–
1973	16,798,164	11,223,843	10,723,658	3,197,897	3,570,583	564,343	–
		(66.8)		(29.8)	(33.3)	(5.3)	–
1977	21,207,303	15,358,210	14,827,172	5,468,202	6,136,171	277,713	–
		(72.4)		(36.9)	(41.4)	(1.9)	–

Year	Registered Voters	Actual Voters and Rate	Valid Ballots Cast	WP/VP/ JDP	TPP	MP	DLP
1983	19,767,366	18,238,362	17,351,510	–	–	7,833,148	–
		(92.3)		–	–	(45.1)	–
1987	26,376,926	24,603,541	23,971,629	1,717,425	4,587,062	8,704,335	2,044,576
		(93.3)		(7.2)	(19.1)	(36.3)	(8.5)
1991	29,979,123	25,157,089	24,416,666	4,121,355	6,600,726	5,862,623	2,624,301
		(83.9)		(16.9)	(27.0)	(24.0)	(10.8)
1995	34,155,981	29,101,469	28,126,993	6,012,450	5,396,009	5,527,288	4,118,025
		(85.2)		(21.4)	(19.2)	(19.6)	(14.6)
1999	37,495,217	32,656,070	31,184,496	4,805,381	3,745,417	4,122,929	6,919,670
		(87.1)		(15.4)	(12.0)	(13.2)	(22.2)
2002	41,407,027	32,768,161	31,528,783	10,808,229	3,008,942	1,618,465	384,009
		(79.1)		(34.3)	(9.5)	(5.1)	(1.2)

Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix.
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages.

TABLE IV
RESULTS, 1961–2002

Political Parties, 1961–77							
DP	NP	NAP	NSP	TUP	TLP	NTP	Ind.
–	–	–	–	–	–	1,391,934	81,732
–	–	–	–	–	–	(13.7)	(0.8)
–	582,704	–	–	–	276,101	346,514	296,528
–	(6.3)	–	–	–	(3.0)	(3.7)	(3.2)
–	292,961	275,091	–	254,695	243,631	197,929	511,023
–	(3.2)	(3.0)	–	(2.8)	(2.7)	(2.2)	(5.6)
1,275,502	62,377	362,208	1,265,771	121,759	–	–	303,218
(11.9)	(0.6)	(3.4)	(11.8)	(1.1)	–	–	(2.8)
274,484	–	951,544	1,269,918	58,540	20,565	–	370,035
(1.9)	–	(6.4)	(8.6)	(0.4)	(0.1)	–	(2.5)

Political Parties, 1983–2002								
SDPP/ RPP	PDD/ DPP	NWP/ NAP	PP	RDP	NDP	YP	Other Parties	Ind.
–	–	–	5,285,804	–	4,036,970	–	–	195,588
–	–	–	(30.5)	–	(23.3)	–	–	(1.1)
5,931,000	–	701,538	–	196,272	–	–	–	89,421
(24.8)	–	(2.9)	–	(0.8)	–	–	–	(0.4)
5,066,571	–	–	–	–	–	–	108,369	32,721
(20.8)	–	–	–	–	–	–	(0.4)	(0.1)
3,011,076	1,171,623	2,301,343	–	–	–	–	455,284	133,895
(10.7)	(4.2)	(8.2)	–	–	–	–	(1.6)	(0.5)
2,716,094	1,482,196	5,606,583	–	–	–	–	1,515,961	270,265
(8.7)	(4.7)	(18.0)	–	–	–	–	(4.9)	(0.9)
6,113,352	1,960,660	2,635,787	–	–	–	2,285,598	2,399,490	314,251
(19.4)	(6.2)	(8.4)	–	–	–	(7.2)	(7.6)	(1.0)