

## BOOK REVIEWS

JOHN J. JOHNSON (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962, viii+427 p.

The governments of many of the newer countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, generally referred to as developing countries, some of which are not regarded as newly-risen nations, are dominated or guided by the military. What are the circumstances which have brought about this situation: are they only of a transitory nature, what are their significance and what of the future? These are some of the important questions which naturally come to mind when the countries of Southeast Asia, and especially when such neighbouring countries as Korea, with which Japan has important connections, are considered. It is regrettable that Japanese political scientists have not yet given these questions the attention they deserve.

The book under review, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* edited by John J. Johnson, a consultant of the Rand Corporation, is the book to answer these questions. Besides, its academic value is enhanced by including articles which compare and contrast the political institutions of the so-called underdeveloped regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the aspects of military government in each country or region. The two articles, one entitled "The Military in the Political Development of the New States" by Edward Shils and the other, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" by Lucian W. Pye are of the greatest importance in this connection, because they are the theoretical studies which make possible this comparison of political institutions. Of course, the value of the book as a whole lies in the fact that it treats the problems of the military regimes against the background and circumstances of each region and nation. However, the part under review is devoted mainly to general observations based on the comparison of institutions.

The book was compiled as a result of study meetings held in Santa Monica, California, under the sponsorship of the Rand Corporation during the summer of 1959. As Hans Speier, chairman of the Research Committee of the Rand Corporation, states in the Introduction, "Modern social science has made no serious and sustained effort to study the role of the military in the underdeveloped countries on a comparative basis. We lack a social typology of soldiers. We have little knowledge of the extent to which the military are committed to ideas of industrialization and free political institutions." (p.v.) In these circumstances the efforts of the writers of the articles in the book in trying to clarify these important problems are of special value.

The reviewer must admit that his knowledge is limited to the part the Japanese military played in Japan's history since the Meiji Restoration, and consequently cannot compare Japan's experiences with the cases dealt with

in this book. It is hoped that such a comparison will be the subject of future studies, but this review will merely deal with a few points which have interested the reviewer, especially in the studies made by Sils and Pye.

The general purpose of the book itself must be, presumably, what the institutional comparison aims at. That is, to discover the reasons why these military regimes came into being to clarify the political characteristics of these regimes, and to examine whether or not there are any other political institutions which could replace them. The final objective is to find out whether these regimes can bridge the gap until a free and democratic government can be established. A special effort seems to have been made to discover whether military regimes can establish strong, stabilized, honest and efficient administrations which can prevent these countries deteriorating into communitistic oligarchies.

The reason why the writers lay such stress on this point is because in the new nations created since the World War II, and also in the Latin American countries, much influenced by the French Revolution, democratic parliamentary traditions do not exist. Repeated political changes, brought about by corruption and inefficiency, invite the political intervention or takeover by the military. These countries lack the conditions which encourage stable democratic parliamentary institutions, or even a political society, i.e., the sense of identity between the governing and the governed in some form or another. Although there were no democratic representative political institutions in the Meiji Government in Japan there was a constitutional monarchy, which enabled a kind of spiritual sense of identity between the Emperor and his people. What is important is whether or not there is a political regime which can meet the demands of the people for industrialization of their country and modernization of their living conditions under some kind of benevolent association, but, by these standards the regimes set up now in these countries can by no means be called truly democratic parliamentary institutions. The question is, then, can a military regime, which is a modern oligarchical government, meet the needs of the people? This would depend upon the character and the ability of the military leaders, and their attitudes would naturally be determined by their social outlook. Whether or not they will lead the way to democratic parliamentary institutions does not depend upon whether they are mostly middle-class representatives from rural areas, or whether they have received a better education in modern technology and organized training than other classes or whether their livelihood has been assured, or whether they have become worldly-wise. For they still lack something—they lack the touch of the common people. Therefore, although they may be a stabilizing force in politics this must not be confused with stabilizing the lives of the masses, or the nation. Both Sils and Pye place great stress on this point. Therefore, even though the military may be competent as political elites, whether they can lead their countries towards democratic parliamentary institutions depends upon whether they recognize the existence and activities of an opposition, and do not discriminate against

them. It depends also on whether they recognize administrative systems managed by public servants, and freedom of speech, the press and academic studies. Unless they do, they will only drive the people, an inseparable element in democratic government, to political indifference and escapism. The gap between those who rule and those who are ruled in these countries is already wide and deep. The moot point is whether the military, in their role of champions of their countries, can bridge this gap. (*Masanichi Rōyama*)

L.J. WALINSKY, *Economic Development in Burma, 1951-60*, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962, xxvii+680 p.

Problems pertaining to economic development in Burma have been reviewed and examined to a certain degree in literature already published. However, minute and systematic study on the subject seems to be lacking. L.J. Walinsky's current work, however, largely fills that void.

Walinsky is vice-president of Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., an economic consultant service in the United States. He went to Burma when his firm participated in the Eight-Year Plan (Pyidawtha Plan) of economic development in Burma, as a member of KTA (Knappen Tippets Abbett Engineering Co.) in 1951. Having finished preparing for the Plan, he remained in Burma until 1960 as Chief Economic Adviser to the Burmese Government. Therefore he was able to help blue-print the Eight-Year Plan, and also observe the process of its implementation. His knowledge of economic development in Burma is both comprehensive and detailed. In his book, Walinsky details his knowledge systematically, clarifying the whole picture of economic development in Burma, and pointing out very shrewdly the problems which underlie it.

The first part of the book deals with natural conditions in Burma, and her history until independence. The second part discusses factors which influenced the formation of the Eight-Year Plan and its content. The third and the fourth parts examine the working-out of the whole Plan and individual projects. The fifth part enumerates problems involved in the Plan, and the sixth part deals with the lessons of past experience and how they could influence the future development of Burma or other newly-independent countries. It also discusses the development of aid policies of Western countries.

Since there is not sufficient space to introduce the contents of all parts of the book, the reviewer will omit the items which could be found in other literature, and will examine a few observations which Walinsky alone could make.

As is well known, the Eight-Year Plan covered the period from 1952 to 1960. The target was to raise the GNP from K371 crores for 1950-51, to K700 crores by the end of the 1959-60 period, estimated at the basic year prices. The KTA team which was responsible for the formation of the Plan calcu-