

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO JAPAN MADE BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

—Source Materials: *The People's Daily* in two periods in 1958—

SHINKICHI ETŌ and TATSUMI OKABE

Introduction—the Questions Posed

We have long been confronted by two problems.

1. Is it possible to exclude value judgements in social science? Or, speaking in a rather exaggerated way, can social science overcome the differences of religious and political points of view, and seek universal logic or truth? This has been one of the biggest problems ever since the time of Plato, and is still under active discussion. Social scientists in Japan have generally accepted the idea that subjective bias is inherent in social science. Many revolutionaries and radicals have even argued that it is only by viewing from a certain standpoint that the traditional pseudo-social science or traditional "studies which serve the interests of the ruling class only" can be overthrown. Especially, in the case of China's problems, in which the Japanese people have had, and will have, a significant political interest, it is disturbing to find that the same phenomenon has frequently been interpreted in quite opposite ways, and that very "political" statements have been regarded as if they were detached and "scholarly" analyses.

In the history of natural science, mankind took 300 years and much bloodshed to separate natural science from religious values. Today, although it seems as if natural science is completely detached from political values, in some areas political standpoints still intrude into natural scientific judgements. The Michurin controversy and the recent controversy in Japan regarding the safety of American A-submarines are both cases in point. Even in the fields of natural science things happen this way, not to mention the social sciences. But, are we to

resign ourselves to the admission that the "intervening" of political and ideological values in the analysis of social phenomena is inevitable?

It can be accepted that any investigator is human and is apt to be swayed emotionally. But it is a matter for commendation that, in human cultural history, these very human weaknesses and passions have often produced works of great value. It must also be admitted that these above-mentioned "human" values are very important in man's daily life. In spite of these considerations, we believe that the analyses of social phenomena must be cold and "objective" in a true sense. We are, of course, fully aware that, because of these failings of researchers, it is impossible to exclude "completely" the "intervening" of values other than scientific ones in scientific analysis. Still, it is hoped that it will be possible to find a more developed analysis than we have now.

Max Weber once advocated *Askese* (restraint) among scholars in order to make the "objectivity" of social science possible. *Askese*, meaning that researchers discipline themselves in their studies within the range of the analysis of *Sein*, rather than discussing *Sollen*, is no doubt quite important for any researcher. We should try to prevent the intervention of political values in research by keeping *Askese* always in mind. At the same time, we would like, as well as resorting to the *Askese* of our will, to have some methodological devices for excluding *Willkür* as much as possible in dealing with the objects. Is there any "method" of analysing social phenomena which will produce the same conclusion, once the method is used by no matter who—Mao Tse-tung or Goldwater—just like "experiments" in natural science?

This awareness of ours of the problems has been the main factor which has made us decide to use the method of "content analysis" as an experiment. The "content analysis" technique, of course, owes its origins and has been developed in a so-called capitalist society. Hence, some may argue that the method itself should be rejected because it is capitalistic, imperialistic and, therefore, non-proletarian. This kind of criticism is not worthy of consideration. Reason cannot move those who hold such views. They are just like the chauvinists of the early Meiji era who believed that even the passing under a telegraph wire would taint their divine blood by the foulness of Western barbarians. For them, no rational persuasion was effective.

We, however, have never believed that "content analysis" is a specific for excluding political value judgements. Neither do we assume without thought that "perfect objectivity" can be achieved when man

analyses the phenomena of human society. We denied such an assumption in our previous discussion. Just as will be shown later, we believe that we ourselves are quite aware of the limitations of "content analysis." We merely believe that the method may be better than the traditional, impressionistic analysis, and that such an adventurous experiment may at least provide some basis for developing new methods by better endowed researchers in the future. This is the desire that makes us publish this paper.

2. Is it possible to infer the latent real intentions or motives of the communicator from his published or manifest communication, such as "formal wordings," "bluffed firmness" and "abstract expressions of assumed indifference?" This is the second question with which we are confronted. In personal relationships, conflicts, hatred and unfavourable feelings, as well as love and affection, are often caused by misunderstandings. In inter-state relationships, laws similar to those of personal relationships operate. Here, most of the friendly or hostile relationships are caused by misunderstandings about the real intentions and motives of the other party. It has now been accepted as a fact in historical circles that, in the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain had the intention of having Japan play the role of a watchdog in East Asia vis-à-vis Tsarist Russia. But it is doubtful that many Japanese in 1902 correctly understood this intention. The situation on the eve of the opening of the Pacific War was another case in point. It is doubtful to what extent the United States correctly appreciated that, in 1941, the Imperial Government of Japan, while taking seemingly firm attitudes compelled by the circumstances and domestic considerations, was, in fact, anxiously searching for a way of saving the situation short of war. On the other hand, it is also very doubtful that many Japanese understood how the stationing of Japanese troops in Southern French Indo-China provoked American and British antagonism, and that the stimulus was strong enough to make the U. S. place a petroleum embargo on Japan. After the embargo was laid, there arose within the Japanese Navy voices urging an adventurous action while there still existed freedom of action, rather than awaiting the exhaustion of their stocks of oil. In this case, too, if techniques of coldly analysing the U. S. statements had existed, Japan could have inferred that the United States had not established any firm, long-range policy for annihilating Japan after the exhaustion of her stocks of oil. If this had been comprehended, it might have been possible to avoid that vicious circle in which Japan, having once committed herself to a course

of action, uselessly pressed forward with her war preparations and, in turn, caused the U.S. to stiffen its attitudes, and thus destroying the chances of saving the situation. Thus mutual distrust and international tensions can often result through the inability of parties to make accurate inferences.

In spite of this, the traditional way to infer the real intentions and motives of another party has been only by the idiosyncratic intuitions and preconceptions of each investigator. Even today, methods of investigation seem to remain unchanged. The techniques of creation, manipulation, and communication of information have developed to an amazing degree since the 19th century, and an enormous amount of information reaches us through mass media. However, the development of techniques to collate and analyse this enormous amount of information lags very much behind. In fact, many of those concerned with the policy-making process resort to home-made analysis, derived from their own idiosyncratic intuitions and preconceptions. Needless to say, among those decision-makers and experts there may be several "real experts" who can analyse deeply and correctly by reading between the lines. But there are great difficulties in discovering the "real experts" among the mediocre ones, and it is also very doubtful that methods of analysis of the real experts can be taught systematically to others.

We have been groping for the possibility of excluding intuitions and preconceptions from the "inference" by developing some scientific techniques of information analysis. "Content analysis" in the sense we are using here is an experimental method of analysis which we found as a result of our groping. Of course, content analysis cannot be a panacea for the problem. As we are going to mention later, there are limitations to the content analysis technique itself. Furthermore, if content analysis is a technique of analysing the communication of another part, a technique of analysing the behaviour of this party should be developed at the same time. The behaviour of a government or a nation follows trends and rules, just as personal behaviour. Simulation will be very useful in its analysis. As Mr. Hiroharu Seki informed Japan in the July-August issue of *Gaimushō Chōsa Geppō* (Monthly Research Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), an international simulation among abstract N countries is being experimented in Northwestern University of the United States. We are more interested in concretely simulating the forty-years' history of the Chinese Communist Party, rather than a simulation experiment among abstract nations, an endeavour which has strong inclinations towards

play and theory. By that kind of simulation, we would like to analyse China both by content analysis and simulation.

In short, although we are amply aware of the limitations of content analysis and the need of using other methods together with it, we have dared to grapple with it as a first step of developing techniques of "inference."

It is easy to raise the banner of propaganda and boast that this will be the special technique of information analysis in the coming years, but we would like to continue, patiently and quietly, the work of studying the history of the Chinese Communists, reading and listening to what they say in the original Chinese.

I. ON "CONTENT ANALYSIS"

Content analysis is defined as "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication"¹ or as "the counting or measuring of features of a text"² in order to infer latent factors which may slip the reader's attention when just reading the document. This technique was originally developed in the field of journalism or communication research. The application of this technique to the study of foreign policy was first experimented in Britain and the United States during the Second World War when the propaganda of the Axis powers was analysed. Recently, a research project studying international conflicts using content analysis is now being carried with ample funds, under the direction of Prof. Robert North of Stanford University.³

Until a few years ago, the main method of content analysis was frequency analysis. This method is now called "classic" content analysis by researchers who advocate newer methods.⁴ This is a method which tries to clarify the focus, intensity, and direction of attention of the communicators by counting the frequency of symbols or assertions and classifying the directions of the presentation. "Assertion," mentioned

¹ Bernard Berelson, "Content Analysis," in Gardner Lindsay ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. I, Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954, p. 489.

² Ithiel S. Pool, "Trends in Content Analysis Today: A Summary," in Ithiel S. Pool ed., *Trends in Content Analysis*, Urbana, The University of Illinois Press, 1959, p. 193.

³ Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti, M. George Zaninovich and Dina A. Zinnes eds., *Content Analysis, a handbook with application for the study of international crisis*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1963.

⁴ Charles E. Osgood, "The Representational Model and Relevant Research Method," in *Trends in Content Analysis*, p. 37.

here, is variously called "statement," "theme," etc. It is, in short, the smallest unit of meaningful assertion on certain subjects. In the "traditional way of analysis," which usually resorts to personal intuitions and impressions, impressions derived by reading materials can be quite different according to the manner of reading. If a man judges that a certain part is the most important in the whole document, it is doubtful whether the part is really most "representative" of the whole.¹ In this traditional way, there is a danger of overlooking "non-dramatic evidence" and of focussing attention quite arbitrarily on untypical, exceptional cases.² The frequency analysis was developed in order to make up the weak points of the traditional way and to achieve "objectivity, precision and generality."³

The underlying assumption of this classic content analysis "is that the greater the source's interest in a given topic, the greater will be the relative frequency with which lexical items associated with this topic are produced."⁴ Roughly speaking, it is true that frequency is empirically useful as an index of intensity of attention."⁵ For example, the conversational topics of a researcher who is devoted to the study of the Manchurian incident are apt to concentrate on the incident. One who falls in love may have a tendency to be tempted to talk about his love. However, a further consideration may provide a different picture. Even in the case of a researcher who is devoted to the study of the Manchurian incident, it is doubtful if he frequently mentions the Manchurian incident when he talks at faculty meetings. It will also be very difficult to infer the fact and the object of a man's love from his utterances in his office. That is to say, theoretically speaking, frequency is only one means among many of inferring the psychological states of the objects. Viewed in this way, it may not be possible to deny that frequency analysis has its inherent limitations. Secondly, the classic content analysis is criticized on the ground that, by quantifying and precisioning, it proves only those facts which can be quite easily determined by traditional methods. Harold D. Lasswell, who developed

1 Harold D. Lasswell, "Why Be Quantitative," in H. D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites and Associates, *Language of Politics*, New York, George W. Stewart, Publisher Inc., 1949, pp. 42-46.

2 B. Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1952, p. 119.

3 H. D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and I. S. Pool, *Comparative Study of Symbols*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1952, p. 31.

4 I. S. Pool ed., *Trends in Content Analysis*, p. 37.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 196.

a new area of applying frequency analysis to politics, himself admitted that there was a danger of seeking nothing but a quantified precision that is not needed and is unusable.¹ Thirdly, another limitation of frequency analysis also lies in the fact that there is no clear method of inferring "antecedent conditions"² ("antecedent conditions" mean the factors which help determine the content of the communication and include intentions, motives, estimates of the situation and propaganda goals, etc.) such as intentions and motives of the communicators from frequency analysis of manifest content. There can be two types of inferences—"direct" and "inverse." The "direct type" is an inference in which the manifest content is taken at face value. The "inverse type" is an inference which assumes that the communicated content is manipulated by the communicator. Of course, even in "inverse type," verbal inversion is rather rare. In most cases, inversion is partial. Needless to say, there can be various combinations of partial inversion. In some cases, most of the content can be taken at face value with a small portion interpreted inversely. In other cases, the manifest content can be taken at face value, but, the parts in which the communicator is reluctant to speak of frankly because of various considerations may have been omitted from the content. In any case, no matter how precise the frequency analysis becomes,³ we must use the traditional way of resorting to intuitions and experiences to judge what types of communication will be chosen under what circumstances.

Two major efforts which try to overcome the above-mentioned limitations of classic content analysis have been attempted. The first denies the usefulness of precision by quantification, and tries to elevate the analysis to a more useful level by returning to a more traditional analysis. The discussion of Alexander George is typical of this trend. George, after considering the studies of Nazi propaganda in the Second World War, contends that, to infer the intentions of a given communicator at a given moment, "qualitative analysis" or "non-frequency analysis" would be better.⁴ George further argues that, to infer antecedent conditions from content characteristics, the presence or absence of a certain characteristic, and not the frequency, is important, and that the precision and objectivity of the inference can be achieved by clarifying the logic of inferences.⁵

1 H. D. Lasswell et al., *Comparative Study of Symbols*, p. 47.

2 Alexander George, *Propaganda Analysis*, Evanston, Row Peterson, 1959.

3 B. Berelson, "Content Analysis," p. 518.

4 A. George, op. cit., pp. 77-81, 96-105.

The first assumption of George's argument is that political communication is an "instrument" of policy and is necessarily manipulated in some way or other by the communicator. Based on this assumption he rejects the "direct method" of inference which connects the frequency with the antecedent conditions. George's method is called the "indirect method" and tries to clarify the "precise intended meaning" of the content by taking into account both the situational context (who, whom, under what circumstances) and the behavioural context (the purpose or objective which the specific communication is designed to achieve) about the content characteristics. Thus, the inferences about propaganda strategy or propaganda goal are made first and then, on the basis of a "logic-of-the-situation" inferences about policy or intention of the decision-makers, their estimate of the situation and the objective situation which they face is made.¹

This kind of analytical method which assumes that the communication is an "instrument" of policy and is manipulated by the communicator is called the "instrumental approach." By adopting this method, most of the criticized defects of frequency analysis will be overcome. However, if you deny, as George did, quantified analysis and the limiting of analysis to manifest content, there arises a danger of mass intervention of subjective bias in the process of inference. Further, his argument may lead to the diminution of precision and objectivity which "content analysis" has been seeking, and to the reducing of chances of developing newer techniques of content analysis. When Harold D. Lasswell said, "There is clearly no reason for content analysis unless the question one wants answered is quantitative,"² he meant that a non-quantified or instrumental approach was not enough to be called "content analysis." Similarly, Berelson proposes to call such qualitative analysis "content assessment," as distinguished from "content analysis" which centres on quantification.³ If a consistent task all through the development of the content analysis technique has been "an effort to make the results of content analysis independent from the subjective bias of the analysts,"⁴ George's method does not

⁵ Cf. A. George, "Quantitative and Qualitative Approach to Content Analysis," in *Trends in Content Analysis*.

¹ A. George, *Propaganda Analysis*, Parts I & II.

² H. D. Lasswell et al., *Comparative Study of Symbols*, p. 45.

³ B. Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1952, p. 128.

⁴ Hajime Ikeuchi, "Naiyō-Bunseki no Hōhō ni tsuite" (On the Method of Content Analysis), *Tokyo-Daigaku Shimbun Kenkyū Kiyō* (The Bulletin of the Institute of

seem to correspond to the main current.

Does this mean that we should throw away the instrumental inference in communication analysis as too risky a method? Never. All communication, from our daily utterances to official statements of the government of a nation, has an instrumental aspect. Especially in analysing political statements, this aspect is really important. Therefore, whether George's method is denied or not, it is necessary to make instrumental inferences in some way or other. In this case, it is not only entirely possible, but necessary to combine quantified analysis with instrumental approach and to compensate each other.¹

A second method of overcoming the weakness of frequency analysis is by employing more precise means of analysis using methods of quantification other than frequency. The method of Charles E. Osgood is typical. He confines his object of analysis to "manifest content." His assumption in this is that content characteristics can be the cues of clarifying the psychological states or latent intentions of the communicator. This kind of thinking is called "representational" as compared to the above-mentioned "instrumental approach." Of course, it is impossible to assume that all the psychology and thought of the communicator will be included, as it is, in his statements. It may be, however, also impossible for a communicator to manipulate his communication 100%, and to conceal completely what he feels or thinks. Hence, it seems that human communication can hardly be an undecipherable cipher. In this sense, the messages of the communicator "represent" what he feels or thinks.

On the basis of this assumption, Osgood developed a method of evaluative assertion analysis which was designed to replace frequency analysis. He noticed that "a dominant aspect of the meaning of most concepts" is "nearly always evaluation—in other words, an evaluative like-dislike, favourable-unfavourable, goodbad reaction . . ."² If we call this semantic aspect "attitude," the "attitude" will necessarily influence the evaluative presentation of assertions, although there may not always

Journalism, the University of Tokyo), No. 3, 1954.

¹ See I. S. Pool, *Trends in Content Analysis*, p. 52, p. 129 note. Also see Tatsumi Okabe, "Naiyō-Bunseki ni yoru Chūkyō Taigai-Seisaku no Kenkyū" (A Study of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy by Content Analysis), *Aziya Kenkyū* (Asiatic Studies), Vol. 10, No. 4 (Jan., 1964), Tokyo, Aziya Seikei Gakkai (Society for Asian Political and Economic Studies).

² I. S. Pool, *Trends in Content Analysis*, p. 40. Also see C. E. Osgood, George J. Suci and Percy C. Tannenbaum, *Measurement of Meaning*, Urbana, The University of Illinois Press, 1957, pp. 72-73.

be causal relations between attitude and the frequency of symbols or assertions used. This influence can be quantified by measuring the intensity of evaluation, and those assertions which have to do with the "attitude" are graded on a seven-stage scale from +3 to -3, according to the direction and the intensity of evaluation.¹ This is an extension of interests represented in his work on the semantic differential which he developed to measure meaning. It is said that, by using this method, those factors which were not measurable by frequency analysis can be measured.

In evaluative assertion analysis, the messages are first broken up into assertion forms. Assertions usually include "attitude object" (the object of evaluation), "connector" (verbs, auxiliary verbs) and "common meaning evaluator." The grading of evaluation from +3 to -3 will be given both to connectors and common meaning evaluators of all the assertions which include a certain "attitude object," according to direction and intensity of evaluation. The average grade of the attitude object is the value gained by dividing the sum of the product column of the grades of connector and common meaning evaluator for each assertion by the absolute sum of its connector column.² Osgood tried to measure precisely the intensity of evaluation of communication content by this complicated method. This method, though it makes up for some of the shortcomings of the classic content analysis has, in its turn, some other shortcomings. Such as, for example, the envolved intricacy of the whole method and the difficulty of setting a criterion for grading. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that this method is one of the most effective ways of analysis at the present level of development of content analysis technique. The Stanford project, mentioned earlier, adopts q-sort and pair-comparison techniques together with the evaluative assertion analysis.³ In our analysis, however, because of the diversities of research funds, usable labour, and research objectives, we did not follow the Stanford methods.

We have made the evaluative assertion analysis applicable by modifying the shortcomings of complicated procedure and simplifying as much as possible. At the same time, we have used classic frequency analysis and instrumental analysis together, when they are effective. This is the basic attitude by which we have tried the following analysis

1 C. E. Osgood, Sol Saporta and Jum C. Nunnally, "Evaluative Assertion Analysis," *Litera*, Vol. 3, 1956.

2 C. E. Osgood et al., "Evaluative Assertion Analysis," pp. 91-92.

3 R. C. North et al., *Content Analysis*.

of Chinese Communist statements dealing with Japan.

II. ANALYTICAL METHOD OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH

The objectives of our analysis are to infer and find; (a) what kind of estimate of the situation in Japan the Chinese Communists are alleged to have made, (b) what kind of image or evaluation of each party and group in Japan the Chinese Communists are alleged to have made, and (c) what were, in the end, the real estimates of the situations, and images or evaluations of each party and group in Japan on the part of the Peking Government.

In order to achieve these objectives, we selected *The People's Daily* as the object of analysis. The reason for this is, needless to say, that it is the organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party "is the vanguard and the highest form of class organization of the Chinese working class" (the first phrase of the Party Constitution), and as the People's Republic of China "is led by the working class" (Article 1 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China), the Chinese Communist Party is actually leading the Peking Government. It is a well-known fact that not only institutionally defined as above, but, operationally, the Party and the Government are one and the same. Therefore, *The People's Daily* is under the direct control of the centre of the decision-making organization of the Peking Government. It is said that when dealing with some important problems the top decision-makers themselves often write articles for this paper or review the manuscripts of others. Viewed in this way, it is assumed that the content of *The People's Daily* can be almost identified with the statements of the decision-makers of the Peking Government for consumption by the public. Based on this assumption, we judged *The People's Daily* to be the most pertinent object of analysis among currently usable materials.

We, however, do not think that the articles of *The People's Daily* always "represent" the real intentions of the decision-makers. We do not forget that political communication is more or less manipulated as we have already mentioned when we introduced Alexander George's argument. Furthermore, when we take into account that *The People's Daily* has the mission of educating and propagandizing the Chinese public, and the role of demonstration and agitation abroad, we have to presume that a considerable degree of manipulation would also be inevitable. Therefore, in connecting the content characteristics with

antecedent conditions, we feel it necessary to take into account the situational factors and to use together the indirect method of inference which Alexander George advocated. We cannot, however, affirm that *The People's Daily* hardly communicates the real intentions of the decision-makers. In the case of the Soviet Union, it is said that there is an assumption underlying opinion manipulation that "only personal conviction on the part of the agitator and the essential 'truth' of his messages can effectively serve to convince the masses."¹ As the same can be said in the case of the People's Republic of China, it may not be wrong to assume that the content of *The People's Daily* "represent" the psychology and the real intentions of the decision-makers to a fairly high degree, although with certain reserves.

Next, we have chosen the year 1958 as the first step of a presumably long series of "content analysis of the statements made in regard to Japan by the People's Republic of China," which we plan to continue hereafter. This was the year of the complete severance of all relationships between Japan and China. This was the most important turning-point in the history of postwar Sino-Japanese relations. On May 9th of that year, Foreign Minister Chen Yi published a statement which severely condemned the Kishi Government, and Sino-Japanese relations were completely broken off. In fall of that year the domestic situation in Japan was thrown into confusion by opposition to the negotiations to revise the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact and the revision of the Police Act. At the climax of this tumult, Foreign Minister Chen Yi published another statement which denounced the negotiations to revise the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact. In this statement, Japan's "neutrality," together with Japan's "independence," "democracy" and "peace," was demanded officially for the first time. By that time, Japan's "neutrality" had been judged rather negatively by the Peking Government and was once called an "absurd wish."² But, in so far as the prospects of a revolution in Japan led by the Communist Party were unlikely to be realized at that time, the only concrete possibility, in the eyes of Peking, of establishing an "independent, democratic and peaceful Japan" was, at best, the plan for a neutralized Japan which the supporters of the Socialist Party of Japan advocated. Thus, on October 8th, in Premier Chou En-lai's speech for a group led by Jiichirō Matsumoto, Japan's neutrality was, for the first time, mentioned as having a positive value

¹ Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 25.

² *The People's Daily*, Editorial, October 30, 1953.

for the Peking Government.¹ In succession to this, the official statement of Chen Yi was released.

As our objects of analysis we have selected these two turning points in the Peking Government's policy towards Japan in 1958. As our samples, we selected editorials, statements by decision-makers, review articles, and signed articles which represented the attitude of the Peking Government towards Japan from copies of *The People's Daily* published two weeks before and two weeks after the two turning points. We have called the period from April 25 to May 23 "A period," from which fourteen articles were picked out as samples. The period from November 5 to December 3 has been named "B period" from which eight articles were picked out.

The paragraph was selected as the recording unit, and 42 pre-selected "attitude objects" (such categories as "Nobusuke Kishi," "Kishi Cabinet," "Japan's monopoly capital," "the Japanese people," "Communist Party of Japan," "Socialist Party of Japan," and "the United States") were picked out from each paragraph and respectively graded on a seven-stage good-bad scale from +3 to -3. We will leave a more detailed explanation on the selection of A and B periods, the standard of picking up the messages, the method of evaluation (we radically modified the method of Osgood) and the rules of grading, to some other opportunity and will immediately start interpreting the collected data.

III. ON THE RESULT OF ANALYSIS

In the following interpretation of the analysed data, only the main points will be given because of limitations of space.

1. Frequency Analysis


In A period, after the Chen Yi statement was released on May 9, the frequency of occurrence of the Kishi Government and Kishi (as an individual), especially the latter, rapidly increased (see Figure 1). This means that China tried to concentrate the attack on Kishi (as an individual) among other things. The trend became quite conspicuous in the fourth week, during which almost three-fourths of the total paragraphs included accusations against Kishi (as an individual). This is a

¹ China Section, Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Chūkyō Tai-nichi Jūyō Genron-shū* (Collections of Important Statements in Regard to Japan Made by the People's Republic of China), Vol. 4, April, 1959, p. 65.

political tactic which reduces the enemy power to the minimum and concentrates the attack on one point and seems to have been, consciously or unconsciously, adopted here, though in rather a vague fashion.

In A period, other categories with high frequencies were U.S.-Japanese relations and Japanese-Taiwanese relations (Figure 2). The high degree of attention given to Japanese-Taiwanese relations shows that Communist China attached importance to the fact that there had been strong protests and manoeuvres from Taiwan behind the abortion of the Fourth Trade Agreement between China and Japan. On the other hand, the fact that the frequency of U.S.-Japanese relations was, on the whole, higher than that of Japanese-Taiwanese relations seems to reflect an estimate of the Peking Government that U.S.-Japanese relations were an important factor behind the "badness" of Japan's policy towards the People's Republic of China. It is inferred that the increase of frequency of U.S.-Japanese relations week after week may show the Chinese awareness that the Japanese ruling group at that period was more closely approaching the United States. If that was the case, it must have been natural for China to find that the continuance of the cumulative method of diplomacy between the two countries

Figure 1. FREQUENCY (Number of Paragraphs) IN A PERIOD (1)




	I	II	III	IV
All Paragraphs	32 (100%)	12 (100%)	41 (100%)	41 (100%)
Kishi (as an individual)	7 (22.2)	0 (0.0)	24 (56.1)	30 (73.2)
The Kishi Government	15 (46.9)	5 (41.7)	20 (48.8)	12 (29.3)
The Japanese People	7 (22.2)	0 (0.0)	11 (26.8)	7 (17.1)

which had been designed to alienate Japan and the United States and draw Japan closer to China was now quite useless. The high frequency of mention of the United States in B period shows clearly the above-mentioned judgement by Peking (Figure 3). Furthermore, it is noted that "the United States" which did not occur in the messages about Japan in A period, all occurred in B period. Replacing Kishi (as an individual), the main target of attack in A period, the United States became the main target in B period (Figures 2 and 3). At the same time, the frequency of the Japanese people increased in B period. This shows the higher Chinese expectations of an anti-American struggle on the part of the Japanese people. The call for an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutralized Japan should be understood against the background of such a Chinese estimate.

2. Evaluation Analysis on Good-Bad Scale

As is shown in Figure 4, in the latter half of the A period, the negative evaluation of the Kishi Government, crossing the downgraded evaluative curve of Kishi (as an individual), was mitigated. This corresponds to the fact that the blame was concentrated on Kishi (as an individual), as shown in the foregoing frequency analysis. The negative

Figure 2. FREQUENCY IN A PERIOD (2)




	(week) I	II	III	IV
All Paragraphs	32 (100%)	12 (100%)	41 (100%)	41 (100%)
U.S.-Japanese Relations	13 (40.6)	3 (25.0)	15 (36.6)	17 (41.5)
Japanese-Taiwanese Relations	6 (18.8)	4 (33.3)	6 (14.6)	7 (17.1)

evaluation of the United States in A period, when compared with that in B period, is much milder. The inference that the United States became the main target of attack in B period can also be drawn from a comparison of Figures 4 and 6. The rapid upward curves towards positive evaluation of intermediary factors such as "Japanese newspapers" and "a part of the Liberal Democrats"—especially the former—is inversely proportionate to the sharpened negative evaluation of Kishi (as an individual). This also means that Chinese Communists, by concentrating their attack on one point, expected to overthrow the Kishi Cabinet through a democratic and national united front policy. On the other hand, however, the decline of positive evaluation of "all the progressive forces" after the second week may suggest that the progressive camp of Japan did not react as China had expected. The Chinese hard line towards Japan, therefore, seems to have been not only an attack on Kishi, but also a stimulant to the Japanese progressive forces.

In B period, from the first week to the second, movements against the Police Act became very violent in Japan. Correspondingly, the

Figure 3. FREQUENCY IN B PERIOD




	(week) I	II	III	IV*
All Paragraphs	8 (100%)	17 (100%)	45 (100%)	
The United States	7 (87.5)	0 (0.0)	33 (73.3)	
The Kishi Government	1 (12.5)	6 (35.3)	16 (35.6)	
Kishi (as an individual)	4 (50)	5 (29.4)	14 (31.1)	
The Japanese People	2 (25)	3 (17.7)	17 (26.5)	

*In the fourth week, there was no statement in regard to Japan to be picked out.

positive evaluation of all the progressive forces was elevated (Figure 6). China was disappointed with the Japanese progressive forces in A period, re-evaluated them in B period and defined the United States as the frontal enemy (see the lower evaluation of the U. S. in Figure 6 and higher interest in it in Figure 3). Here, it can be inferred that China tried to see a strong inclination towards the anti-American struggle in the anti-Police Act movement.

A few words on the evaluation of the Communist Party of Japan. Although disappointed with the progressive forces in Japan in the latter half of A period, China did not decrease her frequency of all the

Figure 4. EVALUATION IN A PERIOD




	(week) I	II	III	IV
Socialist Party	+3	-	+2	+1.7
Communist Party	-	-	+2	+2
The Japanese People	+1.6	-	+1.8	+1.7
All the Progressive Forces (excluding Communists)	+1.7	+2	+1.9	+1.5
A Part of Liberal Democrats	+0.5	-	+1	+1
Japanese Newspapers	-1.7	-	+1	+1.2
The Kishi Government	-2.3	-3	-2.7	-1.7
The United States	-1.3	-	-1.5	-1.8
Kishi (as an individual)	-2.1	-	-2.7	-2.7

progressive forces (Figure 5). But, the frequency remained the same only by compensating the decrease of frequency of non-Communist progressive forces with the increased frequency of the Communist Party of Japan. Therefore, it can be safely said that, when the evaluation of all the progressive forces drops, that is to say, when there arises a situation unfavourable to China, the frequency of the Communist Party increases. The Japan Communist Party seems, after all, the most reliable friend for China in an unfavourable situation. This can also be inferred from the fact that, in B period, the mentions of Communists appeared only when the evaluation of all the progressive forces was comparatively low, and vanished as their evaluation steadily rose.

Figure 7 shows the changes of evaluation of the main categories from May to November. The replacement of the frontal target of attack, the rise of evaluation of "Japanese newspapers" and "a part of liberal democrats," and a slight increase of expectations of "the Japanese people" can be clearly seen.

Next, Figure 8 is a table showing the absolute value of distances between the arithmetic mean evaluations of the main categories both in A and B periods. We will tentatively call the difference of arith-

Figure 5. FREQUENCY IN A PERIOD (3)




	(week) I	II	III	IV
All Paragraphs	32	12	41	41
All the Progressive Forces (including Communists)	13	1	17	17
All the Progressive Forces (excluding Communists)	13	1	16	13
The Japanese People	7	0	11	7

metic mean values AMD (arithmetic mean distance). AMD is small when the nature of two given categories is similar, in the eyes of the Peking Government. However, AMD does not show the differences of direction of changes or the amount of changes. In order to remedy this weak point, we will further use MTD (mean transitional difference).

The formula of MTD reads as follows: $MTD = \frac{1}{2n} \sum_{i=1}^n |di - \Delta i|$, where n represents the number of "transitional points" or N (time units) - 1, d refers to $x_i - x_{i+1}$ and Δ to $y_i - y_{i+1}$. When there is a perfect simi-

Figure 6. EVALUATION OF B PERIOD



	(week) I	II	III
Socialist Party	+2	—	+2
All the Progressive Forces (excluding Communists)	+1.3	+1.5	+1.9
The Japanese People	+1.5	+1.3	+1.9
Newspapers	+1	+1	+1
A Part of the Liberal Democrats	+1	—	+1
The Kishi Government	-2	-1.5	-2
Kishi (as an individual)	-2.3	-2	-2.3
The United States	-2.3	—	-2.5

larity of changes between two variables, MTD would be 0.00, and on the other hand, when there is a perfect dissimilarity, MTD would be 6.00 in our scale. Figure 9 is the table showing MTD between the main categories.

Generally speaking, if AMD is small and MTD is large, this means two categories with similar nature changes in opposite directions. In this case, it can be inferred that the two similar categories which can be used alternatively, are used discriminately as having different functions. For example, in A period, AMD between Kishi (as an individual) and the Kishi Government is small, with the value of 0.2, while MTD is fairly large, with 0.43. This means that China, having discriminated between Kishi (as an individual) and the Kishi Government, tried to

Figure 7. COMPARISON OF EVALUATIONS IN A AND B PERIODS




Figure 8. AMD BETWEEN MAIN CATEGORIES

The Kishi Government										
Kishi (as an individual)	0.2									
Monopoly Capital	0.6	0.8								
Reactionaries	0.1	0.1	0.7							
A Part of the Liberal Democrats	3.2	3.4	2.6	3.3						
Newspapers	2.6	2.8	2.0	2.7	0.6					
The Japanese People	4.0	4.2	3.4	4.1	0.8	1.4				
Socialist Party	4.4	4.6	3.8	4.5	1.2	1.8	0.4			
Communist Party	4.4	4.6	3.8	4.5	1.2	1.8	0.4	0		
The United States	0.7	0.9	0.1	0.8	2.5	1.9	3.3	3.7	3.7	
A period										
The Kishi Government										
Kishi (as an individual)	0.3									
Monopoly Capital	0.1	0.2								
Reactionaries	0.1	0.2	0							
A Part of the Liberal Democrats	2.9	3.2	3.0	3.0						
Newspapers	2.9	3.2	3.0	3.0	0					
The Japanese People	3.7	4.0	3.8	3.8	0.8	0.8				
Socialist Party	3.9	4.2	4.0	4.0	1.0	1.0	0.2			
Communist Party	2.9	3.2	3.0	3.0	0	0	0.8	1.0		
The United States	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.5	3.5	3.5	4.3	4.5	3.5	
B period										
The Kishi Government										
Kishi (as an individual)										
Monopoly Capital										
Reactionaries										
A Part of the Liberal Democrats										
Newspapers										
The Japanese People										
Socialist Party										
Communist Party										
The United States										

concentrate the blame on Kishi himself. In B period, however, AMD being 0.3 and MTD 0.10, there was no discrimination between the two. If both AMD and MTD are small, the two are similar in nature and are alternatively used without discrimination.

This relationship is seen, in A period, between Kishi (as an individual) and the United States, among the people, Socialist Party and Communist Party, and, in B period, between Kishi (as an individual) and the Kishi Government and between the people and the Socialist Party.

The third formula showing the relations between variables is FD (functional distance). This is computed by the summing of MTD and MVD (mean vertical difference). MVD is shown by the formula :

Figure 9. MTD BETWEEN MAIN CATEGORIES

The Kishi Government																			
Kishi (as an individual)	0.43																		
Monopoly Capital	0.38	0.05																	
Reactionaries	0.50	0.06	0.12																
A Part of the Liberal Democrats	0.31	0.18	0.13	0.25															
Newspapers	0.65	0.58	0.53	0.65	0.40														
The Japanese People	0.31	0.15	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.47													
Socialist Party	0.55	0.12	0.17	0.05	0.30	0.70	0.23												
Communist Party	0.33	0.10	0.05	0.17	0.08	0.48	0.05	0.21											
The United States	0.42	0.12	0.07	0.18	0.17	0.57	0.10	0.13	0.18										
A period																			
The Kishi Government																			
Kishi (as an individual)	0.10																		
Monopoly Capital	0.25	0.15																	
Reactionaries	0.25	0.15	0.00																
A Part of the Liberal Democrats	0.25	0.15	0.00	0.00															
Newspapers	0.25	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00														
The Japanese People	0.45	0.35	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20													
Socialist Party	0.25	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20												
Communist Party	0.25	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00											
The United States	0.20	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.25	0.05	0.05										
B period																			
	The Kishi Government	Kishi (as an individual)	Monopoly Capital	Reactionaries	A Part of the Liberal Democrats	Newspapers	The Japanese People	Socialist Party	Communist Party	The United States									

$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n |x_i - y_i|$, where n represents the number of time units. When

FD is 0.00, it represents perfect similarity of the two variables, and when FD is 12.00, in our scale, it represents perfect dissimilarity. Figure 10 is the table showing FD values between the major categories. That the FD between the Kishi Government and Kishi (as an individual) decreases from 0.96 in A period to 0.47 in B period means that in B period the two symbols are used less discriminately. That the FD between the people and the United States increases from 3.25 in A period to 4.18 in B period may be additional evidence to show that in B period the United States is alleged to be the frontal enemy of the people.

If we assume, judging from the nature of *The People's Daily*,

Figure 10. FD BETWEEN MAIN CATEGORIES


The Kishi Government																			
Kishi (as an individual)	0.96																		
Monopoly Capital	1.11	0.60																	
Reactionaries	1.23	0.27	0.77																
A Part of the Liberal Democrats	3.49	3.33	2.73	3.50															
Newspapers	2.78	2.68	2.08	2.85	1.55														
The Japanese People	4.42	4.23	3.63	4.39	0.99	2.41													
Socialist Party	5.40	4.94	4.44	4.98	1.98	2.51	0.98												
Communist Party	4.76	4.50	3.90	4.67	1.33	2.53	0.37	0.79											
The United States	1.42	1.04	0.44	1.21	2.39	2.14	3.25	4.03	3.51										
A period																			
The Kishi Government																			
Kishi (as an individual)	0.49																		
Monopoly Capital	0.42	0.35																	
Reactionaries	0.42	0.35	0.00																
A Part of the Liberal Democrats	3.08	3.35	3.00	3.00															
Newspapers	3.08	3.35	3.00	3.00	0.00														
The Japanese People	3.85	4.12	3.77	3.77	0.77	0.77													
Socialist Party	4.08	4.35	4.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	0.63												
Communist Party	3.08	3.35	3.00	3.00	0.00	0.00	0.77	1.00											
The United States	0.73	0.27	0.42	0.42	3.42	3.42	4.18	4.42	3.42										
B period																			
	The Kishi Government	Kishi (as an individual)	Monopoly Capital	Reactionaries	A Part of the Liberal Democrats	Newspapers	The Japanese People	Socialist Party	Communist Party	The United States									

China always evaluates herself as +3, we can construct a multidimensional, visible diagram with the FD values. If we visualize the diagrams on two-dimensional paper, they would look like Figures 11 and 12. It can be safely assumed that they are the images of the conflicts among major categories which the Chinese political leaders had—or at least pretended to have—in their minds in the A and B periods.

IV. CONCLUSION


With the above analysis, we have made a start in investigating, by the use of "content analysis," the statements in regard to Japan

Figure 11. FD BETWEEN MAIN CATEGORIES (A period)



made by the People's Republic of China. The results of analysis shown here may have only confirmed the results of "the analysis made so far," but we have acquired confidence that the method is worthy of further study and development in the future. We can then expect better results by processing much more voluminous data, as well as by improving the content analysis technique itself to a more effective one. For example, the construction of an FD diagram is no more than a mere experiment at the present stage. Once, however, in the future, it becomes possible to compare several models, drawn by the same method, we would be able to extract much more information from the diagrams.

Figure 12. FD BETWEEN MAIN CATEGORIES (B period)



We have, in fact, finished the process of evaluation of the same data by strong-weak scale and friendly-hostile (towards China) scale. We have not been able, however, to extend our discussion to those aspects of the analysis because space does not permit us to do so.