

THE FATE OF IMPERIALISM IN THIS CENTURY

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This paper is a revised version of a lecture which Dr. Hallgarten gave at the University of Tokyo and elsewhere towards the end of 1965. The author had been well known to Japanese academic circles for his *Vorkriegsimperialismus* (Paris, 1935) and *Imperialismus vor 1914* (2nd ed.; München, 1963) and much interest was shown in this lecture, both because in combination with the above works it provided a systematic overall view of Dr. Hallgarten's studies of imperialism, and because the author is one of the last pupils of Max Weber. A Japanese translation of the lecture has been published in an authoritative Japanese journal; *Shisō*, No. 499 (January, 1966).

I

The concept "imperialism" started to penetrate into the Western languages—the first ones which used it—at the end of the 1870's; it at that time referred to a group of friends of the British Empire. It was a period of economic depression, and the then imperialists recommended an increased use of the Empire—which in the preceding period had been somewhat neglected—for helping to stave off the general economic plight. That depression, however, did not only shake the British part of the world, but many other parts of Europe and America as well. Consequently, other big powers that were struck by it attempted to find a similar way out as did the British and to establish overseas empires of their own. This automatically led to a broadening of the concept of imperialism; it from then on referred generally to all men in all countries who tried to push things this way, and no longer only the British friends of empire and empire building.

The very same technological upswing that had helped to cause that big depression—which in fact was due largely to the increased building of freighters importing wheat from overseas—also stimulated the travelling of an entire advance guard of geographers, ethnologists, factory representatives, and technical experts into the unexplored areas of the world, where they mixed with the missionaries of the various Christian creeds in forming the shock troops of the imperialist movement. The aspect of these crowds and that of the noisy agitators at home who avidly endorsed whatever far-flung annexationist plans emerged from their expeditions did conceal for a certain time

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the economic nucleus of the movement: the growth of industrial plants that benefited from the tariff walls and the increasing territorial expansion of the imperialist age, and of the banks that fostered it. The first to discuss this side of the picture was the British social critic John A. Hobson, whose famous study *Imperialism* was published in 1902, and who could still be heard lecturing on this topic over thirty years later, when the author saw him there: a white-haired octogenarian, very thin and lean. Hobson emphasized the stimulating influence exercised upon the development of imperialism by the savings of the mother countries which nursed the plants at home and also the export of capital to undeveloped areas, thus enabling the latter in spite of their poverty to purchase the goods produced. Hobson also was one of the first to question the beneficial results of this development for the affected territories which had to refund the loans they were forced to contract at often ruinous conditions, without corresponding advantages for them or their population.

The growing fusion between industry and banks led to what the Austrian theorist Rudolf Hilferding—who later was a member of the German Reichstag, and who was personally known to the author—in his likewise very famous study on our topic published in 1910—termed finance capitalism (*das Finanzkapital*), which he also used as title of his book. Hilferding showed that through this increasing fusion the explosive power of the modern monopolies that were fostered by it increased strongly. His thoughts which centred a bit more around modern money economy than around imperialism as such were used by Lenin in his world-famous pamphlet *Imperialism—the Highest Stage of Capitalism* written in his Swiss exile during World War I, in which he tried to show that finance capitalism and imperialism were practically one and the same thing, and that its development in all leading countries had even affected the working class and had made it a tool of imperialism, thus forcing him, Lenin, to propose a new start.

II

Lenin's pamphlet, first published in 1917, and then in many new editions, gave an *ex post facto* interpretation to a period which as shown had started about forty years earlier and which at that time was undergoing—as I will show briefly—the first of its three main transformations. Since he himself has stated emphatically that finance capitalism, as defined by Hilferding and himself, was not really developed before the end of the last Century, he dates the start of what he calls imperialism from the Spanish-American War of 1898, thus skipping the first twenty years of the period in which imperialism had become the slogan of the age. He also in his very rough sketch says practically nothing about the way in which finance capitalism over the years developed in the various big nations and affected their international relations, nor does he seem to have foreseen that its development and what he calls its bribing of Labour could reach the tremendous level of what modern America

calls its affluent society. Using his definition of imperialism, the latter exists practically everywhere where modern money economy is flourishing, indeed, it is simply another name for this very economy, and thus must be used, whether the individual nation involved is expanding politically into other territories or not.

One can of course do this—it is to some extent a question of nomenclature—and I see no reason to disprove it, but there will be many people who will find this identification premature, and will request an empirical investigation of the connexions between the growth of modern money economy and the different stages of the simultaneous political development: the stages in question are the pre-World War I period which is that of “classical” imperialism, the Fascist period, and the after-World War II period which I shall refer to as the age of super-state rivalry. In this scheme (the first two stages of which I can only present in a few words) imperialism in the sense it was used since the 1880’s will be found rampant in most big powers and most of the times, though in the present period it will be shown to have been transformed, with some of its features humanized but with others dehumanized to an almost tragic extent.

In going with you through these stages—especially the third one to which this lecture is dedicated—I shall, as always has been my habit, try to show in which way the given phenomena can be explained from both the Marxist, including even the Leninist, angle and from an enlightened non-Marxist viewpoint. I say “enlightened non-Marxist viewpoint” though I know that, given the mental shape of large sections of the Western world in our age, that glorious age of super-state rivalry, the “enlightened non-Marxist viewpoint,” meaning a determined effort of independent historians to penetrate into the very depth of the type of questions first probed by the Marxists, is practically non-existent and is not much more than a purely theoretical Archimedean construction. For many years, the lack of economic and profound sociological knowledge of the average Western historian has been almost a scandal—though there are of course some noteworthy exceptions—and I fear that in this time of increased super-state rivalry, deliberate anti-liberalism, irrationalism and Communist-beating in the West things will get worse.

III

Let us investigate, then, very briefly the chief characteristics of the first two periods—those of classical imperialism and of Fascism—in order thus to gain a proper background for putting the fate of imperialism after 1945 into sharper focus.

The period of what I just called classical imperialism, reaching roughly from the 1870’s to the end of World War I, is the time in which most mother countries of imperialism and most colonial areas were still ruled by monarchs, even though the latter’s monarchism was of a primitive kind. In

colonial or semi-colonial countries with an old civilization such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Persia, parts of India, Annam, or China the monarchs were patriarchs, or representatives of such and so was the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, while the rulers of more primitive areas, especially in Africa, were mostly tribal chiefs. This general monarchism not seldom tended to serve the interests of the imperialists of that period, as shown for instance by the attitude of the German emperor, William II, who delighted in appealing to the common interests of the monarchs in a way that often betrayed his dreaded tactlessness. He was never tired of presenting himself to the despots of Morocco, of Turkey, or of other states in which he was at the moment interested as an unselfish brother and friend, eager to defend their thrones against disobedient subjects or against other big powers. The recipients of such vows, far from being regarded as true peers of the Kaiser, were expected to give preference to German military instructors, shipbuilders, arms manufacturers, bankers, and traders, to exclude foreign nations, and to force their subjects to foot the bill for the gifts the Germans bestowed on them by paying high taxes. Through their absolute and hereditary power and the tremendous size of the areas they controlled the exotic despots of those years distinguished themselves from the men who started to represent those same areas after World War II: the spokesmen and leaders of the new nationalism.

Their absolute power made those despots excellent tools in the hands of the real masters of that time, the private banks. The loans given by financiers like Jules Pastre, Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt, or Frühling & Goschen to the Khedive of Egypt, those granted by the barons Hirsch, Rothschild, Bleichröder, or Erlanger—all Jews ennobled for the eminent services they thus rendered to monarchism—to the Sultan of Turkey or to the numerous Balkan monarchs whose penury was proverbial, or the ones a group of French banking houses around the turn of the Century gave to the Sultan of Morocco (well knowing that he would be unable to refund them unless France stepped in and rebuilt his practically non-existing administration) were the very symbols of that age. Where the local despots thus duly went bankrupt, boards were set up by the bankers that brought their countries under financial control, which often was followed by political occupation.

The establishment of such boards—such as the Dette Publique Ottomane in Turkey—simultaneously marked the transition from the ventures of individual financiers to the growing régime of the monster banks that mobilized the financial reserves of the nations; the individual financiers, recognizing the change of the time, frequently entered the boards of these big institutes. The banks promoted the interests of the big industrial enterprises they sponsored, especially the then leading industries of coal and steel. From the beginning of this Century the individual ventures at home and abroad therefore are replaced by schemes of a much more grandiose scope. It is the time of the first modern ocean steamers, the general electrification, and the monster railway scheme such as the Trans-Siberian, the Baghdad Railway,

and, over a decade later, the Trans-Africa railroad scheme which (like the Baghdad scheme) was cut short by World War I, but unlike the Baghdad project, had not yet started.

The increase in ocean shipping and the building of these super-highways of steel in turn deeply influenced the warfare of that time. It was the years of the biggest naval race the world has ever seen, while the tremendous financing of railway construction by *das Finanzkapital*, whose chief domain was Russia, stimulated both the growth of a modern industry in that country and the arming of the Russian giant who resented the building of the Baghdad Railroad and the other German machinations in Turkey and at the Straits. Since the ships loaded with wheat from Southern Russia had to cross the Straits to reach the world's sea lanes, and since the Russian economy depended on this trade, German occupation of the Straits was tantamount to Germany's cutting the Russian throat. There is good evidence that the German imperialism in Turkey was proceeding exactly along this line, and that a World War about this question was imminent, when Archduke Francis Ferdinand was murdered and a general political crisis started which speeded up the trend of events. The clash of the imperialisms in 1914 for the first time gave the inhabitants of the lowest floors of the building—the lowest strata of the workers and peasants and the colonial people in Asia and Africa—a glimpse of what, if used wisely, was able to lead them to a better future. As long as no such globe-shaking earthquake had been in sight, they possessed no means whatsoever to improve their mostly miserable fate. The years before 1914, in which the labouring classes in Europe began to milk a flourishing capitalism, did not yet bring any change in the life and the working conditions of the colonial man other than some progress in hygiene and similar fields which the white man introduced and insisted upon, in his own interest.

The white man, by starting the war of 1914, actually put his own house on fire. Living in a world in which trade had been expanding constantly, which therefore knew of no currency problems, inflation, or deflation worth talking about, and thus had no unemployment problem and, therefore, neither Communism nor Fascism, he practically existed in a sort of paradise. He did not appreciate what he had before that paradise was lost.

IV

The immediate result of World War I was both an unheard-of impoverishment and general crisis of Europe, affecting both vanquished and victors and leading to European loss of prestige, and the establishment through Lenin's coming to power of the first Marxist State in the world. Marx himself of course would have been quite surprised could he have seen it and could he have analysed the socio-economic basis of the political creation whose patron he had become: it was the product of a still feebly developed capitalism,

crippled by a pernicious war, and of a tremendous agrarian problem rather than that of an over-developed money economy shaken by titanic social crisis, as he had predicted, and it would not have come to life had not its founder, Lenin, a giant like Marx himself, proceeded in spite of the fact that the conditions both found vital for the universal victory of the working class did not yet exist in his country. Lenin thus regarded the victory in Russia merely as a conquest of a first stronghold in the working man's fight for universal political control, and he believed as long as he lived that the combination of monopoly capitalism and of what he termed the workers' opportunism which hampered his success in other parts of the world would finally be overcome. When this turned out to be erroneous, both the basis and the meaning of the concept of social revolution changed, and became so to speak *territorialized*, replacing the old idea of parallel working class progress and social revolutions in all countries by a challenge to all workers to defend the interests and the policy of the Soviet Union in its struggle against the other big powers—a turn of tremendous international importance about which I shall say more in my discussion of the post-1945 period.

One of the many results of the international post-World War I social crisis was the emergence of the little groups which formed the nuclei of what soon became the Fascist and national socialist movements. Formed by apostates from the socialist camps or *déclassés* of the middle classes they gained momentum through post-war inflations and later depressions, and, or—as in the case of Italy—through the voting of the American immigration laws. These typical post-war developments made entire fractions of the middle and lower middle classes for the first time in the evolution of modern money economy decline from their position and share those leaders' fate and thoughts, and also affected many workers. While France—a comparatively stable agrarian democracy—and Great Britain—the mother country of industrial democracy for which army, militarism and Fascism were taboo—lacked the incentives for the new trend, Germany and Italy, both being socially more backward and greatly troubled by economic disturbances, fell for it.

The emerging of that new stratum of footloose hooligans, which in the big depression after 1929 assumed tremendous dimensions in Germany, added a brand-new element to the features of European life which, unless used for unchaining a new imperialism, was likely to threaten existing society. In this respect Fascist imperialism distinguished itself sharply from that of the classical age of European imperialism which knew of no joblessness or footloose masses, and—as far as I see it—was strongly related to the type of imperialism Japan had developed even in the decades while Europe was still developing that of the classical brand. In Japan—as far as I gather from writings by Professor Conroy, and from those of prominent Japanese scholars such as Professor Maruyama whom he quotes, and some of which I have studied—the early emergence of monopolies—children of a wilfully created capitalism which lacked a liberal stage—coincided with that of impoverish-

ment of the *Samurai* and other elements. Therefore—if I see things correctly and I admit that in this respect I am speaking like a student addressing a gathering of teachers and hoping he understood them right—Japanese monopoly capitalism from the outset had to face the problem of how to divert those unruly masses and to prevent them from making mischief. It thus, in spite of its peaceful inclinations which corresponded to its unrivalled position in all foreign markets it cared to reach, once and again felt obliged to yield to the wishes of war-makers, in order to employ the potential mischief makers across the sea.

This at once creates the problem—which of course I can only discuss with reference to Europe—to what extent the policy of the thus diverted masses was shaped by the monopolies which also, at the end, exploited their conquests, or how far it was conceived by the mass leaders. In my opinion—which is also expressed with reference to this particular problem in my book *Why Dictators?* (New York, Macmillan, 1954)—the rise of such leaders depends on the ways of social selection, which differ according to circumstances. While most modern social scientists rightfully reject the primitive psychological approach to history so dear to many—especially the reactionary—historians, the leaders' psychology and thinking, once their rise to leadership is explained, indeed requires the attention of the historian to the extent their thoughts were able to materialize which in turn depends on the social structures they were heading and on the latter's general historical momentum. Besides, with the possible exception of hereditary régimes where the psychology of the ruler is more or less determined by accident, the psychological make of the leading figures is not a product of mere hazard either. Fascist-type dictators show an entirely different make from dictators leading the lowest classes, and both in turn differ from reactionary dictators and from bourgeois-supported men.

This being so, the rise and the activity of a Hitler, the chief figure of the age of Fascist expansion, and the man responsible for the main international frictions of our own age, cannot be presented in a way that makes him a mere executor of deep and hidden plans conceived far ahead and in deep mystery in the well-guarded and sound-proof conference rooms of the leading German industrial combines. Even after 1929, when due to the depression his movement increased with lightning speed, he for most of these combines, with the possible exception of the *Vereinigte Stahlwerke* and the chief *banks* which hoped him to free them from state control that resulted from subsidies given them during that depression, was hardly more than *der Trommler*—the drummer—the figure who would lure away the masses from their factories and offices. He thus, if I see things correctly, in their minds must have played a similar role as some of the leaders of the Japanese form of mass dictatorship played in the eyes of the big Japanese combines, after the latter's direct political influence had declined. Though some of the German captains of industry must have read Hitler's book *Mein Kampf*,

with its passages on the USSR which give a clear outline of what he intended to do to it, none of them had inspired these ideas, nor were they ready to adopt them, before he crossed the Russian frontiers. His pet idea, to expand in the East, to eradicate the Jews, enslave the Slavs, and populate the conquered space with his SS guards and other German settlers, was the brainchild of a socially declined little man who had belonged to the German minority in the former Hapsburg monarchy which abounded with Slavs and Jews, just as the naval policy of William II reflected the intentions of a ruler who wished to make up for his being half-British, which in the Prussia-led Germany of those days was regarded tantamount to a crime. This did not exclude that in both cases the contemporary industrial powers exploited these circumstances as best they could, which meant in the case of Hitler who was less interested in overseas expansion than had been the Kaiser, that they used his power for subjecting or eradicating heavy industry in the areas he occupied, and for replacing its leading personnel by their own men. The shameless way in which they helped him enslave occupied Europe has been exposed in full in the Nuremberg war crimes trials, though the lessons learned there are now forgotten, and German heavy industry once more dominates the Old World. Had Hitler been able to consolidate his conquests, his SS guards under the leadership of the dreaded Heinrich Himmler in closest co-operation with the German industrial combines would have made Poland and Western Russia some sort of German Manchukuo.

That much about the form of expansion in the Fascist period. What few remarks I was able to make about it served the purpose—as I said before—to put the ideas I am now to present on the after-World War II period into better focus. During the general fight against Fascism and its younger brother, National Socialism, a general development continued which had started slowly before and during World War I and which for the analyst of the post-1945 period is of utmost importance: it was the gradual emancipation of the colonial man. Speaking in most general terms, this emancipation was the result of two simultaneous developments. The one was the gradual evolution of nationalism, i. e., the cultural and political self-assertion of hitherto dormant populations under the impact of the technological age, and the other was the growing frictions among the powers that kept those nations in bondage. Both tendencies were interdependent. Thus, the growing nationalism of the Balkan people which, along with the nucleus of such movements in what today is Iran and modern India, was among the first ones to start this evolution, reflected the growing dissolution of those antiquated super-states, the Hapsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, the old masters of their destiny, under the pressure of other big powers. By the same token, the increasing emancipation of India after World War I, as well as the unrest and nationalism in the Near East and North Africa and especially the movements in Egypt resulted from the internecine fight between the European powers, the former overlords in those areas, during World War I. This be-

ing so, it could be foreseen that a second World War and its aftermath would lead to the rise of practically all elements which hitherto had kept quiet, especially in Africa, and even allow the formation of numerous nations which until that time did not even know themselves that they could ever qualify as such.

V

And thus, after all these preliminary remarks which, however, we think were inevitable in view of the singular complexity and intricacy of our problem, we now have arrived at the decisive point: the analysis of the question, what was and is the fate of imperialism in our own age, the age I said I would refer to as that of super-state rivalry? To anticipate my answer: while the forces that spiked imperialism in the past are still there, their methods have changed very strongly. Under the impact of the universal emancipation of new nations most of the methods of classical imperialism have been abandoned or otherwise have become obsolete. The relations between the big powers—including the former champions of imperialism—and the former colonies have become humanized. But many of those methods have become replaced by others, more subtle and sometimes worse. The worst thing is that the mutual struggle between the big powers in the fields of military power, economics, and technology, which formed an important—and even the essential—element of all earlier forms of imperialism, has now reached a stage whose terrific aspect dominates the scene and makes the present period the by far most dangerous one of the three stages under discussion. We shall therefore make this the starting-point of our brief investigation.

The outcome of World War II showed, in a way, the usual picture offered whenever a coalition of big powers manages to bring about the total defeat of their common enemy. With their enemy's power gone, and their own armies in control of the field, their mutual relations are bound to get tense, and their comradely feelings are replaced overnight by a power struggle between their armed forces which in most cases is acerbated by disagreements about the distribution of the spoils. In 1945, as in 1815, these natural rifts were accentuated by social and ideological differences which divided the thus formed camps: just as after the downfall of Napoleon there was a split between absolutism and feudalism on the one side, and the sphere of bourgeois liberalism on the other, the defeat of Hitler was followed by decades of fierce struggle between the Communist and the non-Communist section of the victors.

Different from what had happened after 1815, however, the conquerors of 1945 felt that the cleavage separating them was too deep for permitting them to withdraw their armed forces from the areas into which they had moved during their victorious advance. Entrenching, instead, at the common line of demarcation, they automatically became dependent on the military control

of all territories and sea lanes between that line and their home countries, whether enemy countries, "liberated nations"—i. e., nations freed by them from enemy conquest—or not. The ways and the legal forms in which they reached this goal differed, according to their different nature and philosophies. While the USSR in its sphere of interest sponsored the erection of satellite states including East Germany, the USA and Great Britain made the section of Germany they had occupied formally independent, and centred the military defense of Europe west of the Iron Curtain in a formally free organization, NATO. But the fact that their military occupation of Europe continued, even though in a different legal form, and that Western Europe practically became a tremendous fortress, equipped and mainly directed from the Pentagon, led to an expansion of United States influence and power, which distinguished the post-1945 period sharply from the period after World War I when the USA had been the first of the Western Allies to withdraw its troops. In my mind, this effort of the leading nations of the big power blocks to reach practically across their frontiers and to create scores of new and often hidden military and political dependencies is one of the chief characteristics of the post-World War II period. The leading powers in this field and in others practically are developing into super-states. I therefore refer to our period as that of super-state rivalry.

Since the non-Communist sector of the rivalling super-states comprises the powers that adhere to the principle of money economy in its present, monopolistic stage, which the Communists since Lenin regard as identical with imperialism, they refer to that sector as the imperialist camp. We can of course not prevent them from giving any name to any target they chose and we also intend to show in each individual case, how far their and our thoughts on the target, notwithstanding that debatable nomenclature, might frequently meet. But we must not forget that the constant colonial expansion for which Lenin made finance capitalism responsible was in fact approaching its end when he shaped that concept, that the present Western economy nevertheless is marked by a development of finance capitalism which exceeds everything Lenin thought possible, and failed to die as he had said it would, and that since World War II it has constantly denounced the type of expansion Lenin had in mind. Whatever substitutes for imperialism it has chosen—and there are plenty and powerful ones—differ from the features Lenin was familiar with. I therefore prefer to speak of the present form of what the Communists call modern imperialism as *the capitalist—or if you want monopolist—form of super-state rivalry*, as distinguished from its Communist form.

The shape of this super-state rivalry was determined to a large extent by struggle of the preceding period in which the world had had to fight Fascism and National Socialism. It actually continued many features that had been copied from the Fascists with a view to outdo and thus to beat them. This is even true of the building of nuclear weapons—possibly the most ominous feature of the new age—which owed its start to the wish of the Western

powers to outrace Hitler in this field which they suspected he had entered. The most notable of the score of new Hitlerian weapons the victors of 1945—both in the West and the East—got hold of after they had marched into Germany was the rocket. The A-4 which Wernherr von Braun and a team of German experts, all pupils of Hermann Oberth, who at present is the leader of German Neo-Nazism, produced in Peenemünde, and which Hitler gave the name *Vergeltungswaffe* (retaliation weapon) 2, or V-2, is the common ancestor of the most important American and Russian rockets.

The American effort, to balance the USSR's great superiority in manpower by a systematic improvement of super-weapons caused the USSR to follow suit, and led to a technological arms race which made super-state rivalry reach out for the stars.

If this development gradually lessened the importance of the numbers of combatants each side kept armed or was able to mobilize, this was not the same with reference to the various intelligence services they had established during World War II. In this field, the USSR, as a dictatorship whose entire existence depended on checking disruption from within, had a marked advantage over the Western World which in this area, too, learned much from Hitler. Without the example of the numerous secret outfits that served Hitler in this domain, the USA would never have developed its Office of Strategic Services ("OSS") which after the War was transformed into that gigantic octopus, the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), that tremendously powerful arm in the hands of the monopoly-sponsored super-state in which so much of Hitlerian feature lives on and the vestige of which can be observed by every newspaper reader who carefully checks the news on present-day rebellions, revolutions, uprisings, and brushfire wars.

The constant evolution of the arms race of the rivalling super-states in turn helped the monopolistic, or Western type, super-states and their followers solve a problem which had plagued the Western World since the big depression of the late 1920's and the 1930's. It was the problem of stimulating the economy. Since that depression money economy walked, so to speak, on crutches. After roughly 1936, when the pump priming recommended by John Maynards Keynes and others for revitalizing it lost momentum, because the legislators in the countries involved no longer saw eye to eye about the measures to be taken, it was gradually replaced by rearmament which in Germany had been used as a chief stimulator from the outset. Marxists and especially Leninists who regard capitalism in its monopolistic, or as they call it imperialist stage as dying, are inclined to regard rearmament as the very instrument that saved it in the last moment, though as they say quite truthfully, real salvation can never come from something as destructive and unproductive that absorbs constantly increasing slices of the consumer's cake. Non-Marxists are inclined to approach this problem more cautiously. Taking a more optimistic view of the fate of money economy even at its highest, monopolistic stage, they tend to believe that monopolies, far from being as

barren and uncreative as their critics would make them look, represent organizational and technological progress. If technical progress, they argue, leads to a reduction of the labour force at one point, the surplus workers, in this age of rapid technological development in all fields of human life, are likely to be absorbed elsewhere, thus stimulating the evolution of our happily advancing affluent society which has lifted humanity to unknown standards of life. This argument has some flaws even within its own logic. In a small country such as Germany, as opposed to a big nation such as the United States, no such development is thinkable without opening of foreign markets by peaceful means or by war. But even where a peaceful evolution of this type is assured, modern money economy—as most non-Marxists admit—must conquer a series of obstacles that have increased through and since the big depression. Among those obstacles of natural progress are the general overproduction in agriculture brought about by technical progress, the disproportionate growth of war industries during World War II, the increasing industrial competition through the creation of so many new nations and, most recently, the tremendous problems created by automation. Given all these difficulties even non-Marxist economists, though they might not go quite as far the Marxists and Leninists, who regard armaments as a capitalist panacea for saving the life of money economy, will mostly admit that arming takes care of important economic problems, and in combination with sundry other interventionist economic measures resorted to by the modern Western states has become an integrating part of Western economic life. It may be added at this point that in the Communist super-states, though they do not face the same problems, weapons-making under the influence of super-state rivalry [likewise has reached a momentous stage which gives the men in control of it a powerful say in the economy which cannot be ignored.

The tremendous role weapons-making plays in the modern super-state rivalry, both militarily and economically, led to an assertion of the dominant position the military are maintaining in the super-states, which in turn tends to sharpen all international conflicts. But around 1960 big rifts appeared in the super-state systems which reflected important social and political changes. Under the impact of World War II both Great Britain and France, the mother countries of what I have called classical imperialism, had to seek the protection of the United States, in order to safeguard whatever was left of their dominant position. Being mostly interested in maintaining its stand towards the USSR all around the globe, the United States refused to give protection to those sections of those old empires whose maintenance seemed unessential from this angle. This forced them to solve their colonial problems as well as they could. But whereas Great Britain, with her traditional elasticity, managed to pull through, the French colonial empire, based on rigid military might, practically broke to pieces. Trying to recover what she has lost by building what may be termed an invisible empire, present France simultaneously is trying to modernize her military position in Europe and in doing

so is gradually breaking away from the American super-state. Within the Soviet super-state we at present witness a similar split. This rift seems to be caused by the natural discrepancies between the structure of the tremendous People's Republic of China which at present is, so to speak, in its Stalinist stage, and that of the present Soviet Union which has passed that stage fifteen years ago and is directed by a techno-bureaucracy for which world revolution is a thing of the past.

On the whole, however, the picture of a world divided into two immense political and ideological blocs was still preserved, and the ideologists in both camps were trying to make humanity forget these splits. Taken as a whole, the after-World War II period is one of the chief ages in history in which the "territorialization of ideologies," which I first mentioned when talking about the World War I period, reached its climax. The identification of the concepts America=democracy and USSR=social revolution still dominated the world and the general lines of political propaganda.

VI

With this kind of powers struggling for supremacy what, then, are the relations with the recently emancipated part of the world, the former victims of colonialism? What is the role of these new nations in the rivalry of the super-states that are bidding for their sympathies? Do the ties that connected them with the former colonial mother countries still exist, and/or are they connecting themselves with the super-states of our time, the USA and the USSR both of which, in vying for their sympathies are able to boast of their non-colonial past? In trying to answer this question in a very general way I shall make a few remarks about their type of nationalism, their leaders and the latter's affinities, and the way in which the super-states try to direct them.

Talking first about their general shape and nationalism, he must distinguish between those formerly colonial or semi-colonial nations whose struggle for de-colonization had started comparatively early and some of which—like India, China, Persia (Iran), and Egypt—were heirs to an ancient civilization, and the rest of them. While the former countries gained in influence, especially through the United Nations, the latter frequently were created by mere coincidence and could hardly affect international politics but by forming federations. Thus what today is Jordan was originally little more than a present made by Winston S. Churchill to Abdullah, brother of Iraq's King Feisal; Ceylon was politically an invention of the British, and what today is Nigeria was so little of a nation that during World War II its later chief and founder, Awolowo, in a statement which greatly resembled one issued around the same time and with the same reason by Ferhat Abbas, one of the fathers of the present Algerian nation, did declare: "Nigeria is not a nation, it is only a geographical concept. There are no Nigerians." At a

later stage his party, however, stated that it was its most important goal to create a nation from the conglomeration of people living in that area. Many nations in present Africa are merely formed by the totally accidental frontiers, boundaries, and demarcation lines which the European colonialists in the past drew through the territory they inhabited.

The first instance of a federation formed by the ex-colonial nations was the founding in 1958 of the United Arab Republic by Nasser. Syria at that moment was threatened by Communism. Moscow—as it later did in Cuba—tried to use it as an advanced post in the non-Communist world. Nasser checked this move by coming to terms almost overnight with Syria's president, Al Kwatli. The two states, which have no common frontier, were unified, and they later associated with the Yemen, then a theocracy ruled by an absolute monarch. This caused the resistance of the two Hashemite monarchies, Iraq and Jordan. The two cousins, Feisal and Hussein, created the Arabic Federation (February 14, 1958) which was to re-establish the balance of power in the Near East. The new Federation had hardly more than a symbolic value; nobody really thought that these two sheikdoms—these states were hardly more than that—would actually fuse. This was the pattern of many such combines in the de-colonized world, some of which never left the planning stage. In some cases one tried to form a common market, as in Europe (this was, for instance, done by the six republics of Central America). Or something of that type was merely intended (for instance, by the Casablanca group: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and Algeria, and also by Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay). Or one founded common military commands (as, for instance, was done by the Casablanca group for the common defense of Africa against any kind of attack) or one entered into agreements on a co-ordination of politics (Monrovia group comprising the former French colonies plus Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Libya, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Togo, and Somalia; the Casablanca Group; the Afro-Madagascan group plus Ruanda; the Arab League; the Maghreb states; SEATO: the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya; "Maphilindo"—Malaya (then not yet Malaysia), the Philippines, Indonesia). Finally, one tried to copy the creation of the United Arab Republic—not an encouraging example indeed. Senegal and Sudan combined to form the Mali Republic; Ghana and Guinea fused, and soon were joined by Mali, thus attempting to form a West African union. Under the leadership of the former tribal chief Houphouët-Boigny, the "Entente" (Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger) was formed. The British initiated the Central African Federation, the Southern Arabia Federation, the West Indian Federation, and Malaysia. All these combinations remained more or less ephemeral and had hardly any success.

One of the most outstanding features in the history of these new nations was their producing an astonishing number of leader personalities. This confirms my theory that there always exist plenty of potential leaders, but

that they only emerge in times when an explosive social situation like the one of those years warrants it. While it would be exaggerated to state that Tunisia is Bourghiba, Egypt is Nasser, Guinea is Sekou Touré, Sukarno is Indonesia, there is something to be said in favour of it. Not by accident does the book Nkrumah published about his life carry the title: *Ghana—an Autobiography by Kwame Nkrumah*.

Ben Bella—though now jailed by Boumedienne—Nyerere, Kenyatta, Tubman, Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny, Ayub Khan and Kassem—though slain—, Lumumba—though likewise slain—and Olympio (who also perished) represent, or did represent, their nations in person. Since most of the new nations acquired their independence not through veritable anti-colonial revolutions, but through the weakness of the European colonial nations, and through the super-state rivalry, which caused the United States to urge them to free their colonies, they mostly were ill-prepared for their new role. They thus, for lack of a developed party life and an organized opposition, used to put their trust in either the leaders of the local unity parties such as Bourghiba, Touré, Houphouët-Boigny, and Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, or officers playing the roles of social revolutionaries such as Nasser, Kassem, Ne Win, and even—in some instances—in conservative generals who promised to make an end to local corruption, such as Gursel in Turkey, Ayub Khan, Field-Marshal Sarit Thanarat of Thailand, or General Park of South Korea, some of whom (like that monster thief Sarit Thanarat), it is true, became far worse thieves than the figures they ousted. Decisions made by such leaders were regarded unattackable, since the population failed to realize that they mostly reflected political compromises between the various interests involved, and regarded them as manifestations of their nations' true wishes, revealed to those leaders through their inspiration.

The national leaders, in other words, had become what Max Weber calls charismatic figures. As such they were viewed with the greatest interest by the super-states and other big powers who all tried to gain the upper hand by enlisting the help of a maximum number of such persons. In this respect the situation had changed enormously since the period when the big powers were racing each other in the search for colonial space, though the methods they used in vying for the sympathies of those men were not inspired by an increase in unselfishness and helpfulness, but were studded with devices apt to connect the targets of their efforts still more closely with their cause than had been possible in the age of classical imperialism. The selection by the big powers of the proper leaders they cared to support was determined largely by the latter's social background and preparedness, to serve the cause of the big powers and, if necessary, to prevent private investments from being nationalized. Among the United States' favourites in that field were the late strong man of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, as is now the present Korean dictator, General Park, the series of dictators of South Viet-Nam (starting with the late Ngo Dinh-diem, who—just like Rhee—became so

intolerable even to his allies that he had to be removed, and reaching up to the present dictator, Nguyen Cao Ky, a declared worshipper of Hitler); the strong men of Thailand, including the late Sarit Thanarat who by illegal methods accumulated a fortune of about 130 million dollars; most dictators in present Latin America, with the exception, of course, of Castro, that target of general wrath, and most of the strong men in Africa. The latter were topped by that dubious figure, Moise Tshombe whom America at first fought, since he tried to detach his native area, the valuable Katanga, from the Congo and to put it back into the hands of Belgian high finance, but who was granted forgiveness and support, after that question had been solved according to American wishes, and Tshombe had managed to convince all concerned that if they acquiesced to his staging a comeback, as *de facto* head of the entire Congo, this would serve the interest of all foreign investors without exception. His might collapsed in October, 1965.

In keeping with the change of time, and the rise of the coloured man in the United States, both this country and the Soviet Union offered their friendship to the natives in the former colonial areas, and, at least in their propaganda, regarded imperialism as a bygone cause. Since 1949, when President Harry S. Truman, in his Inaugural Address, formulated the famous Point Four Programme, America seemed bound to make these areas miniature editions of her own affluent society. But whatever large financial contribution she mobilized for such purposes went at first chiefly into the Marshal Plan that served the reconstruction of Europe, and in the 1950's the poorly endowed Point Four Programme was combined with, and soon hopelessly outranked by, military aid that served the global requirements of super-state defense. Both types of aid even contradicted each other. While the civilian aid envisaged in Point Four—embracing help in the fields of education, hygiene, technical know-how, and agriculture—tended to improve living conditions, military aid on the whole did the opposite, especially if extended to dictators who practically were of no real use in global defense and used that money for increasing their armies and the pressure they exercised on the populations. Apart from this, the granting of military aid usually depended on the preparedness of the recipient to purchase an equal amount of material from his own means at the expense of the hungry masses of these nations. This material frequently was very expensive. Thus, for instance, in the autumn, 1965, Argentina, though teetering for months in a state of economic and political jitters, was coaxed into buying 50 jet attack planes, the A4B, from the Douglas Aircraft Co. at a cost of about \$250,000 each. While those planes were modern, as far as Argentina goes, they by that time were outdated, speaking in international terms, and in fact were regarded as "junk" by the big arm traders who dumped the fantastic waste of the biggest arms race in history—which at present costs the world 135 billion dollars each year—on the underdeveloped areas.

But the possibly worst result of the arming of undeveloped areas and

their despots was its negative effect upon the problem of land reform, which seems to be the decisive social question in the mutual rivalry of the super-states. Being something like night watchmen of the wealthy, even though they often blackmail foreign investors, the despots of those areas on the whole defended both capitalists and landowners against any real change. To be sure, this situation worked both ways. Without the existence of such elements, wealthy natives, tribal chiefs, local merchants, traders, bankers, and officials, who waxed rich in the period of classical imperialism, and without the protection given them, many of those areas, especially in Africa, might by now have turned Communist. But their interests and those of their protectors, the despots, in many cases, prevented their areas from becoming socially modernized and, for instance in South Viet-Nam, drove the landless into the Communists' arms. The problem was made worse by the fact that many undeveloped areas grew monoculture, the products of which were rejected by the big powers in the interest of their own agriculture. At present the economic and social cleavage between most of those areas—including for instance Latin America—and the United States of America, that nucleus of Western super-state formation, is increasing rather than decreasing.

VII

Little wonder, then, that the general opposition in the world to this situation is likewise rising. But for the tremendous splits that weaken this opposition the basic features of present super-state rivalry might have been changed by now. But with the USSR being paralyzed internationally by its struggle with the People's Republic of China, and the latter not yet possessing the technical means for playing a really leading role and for bolstering what seems to be becoming a Chinese-sponsored 4th International with arms, the situation for the time being stays stationary, and the underdeveloped nations consume their energies in bloody and costly internecine fights, as between India and Pakistan. The arms race between the super-states continues and basically determines the picture. This even is true of the war in Viet-Nam, which until some years ago was a rearguard action of declining classical imperialism, but of late has developed into an effort of the Pentagon to militarize its originally reluctant nation and—killing two birds with one stone—to stop the People's Republic of China before she can enter the main race.

To make the world, its security and economy, dependent on the progress of a super-arms race by super-states which reach into space and on one's capability to maintain a balance of terror, is hardly the way to solve its problems, and to discharge one's responsibility towards one's own nation and towards mankind. The people of the entire world want to live in peace, and to see the spectre of nuclear and space war banished. Without this

solution, neither the military nor the social world problems, which are so strongly determined by the arms race, can be handled efficiently. The race and the super-state rivalry of which it is part and parcel may easily press the undeveloped areas below the low level on which they have been living in the time of classical imperialism which it is everybody's intention to do away with forever. Whether that race can be checked and the formation of the super-states either stopped or deprived of its threatening military aspects, before it is too late—that is the problem of this time.