ISLAM AS A MODERN SOCIAL FORCE

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This article aims at an understanding of Islam as one of the forces exercising positive influence on the conduct of modern Muslims, and as a social force considered from a sociological point of view. The first task for Muslims in the present day may be considered to be that of fundamental reform, that is, there must be a switch from negative to positive attitudes both within the individual and within society as a whole. This must be accompanied by the firm establishment of a strong political base under the leadership of which progress may be made towards achieving a modern economic development. Accordingly this article examines the historic-social conditions necessary for a fundamental reform of Islamic institutions and the Muslim's way of thinking, and into the historical development of political and social values in Muslim society.

Studies in modern Islam could be categorized generally as having two approaches. In one of them, modern Islam is treated as the main underlying factor obstructing modern socio-economic development, and the external aspect of the social change to which Islam has been subjected is emphasized. This type of approach reveals the old-fashioned Western outlook of a "*stationary* Asiatic society," and the inner dynamics and traditional popular values operating in modern Muslim society would not seem to be recognized. One may be able to point out that a similar external approach underlay Soviet interpretations of modern Islam until the close of the period of Stalinism.

In the other approach, Islam is viewed as a potential social force working to advance a transitional society towards modernization, and traditional popular values would be re-evaluated to reorient them towards modern social reconstruction. Historically, it is evident that nationalist leaders in Muslim countries, excepting the Turkish Republic which adopted secularism, have generally attempted to use the promotion of the social force in Islam for the purpose of political liberation in the pre-independence period, and as a source of energy for attaining social reconstruction in the post-independence period.

Whereas the former approach tends to stress the impact of the West on modernization, the latter emphasizes the inner dynamics of the social change. Although the background of the appearance of the latter approach in the West may be found in the need for "mutual understanding" between the United States of America and the Middle East from a strategic point of view, it has merit in the cultural pluralism in which the Middle East is

recognized as socially distinct from the modern West. Therefore, logically, it should recognize in Muslim Asia a unique, distinct way of modernization not seen in modern Western history. In the Soviet's approach to modern Asia in the post-Stalinist period, a change in policy and in historical inter-pretation may also be seen, and the possibility of a unique development of a transitional society (a society which is not yet socialist nor capitalist) is recognized, with certain limitations.

On discussing the role of traditional values in transitional Muslim Asia, we are asked to reconsider the conclusion of the great Islamic scholar, H. A. R. Gibb, who predicts that the future of Islam rests where it has rested in the past, under the traditional leadership.[1]

The present article aims at re-examining sociologically within their historical context some of the problems of the internal relationship of the traditional values, especially the religio-social values of Islam, with the modern political revolution and with ideological change.

Before entering our subject, let us define some concepts of modern history and society as follows:

1. "Modern history" in Muslim Asia.

As in colonial and semi-colonial Asia, modern history in Muslim Asia began with the colonization of the society internally, which was coincident with the period of imperialism internationally. Historical conditions of colo-nialization vary regionally. We divide modern history into three stages: (1) from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, (2) the inter-war period, and (3) post-World War II. Corresponding to these historical stages, the character of nationalism, and the nature of the response to colonization, has changed.

2. "Modern Islam."

In the strict sense, the Western concept of modern Islam implies the school of modern reform movements or the modern intellectual movements, as distinct from the traditionalist Islam. We will treat the modern develop-ments of Islam as a whole herein as modern Islam.

3. The interrelationship of "colonization" with "de-colonization."

Simultaneously with colonization arises the response from within a colonial society to get rid of it. The experience of Afro-Asian nationalism shows that the two movements cannot be separated outwardly, but are comprehended as interrelated internally; hence the national movement is itself a dialectical process of the two forces within society, the one of a colonizing force and the other a de-colonizing force.[2]

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1   On the future development of Islam, H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Illinois, University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 122, states that "the future of Islam rests where it has rested in the past—on the insight of the orthodox leaders and their capacity to resolve the new tensions as they arise by a positive doctrine which will face and master the force making for disintegration." See also a similar conclusion in his *Mohammedanism* (London, Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 191.

I. THE DUAL STRUCTURE OF TRADITIONAL ISLAM AS THE BACKGROUND OF THE PURIFICATIONIST MOVEMENTS

The religous structure of Islam in the later mediaeval period preceding modern history may be treated as the dual structure which consisted of orthodox Islam based upon the system of Sharī'ah on the one hand, and Sufism on the other. While the two can be treated as succeeding stages in the historical development of the religious thought of Islam, from the sociological point of view, they present a dual structure which is inseparably interwoven.[3]

Orthodox Islam constitutes the order of the universal Islamic Community, which in point of the social functions provides a general framework for man and society, but leaves the actual content of ethics to each Muslim and to society. Thus orthodox Islam may be presented as the superstructure resting on the actual foundation of the old corporate structure of society. It is in this respect that H. A. R. Gibb suggests that the relationship between the outward formulation of any Islamic doctrine and the inner function, or the reality in the Islamic system, was often an indirect one.[4]

In contrast to orthodox Islam, Sufism met personal needs adapted to social environments. The Sufi expression of Islam is characteristic of the magico-religious attitude of popular religion praying for answer to worldly matters of immediate, personal concern such as wealth, children, health, freedom from disease.... A Sufi saint is a charismatic person, not by descent like an "imām-zādeh," the legitimate descendant of an Imām, but by his religious gift, and he is credited with "karāmāt," miraculous grace.

In later Islam, Sufi orders had intricately struck root in social life everywhere in the Muslim lands, especially in the later converted regions. Generally in urban society, Sufi brotherhoods were closely related with craft-guilds. An urban order of Sufism was usually not restricted to a single city, but was connected with other branches of the order in distant cities.

A Muslim of the later period found his identity primarily with a functional group, a guild organization to which he belonged as a member and, at the same time, with one of the brotherhoods. Through these groups he could exercise civic virtue and approach Islam.[5] We can suppose that abstract orthodox Islam seemed too removed for such average Muslims. Orthodox Islam could be related to average Muslims only through the

[2]   Especially suggestive on this point is Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism, Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution*, London, Heinemann, 1964.

[3]   Historically, the development of Sufism is generally grasped as a reaction to orthodox Islam.

[4]   H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, p. 21.

[5]   A. K. S. Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia* (London, University of London, 1954), discusses the important sociological functions of these organizations in traditional Iranian society.

intermediary of Sufism.

Such coexistence between orthodox Islam and Sufism in later Islam implies an extraordinary diversity of religious ideas and practices, and at the same time an intricate complex of political values. It was against this background that the purificationist movements emerged, aiming at the "renovation" of Islam. The chief instance of such a purificationist tendency was the Wahhābī movement, which arose in the eighteenth century in central Arabia.

From the point of view of the types of modernization, the Wahhābī movement attracts our special notice, for it contributed no less to the rationalization of the religion and politics of traditional Islam, which means the concentration of multiple values on one distinct object. It signified the first impact from within on the modernization of Muslim society, which preceded the impact of the West. Notwithstanding that the attitude of the Wahhābīs revealed a marked irrational and reactionary tendency inherent in it, nevertheless it cannot be denied that their orientation for the restoration of the "pristine" purity of the faith redirected itself to a new social order distinct from the traditional one. Distinctions were made between original Islam and un-Islamic accretions and later deviations, and thus the movement simplified the intricate complexity of the established religious authority system to aid in the concentration of the religious and political allegiance of Muslims.

It was a natural consequence that the movement protested primarily against Sufism as un-Islamic, and at the same time attacked the authority of orthodox Islam for its compromises with Sufism.

In view of the Muslims' self-consciousness of their history, the movement can be interpreted as the first modern occurrence of a deviation in Islamic history, and accordingly it summoned Muslims to restore once again the divinely guided society. Such an inspiration for Islamic restoration and renovation has been seen to be recurrent and has become an integral part of modern Muslims' historical thinking since that time.[6]

Parallel purificationist movements emerged in other Muslim lands as well, preceding modern history. For example, in India the tradition of the orthodox restoration (tajaddud) can be traced back to Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindī (1563-1624), who lived in the days when the Mughals were at passing their zenith. He has been regarded as the first "mujaddid," a regenerator of Islam in a time of spiritual decay in India.[7] However, the chief instance of the Indian tradition of " tajaddud " parallel with Arabian Wahhābism was Shah Walīullāh of Dehlī (1703-1781), who was almost contemporary with the

[6]   For an argument on the inner tension between the Islamic historical consciousness and actual historical development, see W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1957.

[7]   Mohammad Yasin, *A Social History of Islamic India, 1605-1748* (Lucknow, India, Upper India Publishing House, 1958), discusses the concept of " Mujaddid " in Mughal India.

Arabian Wahhāb. Presenting himself as the "mujaddid" of the time, he attempted to restore pristine Islam. In later centuries ever since the decline of Muslim society in India, his reform ideas have been the main source of inspiration for the orthodox reform movement among Indian Muslims.

It is noteworthy that in the nineteenth century the purificationists' protests against internal deterioration became linked with the resistance against the encroachment of the "infidels" of the British East India Company, which came to constitute the main background of the Indian Mutiny of 1857.[8]

It is this double orientation—the internal regeneration, and the resistance against foreign colonialism—that significantly characterizes modern Muslim nationalism as we shall argue it in the following sections.[9]

In the end, it will be necessary to remind ourselves that these purificationist movements preceding modern history should not be interpreted as isolated phenomena to be found only within Islamic history, but should be grasped in a wider perspective in comparison with the course of modernization in other areas.[10]

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SYNTHESES OF ISLAM AND POLITICS

The remarkable characteristic of the political structure in modern Muslim Asia is the increasing of the distance between the state and society. We can hardly see any self-identification of society on the basic level with the state in this region. The author maintains that the prerequisite for the modernization of a developing country is the strengthening of the identity of these two elements, by means of which the developing country will be able to secure the stability of political power and effectively concentrate the entire energy of the nation which are necessary for national reconstruction.

Therefore, in this section we shall discuss some basic correlations between Islam and politics; in other words, developments of syntheses between traditional and modern political values in transitional Muslim Asian society, which is in need of a strong political authority.

See p. 156.

[8]   Ziya-ul-Hassan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1963), Chapter 1, presents an outline of the development as a prelude to the Deoband School.

[9]   W. C. Smith, p. 47.

[10]   For instance, we may be permitted to compare the Wahhābism with the "*Kokugaku* school" which emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Japan. The Japanese purificationist movement demanded the exclusion of alien elements, Buddhism and Confucianism, which had struck intricate roots in traditional society, in order to restore the ancient Shintoism. For such an attempt at comparison with Japanese society, see R. N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion*, Glencoe, Ill, Free Press, 1956.

Historically, the original model for the basic orientation of the political actions of modern Muslims—internal reform and external defence as W. C. Smith phrases it[11]—can be found in the first awakening of the Muslims at the end of the nineteenth century, at a time when the whole of Muslim Asia had become incorporated into the colonial system and when the colonization of the Muslim society had just begun. The greatest pioneer in the modern awakening at that time was Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839–1897).[12] Although his political thought was historically restricted, he was basically inspired in response to modern colonialization, and it is in this meaning that his thought still has positive significance even up to the present day, in so far as de-colonization has not yet been completed. The period when he played an active role corresponds to the nascent period of local national movements. The Revolt of ʿArābī Pāshāh in Egypt in 1879–1882,[13] and the Civil Tobacco Boycott Movement (Tahrīme-e Tanbākū) in Iran in 1890–1891,[14] are enumerated as the first movement of nationalism in Egypt and in Iran respectively. Influence of al-Dīn al-Afghānī was very strong among the leaders of both of these movements. By a glance of his political review, *"al-ʿUrwat al-Wuthqā,"*[15] co-edited with his disciple Muhammad ʿAbduh, we can see the wide range of his political vision, which was not restricted to one particular nation, but extended almost over the entire Muslim world with the exception of Southeast Asia: from Central Asia in India in the East, to the Mahdist Sudan and North Africa in the west. This may suggest to us that he comprehended modern imperialistic penetration not from the viewpoint of a traditionalist Muslim, but with wide perspective, seeing it as an interrelated world-wide problem involving the colonial East and the colonialist West. He may be treated as the first person in the Muslim world to arrive at such a comprehension of modern international relations.

In this respect, his alleged Pan-Islamism would seem to have been less religiously motivated in the direction of abstract Islamic unity, but would

11 W. C. Smith, p. 47.

12 About his political thought and activities, especially his influence over the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, see my article, "Nishi-Ajia ni okeru Nashonarizumu (Nationalism in West Asia)," *Shisō*, No. 438 (Dec., 1960), which is based mainly upon Persian published materials.

13 Yūzō Itagaki, " ʿOrābī-Undō no Seikaku ni tsuite (On the Character of the ʿOrābī's Revolt)," *Tōyōbunkakenkyūjo-kiyō* (Tokyo University), No. 31 (March, 1963). He considers that the leadership of ʿOrābī was conceived by soldiers and fallāhīn as a village Shaykh.

14 Ibrāhīm Tīmūrī, *Tahrīm-e Tanbākū* (Boycott of Tobacco), Teheran, Kitābkhāna-ye Suqrāt, AHS. 1328. He sees in the movement a reflection of public opinion represented by the ʿUlamā, against the background of the interests of the Iranian merchant class, especially the traders in tobacco.

15 It is said that the journal was familiar in British India in the 1880's, although imports were strictly prohibited by the British authorities. Cf. ʿAziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964.

constitute rather a political awakening to the need for solidarity among the whole of Muslim Asia against their modern common enemy, Western impe- rialism, especially late nineteenth century British imperialism. We should re-evaluate his wide perspective, apart from his suspected connexion with the politically reactionary of Sultan 'Abdul-Hamīd II who tried through Pan- Islamism to prevent the coming internal disruption of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, his political thought should not be interpreted as a kind of supra-nationalism working contrary to the growth of modern local nation- alism on the basis of the nation-state, but should be interpreted as contributing practically to strenghen it, while at the same time encouraging the reinforcing of an alliance with a neighbouring Muslim nation. In this context, nation- alism in a single state on the one hand, and the international solidarity to be established between the Muslim nations on the other hand, were never inconsistent, but rather were complementary. In reality, however, on the level of politics, an alliance between national movements developed far less than he had expected.

In al-Dīn al-Afghānī's political thought such subjects as the modern development of the world or the threat of colonialism were explained mainly with traditional terms and dialectics by reason that modern Western concepts of politics had not yet been made familiar. Not only for that reason, his method of preferring traditional frames of reference, added to his power of eloquence, was intended for appealing mainly to the 'Ulamā class, to whom he entrusted the leadership of the popular movement. Such an aspect of his thought should not be judged one-sidedly as "reactionary,"[16] but rather should be interpreted positively as expressing his conviction in the capacity of the traditional leadership to transform the traditional values into a pro- gressive, positive force, penetratively touching with the will and the feeling of the sensitive Muslim masses at the historical turning-point.

In this context, his political reform was not intended for the reinforce- ment of a declining despotic dynasty. According to al-Dīn al-Afghānī, political sovereignty should never be in the hands of a political ruler ("hākim"), but should be in the hands of the people who, though not yet forming a modern nation, were believed to have the potentiality to transform the traditional values into a positive force. He asserted that the Muslim public was endowed with the power to dismiss a temporal political ruler in the case that ruler could not render service for the public welfare ("maslahah," "sa'adah"). This concept of the peoples' sovereignty may be regarded as a form of democracy based on traditional values. Actually at that time public opinion was just emerging in Muslim Asia in spite of despotic restric- tions and the severe suppression of political activity undertaken by the citizens.

This positive aspect of his political thought contributed later, inspiring

[16]   Article, "Islam," *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd ed., Moskow, 1953), defines the role of his thought negatively as "serving the re-enforcement of the reactionary 'Ulamā and the feudal lords."

the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (Inquilab-e Mashrūtiyat-e Irān, 1905–1911).[17] The revolution condemned the rule of the Qājārides as "istibdād," despotism, and demanded the basic rights of the "millat," the nation. In this way, the Iranians came to conceive of the nation as opposing despotism which violated the rights of the people. It was due to this that the Revolution took the form of a struggle for the basic rights of the people. The movement in its early stage adopted the traditional method of protest, "bast" "bazaar," (the closure of the commercial centre of the city) and petitions for reform and at this stage this movement was restricted to the capital. Through estimation of the number of the participants of these demonstrations, it is known that the majority of the citizens in the capital joined in the movement, which means that the movement was organized on a traditional basis.[18]

The movement soon advanced from the earlier stage of civil demonstration to the armed revolt of the citizens, in the period of "Istibdād-e Saghīr," the Counter-Revolution of the Shāh. In Tabrīz, the most advanced city of Iran at that time, "mujāhidāns," armed citizens, and revolutionary civil authority were organized principally under the leadership of "Ijtimā'iyūn-e Āmmiyūn," the Social Democrats of Baku, Caucasus. This shows that the socialist values of popular democracy and popular organization could be easily associated with the traditional basis in Iran, when something of socialism was first introduced under the direct influence of the First Russian Revolution. This early popular socialism should be distinguished from the kind of theoretical socialism introduced in the 1920's and 1930's by the westernized intellectuals who had first learned of it in the West. On the popular level, under the conditions of colonial rule, the traditional values of Islamic society proved that Islamic society, far from excluding socialist values, could assimilate them without losing its identity.

As the result of the Revolution, the power of the Qājārides received a deadly blow from the national forces of the citizens. Internationally, however, the period coincided with the completion of the semi-colonial system as exemplified by the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907. As a matter of course, the régime of the reactionary Shāh, once defeated by national forces, was reinforced by the imperialists. Russia especially considered the maintaining of the Court a useful means of intervention in internal politics. Under these international relations, a revolution demanding basic rights and basic reforms was destined to be suppressed by the intervention of outside powers.

In this way the revolution was frustrated, and it was the first of the

17 See my article, "Iran Rikken-kakumei no Seikaku ni tsuite (On the Character of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution)," *Tōyōbunkakenkyūjo-kiyō*, No. 26 (Feb., 1962), which analyses critically the social background of the movement, basing itself upon Persian published materials. For a general outline of the movement, see article, "DUSTŪR" (by A. K. S. Lambton), *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (new ed.).

18 The movement was organized on the basis of craft-guilds, financed by merchants. The form of "bast" may be compared with the Indian form of civil protest, "hartal."

frustrations that the Iranians have repeatedly experienced since that time. For the first time it gave the precious lesson to the Iranians that the real force of the "istibdād" suppressing the democratic and national rights of the Iranians was no longer an internal one, but that the greatest "istibdād" was the foreign imperialism behind it. From that experience, it came to be formulated that a realization of democracy in Iran in the age of imperialism presupposed a national liberation from imperialism. Such political consciousness has since fixed the political orientation of the Iranians, and such formalism is especially valid among the intellectuals, in whose view the obtaining of democratic civil rights is inseparable from national liberation.

In India, where the British colonial rule had begun earlier in comparison with that of the Middle East, the orientation of the external defence is found earlier.

The modern tradition of the Indian Muslims, to give priority to external defence, can be traced back to the "fatwā," the religious decree issued in 1803 by 'Abdul-'Azīz (1764–1824), the son of Shāh Walīullāh, q. v.[19] The religious decree attracts our attention in that it reflected for the first time a foreboding of the coming colonialism never perceived before that time. Terming the British colonialists "kuffār," infidels, it made resistance against the British East India Company a religio-political duty of the Muslims. It was one of the first modern declarations of "dār al-harb" applied to Muslim India. This current of Islamic resistance against British penetration developed to gather a great momentum until it finally exploded in the Mutiny, the "War of the Independence." In that case, it is highly doubtful if the participants in the movement displayed loyalty for the existing authority of the Mughals. Rather it can be supposed that they sought the realization of some popular religious authority in place of the established political system.

The dual loyalty, which religiously safeguarded the Sharī'sh in a colonialized society and which struggled politically for the cause of the freedom of India in co-operation with non-Muslim Indians, characterized the subsequent orientation of orthodox nationalist Muslims. Dār al-'Ulūm, Deoband, founded soon after the collapse of the Mutiny, and the Jam'īyat al-'Ulamā-i Hind, formed during the Khilāfat movement in 1919, are examples of this trend.[20] They constituted the Muslims' wing in Indian nationalism before independence. Naturally they participated in the movement without regarding their communal interests.

As we have just shown, in the modern society of the Indian Muslims, the force for regenerating the traditional values which had positive significances as a norm of the political actions of the Muslim masses was located in the depth of nationalism. The motivation of the people to national resistance may be explained by their feeling that the social potentiality, or the social harmonizing power preserved in the traditional values was totally

19   Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, pp. 2–3.
20   Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, pp. 2–3.

exposed to destruction or disintegration by colonialism.

Parallel with the above orientation of the "external defence," a new trend of "modernism" emerged in modern Muslim India at the momentous juncture following the suppression of the Mutiny. The new trend favoured the modern Western value of criticizing the traditional values. The people refused to apply politically the principle of "dār al-harb" to British India, swore loyalty to the British rule in India. The leader of the movement was Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān (1817–1898). His main motive was to deliver the Indian Muslim community from possible utter ruin. On the other hand, the movement had the significance of "opening the door" of the hitherto closed Indian Muslim community to modern Western thought and institutions of the British liberalism of the nineteenth century. The intellectual movement was a prelude to a new age of enlightenment.

The social basis of this movement was a modern urban middle class composed mainly of Muslim bureaucrats who had risen from the status of petty clerks and of those modern landlords who were created under the colonial system. It is important to note that this intellectual movement developed politically to take the leading role for the establishment of the Muslim League in 1907, and since that time it was treated by the British as representing the Indian Muslim community politically. This political organization formed the basis of the Muslim "communalism," in opposition to the united Indian nationalism, which was defended by the orthodox Muslim nationalists.

On the whole, the modern reform movement initiated by this Muslim middle class could not take root in society and failed to assimilate modern values with the traditional values, for the movement introduced into the Muslim society modern Western thought and institutions without basing these upon the traditional values and traditional social foundation.[21] On the contrary, the gap or the social dis-communication underlying modernism and traditionalism became even wider in the process of modern social development. Neither modern traditionalism nor Westernized modernism could independently integrate modernization with traditional social values.[22] Indeed, such a social disintegration within modern Muslim society has generally been pointed out as the most profound problem, not only in Indian Muslim society, but also in the whole of modern Muslim Asia.

In the post-independence stage after the War, Muslim Asian nationalism has generally faced up to the transformation from the foregoing negative orientation of nationalism (reuniting the traditional values with anti-colonialism) to the positive nationalism devoted to national reconstruction (reintegrat-

[21]   As a suggestive social analysis of the development of Muslim modernism in India, see W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, London, 1947. The approach and the inspiration of the work appear resembling closely to the contemporary J. Nehru, *Discovery of India*, 3rd ed., London, Meridian Books Ltd., 1951.

[22]   Cf. the concluding part of Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi's cited work.

ing traditional values with nation building). Although even after political independence it cannot be denied that the dangers of old colonialism and "neo-colonialism" still exist for Muslim Asians, who tend politically to over-emphasize the threat, mainly for the internal purpose of national unification.

It may be an interesting problem for us to try to see in which way the traditional values are at present re-evaluated by Muslim Asian leaders, or whether and how they can be made the fundamental basis of positive nationalism. For example, we may be able to witness attempts at re-evaluation in individual writings such as those entitled *A Discovery of One's Nation*, or *A Philosophy of Revolution*, written by nationalist leaders.

First, the prerequisite for modernization is considered by these men to be the realization of national unity and at the same time the stabilization of the political base. The general tendency may be characterized by the inclination to the justification of authoritarianism as a political means, justifiable at least in the short run. The attempt to relate the Islamic value system to independent political authority is a work of inconsistency in itself on a purely theoretical level. For Islam categorically excludes any independent political authority other than one based upon the ultimate religious authority. Likewise, for the purpose of making a national religion which may be an effective means for national unification, the Islamic constitutional theory of Universalism is not favourable, as Islam should ultimately be realized in a supra-national Community.

Accordingly, the legislative body, often undivided from the executive body of the new state, should pass along a new interpretation of Islamic teaching in favour of national unity and rapid reform on its own initiative. In this sense, modern Islam is in reality a national religion developed in accordance with the needs of nationalism. The constitutional theory of the Islamic State in Pakistan exemplifies in itself an attempt to synthesize the supra-national Islam with national Islam.

However, the mere making of the official ideology of the state which may be declared in the preamble of a constitution or in a charter of a party means nothing unless the ideology is "sincerely" supported by the majority of the nation. The disintegration of politics from the social base, characteristic of a colonial society, has not been successfully resolved. So far a real national philosophy or a real national conviction, acceptable to the majority of the population, and with which Islam should be co-ordinated, has not been attained. On the one hand, it is certain that the success of the effect of such a national conviction depends ultimately upon the achievement of economic development. The causal relation between economic underdevelopment and political disunity has constituted a vicious circle, in the modern history of the area. In this difficult situation, the developing Muslim Asian countries are challenging the existing vicious circle through the concentration of political values. This is the reason why these countries are more and more inclined to be ideological authoritarian states.

There has been a trend to national ideal-making—secularist and neo-Islamist. The most noteworthy neo-Islamic elaboration is the national ideal of the "Islamic State" in Pakistan. Politically the Islamic State was adopted as a national ideal for the protagonists of the two-nation theory in the 1940's. However, the original inspiration may be traced back to Sir Muhammad Iqbāl (1876–1938), a great romantic Persian and Urdu poet-philosopher. He expounded the Islamic theory of polity, reinterpreting Islam as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity, meaning a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal. The ideal, subsequently remoulded through the political leadership of the Muslim League played an enormous role in achieving national unity in the critical period immediately after the separation.

That national conviction could bind together heterogeneous social forces and provincial interests, but, inevitably, soon after the enthusiasm followed disillusionment and the estrangement of the public from this ideal. This was because as a political concept it was too vague, and could be interpreted in several ways, ranging from the secular to the neo-Islamic totalitarian interpretation. Thus the political leaders of the Muslim League, the orthodox 'Ulamā, and the followers of the Jama'at-i Islami interpreted the concept in ways favourable to their own interests. The official ideal proved sometimes dangerous to national unity, for in its name the extremists could justify their actions, and it rendered national unity more unstable.

The régime of Ayyūb Khān, while adopting the new course of national reconstruction and the new political system of Basic Democracy and rejecting the old parliamentary democracy, supports the ideal of the Islamic State. His real intention of deliberately preserving the Islamic national ideal may be explained by the fact that his régime attempts to enforce the rapid *de facto* secularization, while unifying the multi-national structure of the population in the name of Islam and preventing potential revolt on the part of the traditionalist Muslims.[23]

Anywise, we should approach the Islamic State of Pakistan as a "nasb-al-'ayin," a national ideal, but we should be careful not to approach it as a political system or a substantially theocratic institution. In reality, the 'Ulamā class have not gained any official posts, nor have they been accorded any privileges by the Pakistani governments.

In recent years, most Muslim Asian nations have experienced revolutionary political changes generally characterized by the emergence of "authoritarian" régimes in place of the past parliamentary political systems in the area. The new authoritarians may be characterized by their attempt to resort to popular support, directly appealing to the labourers and the peasants. They attempt to reorganize the political system in order to tightly control the lowest level of the social system, excluding the intermediate agents

[23] Mushir al-Haque, "Idarah Thaqafat-i Islamiyah," *Iqbal*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Jan., 1964), Lahore.

and local powers interposed in the past between the state and society.

This brings about the communication and information revolutions which are now taking place. Traditionally, communication channels were mainly in the hands of 'Ulamā who usually played a representative role at the local level. And among the urban lower middle class, such religio-social organizations as al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn in the Arab world or the Jamaʿat-i Islami in Pakistan have possessed their own communication nets. It is pointed out that Nasserism managed to utilize the popular symbols and popular organizations of the Ikhwan, while purging the leaders at the upper levels of the movement.[24]

Similarly, in the process of the "White Revolution," undertaken by the Iranian Shāh, the land reform was greatly obstructed by the 'Ulamā in the first stage, but the government was able to explain the benefits of the land reform to the prejudiced peasants, immediately appealing to them through the transistor-radios which had been popularized among the peasants. Generally in the Middle Eastern society, radio seems to be far more effective as a means of informing the masses than the press, which is more suited to the educated.

New authoritarians do not as a rule deny Islamic values. But the state control over those domains of Islam hitherto untouched by the state is actually much more strengthened under new authoritarian régimes than under the former parliamentary systems, in which traditional Islam had constituted a vast basis for conservatives, and therefore had served the conservative political purpose.

Parallel with the trend of *de facto* secularization, new authoritarians attempt to revive the positive social concepts of Islam, and relate them to their radical reform programme. For example, the popular concept of "social justice" has been adopted for the political programme in the United Arab Republic, although the leaders themselves are fully aware of the stationary aspect inherent in the popular ethos.[25] In the political development of the UAR, the value system of "ishtirākiyyah," the unique way of socialism, is at present being promoted, and the other social values, including those of Islam, are to be co-ordinated with this.

As a general rule, new authoritarians utilize Islamic social symbols and ethos for popular mobilization and for the manipulation of public opinion. And further, the international aspect of Islam, more properly its cosmopolitanism, is utilized as a means of strengthening the inter-regional relations of the Muslim countries.

As a whole, Islam seems to have been passively subordinated in modern development to the priority of political values, as we have seen above. But,

[24]   See, Yūzō Itagaki, "Musulim-Dōhōdan no Kaitai ni tsuite (An Interpretation of the Dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood)," *Isramu Sekai*, No. 1 (Nov., 1963.)

[25]   Takeshi Hayashi, "On Arab Socialism," *The Developing Economies*, Vol. II, No. 1 (March, 1964).

the author maintains that it is but one aspect of modern Islam which may be regarded as a compromise on the part of Islam, and so he does not believe that Islam has lost all dynamic vitality in modern history. In reality, we may be permitted to view all the varieties of nationalism in Muslim Asia as being based on a coexistent relation of three different values or forces: that of Islam, nationalism, and socialism. The experience of modern ideological developments seems to prove that radical nationalists had ultimately to return to Islamic values, even if they had at one time ignored these values individually.

In conclusion, the present and the future national ideology would seem to be one which is shared on their own initiative by the Muslim masses, who have been accustomed to being apathetic to the old political values. That means that it should be reconstituted basically, placing deep trust in the revolutionary masses and enabling them to develop the positive aspect of their traditional popular ethics. These Muslim masses are today aware of their own rights, demanding a social revolution. Although they do not seem to have arrived at establishing their own political power or a political organization of their own, yet the new authoritarians reflect the demand of the revolutionary masses to some degree. The new authoritarians themselves suggest the simultaneous character of social revolution and political revolution. We can find such a consciousness of history, for example, in the *Philosophy of Revolution* by Gamal Abdel-Nasser, which states that the simultaneous attainment of the political revolution with the social revolution is the historical task of the Egyptian nation.[26] For the achievement of this task the way of nationalism may be experimental, pragmatic, and above all realistic in order to cope with rapid social change.

Certainly the process of the modernization in Muslim Asia is a historically unique one without any established model for it in modern world history.

III. TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUAL ETHICS

As an accompaniment to modern social change, individual ethics should inevitably be transformed, seeking individual security and ethical reunion in the disintegrated society. Consequently we will discuss in this section some aspects of the modern transformation of individual ethics.

From the point of view of ethical structure, orthodox Islam prescribed a primarily religious, at the same time, legalistic system of actions for the individual before God.[27] The ethical core of that action was " taqwā," religious piety. It was only secondly that orthodox Islam prescribed the social part of his actions, or his inter-personal relations ("mu'amalah"), within the charismatic Community. Through the religious relation, the brotherly

26 Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution,* Cairo, UAR. Government, 1954, pp. 22, 27.

27 On the theory of salvation in the Shi'ite Islam, cf. Dr. Khodāyār-Manūchehr Mohebbī (Tehran University), *Les Rites de Purification en Islam.* (Persian unpublished.)

relation of individual believers and the equality of them before God could be deduced in an abstract way.

The ethical basis of orthodox Islam was thus a universalistic one founded upon an atomistic view of social relations. The whole system should be regarded as a grand framework on the level of universal relations, and therefore we can state that it had almost no immediate relation with the particular needs either of personal ethics or those of social groups.

It was the function of Sufism to provide personal and social ethics in the traditional corporative structure of society, especially in later Islam. Sufism was a way of self-realization open to submissive man in the midst of social insecurity.[28] Surely it is a one-sided view for modern European Islamists to see it as a religious mysticism of man isolated from society, thus disregarding the sociological aspect of it.

The Sufi orders (singular form, "tarīqah"), the social expression of Sufism, functioned to provide social security and at the same time spiritual fulfilment for its members, overlapping with autonomous functional groups as represented by the craft-guilds in traditional society. The Sufi orders together with various corporations constituted a social mechanism which enabled citizens who had suffered under oppressive rule to exercise civic virtue, and thus helped the growth of an independent personal character.[29] In Iran, since the establishment of the Safavides, the later Shi'ism of the Twelvers was substituted for Sufism, assuming a similar function.

In comparison with the supremacy of the religious and social aspect of the ethical system, it is worthy of note that those social regulations and civil penalties which were imposed by the state were only passively accepted and that their violation carried no stigma of conscience.[30]

In the process of modern colonization, the traditional corporative functional groups and the brotherhood organizations rapidly dissolved and lost their former function of relating man to society. On the contrary, the insecurity of man increased to its maximum under the conditions of a colonial-capitalist system.

Another side of this insecurity of man meant an opportunity for a modern rising class, represented by the modern landlord class. All the same, local histories of the modern Middle East show that a great many individual landlords dropped out the ranks, to be replaced by newly rising elements in the short term, and such replacements of landlord families have been very frequent.

In addition to the decisive impact of colonial capitalism, the dissolution of the social basis of the traditional corporative organizations was further

[28]   A. R. Arasteh, *Man and Society in Iran,* Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1964.
[29]   On a social history of Iran, see A. K. S. Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia,* London, London School of Oriental and African Studies, 1954.
[30]   H. A. R. Gibb, "Social Factor X," in W. Z. Laquer ed., *The Middle East in Transition,* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958.

accelerated by radical nationalist reform régimes between the wars, especially in Kemalist Turkey and in Reza Shah's Iran. These régimes regarded traditional autonomous groups as directly opposing the task of the centralization of power. Unhappily, in Iran, the attempt resulted in utter social disintegration, bringing out the violation of the rights of the people by the state, and thus drying up the source of individual initiative.[31]

In this way, in modern history the ethics which traditionally related individuals with society lost their traditional social roots, together with their spiritual vitality. This explains to us the fact that Muslims have faced the modern world unprepared. It is the moral void or the social disunity thus produced by colonial-capitalism and further mismanaged by nationalists that constitutes the profound inner crisis of modern Muslim society.

As a matter of course, a modern ethical movement tends to regain the lost tie which reintegrates individuals with society. It is against this background that Muslim Asian nationalism displays a strange ethical inclination. The West may easily point out the trend to totalitarianism inherent in the development of nationalism.

So far we have been concerned with the analysis of the modern personal and social moral structure of Muslim Asians and our diagnosis of their society.

We shall discuss in the following the characteristics of some proposals in modern Islam for the solution of the modern reconstruction of personal morality, or Muslims' attempts in search of a new religio-moral foundation, according to the stages of historical developments.

The first awakening of individuals and of the Community to their moral responsibility in the decline of the Islamic world may be credited to al-Afghānī, q. v. He rejected the traditional non-responsible attitude at the time of the struggle against imperialist penetration. To arouse the feeling of Muslims' responsibility for history, he cited the phrase of the Qur'ān: "Verily, God does not change the situation of a people until they change their own condition" (13, 11). In his views of morality, it was imperative for the survival of Islam for Muslims to stand resolutely on their own legs vis-à-vis the modern West.

His contemporary, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān of India, politically antagonistic to the former, urged the transformation of the moral structure based upon conventional old customs ("rasm wa riwāj") into a rationalistic personal morality, as the social basis for the improvement of his Indian Muslim community. In his thought the sense of individual responsibility was expressed as "self-respect," or "self-help," inspired by the modern Western liberal spirit.[32] In any event, he attempted to establish a modernist personal morality

31   A. K. S. Lambton, p. 30. A. R. Arasteh, *Man and Society in Iran,* criticizes the Reza Shah régime on the same ground.

32   See his Urdu articles in "Tahzīb al-Akhlāq," recently collected and edited under the title, *Maqālāt-i Sar Sayyid* (Refinement of Ethics), Part 5 "Akhlāq awr Islāhī Mazāmīn", Lahore, Majlis-e Taraqqī-ye Adab, 1962.

upon liberal principles, but his appeal was restricted to the rising Muslim
middle class, and met with overwhelming hostility from all sides. It was
unhappy for the later development of his intellectual movement that it unduly
disregarded the traditional positive moral base. It further attracts our atten-
tion that he confidently advocated the secularist principle, clearly distinguish-
ing "dīnī," religious, from the "dunyawī," secular, affairs. Thus, as a modern
moral system his thought was thoroughly consistent.

Furthermore, one may point out the importance of personal moral reform,
a mending of the traditional moral basis through educative means, in the
social thought of Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh of Egypt.[33]

Thus the early phase of modern Islam may be characterized sociologically
by the search for a new personal moral basis for Muslims who had plunged
unprepared into modern history, but their approaches were widely different
and sometimes opposing. It was only through these pioneer reformers' efforts
that Muslims of later generations could assimilate modern civilization without
much spiritual hesitation.

The second phase of modernism may be set in the inter-wars period. In
this period, the liberalism which was once the hope of the early modernism
proved to be decadent and corrupt. Muslim Asians unhappily saw liberalism
merely as a colonial legal form, and failed to grasp it as a social ideal or the
foundation of a personal morality.

In this historical stage, some new principles of morality were sought for in
place of the old liberalism. The new social situation might be characterized
by the intensification of social maladjustment and the alienation of the indi-
viduals from society on the social level, and the upsurge and the following
disruption of national liberation movements on the political level.

It was the new generation of the middle class that felt the need of new
radical reform ideologies challenging the old colonial social system on the one
hand, and preparing the future social change to be developed after World
War II, on the other. In this last sense, the ideological revolution initiated in
this period still remains to be fulfilled.

The new orientation of social ethics manifested in this period was the
revolt, more or less romantic, which demanded the recovery of man's initiative
in the dehumanizing colonial system and in the search of the moral reunion
of man with society.

The new orientation may be best typified by Sir Muhammad Iqbāl, the
charismatic "spiritual leader of Pakistan." Although he addressed his original
neo-Islamic thought to the modern Muslims in the world at large, the actual
influence of his thought was limited to Muslim India.

For the task of the neo-Islamic reconstruction of society, he urged first of
all the strengthening of the "khudī," individual vitality, resolutely rejecting
any weakening of this. In his dynamic view, the true Islamic ego was "not

[33] Cf. Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, New York, Oxford University
      Press, 1933.

a thing, but an act." Thus, the creative value or the vitality of individuality aiming at the complete freedom of the human ego was asserted to be the very basis of the reconstruction of society.[34]

The traditional Sufi ethics absorbing the individual's initiative and the inactive attitude of the Mollāhs, were necessarily regarded as unbelief. However, the development of the egohood was not the final object, but it was to be assimilated in the spiritual Islamic Community ("ummah"). Hence the ultimate goal of " be-khudī," the identification of individual ego with Communal ego. This may be a dangerous aspect that easily leads to neo-Islamic totalitarianism. Although Iqbāl pointed the way to neo-Islamic totalitarianism, his thought remained a humanistic aspiration, and could not in the end, attain the level of a systematized ideology.[35]

In our evaluation of his self-contradictory social thought, we should first of all re-examine his philosophy in the actual context of the frustration of contemporary intellectuals in Muslim India. Then it will be made clear that this message had positive significance for the young frustrated intellectuals. In essence, his ideal man meant nothing but man exerting himself desperately to liberate himself from the inner colonialism threatening to degrade the individual's own spirit. His greatness lay in his self-criticism, directed against the " ghulāmī," the inner subserviency, of colonial man.[36] Such a morality of the self-criticism of the colonial mentality may be readily accepted by Afro-Asian nationalists in general.

In Iran, social maladjustment as the result of the rapid reforms under the Reza Shah régime was criticized by Ahmad Kasravī (1890–1946) in the latter half of 1930's.[37] As a conscientious intellectual independent of official position, he criticized contemporary Iranian society, distinguishing the positive moral forces from the negative forces, among the latter of which he mentioned the intellectuals' uncritical adoption of Westernization as a fashion, the negative effect of classical Sufi literature, and those aspects of Islam polluted by the Mollahs. With all his self-contradiction he was sincerely loyal to the principle of liberal democracy, which was the standard of positive action. In a sense, he inherited the tradition of democracy and nationalism as set forth in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of the early twentieth century.

[34]   The Preface of *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 2nd ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1934.

[35]   A. H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan* (Lahore, Muhammad Ashraf, 1950), says that towards the end of his life, he conceived a separate work on the " Reconstruction of Islamic Jurisprudence" (p. 187).

[36]   The concept should be distinguished from that of " 'ubūdiyyah." · According to A. Schimmel, *Gabriels' Wing* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1963), the concept contains " whatever weakens human character and declines man from his way to loftier heights. Besides imitation, the concept of fear and timidity is prevalent here" (p. 145).

[37]   For detailed analysis of his thought, see my article, "Gendai Iran ni okeru Isramu Kindaishugi no Tenkai (The Development of Islamic Modernism in the Contemporary Iran)," *Tōyōbunkakenkyūjo-kiyō*, No. 16 (Dec., 1959).

In the 1930's and 1940's when the crisis of the colonial social system was intensified, we can see the emergence of the following two orientations, which have influenced post-war social revolution since then.

One was expressed in neo-Islamic popular movements, represented by al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn in the Arab world, and the Jammat-i Islami in Pakistan. Neo-Islam is modern reconstructed Islam, with a marked tendency towards fundamentalism or totalitarianism, and should be distinguished from the Islamic system existing under the 'Ulamā. These movements have all the characteristics of a modern popular movement, manifesting deep-rooted popular discontents against the established social order. This type of popular organization is no doubt symptomatic of a moral crisis in social transformation, and at the same time of the crisis of ideology. Naturally these popular movements will not cease to exist until the void in the modern moral structure has been finally filled. It also attracts our special attention that they emphasize self-discipline and show moral honesty in relation to the ideas they have intellectually propounded.[38]

The other new factor in this period was the introduction through the West of socialist thought and communism, with its own ideology and distinctive personal moral system, to a small number of the intelligentsia. Socialist thought was negligible and isolated so far as serious attempts were made to assimilate the new thought with the deep needs of society. In this sense, the socialist thought of this period was destined to fail just as the old liberalism had been doomed in Muslim Asian society. For its rebirth after World War II, socialism had to correlate itself with nationalism.

The third stage of Islamic modernism may be marked in the developments after the War, when most of former colonial nations acquired political independence. And since the 1950's many of the new nations have passed through transformations of the established political structure.

The present stage of nationalism requires the transformation of the existing structure of personal and social ethics, to be intimately correlated with the task of national unity and national reconstruction. In reality, however, mere political independence or the mere emergence of a nationalist government has not always resulted in a revolution of personal and social ethics. The economic developments in new nations have not so far been intimately adjusted to changing social needs. That is why economic development in these countries has scarcely touched individual ethics and initiatives. It is very easy to superficially point out the prevalent practice of official corruption, financial scandals, and gross incompetence on an increasing scale during economic development.[39] Likewise, negative individualism or dis-

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[38]   W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, p. 236.

[39]   There are instances of self-criticism by Muslim intellectuals today. In Pakistan, for example, essays of Hanīf Rāme, editor of the Urudu monthly, *Nusrat* (Lahore). In Iran, Mhd. 'Alī Islāmī Nodūshān, *Īrān rā az Yād na barīm* (Teheran, Majallāh-ye Yaghmā, 1962).

unifying social forces, based upon personal relations, individual interests, and accustomed interest groups, still dominate action, which has not been subdued by the positive moral forces and caused to be based upon the functioning organs of social democracy and upon the co-operative community. Indeed, in underdeveloped countries, the success of active moral force signifies the liberation of huge potential dormant powers.

In the view of Afro-Asian nationalists, the political situation of a new nation can be grasped as passing through an internal conflict between the re-colonizing forces and the de-colonizing forces within the society. On the personal level, the conflict is between the negative action of an individual and the positive action within him. The present task is therefore defined as the alignment of all the positive forces to confront the negative forces. In this context, the Islamic social forces may align with both of the opposing political forces. Thus, the Islamic social forces *per se* cannot be defined one-sidedly either as those of reaction or as those of progress. One can only state that the future of Islam lies only where it aligns with positive de-colonizing forces, while contributing to the moral reunion of the society.

The present internal revolution in the countries shall never be resolved until the deep social needs of moral reunion and human integrity can be appropriately met. At the bottom, it suggests an increased socialistic inclination for the present and for the future in these countries. Their nationalism would be expressed with familiar popular symbolism.

If material conditions become worse, it is probable that their irrational and disordered sense will be further reinforced. But, if the material condition of the countries becomes better, it is possible that the movements will take an increasingly rational or ordered form.

We have hitherto discussed the internal aspects. In the end, we should note the enlargement of international dis-communication between the developing countries and the West (including Japan in this respect). In view of Afro-Asian experience, the ultimate object of nationalism is not political freedom, which is the means or the stage necessary for the realization of the social liberation of man, in the inner moral sense. So far as Afro-Asian nationalism aims at regaining human dignity and recovering human integration, it really shares basic values with Western liberalism, which has enjoyed them at the sacrifice of the Afro-Asians in modern world history.

The task of social scientists who study modern Muslim society is, having insight into the humanistic aspiration of the Afro-Asian nationalist leader, to establish the philosophy of real mutual understanding which shall become the basis of the economic co-operation of the future on a global scale.