

MENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE EMPEROR SYSTEM

—An Analytical Interpretation of the Background of
the Emperor System—

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I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MENTAL STRUCTURE

The mental structure of a given period reflects the contemporary economic structure, and the former not only is determined by the latter but reacts upon it. Each of them, therefore, stands in limited independence. When various mental factors are systematized into a structure which gains thereby a mode of response to the world, this structure is none other than that which we regard as mental structure. Mental structure is located on the following three levels, where it lives and metamorphoses. The first level is that on which the mental factors are incorporated within the individual into a structure within which two components may be identified: personality and thought. The second level is that on which the mental factors interact reciprocally among persons, and between persons and things. The third level is that on which the mental factors are integrated in the form of organizations and systems—social customs and institutions may be regarded as examples; this level more or less presupposes collectivity. Mental structure is conceived to be simultaneously formed, maintained, and transformed on each of these three levels.

Mental structure has been generally treated as a problem connected with the first level, namely that of the individual. However, we must note that this approach is specific to that modern Western way of thinking, which, by perceiving a *Gestalt* within the individual, seeks to create order in human life. With the spread of Westernization and modernization this approach to understanding mental structure in terms of the problems of the first level became universal. Granting, however, that there is no other way to conceive of mental structure than on the basis of the individual, it would be methodologically impossible to apprehend, through individuals and their thought, the age and society in which they lived, since we know from experience that it is impossible

to assume that *every* individual shares a certain structure in common in personality and thought. It is likely that individuals are more or less undeveloped both in thought and personality, and are thus subject to the sway of the situation. For these reasons the author deems it necessary to treat the problem of mental structure on the afore-mentioned three levels.

Since the mental structure undergoes systematic transmutation on three different levels, there is always the potential on the one hand for congruity and harmony; and on the other, for conflict or intervention among these different levels, and even destruction of the structure itself. It goes without saying that there is also the possibility that this kind of harmony, intervention, and collapse may occur within each of the levels, namely among constituent groups and individuals, or even within an individual.

Mental structure as thus defined appears concomitantly with the forming of subjectivity, which is necessarily determined by the environment. However, since subjectivity as an entity not merely intends to be free from the influence of environment but further acts upon it, it is essential first to clarify the correlation between the two.

The first point worthy of note is that we always act upon the environment through its image; in other words, we do not live in the environment as such but in its image. The second point is that the environment itself makes its appearance to the individual only when discrepancy occurs between the environment as such and its image. We can approach understanding of the environment only through activity, but at the every moment we make contact with the environment, it modifies the former image, and we are again left in the mere world of new images of the environment.

One is apt to think naïvely that the worlds of facts and of images are clearly demarcated. However, the world we know is merely that of images, that of facts being approachable only through activity, but still beyond reach of our perception. Nevertheless, we have succeeded in producing images which resemble closely the world of facts through linguistic and mathematical models. It is true this success can never be overestimated, and at the same time it is a great mistake to think that we have directly grasped the world of facts.

How, then, can we have access to the world of facts? Since it is approachable only through our activity, there are only three possibilities: (1) through one's subjectivity; (2) through the subjectivity of others; and (3) by means of implements.

Taking the term "activity" in its broadest sense and regarding cognition as one of its forms, "cognition" itself would naturally constitute a part of the third approach. Furthermore, utilization of implements includes of necessity that of human-being as agent (of course, disregarding subjectivity of the individual in this case).

The result of activity upon the world of facts would be either confirmation or modification of the image employed. This confirmation or modification is, again, made through one of the afore-mentioned three approaches.

Thus, we are living in a world of images which are formed through the interaction of subjectivity and environment, presumably extracting something from both elements. Nevertheless, both subjectivity and environment themselves are hidden in deep mist, inaccessible to our perception. However, in so far as subjectivity and environment cast reflection on the world of images, the two factors are evidently correlated in that world. Now, what is conceived of as subjectivity, as it is reflected upon the world of images, is nothing but the *mental structure*, while that perceived as a reflection of environment may be regarded as the material structure. To grasp the world of images as a structure is nothing other than self-recognition. Through apprehension of the material structure we can act more effectively on the environment as such, whereas through grasping the mental structure we can control more directly the activity of the subjective body. This ability to apprehend, act, grasp, and control is precisely the meaning of freedom.

We have already seen that fabrication of mental factors into a certain structure occurs on three different levels. It is necessary therefore, in dealing with the problem of mental structure, to see the process of fabrication on each of these levels as well as to see their mutual relationship. In this article, however, the writer intends to concentrate his attention mainly on the third level.

II. THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY

The writer holds that the ground for legitimacy of the *Tennōsei* 天皇制 (Emperor System) in modern Japan lies basically in the order of *shizenon* 自然村 or the autogenetic village¹; and that the nature of

¹ Autogenetic village refers not to a town or village in the modern administrative sense, but rather to what is called *buraku* 部落 (hamlet). Originally the *buraku* constituted one of the administrative units; but since the Meiji era the *buraku* have undergone merge or division and have finally taken the form which they preserve today. Conventionally, the *buraku* were called *mura* while as administrative units the villages were referred to as *son*.

Fascism in the Shōwa era may be understood as deriving from a reaction against the disintegration of the substance of the autogenetic village. It is indeed true to say that ever since the Meiji era, the order of the autogenetic village had consistently functioned as the foundation of the legitimacy of the *Tennōsei*. However, what is distinctive of Shōwa Fascism is that for the first time, it was felt necessary to define and clarify that which had previously been left unaccounted for—namely, the basis of the *Tennōsei* and its roots in the autogenetic village. Prosecution of successive foreign wars revealed the weakness of internal power despite outward strength, bringing public attention to the problem of political power. People discovered for the first time the *raison d'être* of the order of the autogenetic village, just when the latter was already undergoing the process of dissolution.

Why was it, then, that the ground for legitimacy of the *Tennōsei* had been so long unrecognized? Why was it that the *Tennōsei* had endured so long without such cognizance? To answer this question is, in my view, to elucidate the character of Japanese Fascism; for the Imperial power, neglecting to examine the cause of commotion and disruption at its foundation, had instead sought reorganization and reinforcement. This very negligence was one of the important motives behind the drift of the *Tennōsei* towards Fascism.

Let us start with the task of grasping the characteristics of Japan's modernization. Modernization of Japan was initiated by the intrusion of modern European capitalistic civilization, but later it was carried out willingly. The attitudes towards, and the forms of, adoption also underwent transition. In the period from the later Tokugawa era to the Meiji Restoration the principle of absorption was expressed in the slogan *wakon yōsai* 和魂洋才 (Japanese spirit and Western knowledge). Entering the Meiji era, however, the principle became *saichō hotan* 採長補短 (adopt the good and supplement the poor). In the Taishō era it became *shōka* 消化 (digestion) or *dōka* 同化 (assimilation) of the imported culture, and finally in the Shōwa era the principle of absorption came to demand *Nippon-ka* 日本化 (Japanization).

In general, it can be said that during this process of change the leaders were unaware of the total configuration of the various cultural elements in their particular civilization, or of the consistency of the implicit logic of these elements. Nevertheless, during the Meiji era, Japan witnessed the evolution of a national consensus formed from the ethos of the samurai class and the sense of order of the autogenetic village, each of which was important for preventing the dissolution of

the national subjectivity which, threatened by the absorption of foreign culture, was on the eve of collapse.

This kind of subjective consensus was advocated at first in the Meiji era through such ambiguous concepts as *kuni no genki* 國の元氣 (vitality of the nation) or *jumpū bizoku* 淳風美俗 (pure manners and beautiful customs). However, when the ethos of the samurai and the sense of order of the autogenetic village permeated among the people, the very principles themselves began to show symptoms of decay. That is to say, the increase in vagueness, not to say obscurity, of the content of these principles, which accompanied their widespread dissemination, was paradoxically the means by which it was possible for the principles to penetrate to the roots of the society. An inevitable result of this process was, first, to compromise the purity of the concepts; and second, to vitiate the energy with which they had been endowed, which was directed at maintaining the integrity of the nation. Thereupon, at the turn of the century, a new attempt was made to revive the above-stated slogans in more distinct forms such as *bushidō* 武士道 (the way of the warrior) and *kokumin dōtoku* 國民道德 (national morality). Finally this attempt developed into a movement to establish such ideas as *shimmin no michi* 臣民之道 (the way of the subjects) and *kōkoku nōson* 皇國農村 (the Imperial farm villages).

From what we have seen above, it may be said that the leaders believed that they could maintain the basis of the traditional order through *kyōgaku* 教學 (indoctrination) or *taisei-teki kyōka* 體制的教化 (education along the lines of regimentation). The most appropriate evidence of this may be seen in the compulsory morals education courses which were given in the schools. However, in my view, the method of force-feeding non-systematic codes in the morals education course taught in those days was far from effective. These moral codes could not function by themselves as principles of conduct for the people, unless there were some kind of training which would enable the people to draw the fragmented codes into a coherent whole.

The author believes it is possible to find evidence of this kind of systematic training in students' training in self-government² within the school. While the morals education course never lost sight of its relation to the national order, there was no distinct, conscious training in self-

² The term self-government here refers to the training which was exercised on such occasions as, for instance, pupils' daily assemblies upon coming to and leaving school—in each case pupils had to form into groups according to *buraku*—or through the collective life in dormitories, through youth associations, etc.

government.

It must be kept in mind that the principle of the autogenetic village can never be explained thoroughly by *kyōgaku* alone. *Kyōgaku* was merely a collection of moral codes which were effective in ancient and feudal Japan. Among the contents of *kyōgaku* we cannot find principles identical with those of the order of the autogenetic village but rather find moral codes similar to those that we often come across in the writings of the Confucianist and *Kokugaku* 國學 scholars³ of Tokugawa Japan. This is due to the fact that the leaders of these days believed that if they retraced, step by step to antiquity, the history of Japanese ethics, they would be able to locate fundamental principles which would be conformable to and support their concepts of the autogenetic village. The leaders failed to recognize that the cultivating medium for the order lay in the autogenetic village itself, and therefore even expedited destruction of that order through intervention in national politics. It was at this very point that the training for self-government incorporated in school education did play an important role in sustaining the order of the autogenetic village despite the lack of a clear awareness of the relation of the latter to the national order.

It was in this way that the sense of order which existed latent on the national scale barely maintained its integrity. There was not even an attempt made at intentional reorganization based upon clear cognizance of the above-stated situation, although it is understandable that any such attempts had to be denied *publicly* in so far as the order of the autogenetic village was to be maintained as a tacit premise.

However, the more that social stratification was accelerated, and the more that antagonism between classes intensified, the more the energy of the people was absorbed into nation-wide organizations whose sense of order was similar to that held by the people. The closer the sense of order of the society was to that of the autogenetic village, the less the society was open and receptive to the outer world. Under such circumstances, exclusionist struggles or sectionalism were apt to make their appearance. The only conceivable remedy in such a case was to actualize the existing but latent order, using as an instrument the existing

³ *Kokugaku* was a reactionary current in literary studies of the mid-Tokugawa period. Its major aims were to clarify the characteristic ways of life and thinking of the Japanese of the period before the introduction of Buddhism and Confucianism on the basis of the philological study of the Japanese classics, and to establish the essential spirit of the Japanese. Kada no Azumamaro 荷田春滿, Kamo no Mabuchi 賀茂真淵, Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長, and Hirata Atsutane 平田篤胤 were called the "Big Four" of *Kokugaku*.

organizations whose membership was immense in number. In the case of Japan, the most typical of such organizations were the military authorities and the civil bureaucracy, for both of which *Tennō* represented symbolically the latent order.

III. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ORDER OF THE AUTOGENETIC VILLAGE

We may reduce the order of the autogenetic village to the following five principles: (1) Shintoism, (2) Gerontocracy, (3) Familism, (4) Status Consciousness, and (5) Autarchy.

Let us proceed to examine the nature of and mutual relations among these principles.

1. *Shintoism*

What we call Shintoism here is not the State Shintoism supported by Shinto bureaucracy, but rather the Shintoism of folk-belief. Shintoism as a folk-belief, which was closely connected to the way of life—as well as production—of families, succeeded in crystallizing the ideology of the “family state”; but a necessary condition for the crystallization of this ideology was the dissolution of the above-mentioned ways of life and production. And at the same time the ideology of the family state played a significant role in orienting the *Tennōsei* to seek its basis of legitimacy in the order of the autogenetic village.

What attracts the author's attention was the important role played by *matsuri* 祭 (festivals) in maintenance of the order of the autogenetic village. What was the function of *matsuri*? It may be defined as the emotional integration of the members of the community. This kind of integrative function has usually been expressed by the word *wa* 和 (harmony). Here we have to recall that the concept of *matsuri* is basically related to the Japanese concept of deity, which had been sustained by the continuing tradition of rice cultivation. *Matsuri* is deemed to have been formed originally by the ancient “familial society”; with the dissolution and transmutation of that society, it became possible to expand and convert the function of *matsuri*. The basis of this expansion and transmutation lay in the formation of a new concept of deity which devolved upon the individual and which accompanied a transformation in the structure of production.

The fact that modern Japan, which transformed itself from a national economy into a part of the world economy, could still retain in its

autogenetic villages *matsuri*, which is functionally related to co-operative production, may be attributed to the characteristics of Japanese agriculture, which demand intensive seasonal labour necessitated by aquatic rice-cropping in the peak months, but which also involve surplus labour in the leisure months. Since industrial labourers in modern Japan worked away from home, the labour power required for capitalistic production could be supplied from the farm, and in that sense capitalistic production maintained a reciprocal relationship with agricultural production.

Now, the function of emotional integration of *matsuri* as it was maintained even after the Meiji Restoration was essential for collaborative labour in the rice cultivation and, then, sustaining and reproducing the economic basis peculiar to the autogenetic village, and *matsuri* itself was administrated in accordance with the concept of deity as expressed in such terms as *tamashii to kami* 魂と神 (the souls and the gods), or individual spirits and the communal spirits.

The advance of Japan's modernization expedited destruction of the economic basis of the autogenetic village, and thus in a sense emancipated the concept of deity from its bonds with the village. In these circumstances the leaders located the most appropriate site for application of *matsuri*, in particular in its function of emotional integration, by pulling together into groups the individuals who had come from villages to the cities. During the era of Japanese Fascism the use of *matsuri* in this sense was conspicuous, together with collective hypnosis by means of mass communication.

2. Gerontocracy

Gerontocracy, the second principle, had also been a principle of the order of the autogenetic village ever since ancient times. According to this principle the community was controlled by its elders, although the pool for leadership was naturally limited to the regular members of the community. In a society in which knowledge and practical activity depended upon memory and experience, advancement in age meant accumulation of knowledge and experience, and therefore the elderly were also the able.⁴ That is to say, one can expect to become a leader sometime in the future, even if one temporarily is under the control of others.

⁴ In a closed society, such as that of the autogenetic village, which refuses to admit an external supply of legitimate members, the leader would naturally be the eldest, but in a society in which the regular constituent member can be supplied from the external world, the leader would not necessarily have to be either the eldest or the ablest.

Among the younger generation under the system of gerontocracy we can observe a strong-rooted conservatism for the reason that subjugation and control are cyclical and therefore reinforce each other.

3. *Familism*

Familism, the third principle, is centred on the concept of *oyako* (parents and children). It should be noted, however, that *oyako* was originally a social concept referring to group labour; *oya* being the leader of the group, and *ko* being a member and, at the same time, a unit of labour. This social concept came to be used in a limited sense, signifying *umi-no-oyako* (parents and children related by blood). In the modern era, the concept *oyako* has frequently been regarded as referring to a fictive parent-child kinship relation, but in actuality it was the reverse.

This conversion of the social concept of *oyako* into one denoting blood relations came with unification of homologous groups within the autogenetic villages; the homologous group was formed of the head and branch families controlled under *katoku no sōryō* 家督の總領 (the right of administration) belonging exclusively to the head of the single-lineage family. In the modern era, as this single-lineage family system gradually declined, the principle of unity was on the one hand applied fictively to small-scale families; while on the other, it was applied extensively to social relations other than familial with the social notion of *oyako* as the medium. Hence, it may be said that it was only in the *recent* past that the familial structure of the Japanese society came to be significant.

4. *Status Consciousness*

Status consciousness, the fourth principle, emerged under the combined influence of gerontocracy and the familism. After the evolution of the single-lineage family in the Tokugawa era, *ie* 家 (family) became the structural unit of the autogenetic village. To belong to an *ie* was regarded as a prerequisite for participation in *matsuri*, and accordingly the idea of *kakaku* 家格 (family status) came into being. When viewed from the standpoint of the *ie*, family status was analogous to gerontocracy; while from the viewpoint of the individual, family status was analogous to status consciousness. Furthermore, family status as a condition of discrimination may be equated with dignity of the family. When this principle is applied to individuals, it becomes the idea of *jinkaku* 人格 (which was a generally accepted translation of "personality" or "*Persönlichkeit*"). Here, we have to note that *jinkaku*, in particular as used by the common people, referred to a notion of dignity rather

than that of personality of the individual. When this principle of status consciousness is extensively applied to the society or state, it becomes a notion of the "dignity-status" of a village or of a state.

In modern Japan, however, dissolution of the single-lineage family system helped stimulate revival of the ancient gerontocracy through the disintegration of the primary social unit from the family to the individual. As a result of this tendency the logic of the cycle of control and subjugation peculiar to gerontocracy lured the groups of prestige and status seekers back to conservatism.

5. *Autarchy*

Autarchy, the fifth principle, is an economic principle of the closed society. In Japan there have been occasions when people were turned adrift by natural disasters (especially famine) and heavy political pressure (especially extortions). However, these two means were not the decisive causes of the collapse of the self-sustaining economic structure; rather the collapse was gradual, intensified chiefly by the increase in external cultural contact.

As a nation, Japan had experienced neither total invasion and occupation by foreign nations, nor massive contact and intercourse with them. This situation was the same in the villages. The visual scope of the villagers expanded without an *exchange* of views with the outer world, culminating therefore in a mere unilateral curiosity on the part of the villagers. This prevented them from throwing themselves open to the outer world; and if they wanted to overcome this, they could only resort to violence.

Yanagida Kunio 柳田國男 (1845-1962) explained the mutual relationship between these two attitudes by using the terms *waniru* (to be self-conscious) and *okoru* (to be aroused).⁵ There seems to have been a radical swing from one extreme to the other, admitting no room for an intermediate, moderate, and reasonable attitude. The villagers' awareness of the outer world thus tended to be unstable. However, in the case of the autogenetic village such a change in attitude did apparently occur under certain conditions. But once the basis of the autogenetic village was discarded by the villagers their attitude became subject to the sway of the constantly drifting situation.

⁵ Yanagida Kunio, *Meiji Taishō shi: sesō hen* 明治大正史世相篇 (History of Meiji and Taishō Eras: The Phases of People's Life), 1931, in *Teihon Yanagida Kunio shū* 定本柳田國男集 (Complete Works of Yanagida Kunio), Vol. 24, Tokyo, Chikuma-shobō, 1963, pp. 244-245.

The fact that the national society of modern Japan, which was formed by the class uprooted from the villages, had to undergo a pendulum movement of action and reaction between adoration of and disdain towards foreign powers and culture may be attributed to this restless consciousness towards the outside world. The author further holds that advocacy for establishing a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere on the basis of the theory of *Grossraum* gained support during the Fascist era precisely because the traditional philosophy of *sakoku* 鎖國 (national seclusion) had been retained at least psychologically, in spite of the opening of the country.

IV. CONDITIONS FOR EXPANDING REPRODUCTION

How were the principles of the order of the autogenetic village extensively reproduced outside the village? In order to understand the basic nature of this reproduction we have to examine the creation of the so-called *daini no mura* 第二のムラ (the secondary village). However, before discussing this topic, let us look first at the traditional method of socialization in the autogenetic village.

Education in the autogenetic village had been provided primarily within the families, but more typically in various *yado* 宿 (dormitories), in which the dormitory master took care of the pupils of various groups, such as *kodomo-gumi* 子供組 (children's association), *musume-gumi* 娘組 (daughters' association), and *wakamono-gumi* 若者組 (youngsters' association). From this system of *yado* or *kumi* arose *juku* 塾 (private school) which was an educational institution for children belonging to social units other than the autogenetic village. Furthermore, the system of *juku* developed into *hankō* 藩校 (schools conducted by *han*) which provided education for sons of the samurai class.

The education provided at these institutions was obviously consistent with the character of the autogenetic village. However, we can detect slight differences among these three types of institutions, differences which derive from the expectations and future activities of the students of each type of school. No doubt these activities each played its own part in the feudalistic society, each having undeniably its own character. Thus, in morals for instance, the emphasis at *kumi* was placed on "obedience and perseverance"; at *juku*, on "vitality and originality"; and at *hankō* on "honour and loyalty."

When the Meiji government instituted a new educational system, the Western system was adopted to a great degree in its institutional

aspects, but in curricula, in so far as morals education was concerned, the conventional teachings were automatically preserved. In other words, in spite of its 'modernity' in outward form, the educational system of modern Japan maintained in its essence the heritage of three types of educational systems. However, it was chiefly the training in self-government that was heir to the traditional morals teaching and that succeeded in developing its potential.

The continuation of time-honoured traditions in this manner is of course not peculiar to Japan. For instance, it has been pointed out by Max Weber that this kind of training can be seen in the German educational system, particularly in the way of training the juniors in a student union. In Japan, as a matter of course, the collective life and the discipline of self-government were adopted extensively in the dormitory and training camp systems of middle, higher, normal, and military schools, as well as in *seinendan* 青年團 or *seinenkai* 青年會 (youth associations) and *seinen-gakkō* 青年學校 (night schools for working youths); and the characteristics of *kumi* education were extended to the various other forms of education.

Notwithstanding, school education in modern Japan contained the potential for denying the conventional idea of order. These destructive elements were represented in the overemphasis on the equivalence of intellectual and technological education in the curriculum. What re-educated and restored the order of the autogenetic village in the minds of those who had been brain-washed by this course of education was nothing other than participation in military service under the universal conscription system established in 1873, because the army was in itself a closed society with the ultimate object of winning a war.

In the early stage of modernization, however, barracks life was in fact considered to be Westernized, modern, and advanced when compared with the standard of living of the farmers and the lower class people. Hence, it even played a role in modernizing the way of life of such people despite the general belief that to become a soldier was to become degenerate. Later, as the standard of living of the farmers and the lower class people improved, it was felt necessary to re-orientate the younger generations to the traditional order of the autogenetic village. At this stage, farmers welcomed military education, and regarded those who had completed military training as *ichinimae* 一人前 (an adult). This indicates that military education had achieved recognition as a champion of the order of the autogenetic village.

What, then, was the consciousness of the order which was cultivated

at these educational institutions? It is evident that at primary and youth schools, whose aims were to bring up people who would have to work for the regional society, the discipline of self-government tended to directly support the principles of the order of the autogenetic village. Here, therefore, let us confine our discussion to the problems regarding higher education.

There are several aspects to which we may direct our attention when dealing with the consciousness of the order implanted in the course of higher education. First was the cultivation of group spirit by means of collective excitement (corresponding to Shintoism) on such occasions as dormitory festivals and intercollegiate track meets. Second, cultivation of the consciousness of *sempai kōhai* 先輩後輩 (seniors and juniors), and also that of *ki* 期 (the class year) (or gerontocracy), through ceremonial events such as entrance into the school or dormitory. Third was a cultivation of the consciousness of *oyaji* (father) and *aniki* (elder brother) (or familism), through the medium of nostalgia towards home. Fourth was cultivation of the consciousness of *tokken* 特權 (privilege) and *joretsu* 序列 (grading) (or status-consciousness), through selective examinations. Fifth was cultivation of the consciousness of *rōjyō* 籠城 (seclusion from the world for the sake of studies) (or exclusionism). With the exception of autarchy, we may find here all of the principles analysed as constituting the order of the autogenetic village.

It goes without saying that when the bearers of such a consciousness of the order were sent out from school into society, they formed a fictive autogenetic village (just as did the people working away from their *home towns*), by retaining connexions with their alma mater, through which they could sustain and reinforce their consciousness of the order. Class get-togethers, alumni meetings, and school festivals—for which occasions drink and food were essential—provided school graduates with chances for renewal and reinforcement of their sense of identity and relation to their peers and seniors. In the case of the people from villages, the *kenjinkai* 縣人會 (an association of people from the same prefecture) took the place of the alumni meetings in providing chances for reunion or confirmation of their relationships. Furthermore, in the case of people from villages, village festivals, the *Bon* festival, New Year holidays, and *hōji* 法事 (Buddhist memorial services for the dead) were occasions when they could visit their native homes, and at the same time, could reunite with old friends and classmates and be confirmed in their personal status. What we have to note here is the fact that most of the people working away from their home town were, like the college graduates,

mostly inhabitants of the *daini no mura* (the secondary village).

At this juncture we must examine how this *daini no mura* differs from the *daiichi no mura* (the autogenetic village). To begin with, its constituent unit was not the family but rather the individual. Unlike the college graduates, people working away from their home town had still been bound by the familism of the autogenetic village. Second, while the inhabitants of the *daini no mura* had few opportunities to go back to their home towns to live, they still retained strong affection for the latter. (The only reason why they could not live in their home towns was that no surplus land remained for their use.) Third, the *daini no mura* generally was oriented to consumption rather than production. The residents were inclined to look down on labour, and to become idlers. Fourth, the secondary village was nothing other than a collection of people bound individually to their native place. Thus, what held them together was merely the image of the native place as conceived from afar. In this case, the native place existed only in the world of memory, and as such, it seemed to have reality.

Once the order of the autogenetic village was implanted by the dwellers of the *daini no mura* in the wider society, the characteristics of such educational institutions as *hankō*, *juku*, and *kumi* took root in the corresponding organizations of the civil and military bureaucracies, business enterprises, and trade unions respectively; and further became determinants of the characters of the ruling, middle, and ruled classes.

In the years of Japanese Fascism, the most important role was that played by the organizations of the civil and military bureaucracies, which were nation-wide control systems. Here, special stress has to be laid on the organizations not directly under the control of the national administration. The most significant among them were those of the military organizations. These included, for instance, *Kaikōsha* 楷行社 (an organization of active army officers, established in 1877); *Suikōsha* 水交社 (an association of active naval officers, established in 1876); *Meirinkai* 明倫會 (for active and retired army officers, founded in 1932); *Yūshūkai* 有終會 (for active and retired naval officers, established in 1913); and under the control of the latter two organizations, *Zaigō-gunjin-kai* 在郷軍人會 (the veterans' association including officers, noncommissioned officers and men both of the army and navy, founded in 1910).

In the case of *Zaigō-gunjin-kai* the privileges of entrance into the the Imperial Palace Grounds and occasional personal audiences with the Imperial Family was given to its members at the time of its inception. In 1925 when its regulation was amended so that executive personnel

could be elected by vote, the organization was democratized at least in its formal aspect.

Since the guiding principles of this organization were precisely those of the order of the autogenetic village, existing implicitly in its set-up and administration, the influence of the organization could easily penetrate deep into the villages. Hence, it is a truism to say that the political parties, which had been buying the votes of the villagers at election times through the intercession of local bosses (especially the parasitic landlords), were undermined at their very basis by this organization. In particular, since 1932, when the secret service fund for military purposes became available, this organization became conspicuously active.

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, however, caused the military bureaucracy to pass its baton of maintaining the order of the autogenetic village to the civil bureaucracy. This was due partly to the rapid increase in the number of mobilized forces, but, at the same time we must not overlook the fact that the civil bureaucracy (and in particular the officials of the Agriculture and Home Affairs ministries) had unceasingly endeavoured to re-discover the value of the autogenetic villages as the basis of the social order.

V. THE ORDER IN THE CITIES

The term *seken* 世間, which is widely used to signify society, may be said to have two connotations as evidenced by the distinction made between its use in the phrase *semai seken* (the closed world) and *hiroki seken* (the wide world). The former, although stifling because of the various obligations associated with the village, is at the same time a cozy private circle. The latter, on the other hand, is a free world in which one can act without reserve, but it is at the same time chilly and alien. The former has unity and stability; while the latter, lacking such qualities, is instead full of competition and development. These two aspects of society may be typically represented by the autogenetic village or *inaka* 田舎 (rural society) and the cities or *tokai* 都會 (urban society).

Now, virtually all Japanese cities except *Miyako* 都 (Kyoto) had developed during the Muromachi 室町 period (1333-1573) and later as temple and shrine towns, castle towns, port towns, or post towns. It is true, at the turn of the fifteenth century there was some tendency towards free marketing activities in cities, and towards development of *sō* 惣 (self-governing organizations of farmers for marketing their products) based on agreement and contract in rural districts. However, the free

marketing activities were gradually subjugated by the feudalistic powers, which had quickly come to maturity. There were of course a few exceptions, such as Sakai 堺, which became a self-defended free city. However, even in the case of Sakai, it was impossible to fend off the pressure of the feudalistic powers. Later, upon enforcement of the policy of *sakoku*, the range of economic activities of the people came to be confined to the Japanese archipelago, which was further divided politically into numerous *han*. As the commercial market became small and narrow, activity in the cities was destined to a continuous ebb and flow with repeated confrontation with the barriers of *sakoku* and the *Baku-han* 幕藩 system. Thus, the development of cities became almost impossible except in so far as such development was dependent on non-economic factors.

For these reasons there was hardly any sense in which the city represented "open society" except in the case of *miyako* on which, as the symbol of religious-political-social power, was focused all the energy of the nation. Hence, in the recent past, the order of the cities was dominated by that of the autogenetic village in the sense of a "closed society." The result of this, as seen from the viewpoint of national politics, was naturally rivalry and decentralization among the local powers. Nevertheless, in so far as the political leaders felt the need to centralize power, it was essential to gather able men as well as wealth. For this, due reward had to be given to those who migrated to the cities. The development of Japanese cities since the mid-sixteenth century was not based upon social and economic necessity but rather upon political necessity as the latter was conceived of by the leaders. Thus, the leaders gave extensive privileges to those who migrated to the cities as compared to those who stayed in rural society, relieving them of their civic responsibilities and alleviating their tribute burdens to an unfair degree, each of the latter of which had to be charged to the members of the "city community" for the sake of developing the cities. In particular after the Meiji Restoration, the leaders continued to follow this policy and indeed strengthened it, contributing further to the "solitude and independent life of the people."⁶ Japanese cities were formed in this manner, and later they came to attract a vast population.

At the time when Japan was compelled by the impact of Western powers to cast off her *sakoku* policy, *fukoku kyōhei* 富國強兵 (enrich the

⁶ The phrase "solitary and independent life of the people" is an explanation of the author's term *Tanshinsha-shugi* 單身者主義, which literally means "individualism." The full explanation was given in Kamishima Jirō, *Nipponjin no kekkon kan* 日本人の結婚観 (The Japanese View of Marriage), Tokyo, Chikuma-shobō, 1964, pp. 31-37.

country and strengthen its arms) became an imperative, and even the development of capitalistic industries had to depend heavily on state authority. Thus, the construction of cities lacked spontaneity, and for this very reason it was difficult for the cities to form an order of their own despite the vast inflow of population.

Since it is evident that growth of the cities owed much to the rural exodus,⁷ we must first examine the motives behind such a population movement. The present writer believes that there were two major motives.

First was a tendency shared by urban and country people, which is described by Yanagida Kunio as *tohi gazoku no kankaku* 都鄙雅俗の感覺 (a sense of urban elegance and provincial vulgarity).⁸ It was, in other words, an acute sense of the discrepancy in diffusion of culture. The residents of the *daiichi no mura* entertained great expectations of *hiroki seken*, particularly in relation to *miyako*, while the inhabitants of the *daini no mura* had similar expectations of *sekai* 世界 (the world). Here, *seken* and *sekai* are conceived not merely as society but as something dynamic, which may be called *jisei* 時勢 (trend of the times). In my opinion, *jisei* may be equated with a certain sense of a cultural termination deriving from the concept of "another world" in folk-religion (which is perhaps analogous to the Christian concepts of the millenium). Here it suffices to note that desire stimulated by this kind of consciousness was the dominant motive among the people concerning expansion of the cities.

As *tohi gazoku no kankaku* is a sense of adoration of higher culture, it is inclined to turn into adoration of consumption, while disregarding the basis of production. When this imbalance in the sense of value is accompanied by an overestimation of the value of money resulting from an unstable structure of living, which in turn depends, on the one hand, on the self-sustaining economy and, on the other, on a monetary economic system; and furthermore, when capitalistic civilization comes to flourish in cities and offers chances for participation by country people, then the desires for acquisition of wealth and for extravagant consumption provide sufficient stimuli for enticing large segments of the population to the cities.

⁷ Under the *Baku-han* system of the Tokugawa period, social restrictions were most heavily imposed on the farmers, though the official sequence of order of the four classes was samurai-farmer-craftsman-merchant; and the actual order seen from degree of freedom was samurai—merchant—craftsman—farmer. In these restrictions rural exodus was absolutely prohibited. Freedom of *residence*, as well as transportation, and occupation were proclaimed in the name of equality of the four classes after the Meiji Restoration.

⁸ Yanagida Kunio, *Toshi to nōson* 都市と農村 (City and Village), 1929, in *Teihon Yanagida Kunio shū*, Vol. 16, 1962, p. 243.

Many factors played a part in luring the villagers from their closed world, while at the same time there were direct forces impelling them from within. What then was the force that drove the villagers out from within?

The happiness of the dwellers in the autogenetic village centred on the idea of the extended family system. However, in reality, there was hardly any land left for the cultivation necessary for maintenance of this ideal. On the contrary, the combination of increased scarcity of land with the heavy pressure of past tributes had made realization of the ideal doubly impossible. Even in the modern era similar kinds of political and social exploitation, for instance, imposition of a heavy tax burden, had been maintained. The permeation of capitalistic economy was accompanied by exploitation through *Schere*, helping no one but increasing the gap between the ideal and the reality. In this way the desire for monetary income became extraordinarily well-developed among the country people, dulling their sense of the value of self-sufficiency.

If social discontent had accumulated and worked inward to cause the awakening of the villagers, it would probably have brought birth control, increase in productive power, or even aggravation of the class struggle; and furthermore it would have been the source of potential energy for social polarization. However, in reality, it was joined with *tohi gazoku no kankaku* and flowed outward, seeking physical balance, so to speak, of land and population in villages on the one hand, and opportunities for labour and monetary income in cities on the other.

When the construction of a new nation was undertaken with the cities at its core, and when the policy of absorbing able men and labour power into the cities was adopted, country people started moving from their native places to the cities seeking positions in the bureaucracies and other fields. Their major concern was to gain freedom, since the degree of freedom still varied according to the kind of work, as expressed by the term *kanson mimpī* 官尊民卑 (respect the officials and despise the common).

Furthermore, for those who learned for the first time that there was life outside of the world of agriculture, development of transportation gave a chance to learn not only the difference in the degree of freedom according to status and location, but also the occupational and regional difference in profit as the term *tokoro bimbō* (poverty caused by difference of locality) eloquently depicts. The perception of these facts made many in the rural districts feel a sense of degradation, and the mood of the community became restless. The natural result of all this was a tre-

mendous flow of population into the cities, especially into the metropolis, Tokyo. The cities, however, lacked any kind of long-range all-round plans to cope with immigration or expansion of administration; therefore, they were left to expand like amoeba. This situation provided precisely the second motive for the expansion of the cities. The character of the cities which expanded on the basis of this second motive may not be described by the term *Lebensraum* in its proper sense, which refers to a place in which one works for life, but rather may be seen as an arena for plundering, where one thinks of nothing but robbing by force. On the other hand, the character of a city as derived from the first motive is a city as a symbol of power, glory, and prosperity.

Let us proceed to look at the characteristics of the "modern" cities thus created. They may be summarized in the following four points. First, freedom (no coercion) was a reverse of the restrictions in the autogenetic village. To be emancipated from the fetters of *semai seken* (the closed world) was to be able to participate in the freedom of the *hiroki seken* (the wide world). It was a freedom that washed away all the feelings of suppression and humiliation accumulated under restraint, as expressed by the proverb *Tabi no haji wa kakisute* (A man away from home need feel no shame). Furthermore, it was a freedom that was from beginning to end, naked self-assertion and competition according to one's ability, as depicted by Nitobe Inazō 新戸部稲造 (1862-1933) in the phrase *nyanwan-ism* (the rule of cats and dogs; nyan=mew, wan=bow-wow). Freedom in this sense was of course synonymous with mere self-indulgence, but in reality it was precisely this kind of freedom that prevailed in the cities.

The second characteristic was luxury and waste. This stemmed from the great expectations the country people entertained of the cities and also from the free competition in the cities. These qualities appeared as vanity, sometimes in the form of *hattari* (bluff); and at other times as ostentation, which in any case is aimed at overwhelming one's opponent. It was also a manifestation of urbanites escaping from the pleasure of production to a life of extravagant consumption. Wine and women are intensive expression of luxury and waste in city life.

The third characteristic of modern Japanese cities was instability. Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666-1728), a Confucianist of the mid-Tokugawa era, had once defined the life of samurai residing in Edo under the regulation of *sankinkōtai* 参勤交代,⁹ as *ryōshuku no kyōkai* 旅宿の境界 (a life of travel-

⁹ An institution established by the Tokugawa *bakufu* in 1635 requiring every daimyo to reside alternatively one year at Edo and one year in his domain leaving his wife

lers). Nevertheless, at least the commoners in those days still enjoyed what may be termed a "sedentary life." Nevertheless, with the expansion of cities since the Meiji era, *ryoshuku no kyōkai* was extended even to the commoners' life. Referring to this state Yanagida Kunio wrote, "A kind of feeling which may be called irritation permeated into every corner of the cities . . ." "which was liable to change into decline of public morality and dissolution of municipal administration."¹⁰ This was precisely because the cities were constituted by what the present writer calls *daini no murabito* (dwellers of the secondary village) who mostly led a "solitary and independent life" whether they had a family or not.

As long as the cities continued to expand, the newcomers not only increased the burdens of the people already residing there, but even threatened their livelihood. This came to hinder the formation of any consciousness of solidarity or of a spontaneous social power in the cities, preventing the formation of a proper order of the city itself. Moreover, with the influx of mass culture, the "massization" and "atomization" which are peculiar to modern cities accelerated the erosion of the existing order. Thus, the cities were deprived of every possibility for unity.

What is most required in such case is the technique of control. Japan was backward in cultivating "the art of evil," when compared with Western nations, owing to the long peace in the past. This may be said to have been a disadvantage for Japan not only in the arena of international society, but also domestically in the sense that it limited the options regarding methods of control.

Among the few means most frequently employed were, first, wine and women; second, power; and third, violence. Wine and women were used in order to drag someone into one's own circle, and to control his will at the price of his secret shames. Power was used, obviously, to oppress others. In this case the *daini no mura* functioned effectively as a pressure group. Therefore, the dwellers of the *daini no mura* often mobilized their whole power to link their village with authority. Violence was used to crush the will of the opponent. In many cases outlaws were employed for this purpose.

From what we have seen above, we may say that Japanese cities formed merely what the author calls *gunka shakai* (*gunka* society) 群化社會,¹¹ far from a *Gesellschaft*. Just as farmers limitlessly flowed into

and children in Edo as hostages.

¹⁰ Yanagida Kunio, *Toshi to nōson*, p. 383.

¹¹ The word *gunka* refers to a social phenomenon involving the dissolution of the integrity of men and their succeeding formation into small, independent groups. From

the cities; and just as the cities expanded incessantly, the *gunka* which originated in the cities gradually spread and infected rural society. Although the rate of urbanization was remarkable, it cannot be said just from this phenomenon alone that the historical principle of transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* propounded by F. Tönnies was operating here. On the contrary, what we find is merely a conspicuous tendency towards regression in the direction of *Gemeinschaft*.

It was indeed a great mistake that the Japanese, overlooking the above-mentioned characteristics, regarded their cities as a *Gesellschaft*, and dreamt of converting the whole nation into one. For, to most Japanese, especially to the common people, "to form a *Gesellschaft*" actually meant nothing other than to become more like the actually existing cities.

It is noteworthy that the gradual formation of *gunka* evoked among the people an extreme individualism and, as a result of this, the people tended to value highly the ability to follow their own desires, to be liberated from any restrictions whatsoever. They regarded such attitudes and the atmosphere in which they existed as "modern"; and therefore, those cities which were most steeped in such atmosphere were conceived of as "most modern."

Such attitudes and feelings are what the author terms *yokubō shizen-shugi* 欲望自然主義 (insatiable craving naturalism).¹² In a society whose activities were supported by people believing in and acting according to such a concept of "modernity," it was inevitable that the order of the society itself be dissolved from within. However, when the necessity to reinforce the order finally became apparent, democracy—taken as the principle of integration of the *Gesellschaft* and equated with cities—was regarded in the early Shōwa era as something deplorable, as may be seen in the rather sarcastic expression *demo kurashi* (Why! It's still gloomy!)

VI. TOWARDS LOCATION OF THE PROBLEM AND A MEANS OF SOLUTION

The sense of order which was imparted by *daiichi no mura* (the autogenetic village) to the inhabitants of *daini no mura* (the secondary

this, therefore, it may also be said that *gunka* refers to a process having two functional aspects: 1) the erosion of the order in a given society; 2) the consequent formation of cliques or factions; that is to say, groups which embrace only a part, not the whole, of the given society. These two aspects are reciprocally related to each other.

¹² For a detailed description, see Kamishima Jirō, *Kindai Nihon no seishin kōzō* 近代日本の精神構造 (The Mental Structure of Modern Japan), Tokyo, Iwanami-shoten, 1961, pp. 185-194.

village) was cut off from the economic basis appropriate to its own character—namely a self-sustaining economy. Since the economic basis of the city, which was the principal environment for the dwellers of the *daini no mura*, was capitalist, the sense of the order could not function properly in that context. Therefore, by being divorced from the economic reality, this sense of order necessarily became more abstract and spiritual in character. When the inhabitants of the *daini no mura* were threatened by the constant economic instability, their sense of order, uprooted from its economic basis, could only rise to a persistent vague feeling of uncertainty which was finally transferred into a sense of crisis vis-à-vis foreign powers.

A similar situation may be observed in the attitude adopted by the Japanese government in solving the economic questions. As has been mentioned before, since the basis of the legitimacy of the *Tennōsei* (Emperor System) was in the order of the autogenetic village, the strength of the Imperial power increased as the order permeated the nation. However, just as in the case of the inhabitants of the *daini no mura*, the Imperial authority could no longer cope with the economic questions which arose, failed to solve them, and finally drove itself into an aggressive stand in foreign relations.

The *daiichi no mura* and the *daini no mura*, both cornerstones of the Imperial power, not only lacked common interests, but also had many points of conflict. This conflict was one of the fundamental reasons that both the *Jiyū minken undō* 自由民権運動 (Liberty and Popular Rights Movement) in the Meiji era and the Taishō Democracy Movement could take an anti-régime stand. For what the people insisted on in these movements was the establishment of an "open society"; but the order of the régime was, in essence, that of a "closed society." The movements spread widely, accompanied by a considerable increase in the number of people who were aware of their political rights and participated in political movements. In the cities, the numbers of those who insisted on improvement of social and political conditions increased immensely, while concurrently the economic basis of the autogenetic village was gradually dissolved through the outflow of population to cities.

The leaders of the *Tennōsei* state managed to form their ideology on the basis of the sense of order of the *daini no mura* (in spite of the fact that there was no economic basis even in urban districts,) and actually succeeded in their attempts. *Kyōgaku* (indoctrination) was the ideology thus formed, and which played an important role in the spiritual control of the nation. However, the leaders were not aware of the fact

that this sense of order was merely that of the fictitious autogenetic village, and they failed to take steps which would reinforce the economic basis of the autogenetic village, leaving them to destruction. In fact, if this reinforcement had been carried out thoroughly, it might not have allowed the persistence of a unified authority, since by nature the autogenetic village itself is a closed society.

Let us now consider how the *daini no mura* could have been stabilized. The people who flowed from the autogenetic villages to the cities and formed *daini no mura*, always had high expectations in regard to their future success in business and to the acquisition of a higher social status. The fulfilment of their expectations was one of the most important measures for stabilizing the *daini no mura*, and was the fundamental condition necessary for securing domestic stability. Consequently incessant expansion and development of the nation became a prerequisite means to the goal of stability. Whenever this demand was left unsatisfied, the accumulating discontent had to find expression either by removing the obstacles which prevented realization of expectations, or by undertaking foreign expansion.

In actuality, however, the world economic depression of the 1930's accelerated the trend towards monopoly capitalism in Japan, and the subsequent rationalization of management crushed the hopes of the inhabitants of the *daini no mura*, resulting in the displacement of many of them. In this the *daini no mura* encountered a crisis of dissolution.

What measures, then, were considered either by the Imperial authority or by the inhabitants of the *daini no mura* themselves in order to avert the final destruction of the *daini no mura*? The first was to expand, transform, and reconstruct the national economy—but this would have led to state socialism; the second was to return the populace to their home towns—but this would have led to agriculturalism; the third was to adhere to authoritarianism—but this would have led to direct rule of *Tennō*; and the fourth was to withdraw from dealing with the problem—but this would have led to quietism.

There was a trend among those who had roots in their alma mater to choose the first, the third, and the fourth ways, and those who came from the autogenetic villages chose the second, the third, and the fourth ways. The crisis of the destruction of the *daini no mura* caused its inhabitants to take heightened interest or concern in the home towns, which formed the core of their unity. However, the unity of the *daini no mura* was based merely on memories of the native place. Although knowing that it was not possible for them to return home, they ardently

hoped to maintain the traditional atmosphere, and the very fact that they lived far away from home sustained this unfulfilled desire.

The native place, namely the *daiichi no mura* to which the dwellers of the *daini no mura* looked, was also undergoing dissolution and transmutation into *daini no mura* under the bureaucratic intervention of the modern state as well as through the infiltration of modern capitalism. However, since the inhabitants of the *daiichi no mura* were living on their native soil, it was impossible for them to view their native place from a distance as the inhabitants of the *daini no mura* did. Hence, transmutation of the *daiichi no mura* into the *daini no mura* virtually meant anomie. Suppose that in this case it were possible for the inhabitants to view the native place from a distance, it would naturally have to be through time, in other words, to review the past. Consequently they would inevitably have to become conservative and reactionary.

Now, although it is true that the native place of the *daiichi no mura* was essentially a world of memories, it could not exist outside of a relationship with the actually existing native place. Hence, anomie of the *daiichi no mura* inevitably influenced the *daini no mura*. However, its effect reached only these *daini no mura* which were formed by people who had actually left their village, and not ones formed by those who had their roots merely in their alma mater.

The author believes that this was the basic situation at the time of the Manchurian Incident. The opening of what was to be a fifteen-year war was precisely for the purpose of evading such a crisis as destruction of the *daini no mura*. The subsequent invasion of the continent was an attempt to project onto a national scale the aforementioned "craving naturalism" which was itself sustained by the people whom it had deprived of the sense of social order and coherence through the anomie it induced, and who were left in solitude. Of course emphasis was laid on the ideas of *gozoku kyōwa* 五族協和 (harmony of the five races) in establishing Manchukuo, "the new order" of the Sino-Japanese Incident, and "emancipation of the races" of the Pacific War. However, in so far as the war against China was concerned, it was an invasion based solely on expansionism from beginning to end.

In any event, the prosecution of war demands the strengthening of military power, and the strengthening of military power necessitates an increase in productive power. This increase in productive power calls for the unification of constructive energy, which in turn presupposes unity of men of enduring will. Continuance and expansion of war, however, come to require further mobilization of military force and

labour. But, enlargement of the scale of mobilization sets the society adrift, severing the unity of men of enduring will. All this culminates in human devastation unless a new means of communication is cultivated.

The *raison d'être* of the autogenetic village was manifested through the way in which the war proceeded. Hence, the reconstruction and reorganization of the autogenetic village as a source of national energy was willingly attempted. However, the autogenetic village could not participate in the national society unless they could overcome their hermetic character. This would have to have been accompanied not by dissolution of the autogenetic villages as was the case in the Meiji era, but rather through an internal reform of the autogenetic villages themselves. The national society would then have to have been formed as a combine of autogenetic villages completely apart from the villages themselves.

In reality, however, the revival of the autogenetic villages which was attempted during the recent war was undertaken merely for the purpose of extending Imperial control down to the roots of the society. Hence, the autogenetic villages were conceived merely as the terminal agents of administration. It was therefore impossible to expect any kind of reform of the national society to be initiated by the reform of the autogenetic villages.

By following its unique theory of modernization, the Imperial control system undermined the basis of families and autogenetic villages one after another, and thereby gradually altered the national ethos from the samurai-type spiritual community to that of *daini no mura*. It also set the society adrift and broke down the social-interdependence of the people, making an extraordinary advance by absorbing all the energy of people. However, the result of dissolution of the families and the autogenetic villages was naturally exhaustion of the source of energy. Here for the first time, was felt the necessity for reforming the whole national society, including the autogenetic villages.

Such total reform, however, could be undertaken only in the course of democratization after the surrender, when the logic of modernization peculiar to the Imperial control system was flatly denied. Furthermore, for a true solution of the problem, we had to wait until it was possible for democracy to take firm root in the society. This could only come with an attempt to reconstruct, with the aim of self-guarding the rights of livelihood of the people, the units of the community. This is precisely the problem which we have to face today.