

URBAN RESEARCH AS "AREA STUDIES"

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I

The English Sociologist, Prof. R. P. Dore, succeeded marvelously in studying contemporary Japanese society by choosing to investigate a Tokyo ward. As a scholar from the industrialized, urbanized society of England, Dore brought to his study of Japan, a society that shares those characteristics with England, a truly appropriate approach and pinpointing of his subject. In this sense I believe his *City Life in Japan* (1958) to be superior to his second book, *Land Reform in Japan*. The reason for the success of the former work lies precisely in its having dealt with the city, the nuclear organization of modern society. Dore was able to compare England and Japan beginning with their points in common, and to explain their similar achievements to English-speaking readers. Needless to say, however, speaking from the sociological point of view there are not a few theoretical problems that remain vague, on which Dore did not touch. But, to Dore's readership, these are self-evident, related to understanding and experience of English society, and hence rather than being faults to be blamed on Dore the sociologist and student of Japan, should probably be left to the professional students of English society on whom *City Life in Japan* doubtless cannot fail to have an impact.

The recent appearance of two books, John Gulick's *Tripoli—A Modern Arab City* (1967) and Ira Marvin Lapidus' *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (1967), both published by the Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, provides us with the opportunity to reconsider the meaning and role of urban studies in Area studies, taking the latter to mean studies of national cultures and societies. It was with this background and intellectual interest that I happened to be reminded of Dore's Tokyo study.

As these works of Gulick and Lapidus are the latest products of the most urgent and indispensable domain of social science, namely, area studies, it is appropriate to avail ourselves of them here as materials for clarifying the problems and difficulties involved in area studies today. On urban studies as area studies there are such venerable classic works as R. S. Lynd and Helen Merrill Lynd: *Middletown—A Study in American Culture* (1929), which formed the model for Dore's work, and *Middletown in Transition—A Study in Cultural Conflict* (1937). And we cannot overlook the various articles in W. F. Wertheim: *East-West Parallels—Sociological Approaches to Modern Asia* (1965) and Clifford Geertz: *The Social History of an Indonesian Town* (1965). There are also E. G. Breese: *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries* (1966) and G. Sjoberg: *The*

Pre-Industrial City—Past and Present (1960). Among works by economists, there are B. F. Hoselitz: *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth* (1966), and S. Kuznets: "Consumption, Industrialization and Urbanization," in *Industrialization and Society* (1966). And, in addition to P. M. Hauser and L. F. Schnore *The Study of Urbanization* (1965), such works of U.N.E.S.C.O. and the United Nations as the *Report on the World Social Situation* (1957 and 1963) should be kept in mind. I should like to comment on these again on another occasion.

These various works bespeak the fact that urban research has come increasingly to be regarded with importance. That is, it seems safe to regard them bespeaking the fact that urban studies rather than being simply a theme chosen by individual scholars as a result of their own particular interests, has come to significance as a key subject of research on the contemporary period. Then, on the other hand, if area studies are to be more directly responsive to the necessity and urgency of research on different cultures and societies, particularly of the non-Western areas, it is only natural that such studies will concentrate on research on cities in specific areas. Be that as it may, if urban studies have not as yet been numerous among area studies, neither have they been a star subject.

II

The works of Gulick and Lapidus both deal with the Arab East, the Middle East, the former being as the title reveals, a field study of the second largest city of Lebanon, the latter being an historical study concentrating on two Syrian cities, Damascus and Aleppo. To speak of both books as works of area studies will meet with objections, because the two differ in approach, and because one is an historical study, while area studies are commonly understood to refer to study of the contemporary. Moreover, area studies take as their principal subjects the non-Western areas which had previously been generally considered the province of Oriental studies or Orientalism. My point, therefore, in treating the two works together, is precisely to be able to challenge both schools of thought. Area studies are grounded in the methodology of social science, while Oriental studies belong to the tradition of classical studies.

A second likely objection concerns the relationship between history and social science. In classical Oriental studies, history assumed a different meaning from that which it has for social science; history, in the view of the former, possessed no connection with social science. Like most social scientists, I believe the historical approach to be both indispensable and definitive in each of the spheres of social science. I believe the humanities and social sciences differ from the natural sciences in this regard; in the American approach to social science, the position that should rightly belong to history has been occupied by psychology and statistics.

The statement of Gulick, a student of social anthropology—an outstanding American-style discipline—that "students of urban ecology and demography will find this book deficient in the kind of statistics they value" (p. ix) is

probably of profound interest here. He is, "as a social anthropologist interested in Arab culture and also in urban culture generally," attempting to come to grips with the contemporary city of Tripoli. He is apparently reacting against naive application of a general social science theory built up from research in Western societies to a different culture and society, and against the unconscious value judgments and even moral evaluations to which this leads. Often, area studies are compounded of interpretations and additional reinterpretations ungrounded in reality. Gulick also tries "to specify what are statements of fact (and their sources) and to distinguish them from suppositions and generalizations," and avoids "loaded or ambiguous terms, such as those of conventional urban *theory*."

Gulick's book is based on field work he conducted during a ten-month stay in Tripoli from September 1961 to July 1962. As the author's experience has included rural research in Lebanon prior to his research on Tripoli, the book is one of the reliable and important works written by an experienced field worker on contemporary Lebanon. The volume is divided into seven chapters and includes two appendices with a bibliography which even includes a list of bibliographies on social anthropological research on cities. In the author's picture of Tripoli at early dawn, as the calls to prayer of "Allahu akbar" (God is great!) begin, we can almost hear "ALLAAAHU AKBAR" reverberating from the print and see the lights appear in windows here and there, and under the street-lights waiting for the first bus while the stores are yet cloaked in their ponderous shutters, the still sleepy figure of a tea seller, the passing of donkeys and bicycles come from the villages and, at length, the trucks. In the author's so vivid evocation of the various quarters of Tripoli as the veil of night gives way gradually to the bustle of day we find ourselves succumbing to that atmosphere fondest to the memory of one who has ever lived in an Arab town, and forgetting that we are reading a specialist's book. Such is the chapter of sights and sounds with which the book begins. The author follows this with a general statement of the history of the city from pre-Christian times down to the present, and then goes on to sectarian activities and organizations, and governmental administration and services.

Lebanon's distinctive social composition and disposition of political and economic power are embodied in her various religions and sects. While *Maronite* Christians predominate in the over-all social composition of the nation, in Tripoli, the major city of northern Lebanon, orthodox Muslims predominate, followed by Eastern Christians and then the *Maronites*. How that affects the social structure of the city, the author tries to make clear in a sociographic explanation of inter-religious balance and tension through his treatment of daily life in the city.

I indicated earlier that the opening chapter of the book is not that of a specialist's book. But just what is the composition or description of the specialist's type book? What does the methodology used in this book, that of social anthropology, have to offer to area studies? Today, in the midst of methodological anarchy, we have no definitely established approach to the

study of a given foreign area or civilization, save the recognition of the necessity of taking a multi-disciplinary approach that incorporates a sophisticated body of scientific knowledge.

As is often said, "the study of civilizations is a field unevenly divided between humanists and social scientists" (G. E. von Grunebaum, *Islam—Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*, 2nd ed., London, 1961, p. vii). Today, with such prominent scholars as H. A. R. Gibb seeking for a scholarly wedlock of Oriental Studies and social science (cf. his *Area Study Reconsidered*, London, 1963), let us take this occasion to discuss, with some exaggeration, the problems and issues of area studies that appear in Gulick's work, in order to determine how the anthropological approach may develop from the level of individual craftsmanship to that of a multi-disciplinary branch of social science.

III

The first point concerns the basic character of social anthropology as an empirical science. Whether by its nature or as the result of its present stage of development, the character of social anthropology is such that even if several anthropologists independently studied a given area, we would not be assured of being provided with a total picture of that society comprising a much broader spectrum of its aspects than would be afforded by the work of one researcher. We would, rather, be provided with exactly as many images of the society as the number of anthropologists who dealt with the subject. This implies that there is no method firmly established and accepted among anthropologists. Hence, they have no principle by which to coordinate the disjointed results of their research. Thus, the more excellent the individual results, the more difficult it is to integrate them into a more advanced and detailed grand view of a society. In other words, achievements in this science depend solely on the personal skills and abilities of the individual researchers, and their findings are not conducive of development into a system of empirical axioms such as those which other sciences have built up.

Granting Gulick's lack of background and interest in sociology and political science, still, it is surely not too much to doubt seriously whether it is permissible for a contemporary study to be a-historical. In this regard, in Gulick's treatise on the "Growth of Tripoli" (Chapter II, pp. 11-36), we find that development and change are treated neither in historical perspective nor in terms of stages. Moreover, it is natural for the reader to want to know what the author means by the term "city"; unfortunately, he leaves us in the dark in this regard. After reading that "a strong alliance between the sectarian and civil powers was a long tradition in Islamic cities," we encounter the comment that "however, the nature of this alliance was such that Muslim thinkers never developed any specific or workable concepts of municipal administration and law, as such" (p. 69). Even supposing that those thinkers neither had nor have such concepts, does that mean this is a cultural tradition that will remain unchanged in the future? Regarding the quotation above,

the author refers us to G. E. von Grunebaum: *Modern Islam*, p. 137, edition not stated, but in the 1964 edition of that work I find nothing on the page indicated which accords with the author's reference. (And even if we take the proper place to be the account on pages 184-185 of the same edition, then it must be said to be a misreading of von Grunebaum. Von Grunebaum is speaking of "classic Islam" and of the classic *ummah*.)

But, to the author, this is probably a minor point as he seems to expect that the book will be evaluated as ecological sociography based in behavioral science. However, just recording the facts as they are leads the reader to wonder how the book differs from travel guides, such as the excellent *Les Guides Bleus Moyen-Orient* (1956) etc. For example, in saying that "the clustered shops represented ethnic or sectarian groups, and correspondingly Tripoli's goldsmiths are nearly all Christians" (p. 103), Gulick merely arouses a taste for the exotic and leaves our intellectual interest unsatisfied in not explaining why such is the case. In addition, not only does the author conclude, in contradiction to the Gibb-Bowen's thesis, on the basis of the present inner quarters of the city, that no general blossoming of eighteenth-century style *harrah* (inner quarters) seems to have occurred (pp. 152-153, 159), but he even asserts that "on the whole there is no 'zoning mentality'" (p. 159). As the author says, the connection between Tripoli's structure and its size cannot be denied, but to make such a bold assertion without making a careful examination including Tripoli's functions as a city in relation to hinterlands, can only impair the book's merit.

What is novel in Gulick's book is his having used, in Chapter V (pp. 89-120) on "Work and Commerce" the telephone directory in an attempt to ascertain the characteristics of and to stratify each section of the city and of the old and new cities. This type of research is very popular among sociological studies conducted in the United States, but its application to Tripoli is something original. The result is to emboss in bas relief how unique a position and meaning as a social stratum the merchant (*tujjar*) group possesses. The large merchants, more properly termed businessmen, keep their houses and shops separate and install phones in each. Gulick concludes that they do not consider themselves simply merchants, but specialize as professionals in the goods they handle and conform to the ethos of modern business elites. In contrast, the small merchants combine home and shop, and are less definitely specialized in their business activities; moreover, small merchants in the same business concentrate their shops on the same streets. After continuing this vivid but amorphous account, the author turns, in a chapter on "Private Life and Public Face" (pp. 121-185), to the social relations and the patterns of social behavior of the Tripolitans. What should be given attention here is Gulick's hypothesis of "the vulnerable ego" which he deduces from the expectations and conflict to be found in kinship relations. In the author's interpretation this extends beyond the nuclear family, and the "extended family, lineage, and class" become the principle of social cohesion. In particular, according to Gulick, that the "most prominent families" are truly so ranked

socially is not only because they are old families of high repute but especially because they are propertied families with political leadership as well as wealth. Today their prestige coincides with the intellectual professions, such as doctor, lawyer, and business administrator. Because these professions all require long-term high level schooling outside Tripoli and occasionally even in Europe or America, and consequently also require huge expenditures, they are monopolized by the wealthy classes. The author points out that the ex-“landed old families” today have been transformed into professionals and consequently implies that being a landowner or property-owner no longer commands the respect it once did. This is an important point.

However, when he says (p. 115) that in the Minah district there are only one-fourth the legally authorized number of pharmacists, that “it is difficult to believe that there are only 10 dentists in Tripoli where there are 127 physicians” (p. 113), and discusses the “non-involvement of the people’s attitudes toward law” (p. 198), he does not ask in this context—or that of the 1962 Beirut lawyers’ strike—whether the ability to pay of the clients of these professionals and the income base of such professionals are proportionate to the skills involved. Under the peculiar medical system of this country, the length of schooling required for a dentist is greater than that for a doctor, and the fees for treatment are exceptionally high, probably approaching those of the United States and Canada. Consequently, the ordinary people do not consult the dentists or the lawyers. As for the legally authorized number of pharmacists, it is in fact set at the uppermost limit, and, as in the case of the bar, the fact that the numbers are not filled implies the monopoly of the vested interests, the existing pharmacists. Generally speaking, though professional skills may be the symbol of the intellectual elite, this does not mean that upward social mobility is made possible by those skills alone without family background. Family is first, then the professions; in this sense the class of old reputable families is frozen. The author does not touch on these points, perhaps because of his position of not going beyond the narration of facts and conditions. When the author agrees with C. Wright Mills that “much ‘significant’ social science literature consists of pretentious verbosity which not only obscures quite simple meanings but also can foster an erroneous impression of new insights” (p. ix), I in turn doubt whether there are in the author’s book any new insights which measure up to true meaning of Mill’s phrase. It is probably safe to describe the book as a travel guide, or perhaps a daily life-guide, to Tripoli in the name of social science, on the analogy of calling Riesman’s *The Lonely Crowd* great literature in the name of social science. This book will probably be profitable for those who do not know Tripoli and may turn out to furnish some material for strongly theory-oriented experts, with the reservations mentioned above.

However, there are major problems. The author chose to study Tripoli on the basis of his judgment that “the city is not ‘typically Lebanese’ but is representative of non-Lebanese Arab cities” (p. viii). Of course, a city itself is an area, but it must be defined relative to its relationship with a wider

area, in which the surrounding rural areas must be included; in this case within the framework of the nation-state of Lebanon. Hence it is necessary here that Tripoli, as an Arab city, must be defined at first as a city in the Arab world. However, the author proceeds abruptly and without any demonstration to make Tripoli into a representative of non-Lebanese Arab cities. If the author had arranged things so that this would become understood naturally in the course of reading, detailed definitions of "city" and of "non-Lebanese Arab cities" at the outset would be unnecessary. On the diversity of meanings of the term "Arabs" see B. Lewis: *The Arabs in History* (1960, 4th ed., 1966); imprecision in the use of such terms is, in a sense, a general weakness apt to be found among theorists or field survey experts concerned with non-Western subjects. In any case I wonder if the over-simplistic assumption: Arab=Muslim, Christian=Lebanese, wasn't present in the first place. Aren't Arabs and Lebanese the same? Supposing them to be different, then the difference must be at some level such as culture, language, religion, or politics, etc. It is precisely this sort of carelessly constructed image that I believe to be the problem that area studies must overcome.

Such is the Republic of Lebanon that even the post-independence government has never conducted a population census, and her parliament is formed on the basis neither of the strength of the political parties in the population, nor of the proportional distribution of the religious sects in the population, but rather of the Ottoman and French legacy of a balance of power among the sects which disregards the actual population balance. Democracy in Lebanon, in the perspective of the existing power elites, means adhering firmly to this kind of sectarian equilibrium. Whatever democratic doctrine may prescribe, practical politics requires this kind of transformation of the rules. If a proportional distribution of sects were to be applied to the Lebanese parliament, it is well-known that the Muslims would gain a majority over the Christians and that the Christian hegemony in the socio-political spheres would be uprooted regardless of the Christians' economic position. On the other hand, too, the collapse of the existing Christian-dominated political regime would not necessarily be desirable for the Muslim notables, as their position is assured by the sectarian equilibrium rather than by any claim for the application of strictly democratic principles.

Whenever there have been signs of an alteration in the status quo, foreign intervention supporting the Christians or aiding the Muslims has always occurred whenever either has sought help. In this sense, the domestic politics of Lebanon, as well as her national economy, are linked closely to international relations and the world situation. Paradoxically, the fact is that if the Christian predominance were threatened and the Muslim numerical superiority institutionalized the present position of Lebanon's Muslim leaders would be endangered. Popular feeling would spur the trends in the direction of Arab nationalism and Arab unity toward overpowering the prevailing barriers in Lebanon that have been erected by the notables under the beguiling name of "Independent Republic." Regardless of whether this analysis and perspec-

tive is accurate or erroneous, this book does not touch upon such matters. This poses a problem of the potentials of political anthropology and of the anthropological approach to politics. Admitting that the anthropological approach stands apart from political analysis, we still cannot avoid referring to the hierarchy of cities in Lebanon. In the 19th century, under the Ottoman regime, Tripoli stood at the apex of the Levant while Beirut occupied a minor status in the hierarchy of cities in Syria—a situation just the reverse of that of the present in which the gap between them has been growing increasingly wider.

An understanding of the changing relation of the cities will be gained through analysis of the changing social structure of this whole area and by placing the city within the framework of society in the light of the socio-political development experienced by the inhabitants of the area. In any case, simply being ecological and sociographic does not afford any perspective on, or prediction of, the future of Tripoli, the Arab city, which is declining to more minor status in comparison with Beirut.

Therefore, the lack of the above-mentioned perspective leads to misunderstanding of the following issues. The Aleppo merchants' response toward the Syrian authorities concerning economic policy—which in terms of party politics implies resistance on the part of the People's Party (Hizb al-Sha'b) to the Ba'thists (Hizb al-Ba'th)—comes to be regarded as a movement for the independence of Aleppo. This oversimplified the century-old, relatively provincial attitudes of the Aleppo population. At the establishment of the U. A. R., the People's Party agreed to a plan for merger with the Ba'th Party, and it was only when they discovered that the U. A. R. would not bring them as much economic profits as they expected, that the People's Party became advocates of separation. It would be well to recall that they once contemplated the merger of Iraq and Syria, due to the value of Iraq as a market (though this never materialized). The doctrines and slogans raised to mobilize the masses must be distinguished from the concrete acts of politicians and political groups. It is of course a mistake to suppose the masses to be merely an easily manipulated object. What really determines the relations between leaders and masses are matters of social structure that lie behind political behavior. But that structure cannot be deduced using Mr. Gulick's approach. The facility for conceiving it is, rather, furnished in the work of Lapidus.

IV

Lapidus' outstanding premise lies precisely in his taking "cities as process rather than cities as a form" (p. viii). His work is "a study of the social structure and political process of several Muslim cities in the late middle ages" and "concentrates on two major cities, Damascus and Aleppo, in the period of the Mamluk Empire, 1250-1517, with supporting studies of the Mamluk capital of Cairo" (p. vii). He also says, in evaluating existing social scientific and historical studies of the city that "the former overshoots the mark and the latter does not go far enough" (p. 2). With the argument that social

scientific studies confine themselves to emphasizing similarities and that historical studies do not clarify the differences, he criticizes the dichotomous theory of Oriental and Occidental cities: commune versus bureaucrat. Lapidus, who says that "common factors behind the forms of political organization were crucial," focuses his study on the role of the nobility and its relationship with the masses. According to Lapidus, in the development of Islam, which molded the character of Middle Eastern cities, there occurred a process in which tiny communities were integrated into a single religious culture. It was, he says, the bureaucratic system that brought this about, via the fact that the administrative elite of the government received help from the provincial nobles and prominent families. According to him, "the Mamluk period represented the culmination of a centuries' long process by which this social form had been worked out" (p. 7). This came about also through the fact that the *urama* class became the spokesmen and representatives of the various communities of the city. Hence the classical proposition of nobles versus commoners must be replaced by that of the cooperative relations among three sets of actors, the military elite, the provincial nobles, and the urban commoners, says Lapidus. The urban society of medieval Islam which the author depicts is as follows. The bureaucracy concentrated exclusively on the management of land revenues, and the military elite which received these revenues as payment in kind, supplied them to the city markets in order to convert them into money and thus served to purchase urban products and services. The author sees this as having shut off the direct rural-urban circulation route, making the Mamluks into intermediaries in the process, and making overwhelming the dependence on this economic power of the city. (As a result of which not only the Mamluks and Emirs, but even the Sultan, made repeated attempts at speculation in or monopolization of grains.) Around the fifteenth century, the Mamluks' interest in public work had decreased, and they had intensified their exploitation of the people while they were in office. The fact that the Mamluks were a special group, a kind of military slaves, and the fact that they began increasingly to intermarry with ordinary commoners brought about the formation of an urban community on the principle of patronage-clientage relations. This was aided by the Mamluk's economic and political power. Consequently the author denies that the medieval Muslim city as a whole was an integrated community having a structure bureaucratically composed on the basis of a status order. And he points out that all of the existing social statuses and classes were reorganized on the basis of patronage-clientage relations under the Mamluk's lordship, and that the whole urban society was formed by such a community or communities. Consequently,

"In the Muslim world politics was not defined in terms of institutions or structures. Politics as a task of coordinating different purposes, people and interests for the sake of some common goal was defined in terms of networks of overlapping and crisscrossing relationships which were typical of urban life in general. Thus, political ties took the form of patronage-clientage relations." (p. 187)

"All of the crucial political, economic, cultural, and religious roles of society were entrusted to a broad and divided class of professional, religious, and commercial notables (p. 187)." At this point, "one unspecialized status," the *ulama*, came into existence as coordinators of the social order. But class conflict was alleviated, says the author, by the fact that mobility was relatively free and that the *ulama* overlapped with all of the classes in the various communities of the city. Consequently, the decentralized socio-political network impeded the formation of organized opposition.

"Mamluk ties to all classes prevented a dangerous union of the notables and the lower classes. Without the *ulama* effective resistance was impossible to organize, but the *ulama* as the dependent was cut from the common people" (p. 191).

Thus, the author concludes that "this system of relations constituted the government of Muslim towns" (p. 191). Naturally, therefore, "the development of a unified and independent middle class was impossible" (p. 190).

Lapidus states that the high watermark of Islam "in a full sense of its inner character" was reached in the eleventh century under Mamluk rule, after the collapse of the early stage of the Islamic Empire (p. 7). Whether the culmination of Islam, from the point of view of the mutual relations of power and thought, is to be found in the establishment of *sunna*-ism in the ninth century, or in the establishment of the Mamluk feudal system in the period from the late tenth through the early eleventh centuries, is a truly important problem of Islamic history but one which I shall not bring up now. The immediate problem seems to lie precisely in his concept of the "city—as process" which possessed the above-outlined functional structure. In this reference, Gulick emphasized the irrelevance of Gibb-Bowen's theme of the eighteenth century Muslim city as regards Tripoli, giving as his reason that Tripoli was a small town. But while agreeing with Lapidus, in speaking of "the city not as a form but as a process," we must be aware of the deep relationship between the ecological features of Tripoli and its size as a city. To Gulick, on the other hand, we note that despite the fact that Beirut in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a smaller town than Tripoli, it nonetheless did develop the *harrah* after all. (Because this is a problem in comparison, it relates to his manner of interpreting, Gibb and Bowen, when he says of their schema that there was "nothing so full blown as what Gibb and Bowen describe" (p. 153).

Lapidus argues that the community structure of the Muslim city was one of an organic, vertical composition—not in terms of similarity with but in contrast with Western Europe—and he makes clear that there was no room in the cities for the middle class to develop as a class of "wealth and culture."

Generally speaking, the rise of the middle classes was not something with roots only in the urban populace. Rather, from the viewpoint of socio-economic history, we must attach importance precisely to the rural areas where the new industry developed. Therefore, the springboard of succeeding development should have lain precisely in the fact that the cities were the

dwelling places of the Mamluks and "the mastery of the countryside into direct political control of the cities" (p.188). Even if the evolution of social division and cooperation of labor in the cities did not make sufficient strides forward due to the Mamluk-dependent economic structures; or rather precisely if this were the case, the development of industry in the rural areas probably deserves attention. In the sense that the formation of the Mamluk system itself made possible the maintenance of the huge urban populace, it should be regarded not simply as having been an intensification of exploitation of the people by the Mamluks, but as having been in fact the basis of the development of agricultural production. To treat the character of the Mamluks, and consequently also the character and structure of their cities, simply as a sort of military aristocracy without taking these up together with the structural change and development of economic potentials in the rural areas that fed the cities, is to fail to grasp the social structure in its over-all actuality.

It is clearly here that the author was unable to break down the old wall of the rural versus urban dichotomy that he hypothesized as his opponent. That this should become a problem results from nothing other than that in the problems he poses there exists a concern to formulate more outstanding, sociological orientations toward a general theory of the structure of the city and its role in world history, and to counterpose conceptions of the pre-modern and modern cities in comparative studies of Oriental and Occidental cities. (p. viii)

It was for that very reason that this reviewer has commented upon and evaluated this work. Moreover, the author takes exactly the same viewpoint as this reviewer in treating the city as a process not as a form. As a corollary of this urban studies itself, including the two works treated here, probably ought to be dealt with as a process prior to conducting research on the city as a process. That task, however, is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper.