EMERGING OR ECLIPSING CITIZENSHIP?

—A Study of Changes in Political Attitudes in Postwar Japan—

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INTRODUCTION—LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION

Since the time when the Constitution of 1947 was "given" by the Occupation authorities, already twenty long years have passed. The main interest of the writer in this article is to investigate how far Japanese political attitudes in this period have come to correspond to the ideals of the Constitution. In particular, among various other matters, this paper will seek to focus on the problem of whether or not these attitudes, conveniently subsumed under the concept of "citizenship," have developed sufficiently in postwar Japan; because in the prewar days, such attitudes were totally absent—instead there were only those represented by the concept of "the Imperial subjects." How, then, did Imperial subjects get transformed into citizens?

First of all, mention should be made of the point that the Constitution was "given" to the Japanese people. That is to say, it was drafted by the Occupation authorities and then forced on the Japanese government. It was natural therefore that at the time of its promulgation the Constitution was felt by many Japanese as something alien to them. This, however, did not necessarily mean that the people in general disliked it. On the contrary, a public opinion poll conducted immediately after its promulgation indicated that the majority of the people welcomed it. It was rather the ruling elite which had maintained political continuity with its prewar predecessors that felt "forced" to accept the draft Constitution, because it was warned by the Occupation authorities that if the draft were not accepted the latter would present the Constitution directly to the Japanese people.

This context provided the ruling elite with the excuse that, since the Constitution was a forced document, "an independent Japan" should revise it, although in truth by advocating revision the Japanese government has only been trying to accommodate the wishes of the American government. To be more concrete, the revision designed by the conservative (government) party was aimed principally at the "peace clause" of the Constitution,

i. e., Article 9 renouncing war. Although this aim was clearly written into the policy and program of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party at the time of its formation in 1955, as a result of the development of popular political attitudes against the revision (which will be discussed later) the party in power is now plainly denying any such idea.

Incidentally, the weakness of political leadership among party politicians is another legacy of the Occupation. During the Occupation period, the Occupation authorities made important policy decisions themselves and had these decisions implemented through the Japanese bureaucracy, so that there was not opportunity for the Japanese political leaders to engage in the shaping of important decisions. As a result, the weak leadership of the present party leaders, the majority of whom are still today recruits from among the ex-bureaucrats, is partly due to the legacy of the Occupation and partly due to the Japanese historical tradition of having a strong bureaucracy and weak political parties. The ready acquiescence of the Japanese government to U. S. policy and the lack of Japanese initiative in world affairs despite her recognized ability, both of which are manifest today, are also nothing but the remnants of the government's subordinate attitude during the Occupation.

On the other hand, the Constitution together with other reforms has gradually taken root in the popular mind. Ironically enough, when the American government (whose Occupation agents "gave" the draft Constitution) wanted to have the Constitution revised, and when the Japanese ruling elite also wanted to do much the same, the Japanese people decided to preserve it. For in their view, the Constitution has allowed them to enjoy a peaceful life, free, for example, from a conscription system, among many other things. The hold that the principle of pacifism has on the popular mind has often been indicated by the people's angry response to the war in Vietnam[1] and to their government's commitment to it, and more specifically, to the problem of American bases in Japan.

The principle of popular sovereignty in the Constitution has become something more than a "gift." The extent to which it has taken root in the popular mind can be understood from the violent reaction of the electorate to cases of political corruption. In 1965, for example, when some members of the ruling party were found to be involved in such cases, the electorate reacted quickly and punished them severely at the polls by returning candidates from the opposition party to the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly. Fundamental human rights, which were guaranteed for the first time in Japan by the Constitution of 1947, have also become something

[1]   See "The Asahi Poll on Vietnam," *Japan Quarterly*, XII-4 (Oct.-Dec., 1965).

which the mass of the people hold dearly. The Japanese people, who were formerly interested simply in maintaining social harmony and in avoiding any social conflict even when their fundamental human rights were threatened, have now become aware of the necessity of defending them. Once "given" these rights, they have strongly resisted any subsequent attempt at curtailment. The youth of Japan are particularly sensitive today to any threat to their rights. This sensitivity, however, does not always flow from a precise awareness of "rights" as distinguished from vested interests. Similarly, pacifism, another important element of the Constitution, is not always believed in by the Japanese people as a principle; but despite this most Japanese normally hold pacifist sentiments though they do not organize these into an articulated belief. However, this sentiment can very well form the embryo for the growth of real pacifism. Many public opinion polls so far indicate that the younger or the more educated people are, the greater is their knowledge about the Constitution and the greater is their interest in preserving the "peace" Constitution.[2] This, however, does not necessarily mean that all of these people are active in the movement to protest against the government's attempt to revise the Constitution. The increased interest of the people in preserving their peaceful existence over a lengthy period tends to produce two paradoxical results: on the one hand, it is the most important hindrance to the attempt to revise the Constitution; on the other, it at once fosters a passive attitude of least resistance to the government even in the matter of defending the Constitution. In fact, it has taken and will still take some time for many Japanese to be active in political matters.

To sum up, the three major principles of the Constitution—popular sovereignty, fundamental rights and pacifism—have taken root in the public mind to a point where the people have come to feel that they have a stake in the continuation of a peaceful existence. But in order to keep the democratic institutions in full operation what is necessary is more than an attitude born out of pure calculation of personal loss or gain. What is more important is for the people to have an abiding faith in the fundamental principles of the Constitution and guided by these to play an active part in political matters. How far the prospect of active participation by the citizen made possible for the first time in Japanese history by the Constitution has been realized in the postwar period will be discussed now.

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2   See Takeshi Ishida, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," *Annals of the Institute of Social Science*, Tokyo, University of Tokyo, Vol. 9, 1968, pp. 43–44.

I. THE AGE OF ORGANIZATIONS

Although in fact the principles of the Constitution have taken root to a certain extent, this has not necessarily resulted in the emergence of a sense of citizenship, partly because the socio-political situation today is not the same as that in the 18th century when these principles were established; and partly because of the long tradition in Japanese political culture in which the concept of citizenship was lacking.

As in many developed societies of today, the phenomenon which may be called "the eruption of groups"[3] is noticeable in Japan too. In particular immediately after the end of the Occupation, this phenomenon developed so rapidly and widely that it attracted great popular attention, particularly because of the occasional clashes between the rising organizations. The emergence of various interest groups or pressure groups was one of the examples of this phenomenon. Besides the general circumstances, such as the differentiation of interests within the society, which gave rise to this phenomenon in many developed societies, there were two other factors directly connected with its emergence in Japan as compared with other societies. In different ways both of these were related to the end of the Occupation. One was the fact that the end of the Occupation meant that there was no longer any superior body such as, for instance, that which in the initial stages had prevented the formation of a National Federation of Employers' Organization. Second, because of the end of the Occupation and because the process of decision-making now became independent of external influences, there was greater scope for interest groups to play an important role in the process of interest articulation.[4]

At any rate, the increased importance of various groups or organizations attracted so much popular attention that the problem of the individual citizen was not clearly recognized. The underestimation of the role of the citizen was also due to the traditional view of organizations and the actual structure of the various organizations themselves. The traditional Japanese attitude toward an organization is to regard it as an organic entity. For instance, in the case of the agricultural cooperative unions, members usually think that they should belong to the union of their village simply because they were born in that village. The same can be said of the labor unions too, in

3   Ernest Barker, *Reflections on Government*, London, Oxford University Press, 1942, Chapter 5, pp. 142f.

4   For detail, see Takeshi Ishida, "The Development of Interest Group and the Pattern of Political Modernization in Japan," in Robert E. Ward ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968.

the sense that the workers feel it natural to be the members of the union because it has been formed in the factory in which they are working.

If we reflect on the effects of various social reforms carried out in the Occupation period, the abolition of hierarchical relationships, such as between the landowner and his tenants and between the main family and branch families,[5] was indeed one of the most important results of the reforms. Paradoxically, however, exactly because of this change, group conformity, which has been one of the important characteristics of Japanese culture, was even intensified. As R. P. Dore correctly points out, on the one hand, the abolition of hierarchical relationships due to land reform resulted in the creation of "independent" farmers, but on the other hand,

> as the land reform has also strengthened the solidarity of the hamlet, it has increased the constraint on individual choice exercised by the hamlet community, increased the pressure on the individual to conform, and increased the demands made on the individual to sink a part of his individuality in the group.[6]

Thus the long tradition of group conformity, which survived and was even strengthened by the Occupation reforms, really buttressed the new phenomenon of "the eruption of groups," and intensified the competition between the various interest groups. For instance, the period immediately after the end of the Occupation was characterized by the fierce conflict between the conservative government and the business community on the one hand and the organized union members on the other concerning what are called "oppressive legislation," such as Anti-subversive Activity Law (*Habōhō*) in 1952 and Essential Service Industries Anti-strike Law (*Sutokiseihō*) in 1953.

After the emergence of the two major parties in 1955, distinction between the "ins" and the "outs" among the political forces in terms of political power became clear. But although the previously existing volatile political groups were now replaced by two clear-cut bodies, the conservatives were able to hold an overwhelming majority in the reorganized set-up. Therefore, precisely speaking, the new situation was one of a one-and-one-half party system—rather than the two-party system as it is usually called—with the conservative Liberal Democratic Party having the prospect of continuing as a semi-permanent government party. The core of the opposition political forces was the labor unions organized under the General

5   Branch family means the family of a second or third son who did not have the right to succeed to his father's property.
6   Ronald P. Dore, *Land Reform in Japan*, London, New York and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 385.

Council of Japanese Labor Unions (*Sōhyō*).

Because of the clearness of the distinction between the "ins" and the "outs," people tended to think of every individual solely in terms of his party leanings rather than of his existence as an independent citizen. In the latter half of the 1950's, what attracted the popular attention most was not the special interests of the groups, but national issues, such as the problem of the revision of the Constitution, civil liberties, and the nuclear testing. The last particularly touched the people to the quick and evoked widespread resentment, because of the damages caused by the Bikini incident (1954). These issues became so important in the popular mind that they formed the major foci of the political conflicts at the time. Still, however, the framework in which political conflict took place was the same as before —in terms of the "ins" and "outs" in political power. For instance, in the Constitution Protection League (*Gokenrengō*) which was formed in 1954 to stop the revision of the Constitution, the core was made up of organized workers together with intellectuals sympathetic to the labor movement, whereas in the Constitution Research Council (*Kempōchōsakai*) organized by the government in 1956 it was made up almost entirely of those within the latter's sphere of influence. The problem of American military bases, which began to attract popular attention in this period because of such serious problems as the acquisition of land, prostitution, anti-social behavior of the GIs, accidents and so on, formed another target of the popular movement. In this movement too, it was the "outs," i. e., the workers, who played an important role. And their demonstrations around the bases left no doubt in the public mind about the extent of the influence that outside political forces can exert in local matters.

However, the aforesaid framework of political tension gradually changed during the late 1950's. When the amendment of the Police Duties Execution Law (*Keishokuhō*) became a heated issue between 1958 and 1959, many people even including those who supported the conservative party were afraid that the stronger police power might endanger the civil liberties they had been enjoying so far. The title of an article in a popular weekly magazine, "Police Duties Execution Law will endanger dating," symbolizes the widespread popular interest in this issue. Thus the tight control of the sphere of influence of the government party was broken—partly because of the wide popular interest in the issue and partly because of the internal factional conflict in the ruling party itself which now increased almost in direct proportion as its exclusive hold on its sphere of influence decreased. Accordingly the government's attempt to amend the Police Duties Execution Law ended in a fiasco.

Another example of this transition of the framework was the move-
ment against the revision of the Security Pact between the United States
and Japan. When the government began to attempt to revise the treaty,
the National Council for Preventing the Revision of the Security Pact
(*Ampokaitei-soshi kokuminkaigi*) was organized in 1959. This body, how-
ever, was a federation of various labor unions and some groups among the
intellectuals. This organization was similar to, if not an enlargement of,
the Constitution Protection League, whose secretary-general became the
secretary-general of the new body. The reason why these forces were
against the planned revision, which was in fact somewhat of an improve-
ment over the old treaty, was that, as against the forced acceptance of the
previous occasion, the revision would this time mean Japan's voluntary
commitment to U. S. strategy in the Far East and possible involvement in
a war in the area. The legal problems at the center of the issue were not
easily understood by the mass of the people. But all the same, the inter-
national situation was made increasingly tense by such incidents as the
forced landing of the American U2 plane on Soviet soil and the cancellation
of President Eisenhower's visit to that country, which intensified the
people's fear of being drawn into the vortex of international conflict. More
serious to the public mind was the effect of the political strategy used by
the Kishi Cabinet to pass the revised treaty in the Diet. The Cabinet
introduced police power into the Diet and forcibly pushed the measure
through. Strong protest movements took place because of this drastic
method to pass the treaty. On June 4, 1960 a general strike was organized
and about 5.6 million workers participated in it. Almost every day through-
out May and June hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated around
the Diet building. A new phenomenon in these demonstrations was the
participation by many people other than the organized workers (who used
to take part under the order of the union leaders motivated by the demands
of group conformity). Students organized in the Federation of Student
Organizations (*Zengakuren*) were one of the major forces among the new
participants. More important in the context of this paper is the new type
of participation by those who did not belong to any politically important
organizations, such as the white-collar workers, intellectuals, and house-
wives. They participated in the protest movement not because they were
ordered to do so by any organization but simply because they felt it neces-
sary to do so on their own individual judgment, for what Kishi did appeared
to them to pose a real danger to democracy and peace. In this sense, the
movement in 1960 marked the beginning of a new tendency in Japanese
political attitudes, although strictly speaking to a limited extent this tend-

ency was also seen earlier in the movement against the amendment of the
Police Duties Execution Law.   This new tendency, however, could not
directly lead to the growth of a proper civic attitude because of the tradi-
tional strength of group conformity and the people's inclination to depend
on organizations rather than on their individual strength.   There was
another factor necessary for developing proper civic attitude to the point
where such attitudes would obtain a fair degree of political significance.
This new factor is the recent tendency toward de-organization, which will
be discussed in the following part.

II. THE OLIGOPOLY AND AGE OF DE-ORGANIZATION

The fierce competition between interest groups intensified by group
conformity resulted in the late 1950's in the oligopoly by a limited number
of huge organizations.   In 1952 when the Federation of Economic Organi-
zations (*Keidanren*), the most influential interest group in the business
circle, was reorganized, small- and medium-sized enterprises had been ex-
cluded from it.   Thereafter small- and medium-sized enterprises formed their
own pressure group called the Political Federation of Japanese Small Busi-
ness (*Chūseiren*) in 1956, but within a few years it lost much of its political
influence, partly due to the failure of leadership and partly due to fierce
competition with other interest groups.

Each organization in this oligopoly since then has become huge in size
and bureaucratized in its organizational structure.   The tendency toward
bureaucratization of these huge organizations has been intensified by the
traditional Japanese attitude of considering an organization to be a natural
phenomenon with a life of its own.   If an organization is based upon natural
group conformity and at the same time the traditional view of an organi-
zation as an organic entity still persists, there may appear what may be
called "*carte blanche*" leadership,[7] i. e., leadership based on the uncondi-
tional and unanimous dependence of the rank and file on their leader
without specifying their demands but with the general expectation that
services will be rendered to them by their leader.

Impersonal bureaucratic structure is always accompanied by various
difficulties everywhere.   But because of the general apathy of the members
to the process of decision-making in the organization, and because of "*carte
blanche*" leadership structure, it is difficult for those organizations to find

[7]   For the characteristics of "*carte blanche*" leadership, see Takeshi Ishida, "The De-
velopment of Interest Groups and the Pattern of Political Modernization in Japan," in
Robert E. Ward ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 314–315.

sufficient means to solve the difficulties resulting from bureaucratization. The outcome is discontent among the rank and file which cannot be solved satisfactorily by the normal procedure existing within the organization. This discontent very often becomes the cause for the split of the organization.

Here, we should examine another trend in the same period, i. e., from around 1960, which is seemingly contradictory to the tendency of oligopoly described above but in fact is another side of the same coin. That is the tendency for various organizations to split. One of the reasons for this—the result of organizational structure coupled with the traditional popular attitudes toward organizations—has been discussed already. However, another factor, concerning political circumstances, should also be taken into consideration. Because of the weakness of the party organizations each party has had to depend on various interest groups in order to collect votes at the time of elections. In the case of the government party many groups which normally enjoy state subsidies often act as a surrogate for the party organization at the time of election campaigns. For instance, although the government party drew as many as 22 million votes (48.8% of the total votes) in 1967, its actual party membership consisted of a very small number, most of whom were, again, confined to public offices at the national and local assemblies. The second largest party in terms of the number of seats in the Diet and of votes was the Japan Socialist Party, which collected 12.8 million votes (27.9% of the total votes) at the last general election in 1967 whereas it has often been said that there are only approximately 50 thousand party members. The majority of votes were obtained through the General Council of Japanese Labor Unions which has a membership of four million workers.

Because of the weakness of the party organization, each party is interested in securing its relationship with various mass organizations. For instance, when the movement against H-and-A bombs became influential, each party tried to monopolize the movement with the intention of mobilizing it to the advantage of the party. As a result a split took place, dividing the movement into two organizations: one affiliated with the Socialists, and the other with the Communists. So long as the Communists were pro-Chinese, there was indeed a difference between the two organizations as expressed, for example, on the question of the Chinese nuclear testing. Since the Communists switched to an "independent" line, there should not be any difference any more, but all the same the two organizations are still fighting with each other. What is more, both the government party and the Democratic Socialist Party jointly formed yet another, third, organiza-

tion for the movement against H-and-A bombs.

Both the internal bureaucratization of huge organizations and the intention of the political parties to utilize them in their own interests have heightened the discontent of the rank and file members of those organizations. The recent surprising development of the *Sōkagakkai*, a Buddhist sect, which consists of six million households, and the new emergence of the Komeito (Clean Government Party), its political arm, which obtained 2.4 million votes from 32 constituencies in which the party ran candidates at the last general election in 1967, is one indication of the fact that those people who could be called underdogs of society seriously needed an organization, with which they could identify themselves, on which they could depend and to which they could devote themselves.

Under the oligopoly of huge organizations, the intensified discontent felt by both the rank and file in those organizations and the people outside them has often resulted in the distrust of and resentment against the organizations concerned. Those people who are discontented and those who are seriously interested in peace and civil liberties usually depend on the opposition parties as being " party of principle " contrasted with the government party as the "party of patronage."[8] For instance, when the revision of the Constitution was a heated issue in the 1950's, many people voted for the Socialists not because they supported the socialist program but because they wanted to preserve the Constitution and hence wanted to maintain the number of seats of the opposition Diet members so that they could thwart revision of the Constitution.[9] Another example of this sort can be found in the case of the election of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly in 1965 which took place after the exposure of a large-scale scandal among the government party men. The result of the election revealed that the public disappointment and distrust of the government party, the " party of patronage," profited the opposition parties. A similar situation took place at the time of the election of the governor of the Tokyo Metropolis in 1967 when the opposition candidate jointly supported by the Socialists and the Communists won.

Recently, in the late 1960's in particular, people's distrust has been directed not simply toward the government party and other organizations having close relationship with it, but also toward the existing opposition

[8]   Sidmund Neumann, " Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in S. Neumann ed., *Modern Political Parties*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1956, p. 400.

[9]   In order to revise the Constitution, more than two-thirds of votes in the Diet is needed. Therefore, if the opposition parties can maintain more than one-third of seats in the Diet, the revision can be foiled.

parties and their associated organizations, such as the labor unions. In fact, the labor unions, which are now a sort of well-established huge organization with bureaucratic structure, have tended to be concerned with their own vested interests. The Socialist Party, which has been supported by the majority of the labor unions and hence is influenced by them, is losing its position as a party of principle, partly because nepotism and corruption in the ranks of the Socialist Party have been exposed along with those in the government party, and partly because the people have come to feel that the party is more interested in its own vested interests and those of the labor unions rather than in such principles as civil liberties and peace.

Thus many people who are interested in these principles are beginning to realize that they have nothing to depend on but themselves. Whether or not they belong to an established organization, they feel it necessary to do something on their own initiative. Sometimes, they are extremely critical of the leadership of any existing huge organization and start forming very small groups, which can easily be controlled by the members themselves, for various civic movements. In fact, it is a new phenomenon for Japan to have a multitude of voluntary groups in a strict sense. How ironic it is that the age of organization in general, and that of oligopoly of huge bureaucratized organizations in particular, should have brought about, at least in many people's mind, a tendency toward de-organization, and contributed to conditions for the new emergence of the consciousness of individuality. The people's disappointment in and distrust of the existing huge organizations are, of course, a negative element from which alone we cannot expect spontaneous growth of new individualism. Neither the tradition of groupism nor the attitude of dependence on groups is so weak that either will disappear simply because of the presence of this negative element. However, if we consider this negative element together with the fact that the principles of the Constitution have gradually been working their way deep in the popular mind, the recent appearance of a number of civic groups may be regarded as an indication of a new tendency to be called the emergence of citizenship.

It is obvious that there is a new tendency, whatever name be applied. It was, for example, seen at the time when the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier "Enterprise" visited Sasebo. At that time the local union workers who actively participated in the protest movements did so not because they were ordered by their central organization, but because they themselves had taken initiative in planning what should be done in the area. More noticeable was the attitude among the ordinary citizens who were sympathetic to the students and workers who had come from outside to the spot to protest

on their own account. We may compare this situation with the movement against the American military bases in the 1950's when the workers from outside were viewed by the people in the area with suspicion as being the real trouble-makers. On June 15, 1968, more than two hundred civic groups organized rallies in various cities to protest against the war in Vietnam and thousands of persons participated in Tokyo mobilized by a number of tiny civic groups.

Another new phenomenon which followed the Sasebo incident was the rapid and sensitive response of the people all over the nation. When the protest scenes at Sasebo were televised, immediate reactions occurred in various places, as shown by the spontaneous discussion meetings in front of the major terminal stations. In January 1968, i. e., in the month when the "Enterprise" visited Sasebo, 8,163 letters (four times as many as those in an ordinary month) were sent to the editor of *The Asahi shimbun,* one of the leading national newspapers, among which 2,516 were concerned with the issue of the "Enterprise" alone.

The increase in the number of letters to the editors of newspapers in general, and of those on political matters in particular, is a noticeable recent trend. When ten articles written by a correspondent from Vietnam appeared serially in *The Asahi shimbun* 3,390 letters were sent to the editor expressing the readers' opinions. As a result of this widespread interest in the articles, a civic movement emerged to send an English translation of the series abroad, particularly to the people in the United States. And within a year thirty thousand translated copies were sent abroad by this civic movement.

Another type of recent change in popular attitude is in that concerned with urban problems endangering public health. For a long time, low quality in city planning has resulted from the lack of interest in urban problems among city dwellers. Recently, however, the situation has become so serious that problems like inadequate housing, overcrowded transportation, road accidents, smog, noise and so on, have forced themselves on the public consciousness. Small civic organizations have emerged to tackle some of these problems, and although they are not very many in number and their direct influence is not very great, they have stimulated public concern about these problems. It is likely that one of the reasons why the opposition candidate for Governor of Tokyo supported by the Socialists, Communists and other civic groups was successful in the 1967 elections was the newly-felt demand for solution of those problems which had been long neglected under the successive conservative Governors. A popular slogan used in the opposition election campaign was "A Blue Sky for Tokyo."

There has already been some successful resistance by the civic groups against dangers to public health: for example, in Mishima City (in Shizuoka Prefecture) a popular movement succeeded in resisting the introduction of an oil conversion plant into the city. It is, however, too early to conclude from isolated examples of this sort that there has been a full emergence of civic consciousness, which Japan has long lacked. We have to take into consideration another factor, i. e., one militating against the emergence of citizenship, in order to draw a final conclusion.

Among today's highly-developed societies, there is a common tendency toward "the Eclipse of Citizenship."[10] Japanese society is no exception to this general tendency, in the sense that the phenomena common to mass society, such as mass culture and mass apathy, are clearly witnessed in Japan too. Time devoted to watching TV has come to account for more than a half of the limited leisure time of the average Japanese and hence it has automatically resulted in the sacrifice of time spent in reading books, magazines, and newspapers. Among printed matter, popular weekly magazines, some of which have a circulation of hundreds of thousand, have replaced serious books. These habits have made popular attitudes passive and stereotyped; while the hours spent in watching TV may have the effect of fragmenting the interest and concentration of the views, since television shows widely different scenes in rapid succession: for instance, a few minutes' news about the talks between the United States and North Vietnam in Paris is followed by a beauty contest. Thus the people pay attention to immediate interests, and hence tend to lose both long-run perspective and also consequently the ability to think things out. Various public opinion polls show that the majority of the answers to the question: "What is your goal in life?" is "an harmonious, peaceful family life."[11] However, the implication of this answer is ambiguous, because on the one hand it indicates a peace-loving sentiment, although different from the pacifism enshrined as a principle of the Constitution, and on the other hand the people's obsession with daily family life which often distracts their attention from challenging public affairs.

Popular disappointment with and distrust of existing organizations, including the political parties and interest groups, also often tend to intensify apathy in so far as they prove ineffective to channel popular demands through the mechanism of parliamentary democracy. Those who are

10   R. J. Pranger, *Eclipse of Citizenship*, New York, Harper & Row, 1968.
11   For example, one poll conducted by *The Yomiuri shimbun* (Sept. 7, 1964) shows
   that 51% answered in this way. For other detailed informations, see Takeshi Ishida,
   "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," *Annals of the Institute of Social Science*,
   Tokyo, University of Tokyo, Vol. 8, 1968, pp. 33f.

highly discontent with and distrustful of the organizations and institutions either become easily discouraged and withdrawal from political activity or become so desperate that they resort to drastic actions. They also can be categorized politically apathetic according to Riesman and Glazer's analysis.[12]

CONCLUSION

If we assume that two contradictory tendencies of emergence and eclipse of citizenship coexist in Japan today, it is an open question whether the concept of citizenship will ever take firm root in the Japanese popular mind. However, at least some comments may be made about its future possibilities, which depend on the international situation on the one hand and on internal political leadership on the other.

The mentality of the people is still characterized by passive response to what happens, although whenever civil liberties or peace are endangered they become terribly frightened and stand up to defend them. If such threats occur too often, despite repeated opposition, the people may either fall into a state of apathetic resignation or else turn into indignants. Therefore more important here is the problem of political leadership which can articulate the people's demands and channel them into effective results. However, as described above, the lack of creative leadership both among the "ins" as well as the "outs" is responsible for the situation prevailing today. At this moment, we cannot foresee the clear possibility of the emergence of a new creative leadership. There is indeed a sort of vicious circle: in order to change the stagnant situation of today a creative leadership is needed, but the lack of creative leadership is a result of the existing stagnant situation in general and the traditional leadership structure in particular. The newly-emerged civic groups, which have not yet been bureaucratized because they are still small in size, may offer some hopeful alternative but they will not be able to be very influential at least in the near future. As they grow, at least some of them will become large organizations of political significance. At the same time, however, there is the danger that these organizations will become similar in structure to the existing big ones which also started at first as small voluntary groups without bureaucratic structure. One is often reminded in this connection of the organization against H-and-A bombs, which originated as a small civic group composed of housewives in a Tokyo ward and ultimately developed into a highly bureaucratized mammoth organization, *Gensuikyō*.

[12]   David Riesman & Nathan Glazer, "Criteria for Political Apathy," in Alvin Gouldner ed., *Studies in Leadership*, New York, Kussel & Russell, 1965.

Another possibility is that the major political parties will lose their influence until they are forced to change their organizational structure in order to regain influence among the dissatisfied voters. Here again, however, a vicious circle exists in so far as enlightened popular attitude is a condition to a better political leadership and vice versa.

Curiously enough, in present-day Japan, a single factor may produce different results : for example, the increased influence of the mass communications media may lead either to increase or eclipse of citizenship. The direction of development can be decided only by the leadership giving correct orientation to the course of political events. This will also, however, necessitate a change of attitude on the individual level, the most important one being from passive adjustment to the situation to positive control. The embryo of this change can already be seen in civic movements concerned with local issues. Some of them turned out to be successful as, for example, in the case of recalling a corrupt public official. If this sort of successful experience is multiplied, then the tendency toward more matured political attitudes will grow. But if this sort of experience is discouraged by repeated failures, the people will feel frustrated, and ultimately this healthy tendency will peter out. Whether the emerging new individuality will become strong enough to survive various difficulties has much to do with the process of socialization in general and that of education in particular. But this is beyond the scope of this article.