

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE POSTWAR JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

HIROHARU SEKI

I

Twenty-four years after the end of World War II, Japanese diplomacy now seems to have reached a turning-point—a turning-point almost as decisive as the one Japan faced after the Russo-Japanese War (in 1905). After the Meiji Restoration the Japanese government adopted a policy of “national prosperity and strengthening of the armed forces” in order to cope with the pressure of the Western powers. The situation in East Asia at that time offered many haphazardly advantageous factors for the success of this “national prosperity and strengthening of the armed forces” policy. The immense but aging Ch’ing dynasty of China was already showing clear signs of disintegration. On the border of the declining Ch’ing and across a strait from Meiji Japan was the Korean Peninsula. As a result of the decline of the Ch’ing dynasty, Korea was destined to be included in the expanding Japanese empire. The developing balance of power system in East Asia seemed to assure the eventual success of the “national prosperity and strengthening of the armed forces” policy of the post-Meiji Restoration Japan in every way. Having defeated the declining Ch’ing, the Japanese then succeeded in checking the advance into Asia of the Russian Empire, one of Europe’s great powers. Thus the leaders of the Meiji government obtained the Korean Peninsula as a Japanese colony. However, soon thereafter the spirit of nationalism began to appear among Asian peoples, thus producing a determined resistance to the Japanese expansionist policies. It must be remembered that Japanese policy which had already resulted in two major wars (Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese), was governed by basically colonialistic and anti-revolutionary state goals. Japan, with its victory in the Russo-Japanese War, emerged as a member of the family of the Five Powers, having proved its mastery of the techniques that had been previously so successfully adopted by the major Western colonial nations.

Japan then extended its sphere of influence further by economic and political forays into southern Manchuria. One might take an ironic view of the coincidence of a successful Japanese expansion with the ever-increas-

ing tenor in Asian nationalism. However, another perspective on these events may be closer to reality, for in Japan's victory over European Russia—the first successful challenge to European colonial rule in the Far East—a great stimulus and hope were felt among Asian nationalists. Here we can see a vivid example of dialectic process of history.

Needless to say, a second major event which strengthened and accelerated this trend was the Russian Revolution of 1917. The Russian Revolution led nationalism in Asia into a second face. Despite the fact that the international situation had begun to change greatly, the Japanese government continued to pursue its "national prosperity and strengthening of the armed forces" policy that had been largely inherited from the previous century even after the Russian Revolution. And in this way the Meiji government may be said to have lost its adaptability to the new international developments in East Asia.

With these developments in mind our analysis will focus on Japan's post-World War II international relations. Obviously the post-1945 government did not attempt to apply the Meiji "national prosperity and strengthening of the armed forces" policy in its classical sense. If post-Meiji Restoration Japan can be said to have lived a life of a "military animal," post-World War II Japan can be said to have started its life of an "economic animal." Shigeru Yoshida wisely adopted a policy aimed at establishing a foundation for "economic diplomacy," rejecting the plan for rearmament proposed by J. F. Dulles immediately after the Peace Treaty (1951). The restrictions set up in Article 9 of the Constitution, which was regarded by most Japanese as a by-product of the defeat, proved to be a most powerful trump card. In Japan the budget set aside for military purposes was kept within two percent of the national income even after the establishment of the National Police Reserve (in 1950). It may be said that with so little money being spent for this purpose, the country could thus concentrate on its economic recovery and development. The various international situations in which postwar Japan found herself evolved very favorable for a country which was pursuing its national goals as an "economic animal." Japan may have been just haphazardly fortunate. But from the view of international politics, such situations may also be said to have been the result of the inevitable rise of a new global political trend in the post-1945 era. Politically the postwar world was destined to be bipolarized with the United States and the U. S. S. R. standing in mutual confrontation. In other words, soon after the end of the war, the United States, faced with the need of containing the U. S. S. R., was forced to change her global strategy to include a policy aimed at helping defeated

Japan recover. The fact that the Korean War broke out right after the American government had made a major adjustment in its Japanese occupation policy would historically be worth re-examination. Special procurement demands due to the Korean War were entirely unexpected by the Japanese. Nevertheless, the Korean War, used by Shigeru Yoshida as a way out of the critical economic conditions which had been affecting the national economy, brought an unprecedented result. In the year preceding his death, Shigeru Yoshida clearly stated in his article, "Japan's Decisive Century" written for the *Encyclopædia Britannica*:

Through this period, Japan's economy continued the rapid advancement of 1950 without interruption. The phenomenon of a very high rate of investment, which was later to become a consistent characteristic, had already begun to be apparent by that time.¹

Fifteen years later again the Vietnam War began to bring economic prosperity to Japan under ex-Prime Minister Ikeda, who soon thereafter resigned for reason of health, and has been benefiting the country ever since under the succeeding Satō regime. In short, the following can be said. On the one hand, by maintaining the budget for defense within two percent of the national income, Japan was able to concentrate on her own economic recovery and development. On the other hand, thanks to the two wars fought by the Americans in postwar Asia, Japan, without being involved directly in these wars, was able not only to overcome her then current economic crises but to attain new levels of economic prosperity. Both in and outside Japan, the conditions were almost too fortuitous. It is no wonder that Japan, under such circumstances, should have emerged as the world's third greatest economic power. Furthermore, the postwar world as a whole was undergoing structural changes which further accelerated the Japanese growth made possible by accidentally fortunate factors mentioned previously. What were these structural changes? The nature of these changes may be divided into two stages, which we will deal with separately.

Firstly, with the breakdown of the colonial system after the end of World War II, the imperialistic economic system of the prewar period was definitely doomed. I do not mean to imply that no means remained after 1945 to those who would bolster the declining prewar system. Perhaps in this vane, the most dramatic "means" to appear in the postwar period was the development of awesome nuclear arsenals by the Super Powers. It is quite ironic that this new weapon, possessing such large-scale destruc-

¹ *Britannica Book of the Year 1967*, Encyclopædia Britannica, INC., pp. 40-41.

tive power, was to be used as a means for international blackmail and intimidation. But as a result of a tremendous technological development, the new order created by nuclear missiles quickly lost its deterrent effect. Thus the world entered the second stage of the postwar change in the international political structure.

In the first stage of the change, Japan adjusted herself fairly well to the various factors in the structural development of the world. In other words, these new world conditions were such that the principles adopted by the Japanese government in its economic diplomacy worked out well. At this stage, the system of East-West military bloc was not yet dissolved. However, it had been gradually becoming more and more impractical as well as difficult for national economic pursuits to remain tied to the military policies of the Super Powers. International economic relations cannot be determined only by ideological considerations. This is a strict rule in economic diplomacy. This trend had been gaining strength, both visibly and invisibly, in international politics since before the beginning of the Vietnam War. These new changes or conditions in the international political structure made it feasible for the Japanese government to achieve a high level of rapid economic growth and to carry out successfully its policies of economic diplomacy.

Among other factors were major increases in world-wide circulation of information, people and goods, and especially the highly-developed maritime trade system which made oceanic transportation of vast new quantities of raw materials and manufactured goods possible. Thus again the flow of international relation came to aid Japanese economic fortunes. With the dissolution of the old economic sphere, the Japanese began to seek raw materials in all parts of the world. But Japanese goods, products of Japan's advanced technology which established a foundation for her rapid economic growth, were first put on the domestic market. An increase in the average income due to the agricultural land reform and the formation of a large number of labor unions, along with the development in advertisement by the mass media, helped to reduce the prices of products sold in high quantities. Good quality and low cost gave Japanese goods the factors of an important advantage in the international market. Thus the conditions had become such that Japanese-made transistor radios, cameras, and motorcycles came to appear on markets all over the world, overcoming the barriers of the old economic sphere. However, these conditions cannot remain favorable forever, there is already a sign that a drastic change will take place in the situation when the Vietnam War is brought to an end. The big change will occur not in the field of productivity or technology, but rather in the

general area of political and social systems including the social structure and human relations which have been left far behind in this age of technological advance. This is the second stage of the postwar change.

Domestically the "rapid economic growth" policy created many social problems which have, over a long period of time, accumulated in the lower segments of the Japanese society. Now these problems seem to be bursting out everywhere, making its symbolic appearance especially in university disputes as an explosion of discontent of the younger generation. As I have mentioned at the beginning, Japan is now standing domestically also at an important turning-point. Even Shigeru Yoshida seems to have vaguely expected that this would happen when he made his last statement quoted before. Comparing the historical cycle of postwar Japan with that preceding the Russo-Japanese War, he states:

In a certain sense, the Japan of today is analogous to the Japan that emerged from the Russo-Japanese War. By reason of its victory over czarist forces, the nation acquired great power status virtually overnight. The people of Meiji succeeded in accomplishing what they had set out to do. Today the Japanese have succeeded in the undertaking to which they set their hearts and hands immediately following the Pacific conflict. But in the years following the Russo-Japanese War, our people instead of seeking new objectives, lost sight of the national purpose; before they became aware of that fact, they drifted in a misguided direction. If the Japanese nation and people of today, avoiding their responsibilities, fail to give purpose to their high qualities, they will run into a similar danger.²

As to what the Japanese should set up as their goals, Yoshida obviously had nothing but very optimistic and abstract ideas.

In the world of today, it is not an easy task to understand correctly one's own mission and to carry it out. However, if the Japanese people were to look back upon the past century—which, while not devoid of setbacks, was nevertheless marked on the whole by spectacular achievements—and if they turn their eyes on the world horizon, they will come to realize what tasks their nation must face.³

Drawing such conclusions, Yoshida does not seem to have realized at all the serious meaning of the failure after the end of the Russo-Japanese War in Japan's one-hundred-year history since the Meiji Restoration. Also, emphasizing that "if they turn their eyes on the world horizon," he does not give any concrete ideas about how. Yoshida was merely being romantic as a youth when he said:

² *Britannica*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

³ *Ibid.*

...what we need today, one hundred years later, is a far-reaching vision and the ability to assume Japan's rightful role in the ever-widening arena of international relations.⁴

His statement thus does not suggest what position Japan should take in order to adjust herself well to the changing circumstances of international politics. Yoshida was unable to recognize clearly the problems that the "rapid economic growth" policy would cause within the country. Evidently, Yoshida himself foresaw that the economic diplomacy of postwar Japan, the foundation for which had been established by him, was soon to end its cycle after his death. Although there are such limitations in Yoshida's view, I would think that, if we keep these limitations in mind, it would be still worth-while for us to make a comparative study, as Yoshida did, of Japan's postwar and Meiji eras. This is why I started this article stating that Japan, twenty-four years after World War II, was now standing at crossroads which I have compared with the change that took place in Japan after the Russo-Japanese War. However, we should study a little further the limitations of such a comparison.

So long as we are focusing our attention on the aspect of economic growth and development of Japan and its surroundings, a comparative study of post-1945 Japan and Meiji Japan reveals some suggestive facts. It is also possible to a certain extent to compare these two periods in their relationships with the international circumstances as long as we deal only with the types of changes which are common to both cases. However, the nature of growth and development in Japan differs greatly in each case. There is also a fundamental difference, both structural and functional, between the changes in the international situation during these two periods. And these differences make it necessary for us to seek another comparable case in Japanese history to help analyze and understand the second stage of the changes in post-World War II international politics. Thus we now reached to the point to provide a new-model of Japanese diplomacy. This is the subject of next paragraph of this article.

II

In order to foresee the future flow of events after the Vietnam War, it would be perhaps more useful than anything else to find a model in past history which presents vividly the structural differences in international conditions after such a change. For the case in point, I think the period immediately before the Meiji Restoration when all the feudal cliques (*han*)

⁴ *Ibid.*

were confronting each other is an "ideal type" in Weberian terminology to compare with the present situation in order to shed some light on the power struggle within the current international political structure.

As I have mentioned before, the Super Powers will lose much of their prestige step by step after the mid-1970's. It has already been said that in the international political situation in the latter half of the 1960's the military blocs that have managed to protect their respective economic "empires" from disintegration as yet even these strongholds are starting to creak more and more with the decrease in the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. We can see in this weakening of these military blocs destined for dissolution that the pattern of structural changes will acquire an accelerated momentum in international politics after the mid-1970's. In short, the traditional structure of the international political system based on a military order is, ironically enough, crumbling as a result of the great development in the sophisticated nuclear weapon systems. Viewed from a dialectic framework, it should be noted here that we will not come to any kind of reasonable analysis, unless we are willing to abandon the superficial approach to the international relations and dig into the inner crust of the ever evolving structure of international relations. It is in the deep crust of political structures that the sources of change in the past and present systems of international relations are to be found. The roles played by technological development and the world-wide circulation of knowledge, information, goods, and people as factors in the "crust movements" of international politics have already been mentioned in dealing with the first stage of such changes. However, those factors which contributed to the rapid growth of the Japanese economy during the first stage, have ironically emerged as the sources of the second stage of these structural changes. In other words, as a result of the enlarged circulation of information, knowledge, people and goods across national boundaries, movements for a social revolution demanding expanded participation and equality have escalated throughout the world. This escalation not only brings about the disruption of the economic structures which are integral to the military spheres of influence of the Super Powers, but brings forth various factors which lead to the second stage. Demands for a social revolution to realize expanded participation and equality have emerged rapidly not only within the structure of the nuclear powers but also in the countries which are tied to the Super Powers by military pacts. And even in the case of those nations who have remained comparatively independent from the Super Powers, if they have come to base their independence on traditional, and now by-gone, military power or to recover old military prestige of that

nation. They have surely incurred the staggering financial burdens of maintaining a modern weapons system. It is only natural that we should find the demands for such a revolution as participation and equality spreading with particular rapidity in these countries. This can be said to be a universal phenomenon of a world which is moving toward "an information controlled society."

In the context of the current structural change and information dominated society, the emergence of student movements, particularly in the world's advanced countries after the breaking out of the Vietnam War is another facet in this new social revolution. In this world on its way to an information controlled society, it is both surprising and a matter of serious concern that many student movements are, as is the case with the Tokyo University strife, inclined to result in the destruction of the very means of study and research and thereby in the destruction of the pillar of culture and civilization. An analogy to this phenomenon can be found in the Luddites Movement of workmen who tried to prevent the use of labor-saving machinery by destroying it at an early stage of industrialization in nineteenth-century England. If this is the case, the radical destruction of the means of culture by students may be said to be a sign of the fact that we are now undergoing the change to an information controlled society, as the Luddites Movement marked in its own time the beginning of an industrial society. The situation remains at present too complex to predict what kind of forms student movements will take in a more advanced stage of the shift to an information controlled society. However, the crust movement in international politics, as is represented in the growing international student movement, is emerging as a factor of such magnitude as to seriously alter the structure of the present world dominated as it is by the great nuclear powers. The spread of information which has become such a big entropy as to dissolve the nuclear alliance systems has surely become a factor for the eruption of student movements. And we cannot ignore such increased entropy in studying a society moving toward information control and the structural changes as reflected in international politics.

A similar case can be found, though on a much smaller scale and an extremely lower level, in the period of the Shogunate system just before the Meiji Restoration. As far as their social position is concerned, students of the present time can probably be well compared with the lower class samurai of the late Tokugawa. It was, needless to say, those lower class samurai who carried out the Meiji Restoration. These samurai, particularly from Satsuma and Chōshū, were ready to abandon their native lands in order to establish a unified Meiji government. Before the Restoration,

various problems both in Japan and in the world were considered only in connection with the individual cliques. However, the lower class samurai of Satsuma and Chōshū tried to view the problems in connection with the nation as a whole rising above the interests of their own cliques. It can be said that it was with this new perspective that they were able to force the unification of Japan and thus cope with then mounting foreign pressure. Though, after the completion of the Restoration, they were criticized for forming the Chōshū and Satsuma cliques, it seems quite understandable that they who denied the existence of the old feudalistic cliques in order to carry out the unification of the nation should have become the elite of the new modern system. Then in what aspects is the present international situation like that of the period preceding the Restoration when the cliques were confronting one another? For example, though students set up a purely nationalistic slogan for their movement as the demand for discontinuation of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, they do not seem to regard the world as something which centers around traditional Japan. As a matter of fact, it would be more accurate to say that they are opposed to the present relationship between Japan and the Super Power, America, holding it contrary to their hopes for world unity, as the lower class samurai called for an end to the decentralized Japan of the Tokugawa in favor of national unification. In other words, now we see among radical student groups a manifestation of deep distrust of the present relationship between a large feudal lord called America and a small one called Japan. This is the present situation, viewed in comparison with the period immediately before the fall of the feudalistic system in Japan, in which criticism against the U.S.-Japan Security Pact system has come to light through a crust movement in international politics.

In any case, it is a factor of prime importance that the public is now fundamentally doubtful about the image it used to have about such matters as security and national interests. Therefore, the nation is casting a critical eye on traditional conceptualization in international relations such as the balance of power thesis, etc. From such a critical viewpoint to the traditional power policies, so-called realistic argument for security, would be supposed to be just one more concept of a hopefully by-gone unidealistic negative world such as "counter cosmos" theoretically devised in the nuclear physics. Because, as far as we regard the present structure of international system as similar to that of the pre-1868 feudalistic period of Japan, this system of international confrontation based on the traditional nation-state-ism is rapidly becoming an anachronism, which must be abolished. At least this is what the modern Japanese radical seems to feel intuitively. In any case,

the crust movement which denies the relevance of the old system of international politics in the post-Vietnam War world, seems to have begun to appear even within Japan. The international structural shift also manifests itself symbolically in the unity that has been produced by the mass media among the different student movements emerging in various advanced countries. (The Kanda district in Tokyo, for example, is regarded as a Japanese version of the Quartier Latin in Paris.)

As for such a structural change of the contemporary international system, the second type of model, which compares the present environment in which Japanese diplomacy should pursue national goals as described in Article 9 of the Constitution, with the pre-Meiji Shogunate system, is also meaningful. It means that when we take into consideration the coming revolution in international politics toward the unification of the world, our attempt cannot but appear to be some kind of critical review of present Japanese diplomatic policies. It will also mean that we must at least critically grasp the chief characteristics of past Japanese diplomacy, governed by the framework of the idea that the postwar period of Japan was its most revolutionary age of reform. However, the fundamental perspective of this article was to trace the historical process of postwar Japanese diplomacy. In this complicated historical work, both types of models already explained have only heuristic use for the explication of characteristics in the international environment. Thus further work must be undertaken to gain a fuller understanding of the meaning of these two types of models.

III

Now let us begin with investigating the concrete history of the relations of nuclear deterrent power around Japan.

Japan, which was obliged to come under the American nuclear umbrella as a result of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, came subsequently to be exposed to the threat posed by the rapidly developing nuclear capacity of the Soviet Union. Now it is very difficult to maintain the security of a country which has been dependent on the deterrent power of American nuclear weapons, unless strategy of the American government is revised in some way. Due to the American government's continued insistence on a policy of nuclear confrontation with the U.S.S.R., Japanese security has been step by step undermined by virtue of its increasingly dangerous military alliance with the United States. So long as Japan chooses to remain under the America's nuclear umbrella, it cannot avoid being a potential victim of the Soviet reaction to the first strike nuclear deterrence of the United

States.

Whatever the original intention of the Hatoyama Cabinet may have been when it tried to restore diplomatic relations with the U. S. S. R., we cannot deny the fact that the restoration of Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations helped to diminish the danger of Russian nuclear attack on Japan. In July, 1955 Bertrand Russell sent a warning of the danger of an atomic war to the political leaders of various countries, and eighteen Nobel Prize winning scientists announced their warning of the same danger. Subsequently the first World Convention for Banning of Nuclear Tests was held in Japan on August 6, 1955. Viewed objectively, the year 1955, a year before the restoration of the diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, appeared to be a crucial time, for there was a major possibility of the total destruction of Japan by a nuclear counterattack of the U.S.S.R. if the Americans had taken the offensive against Soviet Union. Obviously it was because of such a threat that the movement for both a nuclear test ban and disarmament gained strength. It can be said that the Hatoyama Cabinet restored diplomatic relations with Soviet Union in January, 1956, in order to meet the public demand for peace by a nation which was considered by its people to be in danger of involvement in a nuclear war. Hatoyama, who was a party politician, was more responsive to the public demand for peace than any bureaucrat would have been. If the Hatoyama Cabinet was, as is often said, far more democratic than the Yoshida Cabinet which was supported by nationalistic economic-oriented bureaucracy, it is true only in regard to its resolute determination to resume diplomatic relations with Soviet Union. This was revealed when Hatoyama proposed a constitutional amendment in order to officially permit the rearmament of the country; the public demand for peace, which had been bolstered by the nuclear test ban and disarmament movements, made an important counterattack on his old-fashioned nationalism. In the general election held in February, 1955, the opposition parties, which were against the constitutional amendment, won more than one-third of the seats, and had already been imposing many restrictions upon the Hatoyama Cabinet's Soviet policy after the exchange of ambassadors with Moscow. The influence of the opposition parties subsequently became even greater and the demand for a constitutional amendment, which had been at its peak early in the Hatoyama regime, gradually diminished even within the conservative party. The conservative party has managed to keep its position mainly by promoting the immediate interests of the people. Generally speaking, as far as foreign relations are concerned, its policies have seldom received any larger degree of support from the people except in the more to restore relations with Moscow by the Hato-

yama Cabinet. The opposition parties, therefore, have often played the roles of organizers of political movements among the masses and as well as a powerful group exercising a political veto especially in diplomatic matters. Japan owes much to its opposition parties, with the Socialist Party as its central force, whose pressure has restrained Japanese diplomacy from taking military posture and thus adding to international political tension. Of course the opposition had behind it the support of a large mass of anti-nuclear weapons movement, including those who had voted for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), many of whom hoped to prevent the Japanese government from committing itself to dangerous military policies through the veto of the opposition power.

Having been granted United Nations membership after the restoration of diplomatic relations with Soviet Union, the Japanese government dispatched Shigemitsu to New York in December, 1956. In his first speech made on behalf of the newly admitted Japan at the eleventh General Assembly, he was forced to emphasize the importance of U. N. diplomacy and the necessity to ban super-kill weaponry in order to prevent recurrence of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies by the pressure of the general atmosphere of Japanese people, and he appealed for realistic efforts to grapple with current problems particularly the cold war. He also stressed the importance of fostering Asian nationalism and expressed Japan's duty and hope to be a bridge between the West and East. This came as a result of Japan's new progressive diplomatic line adopted after the restoration of the Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations. The succeeding Ishibashi Cabinet though it lasted no more than two months, followed the independent diplomatic line of the Hatoyama Cabinet and focused on expansion of Sino-Japanese trade and the American military base problems. However, since Communist China did not yet possess nuclear weapons, its threat to Japan was not felt enough to give rise to a public demand for restoration of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. After the resignation of Ishibashi for health reasons, the succeeding Kishi Cabinet at first included in its three major foreign policies not only "cooperation with the Free World" but also "diplomacy in accordance with the United Nations" and "necessity of taking a position as an Asian nation." But soon the latter two policies proved to be a mere lip service to the public. The Foreign Ministry, which had no means of direct communication with Japanese people, functioned as a powerful veto organ against demands of the public. As a matter of fact, Japanese diplomacy soon lost its progressive stance seen in the Shigemitsu's speech and gradually became nothing more than one-sided American view, which could easily advocate to continue nuclear containment of Communist

China. All the foreign policies were decided in a secret room in a bureaucratic structure carefully isolated from the criticism and the opposition of the people.

Of course, a strong public demand for peace and neutralization was aimed at preventing the Japanese government from making foreign policies in the line of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, and so it became necessary for the government to make such decision in a place beyond the observation of the public. The Foreign Ministry, with its unique ethos, had come to be regarded by the people as something special, thus permitting itself to become a political means to separate government decisions from the demands of the public. Information gathered at the Foreign Ministry consisted of that obtained by high-ranking Japanese diplomats in their associations with the high officials and the corporate executives of various countries in the world. Many businessmen representing commercial interests pursued only their own vested interests in profit-making gathered around the Japanese embassies and consulates in various parts of the world. Under such circumstance, the Japanese Foreign Ministry naturally neglected to promote deep cultural relationships with the people of these countries. It is sure that the best effect of such Japanese diplomacy appeared in the area of so-called "transistor merchants" and "economic animals." On its darker side however, Japanese diplomacy proved to be nothing but import of American view illustrated in Pentagon and U.S. military-industrial complex. It is not surprising that the analyses of international situations presented by the Foreign Ministry are often very inferior in quality to those done by the Japanese press. One may not find it difficult to find such a good and very obvious example of lack of analytical framework in commenting on international politics is the diplomatic "white paper" issued by the Ministry every year. The low standard of this diplomatic "white paper" might make a clear contrast with the high standards of the economic "white paper" issued by the Economic Planning Agency. In short, the government in general seems inclined to take only favorably biased report into consideration in making foreign policies. This may be an unavoidable tendency in collecting information. However, this tendency has encouraged the Japanese Foreign Ministry in ignoring the desires of the Japanese public in its decision-making. The Japanese embassy in Washington D.C. carries a larger staff than any other Japanese embassy or consulate in the world. And there are nine Japanese consulates in the United States. This major concern with the U.S.'s opinion has facilitated the partiality of information and the overwhelming impact of Washington on Japanese diplomacy. We may even say that the Japanese Foreign Ministry has almost totally fallen into

the hand of the U.S. government. If we bear this in mind, we may be able to more clearly analyze Japan's diplomatic history up to the present. The interpretation of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact and the resultant policies have not been seriously changed throughout the consecutive regimes of Kishi, Ikeda and Satō. But in general, the degree of Japan's dependency upon the United States has become greater. This development can be well explained as a result of the feedback cycle mechanism of collecting information to be on which to base foreign policy decision-making.

Of course, there are other factors which strengthen this mechanism such as prevalent attitude of "security first" or opportunism and spiritual stagnancy among Foreign Ministry officials due to the high degree discrimination between career and non-career diplomats within the Ministry. Thus such a spiritless atmosphere in the Ministry has in turn discouraged its officials from making any drastic re-examination of the fundamental principles of Japanese diplomacy.

The following is the factual diplomatic history of Japan. The policy making organ in the Japanese government, which successfully reduced the threat of the Russian nuclear weapons by restoring diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. during the Hatoyama regime, gradually lost its zeal for easing the international tension. Having offered, though unsuccessfully, great resistance to the restoration of Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations, the Japanese Foreign Ministry now tried to take advantage of the shift in the American policy from the containment of the U. S. S. R. to that of Communist China. It announced to the people that the Chinese threat was not powerful enough to influence the current balance of power, and presented itself as a big barrier to the restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. The aggressive attitude of the Kishi Cabinet toward Communist China was probably a symbolic manifestation of such thinking. Kishi insisted on amending the Constitution, which had been forced on Japan by the United States, even more strongly than Hatoyama did. And he tried to revive the old nationalism in Japan by revising the U.S.-Japan Security Pact.

It is true that Hatoyama was a nationalist in the classic sense in his advocating of an amendment of the Constitution. However, Hatoyama made a valuable contribution by restoring Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations—the only attempt made in the diplomatic history of postwar Japan to ease international tensions. Kishi for his part, only aggravated relations with Communist China and intensified the international turmoil in East Asia. He was an authoritarian ex-bureaucrat and flatly disregarded public opinion as is often the case with a politician with such a background. In this way, the Japanese public were forced to stand up against Kishi, thus oppos-

ing his rule and bringing down his cabinet. The resignation of the Kishi Cabinet was also a result of the fact that diplomatic problems were finally brought out from the old safeguarded room in the Foreign Ministry into the light to be discussed by the public. The anti-U.S.-Japan Security Pact movement in 1960 also brought an end to traditional nationalism in Japan. However, the new emerging Japanese nationalism, with its international background and opposition to the Security Pact, also failed. Thus it was with the great difficulty and at the cost of his cabinet that Kishi carried out the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact. The defeat of the old nationalism which Kishi had hoped to revive among the Japanese people proved that the people and the opposition parties had gained enough strength to resist an important government policy if ever militarily oriented. The government party barely overcame this anti-U.S.-Japan Security Pact movement by joining forces with the Foreign Ministry.

What effect did the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact have on the international politics? As a direct effect, it made it more difficult to lessen the level of tension in Asia, and posed a serious obstacle for the restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Nuclear weapons on the American military bases in Okinawa continued to menace and threaten Communist China.

The revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact also produced some indirect ill effects in international politics as Japan's ex-ambassador to Great Britain, Haruhiko Nishi, has so validly pointed out by his official memory. That is, disappointed at the Japanese decision on the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, the U.S.S.R. under Nikita S. Khrushchev transferred nuclear missiles to Cuba, thus bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. From the same standpoint there can be no doubt that the nuclear weapons on Okinawa have been just as intimidating to Communist China as the ones placed in Cuba were to the United States. But it was through their experience with Cuba, not with Okinawa, that the Americans realized the true characters of nuclear threat not by herself but by her opponent. The countermeasures taken by J.F. Kennedy confronted the people of the whole world with the danger of a total war. But Kennedy was fully aware that a total nuclear war would result in a complete destruction of human race. Khrushchev had also reached the same conclusion. These two leaders both became, therefore, very deliberate in deciding the next step. And their deliberateness prevented the eruption of a nuclear war. Through their experience in Cuban crisis, these two leaders reached a tacit understanding that they must abandon their mutual threat policies of depending on the first-strike deterrence. However, for Communist China, the United States

government never tried to apply this new principles. Though Okinawa remained as a nuclear menace to Communist China like Cuba to the U.S., this situation no longer caused any great difficulty for the U.S. The U.S. government felt no need for re-examination of its global strategy until Communist China developed nuclear weapons powerful enough to destroy Japan or the United States. If this had been the case, the rapid development of nuclear technology in Communist China would have been ironically indispensable for ending international tensions in Asia. How could it be denied if logically consistent? Of course, at that time, such American strategy against Communist China did not even arouse sensitive recognition of the existence of the Chinese threat among the Japanese. This lack of awareness lasted until the middle of the 1960's. The first successful Chinese nuclear test came in October, 1964, and the first bombing attack by the Americans on North Vietnam was made on February 7, 1965. Thus international tensions were climbing new peaks of intensity. Now we have reached to the point to discuss the problems that Japan faced under such circumstances.

IV

Before explaining the direct impact of the Vietnam War on Japanese diplomacy, it is necessary to give some information on the post-Kishi trends of Japanese diplomacy as a pre-condition of this impact.

After the fall of the Kishi Cabinet, the Ikeda Cabinet focused on a combination policy of an economic foreign policy and a domestic policy of "rapid economic growth." Current demands for an economic foreign policy and the high level economic growth in Japan were successfully combined together. Since Communist China had not yet succeeded in developing nuclear weapons powerful enough to act as a deterrence against the United States, it was also explained the U.S. government had no immediate need to change its strategy against China based upon the principle of the nuclear deterrent power. The U.S. government was using the same old containment policy against China, which she had formerly applied against the U.S.S.R. Japan was then entering a new prosperous period of peace, often referred to as "Shōwa genroku" under the protection of American nuclear weapons. Though the Ikeda Cabinet was replaced by the Satō Cabinet, Japan's diplomatic line remained the same, stressing the reliability of America's deterrent power guaranteed in the U.S.-Japan Security Pact and the security of a country protected under the American nuclear umbrella. As previously mentioned, so far as the interpretation of and policies for na-

tional security are concerned, attitude of the LDP was the same throughout the regimes of Kishi, Ikeda, and Satō. But in their individual foreign policies, the Japanese government has become more and more one-sided pro-American. There is a growing tendency to completely in line with the United States from the time of the eleventh General Assembly of the United Nations when Japan was first admitted to the United Nations up to the twenty-third General Assembly last year, whether the issue was in the problem of disarmament, nuclear test ban, peaceful settlement of disputes, or human rights.

Such tendency took an especially clear form at the sixteenth General Assembly of the U. N. in 1961, a year after the revision of the U. S.-Japan Security Pact, where the problem of whether or not to admit membership to Communist China was discussed. The Japanese delegation acted as a "cat's paw" of the United States, actively maneuvering behind the scenes to gain support of the group from Brazzaville for treating the issue as an "important question." Since that time, Japanese diplomatic policy has been devoted totally to American interests. Though the Ikeda Cabinet made an attempt to restore purely economic relations with Communist China separating economic relations from political relations, it stuck to its position of treating the Communist China issue as an "important question." Furthermore, after the beginning of American attack on North Vietnam, the succeeding Satō Cabinet strongly supported all the American policies for Southeast Asia, and its containment policy against Communist China. The climax of U. S.-Japan alliance came in November, 1967 when the two governments made a joint statement emphasizing the nuclear threat from Communist China and confirming Japan's strong support of the United States in the Vietnam War. Why did the Japanese government have to become more and more subordinate to the United States in such a way in its foreign policy? It was because the Ikeda Cabinet, though some of its economic foreign policies were aimed at overcoming the influence of the old economic sphere, actually could not but promote a close economic relationship with the United States in order to carry out its policies successfully. Needless to say, in this point the young government economists devised and developed economic foreign policies based upon economic rationalism independent from both traditional and progressive nationalism, but they never strongly criticized the large degree of dependence on the United States of Japanese foreign policy. In the field of external affairs, the government party and the opposition were in a serious conflict of views since the new independence of the postwar Japan. However, the high level of economic growth and the primacy of economic rationalism temporarily mitigated the actual

confrontation between the government party and the opposition even in the area of foreign affairs. The incident which brought an end to this superficially harmonious coexistence was the Vietnam War.

When the impact of the newly emerging international peace movement eventually reached Japan, it began to affect domestic affairs there. Many domestic anti-Vietnam War organizations such as "Beheiren" (Japan Peace for Vietnam Committee) emerged one after another. A new-leftist movement by the people who were not satisfied with the old left-wing parties also began to gain strength in Japan in a unique way. In this widely prevailing trend of new-leftist ideology, the Japanese student movements, mentioned previously, came to seek their new pattern of revolution in the ideologies of the contemporary revolutionary thinkers such as Marcuse and Ernesto Che Guevara. Of course Marx and Mao Tse-tung still have considerably great ideological authority and great influence over the students. But new ideology of the students revolt aiming at world revolution brought a revival of Trotskyism.

In this new atmosphere of political consciousness among the Japanese people a definite impact on the current political party system was broadly produced. Thus rising Japanese multi-party system entered a new era. Viewed in a long run the numbers of votes cast for the current conservative party in recent general elections have been already gradually decreasing. The Socialist Party, the major opposition party, has also been losing its power. On the other hands, the Komeito, the Communist Party and the Democratic Socialist Party have been gradually increasing their voting power. In the general election of the House of Councillors in 1962 the LDP obtained 47.1% of the total votes in local constituencies. Then in 1965, it received only 44.2%. In 1968 it managed to maintain its status obtaining 44.9%. However, it was probably not the party but the widely-known "talents" running under the banner of the LDP in the national constituency that gathered votes for the party even in the local constituencies. Also in the general elections of the House of Representatives held in January, 1967, the LDP won 48.8% of the total votes. Although it retained 56.9% of the seats, its poll has been showing a slight but steady decrease throughout the five general elections since February, 1955. To be specific, the votes they obtained are as follows: 63.2% in February, 1955; 57.8% in May, 1958; 57.6% in November, 1963; and 48.8% in January, 1967. Furthermore, we must not neglect that this change has been taking place in spite of the fact that the surrounding international situation has been comparatively stable. Now we can see a sign of a drastic change in international political conditions. And the recent national public opinion surveys prove

that people who support neutralization of Japan always exceed 50% of the poll. Even in such a situation, the LDP is determined to take a strong position for automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact in 1970 without any discussion in the Diet. If the LDP government decides to carry out an automatic extension of the Pact, the Pact can remain valid as it is without any revision or amendment, even after it reaches the end of the "tentative term" of ten years on June 22, 1970. It is tactically possible for the government to realize automatic extension of the Pact, without bringing up any proposal concerning the revision of the Pact before the Diet. The Foreign Ministry takes an optimistic view of automatic extension and does not anticipate any serious political crisis as in 1960. However, a great deal of doubt has arisen about such an optimistic perspective when we take into consideration the changes both in international situation and domestic political scene. Such doubt has been prevailing in the government party as well as in the opposition and thus making it difficult for them to persist in their optimistic view of the 1970 issue.

It is sure that average public opinion is not just demanding an immediate end to the U.S.-Japan Security Pact and the imminent establishment of neutral Japan. But as the year 1970 draws near, Japanese nationalism has begun to cry out for the return of Okinawa and there has also emerged a strong demand for large-scale reduction of American military bases in Japan. Of course, the government and the LDP have been trying to persuade the Japanese people that in order to realize an early return of Okinawa, it is necessary to admit the role and function of the military bases on Okinawa in America's nuclear strategy. Prime Minister Satō himself has also repeatedly said in response to questions put to him at the Diet sessions that nuclear weapons have been and are preventing war in East Asia. However, most of Japanese people believe that essentially, nuclear weapons as a deterrent power are by no means necessary, nor sufficient conditions for stopping a war. Even if the U.S. did not possess nuclear weapons a war would not break out between the United States and Canada. Socialist explains that according to deterrence theory also, recently there is a general recognition of an extreme danger that the deterrent power of nuclear weapons will become ineffective if there is no mutual trust between countries. Therefore, the idea that the definition of a deterrent power as that which prevents the war, as was expressed in Prime Minister Satō's reply at a Diet session, had no logical foundation in reality to persuade the Japanese public. Thus, the Japanese people will begin to demand the simultaneous neutralization of their country and the return of Okinawa given the American-Chinese nuclear confrontation. While the Japanese government who

also wishes the return of Okinawa, is against the neutralization of Japan, the public demand is that, when Okinawa is returned to Japan, all the American military bases should be removed from it and that the military bases in Japan proper should be abolished. However, the American government has been insistent on maintaining its nuclear missile bases in Okinawa. Neither does it wish to withdraw its military bases from Japan proper. As a compromise among these different demands a proposal has been made to return Okinawa to Japan without nuclear missile bases and to reduce the size and number of the military bases in Japan. It seems to me that the final form of compromise will depend on the one hand, on how many seats the government party will be able to obtain in next general elections, and on the other hand, on the capacity of opposition forces to organize and develop anti-U.S.-Japan Security Pact and "return Okinawa" movements. However, there is a possibility that this 1970 question will, together with the crust movement in the structure of international politics and gradually growing instability, emerge as such a great political controversy that it will not be possible to solve it only in the secret room of the Foreign Ministry even with its most tactful methods. Opposition parties believe that if Okinawa is returned with the American nuclear missile bases, it will along with the rapid development of Chinese nuclear weapons, further increase international tension in East Asia. And Japanese politics, which is entangled in American nuclear strategy by virtue of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, will, as a result, become extremely unstable. Japan, with its many domestic problems, would not be able to stand the mirror effect of America's persistent dependency on the first-strike deterrent power of Japanese based nuclear weapons against Communist China. Furthermore, toward the latter half of 1970's the Japanese people, faced with even more radical changes in the international political structure, will come to see a great danger in opposing the admission of Communist China to the United Nations and in retaining the American nuclear missiles in Okinawa as the first-strike deterrent power against China. Because if the first-strike deterrent power of nuclear weapons of the United States becomes ineffective in East Asia before the mid-1970's though it seems now only a distinct possibility, the whole of the Japanese islands would be destroyed by the Chinese counterattack with its nuclear weapons even against a limited American nuclear strike on Communist China. Although not at the beginning of the 1970's, the time will come sooner or later. The Okinawa problem is not so simple as to be solved just by pointing out, as Japanese ambassador to the United States, Takezō Shimoda has tried, the unrealistic view of the Japanese people. The Foreign Minister, which was

managed to settle nearly all problems using only the policy-making mechanism within its secret room (the U. S.-Japan Security Pact Revision in 1960 excepted), will not be able to avoid being involved in a nation-wide political movement in 1970 again. In order to withstand such a movement, it is essential for Japanese diplomacy to abandon its traditional one-sided pro-American attitude and set forth completely new policies of Japan's neutrality by the restoration of diplomatic relations with Communist China. It seems to me that such a new policy in Japanese diplomacy would be based on the ever-growing demands of the Japanese people, who want to prevent the emerging U.S.-China confrontation by peaceful means.