THE CHILD'S CHANGING IMAGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER*

—A Preface to the Study of Political Socialization in Contemporary Japan—

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I. A PERSPECTIVE ON POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Socialization refers generally to the individual's learning of social behavior through which he becomes able to act appropriately as a member of a social group. Herbert Hyman has described this aspect of human social development as "the area of *learning*; more specifically the *socialization* of the individual, his learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society."[1] Political socialization is socialization into political life, through which the members of a political system are expected to come to possess shared knowledge, shared attitudes, and shared values with respect to political objects. These political orientations are of great significance for the persistence of the political system. As David Easton and Robert Hess have stated:

> no [political] system can attain or remain in a condition of integration unless it succeeds in developing among its members a body of shared knowledge about political matters as well as a set of shared political values and attitudes.[2]

In the vocabulary of Easton's systems analysis, political socialization constitutes an important source of support for the political system.[3]

* Although this paper appears under my name, it is really a product of the cooperative research of myself and ten students in my seminar at International Christian University. I should like to express our deepest appreciation to the principals and the teachers of the primary, middle, and high schools in Setagaya ward, Tokyo, who were so kind as to cooperate in our survey. In addition I should like to thank Mr. Joseph A. Massey of Yale University for having translated the paper and for his participation in, and instructive suggestions toward, our research.

1 Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization*, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959, p. 25.

2 Easton and Hess, "Youth and the Political System," in S. M. Lipset & Leo Lowenthal eds., *Culture and Social Character*, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 226.

3 See David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1965; and *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1965.

It is likely that where a society and its political system are stable, the shared knowledge, values, and attitudes of the members will be transmitted and reproduced from generation to generation with great fidelity. Japanese society and the Japanese political system, however, have undergone major changes since the Meiji Restoration (1868), and the about-face stemming from the defeat in 1945 has had a particularly decisive influence on the nation's political system. But not even in the postwar era has Japan been continuously stable; there are major differences in the political system between the periods before and after the signing of the Peace Treaty in 1952, and the economic changes of the recent past have been widely noted. The changes that have occurred have taken place within a very short period, in fact in less than the thirty year span between the birth of an individual and the birth of his children that is usually taken to measure one "generation." Indeed, such is the pace of change in Japan that the very term generation has come to mean about ten years or so. It should not be too difficult to imagine what aspects political socialization assume under such circumstances. Consideration of the effects of such circumstances has led me to refer to political socialization in Japan as the "political socialization of upheavals."[4]

By far the most important aspect of the political socialization of upheavals is that of the generation gap. The existence of differences between the political attitudes and values of adults and children is probably a phenomenon common to all societies; but where the political system is stable, when children become adults they can be expected to develop nearly the same attitudes as those of their parents. However, in Japan we observe the co-existence of fragmented generations possessing divergent political attitudes.[5] In addition to the well known classifications of pre-, mid-, and post-war generations, there are such expressions in recent usage as "post-First World War generation" and "post-Second World War generation,"[6] and, in the student movement, "pre-," "mid-," and "post-struggle" generations, referring to experience in the opposition movement in 1960 against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Pact.

Not only do the various generations fail to share a common consciousness and common attitudes, but often they are unable even to communicate with one another over the gaps that separate them.[7] Such fiercely disputed

4 Tadao Okamura, "Political Socialization of Upheavals," unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, 1962.

5 On the generation gap, see Rokurō Hidaka, *Gendai ideorogī* (Contemporary Ideology), Tokyo, Keisō-shōbō, 1960, pp. 287ff.

6 *Ibid.*

7 The parallel existence of closed groups might itself be said to be a characteristic feature of Japan. However, our interest here lies in probing into the new generation.

subjects as the system of official authorization of textbooks, the official evaluation of teachers, and the reinstitution of morals courses are not merely partisan political issues but reflect the differences between the generations educated before and after the War. The clarification of the nature of the gaps severing the generations is thus an important problem for research in political socialization in Japan.

Yet, in Japanese political socialization is there only generational cleavage and a complete lack of intergenerational transmission of attitudes? To be sure, present-day youngsters are conspicuously different from the youngsters of preceding generations. Today's youths do not set their sights on becoming "either a scholar or a cabinet minister," as did many prewar children. Nor, at least on the basis of their responses to a questionnaire item, can they be expected to believe that they should "offer their lives for the Emperor and the Fatherland." There is apparent a decisive difference between the political socialization of the present and that of the prewar. But can no continuities be discovered in the less obvious aspects of political socialization? Bringing such continuities to light constitutes another important task for political socialization research, parallel to that of clarifying the generational discontinuities.

Related to these problems is the paradoxical relationship between contemporary political socialization and the contemporary political system. To borrow Easton's terminology, it might be said that political socialization seems not to be producing support for the various levels of the political system.[8] At the level of the *political community*, "patriotism" and "nationalism"—no matter how defined or interpreted—are extremely rare among the younger generation. At the *regime* level, mistrust of the parliamentary democratic system is voiced in many places. And at the level of the authorities, as I shall explain in greater detail below, politicians are the objects of censure and scorn. By the standards of Western societies, political socialization in contemporary Japan might be said to be dysfunctional for the political system. Yet, how is it that despite such political socialization, no major change in the Japanese political system is foreseeable in the near future? Japan, of course, has its revolutionaries. But the balance and the impetus in today's Japanese political culture lies not with them but, rather, with that broader spectrum of people, on the one hand, who are developing an attitude of what might be called "rejection" of the political system, focusing on the many problems of the system, but, on the other hand, on whose very account the political system remains stable. In other words, that the Japanese political system is stable is *not in spite of* the

8 Easton, *A Framework*, pp. 116–117.

apparently dysfunctional political socialization but *just because of it.* The investigation and solution of this paradox is yet another important problem for research in political socialization.

With this general set of problems in view, I, and students in my class at International Christian University, have been pursuing research on political socialization in contemporary Japan. This research is still in progress, and this paper, therefore, necessarily constitutes, from the viewpoints of both content and method, but an intermediate report. The major portion of our research, following the example of most previous research on political socialization, consists in the analysis of the results of a set of self-administered questionnaires, which we distributed to children in their school rooms. The survey sample is made up of youngsters from third graders in primary school to seniors in high school; that is, children from about eight to seventeen years old. Some fifty-three questions were asked of pupils in all grades. In addition, seven rather more difficult questions were asked of the middle school and high school students. The final version of the questionnaire was drafted on the basis of a pre-test survey. The survey was carried out in eight locations of three types:

1. large cities: the Yamanote (suburban) and Shitamachi (downtown) sections of Tokyo; Kobe, and Sapporo
2. medium size cities: Kanazawa and Nagasaki
3. rural areas: rural counties in Aomori and Hiroshima prefectures.

One primary school, middle school, and high school was selected at the survey site in each of these locations, and two classes from each grade level (totaling from 70 to 90 youngsters) were surveyed. The selection of sites and schools was not based on any strict statistical method, but we gave as much consideration as possible to ensuring that the eight regions reflected a variety of aspects of Japan and that the schools chosen exemplified the characteristics of these regions.

This paper reports on one part of our research the analysis of age development in the formation of the image of the Prime Minister among children. The data used in the analysis are limited to the Yamanote section of Tokyo.

From 1960 to 1962 I participated in, and benefited greatly from, the Political Socialization Project led by Professors Easton and Hess at the University of Chicago. I hope that the reader will compare this paper with the Easton and Hess paper on "The Child's Changing Image of the President,"[9] from which, as will be apparent, the title of this paper derives. Through such comparative analysis the distinctive characteristics of political

9 *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960), pp. 632–644.

socialization in Japan should become clear. Needless to say, the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the United States cannot be considered in exactly the same dimensions. Many and important differences are to be found between them. But each is undeniably the most important political figure in the eyes of the adults as well as the children of his respective country. The differences in the content of socialization with respect to these political figures seem to derive not so much from the differences in the roles assigned to them by their respective constitutions as from broader differences in the two political cultures.

Soon after the Yamanote district survey was carried out in July 1968 a national election for members of the House of Councillors took place in which the Liberal Democratic Party led by Prime Minister Satō managed to maintain the status quo nearly intact. According to a survey conducted in the latter part of August by the *Asahi* newspaper, some 41% of the people supported the Satō cabinet as against 37% who did not.[10] These figures are a fair indication of the average status of Cabinet support throughout the postwar period.

The Yamanote section of Tokyo is a residential area populated largely by middle and upper-middle class families. The standard of living is higher in the Yamanote section than the national average and there is a higher proportion of college graduates among the residents. The schools which we surveyed there are all publicly run and they reflect, I believe, the general characteristics of the area. Given Japan's movement toward urbanization, the political trends found in Yamanote should serve to indicate what are likely to be the nationwide trends in Japan in the future.

By way of reference, Table 1 shows the proportion of the vote in the January 1967 General Election won by each of the parties in the country as a whole compared to the results in the Tokyo Third District that include the Yamanote section. The Liberal Democratic Party led all parties in

Table 1. 1967 General Election Results—Percent of Popular Vote Obtained by Each Party in the Country as a Whole and in the Tokyo Third District (%)

	Nationwide	Tokyo Third District
Liberal Democratic Party	48.8	33.1
Japan Socialist Party	27.9	25.0
Democratic Socialist Party	7.4	18.2
Komeito	5.3	12.1
Japan Communist Party	4.7	9.1
Other	5.8	2.5

10 *Asahi shimbun*, September 13, 1968.

both, but with a smaller margin in the Tokyo Third District than in the nation at large. And the multi-party trend of recent years is apparent in Tokyo and nationally.

II. THE IMAGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

In our survey we asked the following questions about the Prime Minister:

Q. A: Is the Prime Minister rich or poor?
(1) Very rich (2) Rich (3) About the same as the average person (4) Poor (5) Very poor (6) Don't know
(Responses to the following questions take a similar form.)

Q. B: Is the Prime Minister honest or does he tell lies?

Q. C: Is the Prime Minister doing a good job or not?

Q. D: Do you like the Prime Minister or dislike him?

Q. E: How many people do you think like the Prime Minister?

The responses of children at each grade level to each of these questions are reported in Tables 2A through 2E. A number of the characteristics of political socialization in Japan are apparent in these results. If we set aside the results of Table 2A for the time being, we note that the evaluations of the Prime Minister are extremely low. Easton and Hess found in their research that the younger the American child the more he idealizes the President.[11] To the young child the President seems in every way an ideal, almost omnipotent figure. Easton and Hess infer from this that the child transfers the image of his father to the President.[12] This hypothesis, however, cannot readily be applied to the case of the Japanese Prime Minister. While it is true that we do observe among Japanese children too that the younger the child the higher his estimation of the Prime Minister, those estimations are nevertheless conspicuously lower than American children's estimations of the President. Only 19.5% of the Japanese third graders replied that they "like" or "like very much" the Prime Minister, and only 31.4% thought him to be "honest" or "very honest." In the lower grades the Prime Minister received the highest evaluations in the children's responses to one of his impersonal aspects, his competence at his job. Some 59.7% of the third graders responded that the Prime Minister is doing a "very good job" or "fairly good job." The substantial number of "don't know" and "can't say either" replies in the lowest age group

11 "The Child's Image of the President," *op. cit.*

12 *Ibid.* See also Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," *American Political Science Review*, 54 (1960), pp. 934–943.

Table 2. The Image of the Prime Minister

2A: Is the Prime Minister rich or poor? (%)

Grade		Very Rich	Rich	Average	Poor	Very Poor	Don't Know	No Answer	Total	(N)*
Primary School	3	24.4	50 0	11.0	0	0	14.6	0	100.0	(82)
	4	20.5	33 7	16.9	0	1.2	26.5	1.2	100.0	(83)
	5	16.4	32.8	41.8	0	0	9.0	0	100.0	(67)
	6	13.6	38.6	38 6	1.1	1.1	6.8	0	99.8	(88)
Middle School	7	23.5	42.4	18.8	1.2	0	14.1	0	100.0	(85)
	8	28.9	38.6	15.7	1.2	1.2	14.5	0	100.1	(83)
	9	22.4	56.6	13.2	1.3	0	6.6	0	100.1	(76)
High School	10	44.8	31.3	9.4	0	1.0	13.5	0	100.0	(96)
	11	40.7	40.7	2.2	0	0	16.5	0	100.1	(91)
	12	54.7	37.9	6.3	0	0	1.1	0	100.0	(95)

Note: *N is the same for all following tables.

2B: Is the Prime Minister honest or does he tell lies?

Grade		Very Honest	Honest	Can't Say	Lies Sometimes	Lies Always	Don't Know	No Answer	Total
Primary School	3	14.6	26.8	15.9	8.5	0	34.1	0	99.9
	4	15.7	15.7	31.3	22.9	0	14.5	0	100.1
	5	4.5	14.9	22.4	26.9	17.9	13.4	0	100.0
	6	3.4	14.8	29.5	43.2	9.1	0	0	100.0
Middle School	7	0	4.7	38.8	32.9	21.2	2.4	0	100.0
	8	0	6.0	39.8	26.5	9.6	18.1	0	100.0
	9	0	5.3	47.4	25.0	7.9	14.5	0	100.1
High School	10	1.0	2.1	37.5	24.0	27.1	8.3	0	100.0
	11	0	1.1	44.0	17.6	25.3	12.1	0	100.1
	12	0	0	28.4	26.3	37.9	6.3	1.1	100.0

2C: Is the Prime Minister doing a good job or not?

Grade		Very Good	Good	Can't Say	Not Very Good	Not Good at All	Don't Know	No Answer	Total
Primary School	3	40.2	19.5	9.8	2.4	1.2	26.8	0	99.9
	4	21.7	30.1	14.5	7.2	3.6	22.9	0	100.0
	5	13.4	19.4	23.9	29.9	7.5	6.0	0	100.1
	6	12.5	39.8	19.3	21.6	5.7	1.1	0	100.0
Middle School	7	2.4	20.0	25.9	30.6	15.3	5.9	0	100.1
	8	2.4	15.7	41.0	21.7	10.8	8.4	0	100.0
	9	3.9	40.8	21.1	17.1	2.6	14.5	0	100.0
High School	10	0	18.8	36.5	26.0	13.5	5.2	0	100.0
	11	6.6	13.2	34.0	26.4	11.0	8.8	0	100.0
	12	3.2	16.8	31.6	25.3	18.9	3.2	1.1	100.1

2D: Do you like the Prime Minister or dislike him?

Grade		Like Very Much	Like	Can't Say	Dislike	Dislike Very Much	Don't Know	No Answer	Total
Primary School	3	4.9	14.6	62.2	2.4	0	15.9	0	100.0
	4	0	10.8	60.2	12.0	10.8	6.0	0	99.8
	5	0	4.5	38.8	19.4	25.4	11.9	0	100.0
	6	1.1	9.1	38.6	30.7	14.8	5.7	0	100.0
Middle School	7	1.2	2.4	41.2	32.9	15.3	7.1	0	100.1
	8	1.2	3.6	51.8	24.1	10.8	8.4	0	99.9
	9	0	9.2	50.0	19.7	6.6	14.5	0	100.0
High School	10	0	2.1	38.5	33.3	18.8	7.3	0	100.0
	11	0	1.1	41.8	30.8	16.5	9.9	0	100.1
	12	0	3.2	26.3	37.9	26.3	6.3	0	100.0

2E: How many people do you think like the Prime Minister?

Grade		Very Many	A Lot	Can't Say	A Few	Very Few	Don't Know	No Answer	Total
Primary School	3	14.6	13.4	48.8	2.4	0	20.7	0	99.9
	4	4.8	12.0	37.3	20.5	1.2	24.1	0	99.9
	5	3.0	11.9	38.8	20.9	9.0	16.4	0	100.0
	6	1.1	11.4	25.0	34.1	20.5	8.0	0	100.0
Middle School	7	2.4	9.4	35.3	27.1	15.3	10.6	0	100.1
	8	1.2	3.6	37.3	33.7	10.8	13.3	0	100.0
	9	1.3	6.6	25.0	39.5	9.2	18.4	0	100.0
High School	10	0	7.3	28.1	36.5	14.6	13.5	0	100.0
	11	1.1	2.2	25.3	36.3	9.9	24.2	1.1	100.1
	12	2.1	8.4	22.1	45.3	15.8	6.3	0	100.0

suggests that no great increase in the proportion of children holding positive images of the Prime Minister would be forthcoming even if we were to study still younger children.

These findings lead us to conclude that even at the start, Japanese children's images of the Prime Minister do not appear in idealized terms. Just what sort of an image does the Prime Minister project to children at the earliest stages of political socialization? An examination of Question A will be of assistance in considering this problem. As Table 2A reveals, the majority of children perceive the Prime Minister as either "rich" or "very rich." Scrutiny of the age trends of these responses reveals them to highest among third graders and to decrease somewhat by the fifth grade but spurt upward again from the sixth grade on. However, the perception of the Prime Minister as rich apparently carries a different meaning for children in the lower grades than that which it has for those in the higher grades. In the case of the younger children, this perception seems to be

linked with a *positive* image of the Prime Minister; that is, there are apparently many cases in which lower grade children responded both that the Prime Minister is rich or very rich and that he is honest, doing a good job, and that they like him. However, if the reader compares the proportion of third graders which chose the positive responses to Question A with the proportion which chose positive responses to the other questions, it should be clear that the "rich" image is more prevalent than any of the other positive images of the Prime Minister. Just what does this mean?

Let us look at the overall age trends of the children's positive and negative images of the Prime Minister graphically summarized in Figures 1 and 2.[13] Roughly speaking, we find that the political socialization process in Japan is oriented as follows: children come to view the Prime Minister as a very disagreeable figure—he is a man whom they dislike, a man who tells lies, who is rich, and who does not do a very good job. Earlier I included "rich" and "very rich" as parts of a positive image, but reference to the results of the other questions should make it clear that the increase with age in the rate of these two responses implies in effect that they develop into components of a negative image. When children from the fifth grade up say that the Prime Minister is rich or very rich they are pointedly expressing a negative perception. The results of the following

Figure 1.



Figure 2.



13 The meaning of the "can't say either" and "don't know" responses is a complex problem whose analysis is indispensable in research on political socialization in Japan. However, time limitations made it impossible for such an analysis to be included in this paper. I hope to do so on a later occasion.

question should make this point clearer.

Q. F: Put a circle around the two things that come to mind when you think about a Diet member:

(1) A person who keeps his promises
(2) A great man
(3) A person who does his utmost for the sake of all
(4) A person who takes money on the sly and does bad things
(5) A person who is arrogant
(6) A person who tells lies
(7) Other
(8) Don't know

Table 3. The Image of the Diet Member

Q. F: Put a circle around the two things that come to mind when you think about a Diet member. (%)

Grade		Keeps Promises	Great Man	Works for All	Takes Money	Arrogant	Tells Lies	Other	Don't Know	N. A.	Total*
Primary School	3	28.0	12.8	44.5	0	1.8	0.6	0	10.4	1.9	100.0
	4	25.3	16.3	42.2	0	3.0	0	1.2	6.6	5.4	100.0
	5	20.9	5.2	35.0	8.2	10.5	6.7	2.3	8.2	3.0	100.0
	6	22.2	2.3	36.9	14.8	7.9	10.8	1.7	3.4	0	100.0
Middle School	7	5.9	6.5	19.4	27.1	7.6	18.2	4.1	6.5	4.7	100.0
	7	6.6	2.4	24.1	26.5	8.5	12.0	4.8	7.2	7.9	100.0
	9	8.6	5.9	24.3	21.0	8.6	12.5	5.3	9.2	4.6	100.0
High School	10	0.5	6.2	13.1	35.5	6.7	23.4	6.2	4.2	4.2	100.0
	11	3.8	4.4	12.1	31.3	11.0	18.7	5.0	8.8	5.0	100.0
	12	1.0	4.2	9.0	34.7	15.3	17.9	10.5	1.1	6.3	100.0

Note: * Since each student gave two responses, the percentages have been divided by two here so that they sum to 100% for each grade.

The increase here with age of the proportion of children holding negative images of Diet members closely parallels the situation with respect to the Prime Minister. The response that becomes predominant as grade level increases in that of "a person who takes money on the sly and does bad things." Taking this finding into account should help clarify the negative meaning of the perception of the Prime Minister as rich. There may be objections here to the effect that the Prime Minister and Diet members cannot be dealt with on the same level. However, Japanese children are very much aware that the Prime Minister was once a Diet member. In answer to the question "The Prime Minister used to be: 1) businessman; 2) Dietman; 3) university professor," which was included in a survey I conducted in 1962, 90% of the second graders replies "Dietman."

The development of the image of the Prime Minister varies slightly according to the question. That aspect which shows the least decline with

age has to do with the Prime Minister's performance of his job. This would seem to exemplify what Easton and Hess term role differentiation in political socialization; that is, distinguishing between the role of office of the Prime Ministership and the occupant thereof. However, it should be noted that here too the negative perceptions far outnumber the positive ones. The responses of the sixth and ninth graders to this question give evidence of a special influence at work. In these two grades the predominance of negative over positive perceptions of the Prime Minister's performance of his job is reversed. This would seem to be due primarily to the influence of what is taught in school. In sixth grade Japanese politics and democracy appear for the first time in the textbooks. And in middle school it is not until the ninth grade that politics and economics are presented as a separate course in the social studies curriculum; seventh graders learn about geography, and eighth graders about history. Japanese youngsters probably first develop their cognitions of the Prime Minister's role at these two stages in the educational process. However, it is also evident that what the youngsters learn in the sixth and ninth grade social studies courses does not take firm root in their attitude structure. This is corroborated by data from the following question as well.

Q. G: Who is most important in the running of the government in Japan?
(1) Emperor (2) Prime Minister (3) Diet members (4) Administrative officials (5) Each and every citizen (6) Presidents and directors of business firms (7) *Zengakuren* (8) Don't know

Table 4. Who Runs the Government?

Q. G: Who is most important in the running of the government in Japan? (%)

Grade		Emperor	Prime Minister	Diet Members	Government Officials	Each Citizen	Company Presidents	*Zengakuren*	Don't Know	No Answer	Total
Primary School	3	12.2	28.0	30.5	0	8.5	1.2	1.2	18.3	0	99.9
	4	21.7	20.5	15.7	0	18.1	0	1.2	15.7	7.2	100.1
	5	14.9	28.4	31.3	0	10.4	0	0	14.9	0	99.9
	6	5.7	12.5	8.0	0	71.6	1.1	0	1.1	0	100.0
Middle School	7	0	16.4	9.4	0	68.2	0	0	5.9	0	99.9
	8	0	6.0	22.9	3.6	61.4	0	4.8	1.2	0	100.0
	9	0	14.5	11.8	0	63.2	2.6	0	7.9	0	100.0
High School	10	2.1	21.9	14.6	0	54.2	3.1	0	3.1	1.0	100.0
	11	1.1	20.9	31.9	0	37.4	4.4	1.1	2.2	1.1	100.1
	12	0	26.3	28.4	5.3	29.5	7.4	0	1.1	2.1	100.0

Here we should note the sharp jump of the response "each and every citizen" that occurs in sixth grade, where it occupies 71.6% of the total

responses. But the rate of this response steadily declines thereafter, while increasing in stead are the responses of "Prime Minister" and "Diet members"; that is, men with largely negative images come to be perceived as those most important in the running of the government. Here we have one of the distinctive characteristics of political socialization in Japan.

It follows from the above that the process of role differentiation with respect to the Prime Minister stands in need of re-examination; it cannot adequately be explained solely by reference to the youngsters' evaluations of the Prime Minister's performance of his job (Question C). In addition to the survey, I also carried out interviews with a number of high school students. One girl, when asked why she had responded that "the Prime Minister sometimes tells lies," gave as her reason that "there are many instances in which the Prime Minister cannot tell the truth due to his position." Other students agreed with this. This interview suggests that children perceive being able to tell lies as a necessary qualification of the Prime Minister. This would seem to be the result of the socialization of children into the attitude widely held in adult society that a politician must be one who "swallows good and evil together" (*seidaku awase nomu*). This trend appears in our survey as well. Let us take a look at the responses obtained to Question F. Response categories (1), (2), and (3) indicate a positive image of the Diet member while (4), (5), and (6) indicate a negative image. From these six responses categories, the youngsters were asked to select *two* that come to mind when they think about Diet members. Hence we can classify the responses into those which include 1) two positive images, 2) a positive and a negative image, and 3) two negative images. We can then present these in graphic fashion, as in Figure 3. That many children selected both a positive and a negative image, and that this phenomenon becomes apparent from about the middle age group (sixth or seventh grade) on, are probably manifestations of the role differentiation process. The notion of "telling lies," as has been already explained, does not imply simply a negative image; rather, on reflection we find that this perception on the part of children recognizes the complexities underlying the conduct of political figures. Hence, it would seem likely that it is in reality even more prevalent than Figure 3 would suggest for children to have both positive and negative images of politicians.

From the foregoing, it should be clear what sort of image of the Prime Minister is being formed in the political socialization process in Japan. As the responses to our questions on the Prime Minister and Diet members show, Japanese children clearly harbor a strongly *negative* image of politicians in general and of the Prime Minister in particular. This negative

Figure 3.



SYMBOLS : +Positive image −Negative image α Other DK Don't know 0 No answer

socialization is not a new phenomenon. In a pilot study that I conducted six years ago, in 1962, virtually identical results were obtained. Nevertheless, the authorities—the government—of the system remain stable, and the Diet members continue for the most part to be re-elected, despite their negative images. What accounts for this stability? Is such political socialization a peculiar characteristic of the postwar period? We must now turn to an examination of the meaning of this political socialization and of its relationship to the political system.

III. INSIDE AND OUTSIDE; FORMS AND REALITIES

Why do children come to harbor a negative image of the Prime Minister and of politicians in general? No complete answer to this problem is possible here. As I stated earlier, this paper is of necessity only an interim report. Hence, I would like to put forward here some tentative explanations of this problem, in the form of working hypotheses relating the negative images of politicians held by children to the substance of what is communicated about political objects by the agencies of political socializa-

tion. First let us outline the information that the principal agencies—school, family, mass media—transmit.

The School

The school is extremely important in the political socialization process in Japan. Of particular significance is the fact that "political neutrality" has been and continues to be one of the most seriously regarded principles of postwar education. Detailed discussion of this principle is outside the scope of this paper; it is sufficient here to note that the phrase itself, "the principle of political neutrality," is never directly rejected. This makes it extremely difficult for politics to be dealt with in concrete terms in the school, and as a result discussions of political matters are of necessity cast in abstract terms. Children first come across a discussion of the Prime Minister in their textbooks, in sixth grade. The treatment is abstract and legalistic; the Prime Minister's role under the Constitution is outlined, only the impersonal aspects of the prime-ministership being explained, and with no reference to any specific Prime Minister. This is also true in middle school and high school. While individual Prime Ministers do appear in the history texts, never is any *direct* appraisal made of a postwar Prime Minister. Evaluative statements about important or well known figures can be found in the texts for the national language and morals courses, but these are principally writers, artists, scholars, and athletes; politicians are conspicuous by their near total absence.[14] Consequently, the image of the Prime Minister that the child obtains from what he learns in school, especially from his textbooks, should be at least a *neutral* image, if not necessarily a positive one. Hence, the agency primarily responsible for the development of the negative image must be sought elsewhere. Nevertheless, the fact that children acquire in school an image of what the Prime Minister *should be* is of great significance in the way it relates to the images that they later acquire.

The Family

The Japanese family is hardly capable of being an agency of political socialization in and of itself, for it is not oriented toward politics. The topics of family conversation in which the children may participate are usually likely to consist of T.V. programs, how to spend holidays, and schoolswork, etc. From numerous interviews with schoolchildren and from our own personal experiences, it would appear that discussions of politics

14 An investigation of the first through sixth grade texts of the national language courses, published by five firms and used in 1961, revealed the mention of nine Japanese political figures, none later than the Tokugawa Shogun, and four foreign political figures: Lincoln, Napoleon, Nehru, and Gandhi. See Tomitarō Karasawa, *Asu no Nihonjin* (Tomorrow's Japanese), Tokyo, Nihon keizai shimbunsha, 1964, p. 61.

in the home are extremely rare. In our survey we asked children about the political party preference of themselves and their parents; we could detect almost no influence of perceived parental partisanship on the party preference of the children in the Yamanote section. Moreover, the white-collar stratum is counselled to live "non-politically" and does in fact live so. One noted financial leader has said:

> Something I often tell people in my firm is that if you're going to take part in politics, quit your job with the firm. If you try to do one job with the firm and another outside, you won't be able to do either.[15]

"Taking part in politics" is often extended to cover talking about politics. The families of fathers who work in firms such as this—and these are common in Japan—are cut off from the world of politics. But, as I shall explain later, being cut off from politics is, conversely, significant politically, and is a major influence on political socialization.

The Mass Media

That agency which transmits a negative image of the Prime Minister to children most forcefully is the mass media. As Michitoshi Takabatake has said:

> Revulsion and contempt on the part of common people for 'politicians' seem today to be approaching a summit in the history of our nation.... The characteristics of the times is a scornful ridicule of the 'Diet bunch' that is daily consumed in safety on television and radio, and in the newspapers and other mass media. And in children's dreams of the future, it is the politician that appears as 'what I least want to be when I grow up.'[16]

The tendency for politics to become the object of "consumption" is not restricted to Japan; David Riesman has called attention to it in America as well.[17] But there is presumably no inherent reason why politics, parties, and politicians as objects of mass consumption should assume either exclusively positive or exclusively negative valences. Then why, in Japan, should the political images produced by the mass media for mass consumption be so nearly always negative? Let us try in a rough way to pull together the reasons.

What comes first to mind is the mass media's traditional profession of "neutrality." Under this principle, the media are to furnish "objective and

15 Hiroshi Minami, *Shakai sinri—Shōmakyō* (Social Psychology—Mirror to Society), Tokyo, Kōbunsha, 1956, p. 30.

16 Michitoshi Takabatake, "Seiji no hakken" (The Discovery of Politics), *Tembō* (June, 1966), p. 3.

17 David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd*, revised edition, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961, pp. 190f.

impartial" news, criticism, and commentary on parties and politicians. Specific parties or politicians are never publicly supported. But the audience for "objective news of a mammoth and complex political system, needless to say, is small. Of necessity, then, the media stress the personal aspects of politicians—graft and scandal, for example. And since the principle of neutrality means non-alignment with any current political group, only supra-partisan figures such as the Emperor, the Occupation Army, the Kennedy brothers, and the late Prime Minister Yoshida after his retirement, are furnished with positive images. All existing parties and factions are portrayed negatively. Moreover, the more the trend toward the welfare state progresses, the more people are apt to identify social evils with political evils, and the broader the area in which responsibility is laid upon politicians and upon the Prime Minister. This tendency is intensified by the traditional ethos that regards political power as omnipotent; the trend, in other words, is toward an attitude that seeks and demands all things in politics. Such would seem to be the factors behind the presentation of the image of politicians and the Prime Minister in the media. In addition there is also the fact that we do not find among Japanese politicians the type, such as Hitler or Kennedy, who appeals to the masses; the "master politicians" in Japan is the man of influence who uses his influence in behind-the-scenes maneuvering. Hence the negative slant of the image of the politician is perhaps only natural. However, the fact remains that it is one thing for a negative image of politicians to be presented in the media and consumed by the public; it is another for such an image to take root in the political socialization process. We must also look into the background that makes it possible for such an image to take root.

The Problem of Identification or "We-feeling"

In Section II I touched in passing upon the question of whether children come to perceive the Prime Minister as "our Prime Minister." This is a problem related ultimately to what Easton calls the political community. It needs no reiteration that Japan, leaving aside the relationships between rulers and ruled, has historically been extremely homogeneous and stable. This was particularly true up until the last stage of the Tokugawa period. This has meant that the Japanese have taken the existence of Japan for granted. To the Japanese, being Japanese is the most natural of things, hardly distinguishable from being human. Hence there has been little impetus toward the formation of we-feeling focused on Japan, for we-feeling can be established only in a group that is more or less self-conscious of its human relationships and interaction; the symbol "we humans," for instance, is probably nearly devoid of meaning. Con-

sequently, in traditional Japan the unit of we-feeling was to be found at a level much below "Japan"; underdeveloped means of transportation and communication contributed to restricting that unit to the small community and the family.[18] The unit did expand during the Tokugawa period, but only to the level of the feudal domain.

The external pressure that came to bear toward the end of the Tokugawa period forced the Japanese to become aware of their political community. When the new Meiji government took control, it did away with the conditions that had perpetuated the isolation of the small social units and tried consciously to fashion Japan into a political community. The efforts of the Meiji government were directed toward developing among the masses a sense of political community, not by destroying these small social units but rather by expanding them in the form of the "family state" of the Emperor system. Indoctrination into identification with this political community was intensely promoted, particularly in the schools. Though this was in one sense successful, it also resulted in perpetuating the small social units *unchanged*. That is to say, in other words, that the behavioral pattern of living in small social units deeply tinged with primary group characteristics served on the one hand as the basis for the formation of Japanese ultra-nationalism, but at the same time also functioned to impede the operation of the ultra-nationalist system. Masao Maruyama has pointed out, in particular, that the organization of national life for so-called total war during World War II encountered deeply-rooted psychological resistance deriving from familism and narrow, localistic sentiments.[19]

In 1945 with the collapse of Japan's ultranationalism and of the "family state," the Japanese reverted to their small social units. These included not only the family and the local community, but also the industries that had developed since the Meiji Restoration and which had assumed and maintained, even during the War, the character of traditional communities as a result of the lifetime employment system and paternalism. In addition, the postwar has witnessed the emergence of new types of small social units exemplified by the family-centered "my home" craze and various leisure circles, etc. The forms in which the small community appears are complex; even just within the working place, for instance, the individual develops ties at two or three levels—with the firm, with his department, and with his "old school" group within the firm.

18 Here too these human relationships are represented as being "natural" and as "given." However to preserve that "naturalness" some sort of behavior is unavoidable.

19 Masao Maruyama, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 147.

It is within such small communities that we-feeling develops; all who are not members thereof are perceived as outsiders, toward whom the attitudes taken differ drastically from those taken toward the members of the "inner world." Toward those within one has solidarity, closeness, and mutual understanding; he does his utmost to be understanding toward his fellow group members and criticism of one another is extremely rare. But toward outsiders the limits on speech and behavior are removed; prudence is required where the interests of one's small community are involved, but otherwise one is free to do and say as he pleases, save that to say what one pleases does not extend to being oriented toward communicating with others.

It seems to me that if we consider the Prime Minister as coming to be identified by children as an outsider in the above sense, then we can explain one reason why a negative image of him takes root among children. This is that it can probably be said that to children the Prime Minister, though he may be "Japan's" Prime Minister, is not "our" Prime Minister. Table 5, reporting the responses to the question "What comes first to mind when you hear 'Japan'?," shows the very low extent to which children identify the Prime Minister with Japan (and by extension, with "us"), as well as the decrease with age of such identifications. The table also suggests that the political socialization process does little to implant in children a consciousness of "our" Japan since the proportion of "don't know" and "other" responses increases with age.

Table 5. Symbols of Japan

Q. H: What comes first to mind when you hear "Japan"? (%)

Grade		Emperor	Constitution	Flag	Mt. Fuji	New Tokaido Bullet Train	Minister	Other	Don't Know	No Answer	Total
Primary School	3	2.4	3.7	52.4	22.0	0	3.7	3.7	11.0	1.2	100.1
	4	0	1.2	43.4	33.7	1.2	4.8	6.0	2.4	7.2	99.9
	5	4.5	0	58.2	22.4	0	3.0	1.5	9.0	1.5	100.1
	6	5.7	6.8	39.8	30.7	5.7	2.3	4.5	3.4	1.1	100.0
Middle School	7	8.2	8.2	35.3	21.2	2.4	1.2	12.9	10.6	0	100.0
	8	3.6	0	34.9	26.5	4.8	3.6	13.3	9.6	3.6	99.9
	9	9.2	5.3	27.6	32.9	1.3	0	7.9	9.6	6.6	100.4
High School	10	9.4	3.1	30.2	19.8	0	1.0	17.7	15.6	3.1	99.9
	11	5.5	2.2	31.9	14.3	2.2	0	20.9	18.7	4.4	100.1
	12	4.2	6.3	23.2	15.8	0	1.1	28.4	16.8	3.2	99.0

The "inner world" of children is apt to consist in the family, school, and peer group, etc. But to what extent children consciously view the

Prime Minister as outside their world is problematic. One becomes really conscious of his inner world only after graduation from school. Hence I believe that children rather than making a conscious identification of the Prime Minister and politicians as outsiders, perceive these figures as existing in some vague, "other" place than the children's own world. And since this is the basis on which Japanese adults have traditionally viewed the political world, there is thus a steady transmission of the political images of adults to children, and the political socialization process can in this respect be said to possess intergenerational continuity.

Even though it may be possible for we-feelings to exist within only small social units, it would be impossible for an individual to confine himself within such units, as it is impossible to avoid acting in the outside world. And so, in the cold outside world rules have been provided which if followed are supposed to make things go smoothly. But these rules do not always fit the realities one must face. There are a number of ways for dealing with this. Japanese behavioral patterns place importance on distinguishing between forms and realities and on adapting to the realities of a situation. In Japan, becoming an adult—in other words becoming socialized—means learning how to know when one should follow the forms and when one should follow reality. The adaptive modes of the Japanese are situational; they do not leave everything to be governed by a single principle. The contradictory views expressed within the following pairs of proverbs point this up:

"Knowing what is right but not doing it is the coward's way"; *but*
"The devil one ignores causes him no trouble."
"See another, see a thief"; *but*
"To travel is to find companionship, to live is to find kindness."

The great number of such contradictory pairs of sayings in Japanese serves to underscore the point that what is important is not to choose one guiding principle for all one's subsequent actions but rather to know what one should do according to the exigencies of the situation. The person who tries always to follow one rule is still unsocialized, he is, that is to say, still "young."

It follows that conflict between a rule and a reality need engender no frustration in an individual's personality; on the contrary, such is thought to be the way things naturally are. When one is affected by the facts, then

20 When a politician is regarded as the comrade of the small community, with a large interest therein, criticism of *that* politician disappears. *Vide* the re-elections of the Diet members involved in the "Black Mist" scandal. In that case, the electoral district can be taken as the small community.

he concentrates on adapting to them; when he is not affected, he gives vent to carefree criticism. The image of the Prime Minister can also be regarded in this context. Children learn in school what the prime-ministership is and what sort of person is suitable for it; from the mass media they then learn what sort of person the Prime Minister actually is. The gap that naturally arises between the two is recognized, but no matter how wide a discrepancy there may be, it does not become the catalyst for taking some sort of action vis-à-vis the Prime Minister. So long as the Prime Minister is envisioned as in the outside world and having little relationship to oneself, "one-sided" criticism will continue to be directed at him. But it should not be forgotten that what makes such criticism possible is a sense of security, particularly with respect to one's inner world. A number of the students I interviewed said both that "my family is middle class" and that "there are many poor people in Japan." Cognitions of this type are among the most important products of political socialization in Japan and they occur as well in the formation of the image of the Prime Minister. Hence it is not possible to state unequivocally whether the negative image of the Prime Minister brings about a decline in support for political authority figures. It is entirely conceivable that the stability of a political system should cause an increase in criticism of the system; what might make it possible for criticism and the negative image to lead to action against the system or the Prime Minister would perhaps be a situation in which an individual was no longer able to belong to any inner world or in which his inner world had destroyed.

In summary, we may consider the significance of the fact that a negative image of the Prime Minister develops among Japanese children in the following manner. First, in the political socialization process the Prime Minister comes to be identified not as "our Prime Minister" but as an outsider; and this is what makes possible the irresponsible criticism of him. This is given added impetus by the contempt for politics that characterizes Japanese culture. Second, through the distinction made between rules and realities, children come to recognize that the real Prime Minister deviates from what the Prime Minister is supposed to be in principle. But even though the Prime Minister is perceived negatively as regards his actual qualities, this is not directly linked to any decline in support for the Prime Minister. For in Japanese culture, what is important is how to deal with such realities; it is not always felt necessary to reform them.

In this paper I have tried to consider, on the basis of a very limited set of data, the meaning of the negative image of the Prime Minister. As I stated earlier, the tentative explanations I have offered here are meant as

working hypotheses for the sake of advancing research hereafter, not as conclusions. Nor does this paper cover all of the problems, mentioned in Section I, on which we have set our sights. The generation gap, regional differences in political socialization, a multidimensional reconstruction of the image of the Prime Minister through correlation and cross-tabulation, content analysis of the various political socialization agencies—all of these and other problems remain to be dealt with hereafter. Various limitations have made it possible to report this much here.