

JAPANESE CITY: A STUDY ON ITS STRUCTURAL CHANGES

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When we study the social structure of Japanese city, it would be necessary to examine it in the correspondence with various idealized types derived from combination between the traditional pattern of urban settlement and the new urban forms conditioned by the modernization and industrialization. Accordingly, we now set hereunder such idealized types of city growth and shall continue our analysis with the examination of the effects on the social structure of the coexistence of the two factors, traditional and modern, which the economists call "dual structure" of the Japanese economy, and then we shall try to understand what implications this singularly Japanese character of development may have in the social structure of Japanese city.

I. TYPOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CITY

Most of the major urban centers of modern Japan began as castle-towns (*jōka-machi*)—urban settlements built around a central fortification belonging to a feudal overlord and designed originally at a seat of military and political, rather than economic power. The original urban community was formed of three strata: the lord of the castle and his retainers and dependants, artisans and merchants. At the top of the structure, the lord and his retainers functioned as the organizers and controllers of the political and military apparatus—in its local ramification. But this governing class, having at its disposal massive revenues from the surrounding countryside, constituted the core of large-scale consumers of the community. Artisans and merchants were entirely dependent on this consumer class, and in turn, they provided such commodities as daily necessities and armors. There is no basic difference in the principle of the social composition of city in the cases of temple and/or shrine-towns (*monzen-machi*) and station-towns (*shukuba-machi*) that there were large-scale consumers and artisans and merchants who supplied their services to them, except in the senses that in these cases those who maintained cities were not overlords and their retainers but temples and/or shrines with their privileges and lands as well as that the consumer class of

these cities were not settled down people but their visitors and/or travelers.

With the advent of the Meiji Restoration, and the subsequent decline of feudal rank and privilege and liberalization of geographical and social circulation and mobility, a new pattern of social organization emerged at the urban level. Of most direct significance for this new development were the reorganization of the provincial administrative apparatus and deliberate introduction and fostering of industrialization undertaken by the Restoration government.

Figure 1. Evolutionary Genealogy of Urban Structures




Figure 1 presents a general view of the evolutionary pattern on Japanese urban structures. Needless to say, we have focused only upon the major patterns of development: the schema is by no means intended to be inclusive of every variation.

As the diagram shows, the prefectural seat (*kenchō-toshi*) is the most direct and frequent carry-over from the old castle-town type of settlement. As is symbolized by the situation of the most impressive building complex within the city—the prefectural administrative offices—generally inside the perimeter of the old city ramparts, the collective of government workers employed by the prefectural government forms the nucleus of a high-consumption population upon which a host of petty commercial and industrial enterprises depend for their market. The social structure thus consists of an amalgam of white-collar workers, shopowners, small businessmen or craftsmen, and the laborers and clerks employed in the various small businesses of the city. Gaps between the traditional pattern and the general configuration of urban development of course prevent our indulging in any neat and simple comparisons, but it cannot be denied that the class composition of the prefectural seat bears a unique resemblance to the tripartite structure of the old castle-town (lord and his retainers, merchants, and artisans). With the growth of commodity-production in agriculture in the surrounding rural areas, the prefectural city has, however, assumed a new role as a center of wholesale commercial activity.

By contrast, those castle-towns which were not so fortunate as to become seats of the new prefectural administration, as well as those which were not able to keep up with the rapid wave of modernization and industrialization sweeping across the rural towns of Japan since the Meiji, found themselves most commonly declining of the status of petty commercial cities. With the exception of those few towns in this category which enjoyed access to inordinately favorable transport routes, the general trend was toward a small-scale retail trade, serving a more or less limited market; class composition usually centered about the shopowning stratum, supplemented by skilled craftsmen, a certain number of parasitic landlords, and the inevitable laborer and clerk population employed in a variety of small enterprises.

While the industrial wave concentrated itself for the most part of the Meiji and post-Meiji era in the “new” rural towns and in certain central metropolitan areas, a certain number of traditional towns were able to maintain their existence as industrial centers, either because some peculiarity of the industry in question made it possible for them to compete with their “modernized” rivals, or because, in some cases, a smaller scale of enterprise was actually advantageous economically. Such proved the case, for instance, in the Seto region, a traditional pottery manufacturing center, as well as in Kawaguchi, a pre-Meiji casting foundry district. Here the population would generally consist of the owners and managers of the indigenous industries,

and the skilled labor force employed by them (together with its concomitant apprentice population); in addition there would most likely be a number of shopowners as well as the employees of lower-level management organization.

The "modern" sector of the Japanese economy in the Meiji era was built up from a dual complex of factories, one consisting of production facilities oriented toward supplying the machinery and resources for military modernization, and the other centered about a nexus of government-subsidized and government-run pilot-plants, afterwards auctioned off to *zaibatsu* interests, originally set up to introduce European and American industrial methods into the traditional economy. Both networks had a decisive effect on the pattern of industrial-generated urbanization in post-Meiji Japan.

Finally we have the metropolitan concentration, of which Tokyo is the most obvious instance. As the case of Tokyo reveals, however, the modern metropolis is the product of a complex historical evolution. In the sense that Tokyo began as the seat of the Shogunate government in the Edo period, and served as a kind of mammoth castle-town, it can be expected to show a certain degree of similarity to the prefectural seat category of urban complex. Interwoven also into the fabric of the metropolis of Tokyo are the characteristics of both large and petty industrial cities. The "metropolis," in sum, seems to represent something very much like the compounded total of all of the sub-species of urban development we have catalogued above.

II. THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE TRADITIONAL CONSUMER CITY

We have suggested in the above discussion, a kind of bipartite, polarized conception of the city and the social relationships which give it its distinctive form and content; on the one hand we have seen the city in terms of its origins in the concentration of consumer population (the "traditional consumer city"); on the other hand, we have traced the effect of industrialization on urban development in the emergence of the "industrial city." Within the first category we have catalogued Consumer City types A and B and Industrial City type C (see Figure 1). In this section we shall concentrate upon Consumer City A as the ideal representative of the "traditional consumer city" and we shall attempt to summarize those aspects of the social structure of this urban form which are common to the Consumer City in general. As a specific example of this type of city we shall study the city of Tokushima in Shikoku. Originally a great castle-town commanding the revenues of the 250,000 *roku* manor of the Hachi-

suga Family, Tokushima ranked tenth in population among the cities of Tokugawa Japan. Since the Meiji, however, Tokushima's relative inaccessibility to efficient transport and communications and its unfavorableness as a site for industrial plants has all but prevented the growth of factories and modern productive facilities in the city. Tokushima has remained, in other words, little more than a prefectural seat, preserving intact the attributes of the traditional Consumer City A. We have commented above on the extent of the similarity between the social composition of Consumer City A and that of the traditional castle-town: at the center of the social spectrum lies the stratum of white-collar workers employed in the local administrative apparatus—the descendants, as it were, of the *daimyo's* retainers that formed the core of the consumer population in the old castle-town. It need not be elaborated that what are here described as "administrative" functions will include, in addition to political administration, banking and commercial activities, as well as the prefectural branch levels of national organizations, such as the educational network. In modern Tokushima, a significant proportion of the city's population consists, in other words, of the white-collar employees of local banks, businesses, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and educational organs, including college and secondary level schools.

The size of Tokushima's white-collar class is only partially to be explained, however, as a function of local capital. Among the administrative and commercial organs of the city, a fair number owe their establishment to and depend for their discipline and management on the support of both the central government in Tokyo and the big business juggernaut based in the central metropolitan areas of Japan. There can be little doubt that a fair proportion of Tokushima's inherently stagnant economy is being underwritten by the outlays from these two sources.

The employers of Tokushima's white-collar class can be classified in two general categories: (1) autonomous corporate bodies (municipalities, etc.) involved in purely local activities and local private capital on the one hand; and (2) branch organs of political and business structures of a nationwide character. For the employees of the latter type organizations, the top-level positions in their place of work are for the most part closed to men and women of local origin. The promotion prospects, in other words, of a white-collar worker of Tokushima origin will not exceed the position of chief clerk, or, at best, section head. The result is that there is in extreme case a kind of caste distinction between the higher-level managerial personnel sent out from the head offices and ministries in Tokyo and the lower-level rank and file employed in the local branch organization.

The situation is, of course, slightly different in the case of purely local enterprises. Here there is theoretically no impediment to the continuous promotion of employees of local origin. In fact, however, the higher-level managerial positions in these activities are dominated by a kind of local aristocracy tracing its origins to a handful of indigo-merchants and landlords that rose to prominence in the early Meiji era, which has maintained itself in Tokushima from generation to generation with virtually no departures in the direction of modern industrial enterprise. The capital resources of this class have been concentrated, for the most part, in local banks, marine transport, and in the brewery and distillery businesses, within which enterprises a strongly traditional type of organizational hierarchy has been perpetuated. An early Meiji bank run by one of these entrepreneurs, for instance, exhibited almost exactly the same kind of internal division of labor that had characterized the traditional indigo-wholesale business from which the family had begun in the Tokugawa period: an aproned chief-clerk both oversaw the activities of a force of subordinate clerks and apprentices and attended to customers himself. Of course, as the years went by, the firm found it necessary to surface over its obsolete internal organization with a modern name, a new plant, and even new up-to-date uniforms for its employee. But substantive organizational change was much slower to come. For one thing, employment relationships continued to depend on blood ties: the capitalist-owner tended to employ, in his banking establishment, the same chief clerk (as well as the latter's children and associates living in the area) that had once served him in the dye business. To this day, in fact, the upper level positions in these firms are staffed by men who can trace back their ancestry to a handful of trusted employees of the original enterprise. Modern nomenclature and apparatus notwithstanding, a system of particularistic ways of hiring and careful restriction of higher level employees insures that local enterprise offers no more possibility for promotion than the "Tokyo"-dominated branch organizations of Tokushima.

The range of enterprises under the control of the petty aristocracy of local capital is generally limited to commercial ventures; but a high degree of coherence and class consciousness among this stratum results from interlocking ownership and regular contact within the framework of the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry, etc., as well as occasional intermarriage among the prominent families. Family economic resources and prestige are of course important in maintaining the dominance of this group over local economic activity, but more than any other single factor, it is the sense of group unity, recognized both privately and publicly, obtaining


among this small number of elite families, and their consequent ability to monopolize higher-level employment opportunities, that enables their continued ascendancy. Within the confines of such a tightly-controlled set of employment relationships, characterized by an essentially pre-modern kind of master-servant dependency and the monopolization of the highest managerial positions by a select number of influential families, the anonymity, the impersonality—and corollary freedom—of modern business organization are destined to remain relatively undeveloped.

Even within the most “modern” sector of the local employment situation something of the same sort of traditional employment relationships obtain. Prefectural and municipal government organs, all of which are supposed to have made significant concessions to the ideal of a modern and rational bureaucracy, are commonly understood as providing potential opportunity for the capable and educationally qualified man of local origin. But nepotism and the exercise of local influence to gain promotion seem to have established themselves even within these organizations, with the result that the overall picture here is not appreciably different from that which pertains in the more “backward” private sector.

The small business enterprises operated by local capital in Tokushima are characterized by a high degree of coincidence between management and labor, and between place of employment and place of residence. Again, organization tends to follow the lines of master-apprentice or patron-dependent relationship, rather than the more impersonal, contractual lines of modern capitalism. More specifically, there is a peculiarly small-town flavor to the labor market. Employers, while generally subsidizing a high level of education for their younger sons, in preparation for their eventual employment in a central metropolis or at the higher levels of the local white-collar hierarchy, are generally required to recruit their laborers from among the dispossessed younger sons of the rural population. For the city-born and city-bred youth, one superior status and remuneration of a white-collar job, as compared with a job in a locally-owed small enterprise, will inevitably prove more attractive; and employers, for their part, find the patient and obedient, if not overly efficient, labor power of rural youth a much more practical alternative than the more expensive services of urban-born laborers.

The circulation of elites and lower strata within our idealized Consumer City A is represented in Figure 2. Starting with the most mobile element in the city's population, we notice that the high-level white-collar (managerial) stratum is in a constant state of horizontal circulation between the central metropolis and the local urban site. For this group, life in the big

Figure 2. Consumption and Circulation of Social Groups in Consumer City A



city—employment in the main office—will always be the most highly prized situation, and a post in the provinces will inevitably be borne with an attitude of patient expectation of the eventual re-assignment to Tokyo. Under such conditions, we can expect no more than a minimal participation in local social activities.

Exactly the opposite point of the compass is occupied by the lower level white-collar classes of the city. Owing their positions to a painstaking exercise of local personal influence (in whatever measure this valuable commodity is theirs to exercise), the level of commitment to their fellow employees, the degree of fraternal consciousness directed toward their white-collar comrades, can be expected to be rather low. Compared to their original prospects as sons and inheritors of small businessmen or relatively prosperous farmers, the higher level income and relatively luxurious working conditions of a white-collar job will seem vastly preferable. Even the smart of poor promotion prospects seems to be compensated for by a kind of status complacency; and, more important, a general feeling of respect for and indebtedness to the network of traditional kinship and hereditary relationships, leading up to the elect handful of local aristocrats, at the top, which has gained them their humble but secure position in the social hierarchy seems to more than counterbalance any resentment of the superior

status of their Tokyo-based white-collar colleagues. Whatever ambitions might not be quelled by this type of social morphine are always susceptible to remedy by transfer to the next generation, which is inevitably sent off to the big city colleges as preparation for its venture into the realms of the elite, metropolitan white-collar classes.

Among the smaller businessmen of the city, a number of industrialist, retailers and downtown-retailers have been able to achieve a fairly large scale of enterprise by the exploitation of un-unionized, virtually chattel labor. Found inevitably on the board of directors of neighborhood welfare committees and local fire brigades, as well as trade organization and professional groups, they perform the functions of a sort of political middle-class, motivated, no doubt, by the knowledge that such activities serve to augment their status and increase their local influence. But the chances for their breakthrough into the upper crust of the local aristocracy are quite slim; the best all but a handful of these petit bourgeois aspirants realistically hope for is a gradual expansion of their economic resources, accompanied by an increasing participation in local community functions, bringing them into closer—but still sporadic social contact with the upper crust they would like to be able to join permanently. Needless to say, their economic activities are better described as professional than capitalist; with their vision contained within the narrow confines of local society only, their interests tend to be essentially conservative, and their world view rather unambitious.

Finally, at the bottom level of the social order we find a population of laborers and clerks employed in the small business enterprises of the city. Living and working conditions are worse for them than any other group; but we must remember that, for the majority of this class, born and raised as the younger sons of farmers, life in the city compares favorably with the expectations of a rural existence. For the most part young, and accustomed to regard their employment situation—engulfing as it does their entire scope of existence—more as a family activity than a contract relationship, they are unlikely to be exposed to any group activity outside of their place of work, and tend to assume without question the logic of their employers' values. The focus of their ambitions will most likely be the dream of becoming an independent businessman, like their masters. In fact, however, with the exception of a tiny handful who manage to push their way into the ranks of the local petit bourgeoisie, a more common future will take them off to the big city, where their job experience and the knowledge gained from their apprenticeship in Tokushima serves to gain for them a foothold in the lower stratum of metropolitan society, or back to the farm-

ing village to pursue the occupation of their ancestors.

Of the various strata which together constitute the city's population, then, two elements are to be regarded as only temporary members of the community: the metropolitan-based and centrally dispatched upper crust of the white-collar class, and the laborer and clerk stratum. Paradoxically, however, the transient nature of these strata seems to have the effect of reinforcing the backward and stagnant character of the city's social order. The "have" classes of the city, the ones enjoying a relative degree of benefit under the present order—i. e. the white-collar and independent businessman classes—are of course bound to the local bourgeois elite and to its value system through a network of kinship and patronage relationships. The "have-nots"—the laborers and clerks—are, for the duration of their local sojourn city, enclosed within the protective walls of a type of family enterprise system; they will eventually, however, quit the city either for their ancestral village or for the opportunities of the great metropolis. The stagnant and unchanging character of Consumer City A's social structure derives, in other words, not so much from a lack of mobility among its population as from the perpetuation of a well-greased but highly inert social mechanism, upon which the constant circulation of new human material has little or no effect.

III. THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE METROPOLITAN CITY

Directly or indirectly, all of the various social strata of the metropolitan city owe their livelihood to the concentration of administrative power (both political and economic) vested in their city. It is lodging of this tremendous centralized decision-making apparatus in the metropolitan city which in turn creates the necessity for a plurality of large-scale white-collar employing administrative structures—home offices of government ministries, headquarters of giant corporation, head offices of nationwide commercial outfits, etc. It follows, of course, that the core of the metropolis is its enormous white-collar population.

The metropolis is also a consumer mechanism. Within its confines are paid out and consumed the sum of national taxes collected by the governmental apparatus, and business profits accrued by the nation's largest corporations (excepting, of course, the allotments for reinvestment). The metropolitan city thus may be regarded as a kind of giant framework of consumption erected about a concentration of political and economic power, and constantly expanding its human resources in keeping with the growing ability of this political and economic dreadnought to support a higher level

of consumption.

Historically speaking, the massive white-collar population of the great metropolises dates from the Taishō period, when it first began to emerge as a by-product of the disintegration of what Japanese sociologists generally refer to as the "old middle-class"—an amalgam of local bourgeois elites, independent businessmen, and rich peasants. As functionaries of the highest levels of government and of the most powerful concentrations of private capital in the nation, the metropolitan white-collar class enjoys, along with a sense of status commensurate with its proximity to the ultimate seats of power, a considerable economic might deriving from a high level of remuneration, and a widely envied prestige concomitant with the glamorous and modern buildings from which it enfolds its fellow countrymen in a fearsome web of bureaucratic red tape.

According to the popular stereotype, in the Kasumigaseki or Marunouchi office to which the model Mr. Tokyo-Whitecollar commutes every morning there will be found nothing but the most modern type of bureaucratic organization, based entirely upon free and unrestricted employment opportunity and promotion according to ability and accomplishment. Leaving the office at the end of the day, he is supposed to be entirely his own man, free to associate with whomever he will, be it his social, inferior or superior—for as a member of the most prestigious class in the nation's most prestigious metropolis, he is thought to move at the very vanguard of the big city's social and cultural life. In his modern and tidy home in the western suburbs of Tokyo, he keeps his wife and unmarried children in fine style, shunning the authoritarian and feudal family order that he knows characterizes more backward households, and disdaining to involve himself in the petty socializing and politics of his suburban community.

The actual situation is, unfortunately, not so simple. There is, needless to say, no institution in Japan able to rival the downtown Tokyo white-collar office's impressively modern and sleek appearance. Yet behind this deceptively efficient and business-like façade, there remains much of the traditional and the old-fashioned. Not that we can expect to find here anything like the unmitigated and monolithic network of personal connection and influence that dominates the white-collar world in the provincial Consumer City A; for in the case of Tokyo and other central metropolitan areas which resemble it, we find a peculiar hybrid system within which such opposing criteria as academic background and seniority, individual accomplishment and personal connection are complexly interwoven as determinants of recruitment and promotion. Nor can it be overlooked that the Tokyo suburban white-collar household has managed to recreate and

perpetuate within itself many of the features of the older and more authoritarian residence group.

Less conspicuous perhaps than the downtown white-collar office complex, but very much an ongoing concern is Tokyo's swarm of small businesses, they might be expected to show a certain degree of similarity to their counterparts in the provincial consumer city; but we must remember that the small business community in Tokyo has grown at a rate far in excess of the prewar "downtown" small businessman's ability to expand without structural change. What has occurred, in other words, is that small business with its old-fashioned methods has been caught up in and, to a certain degree, absorbed by the tide of metropolitan expansion and growth generated by big business. In the process, the community and blood ties that used to be such a characteristic feature of small enterprises in Tokyo have been shattered, and the small businessman has been compelled to enter into a fiercely competitive modern market. In concrete terms, this has meant that the opportunity for expansion to the scale of big business has been significantly broadened; but at the same time, the metropolitan small businessman, no longer able to muster the kind of individual loyalty from his employees and fellow businessmen that he could count on in the past, has become increasingly unable to protect himself against fluctuations in the economy, and is now much more exposed to the danger of ruin.

Metropolitan society is divided into two rather separate worlds: white-collar and small business. But between the two, what kind of human circulation—mobility, if you will—can we expect to find? Firstly, it must be understood that the white-collar class is no monolith, but rather a compound of two sub-classes: one made up of the "elite" white-collar employees, possessors of high-level academic qualification, and guaranteed the prospect of promotion to the highest ranks in their organization; and the other comprised of the much larger number of "second class" white-collar workers, lacking in both educational qualification and promotion prospects. In theory, of course, promotion is supposed to be determined by ability and accomplishment, but in actual practice the review of employees for promotion tends to be somewhat mechanical, and most emphasis seems to fall on the employee's level of education, the reputation of his *alma mater*, and his seniority in the organization. Schooling, in fact, has become the ultimate basis of distinction between the "elite" and "second-class" sub-classes of white-collar workers.

Distinguished, as it is, essentially by academic qualification, there is a certain degree of status-complacency attached to the psychology of the "elite" metropolitan white-collar employee. But a rapid rate of growth

in private enterprise has tended to keep the ranks of this sub-stratum constantly swelling, thereby mitigating somewhat the "caste" qualities of their position, and guaranteeing a sizable inbound circulation of new personnel into their ranks. With such favorable prospects for promotion, we would naturally expect the "elite" white-collar sub-stratum to see things basically from the point of view of the interests of the enterprise and its management. For different reasons, however, the "second-class" white-collar employee is often more subservient to company interests than his "elite" superior: knowing full well that his personal prospects for promotion are virtually non-existent, he seeks to underwrite the security of his position by strengthening personal contact with his employers, in the process sacrificing feelings of solidarity with his fellow workers.

Among the more successful of the small businessmen of the metropolis, the possibilities for expanding the scale of business with the help of hard work and good timing are far from remote; in addition, we can expect that the small businessman poised on the brink of success will not shirk the necessary investment in his children's education to guarantee an eventual position for them in the highest ranks of the white-collar class.

For the majority of small businessman and independent proprietors, however, there seem to be somewhat greater limits on parental ambition; for such a family, "success" would generally be envisioned in terms of educating a son to take his place in the lower stratum of the metropolitan white-collar class. Further obstruction to rapid inter-generational mobility derives from the attachment of many or most of these small proprietors to traditional social values, based upon narrow community and kinship ties, and to a kind of petty-bourgeois ownership ethic which ranks the possession of even a diminutive enterprise above the academic qualification as a guarantor of livelihood and security. For these reasons, there seems to be either a total lack or at least a general downgrading of ambition for the next generation among this stratum: at best, higher education and a white-collar career will be delegated to the second or third son in the household.

For the large population of laborers and shopclerks employed in the small enterprises of the city, hope for the future is concentrated in three directions: ownership of their own small business, entrance into the white-collar class, or employment in big business. None but the most fortunate, of course, can expect to achieve the first; as for the second and third, the same inferior education and lack of knowledge that condemned them to the fate of laborer or clerk when at a youthful age, they first arrived in the city generally serves their whole lifelong to frustrate chances for inclusion among the ranks of the better educated white-collar classes or better payed

"company" labor strata. Only through the careful cultivation of the resources of their offspring is there any significant chance for elevating personal status.

Within each of the two major subdivisions of the metropolitan order, then, there is a high degree of mobility, of interchange of personnel: but it is only through the lower-level white-collar occupations that there is any appreciable circulation *between* the two groups. The gap between white-collar and small business is still quite wide, both in terms of living conditions and in terms of the stringency of entrance requirement.

IV. THE TRANSFORMATION OF URBAN SOCIETY

The above discussion has concentrated on features of urban life more typical of prewar than postwar Japan. Needless to say, the changes that have transformed Japanese society in the years since the Surrender have likewise transformed the various patterns of urbanization and the internal social structure of the cities of Japan.

What was responsible for the changes and how exactly did they come about? Firstly, there were the displacements of population and equipment brought about by the switch to a wartime economy. A massive population evacuation program moved large numbers of urban personnel from the metropolitan and industrial urban areas into the countryside, and provincial cities, thereby unwittingly generating a kind of compulsory cultural interaction between the modern and traditional segments of the population. For the former big-city residents, this also meant a rather drastic alteration in living conditions. Furthermore, the total destruction of many traditional consumer-city areas as a result of the fire-bombings toward the end of the war had the effect of drastically weakening the sense of community solidarity and the emphasis on local ties that had characterized the older urban culture. The wartime re-deployment of production facilities also proved of importance, for many of the re-deployed factories were relocated in provincial towns and cities hitherto unfamiliar with modern plants and large-scale production facilities; many of these plants stayed in their new sites even after the war ended, initiating a wave of industrial relocation and revamping of siting priorities that was to be of great significance in the postwar years.

The reforms enforced under the Occupation Army government were responsible for, among other things, the democratization of the economic structure, the modernization of civil law and education, and the drafting of new labor legislation designed to create an autonomous position for the labor

movement within the Japanese polity. All of these reforms, needless to say, had their impact on urban life in postwar Japan—but I should like to concentrate here on two particular reforms, the failure of which were of special importance: namely the institution of regional self-government and the remaking of the tax structure. As is well known, the American Occupation put great emphasis on the democratic election of heads of local government, thinking thereby to secure a relative degree of independent local authority capable of counter-acting the dictatorial pressures of the central government. But its failure to transfer to local government a sufficient portion of the tax base of the nation left local government treasuries constantly short of funds, and permitted the lion's share of revenue to be absorbed, as before, by the national government; for the local treasuries were reserved only a handful of local business taxes and fixed property excises. The result has been that local government has become increasingly dependent on subsidy financing, in return for which a certain concession of political power to the central municipalities has been extracted.

In addition to political reforms, the postwar years have seen the effects of substantial technological innovation in every sphere of life. The economy has been transformed by the spread of automation in production and managerial work; and transport and communications improvement (such as the development of a network of bus routes to supplement the prewar railway system, and the spread of television) has brought the effects of modern technology to the far corners of the nation. But here too the inevitable result has been a further shift of political and economic power from the local governmental organ to the central metropolitan concentration—a further crumbling of regional autonomy and reinforcing of centralization.

The transformation of the farming village in the postwar era has also played its part in affecting the traditional urban structure. Along with the rapid growth of commercial agriculture and the gradual urbanization of rural life have come the enlargement of the market area of the cities in rural regions; all of these factors have had their direct and indirect effect on the metropolitan centers.

In cultural terms, the authority of the traditional value system has been all but destroyed. Mostly, of course, as a result of discontinuity and change in the nature of urban society itself. At the same time, the collapse of the traditional values has in turn hastened the downfall of what remained of the older forms of urban life in the postwar years.

V. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE TRADITIONAL CONSUMER CITY

In the postwar period we see also a slow penetration of heavy industry and big business—hitherto confined to the central metropolitan areas—into the older consumer-cities. Partly an outcome of the saturation of the four pre-existing major industrial centers (Tokyo, Osaka-Kōbe, Nagoya, and Fukuoka) and partly the consequence of new location biases generated by the wave of technological modernization and innovation of the 1950's, this penetration could not have been achieved without the transformation of the traditionally negative attitude toward modern industrial technology prevalent in the provincial cities into a more positive and receptive one. The rapid revival of grass-roots commerce and industry in the post-Korean war period, as well as the continued influx of surplus rural population into the provincial consumer-cities no doubt figured largely in stimulating this change of posture; but the critical factors seem to have been the local government autonomy policies of the Occupation and the postwar reforms in the tax structure. As we have remarked above, the subsidy financing required by most local governments tended to create an increased dependency on the central political *apparat*; but another result of the reorganization of local government and the allotment of fixed property tax revenues to their treasuries, was that local governments found themselves in the position of having to encourage the location of plants and factories within their areas of jurisdiction. The clearing of factory sites and improvement of local road and harbor facilities, as well as temporary exemption from property taxes, were among the several means utilized by district governments to attract businesses from the larger metropolitan areas—although it must be realized that it was the strategic interests of the businesses themselves, in the final analysis, rather than any external inducements, that encouraged the wave of relocation of the 1950's. The degree to which this shift was internally motivated is revealed nowhere more clearly than by the very unevenness with which the relocation was accomplished: although many provincial consumer-cities offered comparable inducements to big industry, only a limited number of them have been successful in luring factories—the successful ones, of course, growing and transforming themselves in the process, and becoming increasingly differentiated from their unsuccessful sister cities.

But what of the effect of the introduction of large, modern factories into these backward consumer-type provincial urban complexes? In terms of the structure of power, the most obvious result has been to force the traditional “aristocracies” of these cities into a greater dependency on the

power of the central government and big capital. For example, the attracting modern plants and offices to the city in question could only be secured through the cooperation of both the regional government and the regional dietman in Tokyo; the degree of success which the city planner could hope to achieve in luring big business outlays would then be determined, at least partially, by the extent of the influence the regional government and the dietmen in question could bring to bear on representatives of big business themselves. Relying solely on the contacts open to the local elite would, under such circumstances, prove a dangerously limiting policy.

A development similar in many respects to the drastic reshaping of the local power structure occasioned by such private economic forces as the introduction of modern factories seems to have occurred also in the realm of administrative political structures. The competition for government subsidies and the choice of a local site for a government-controlled enterprise required the same kind of central lobby that had proved of so much importance in the securing of private business patronage. Hence, for example, we find the frequent espousal by conservatives running for local office of the slogan: "Closer Ties with Tokyo."

At the same time, the local ruling elite in these cities was undergoing a very definite change in character. Partially as the result of the economic shock occasioned by the postwar reforms—notably land reform—and by the increasing dependency of the provincial city on the central metropolitan power structure, the traditional elite of the consumer-cities found itself losing ground to the extent that it was tied to *rentier* and traditional commercial interests. Into their places stepped a so-called *nouveau riche*, or "new *zaibatsu*," comprised chiefly of local contractors (often tied to significant forestry interests), freighters, and owners of local manufacturing industries—many of them, it should be noted, owing their new positions directly or indirectly to contracts connected with the construction of local plant facilities for big businesses or the erection of offices for local or central (branch) government organs.

The effect on the local economy of the construction of large, centrally-financed factories depended to some extent, of course, on the peculiarities of the industry involved. The leadership of the chemical industries in establishing plants in these areas guaranteed, however, a certain common and relatively high degree of automation in the new factories, and a correspondingly minimal integration of the new plant into the local economy. With the exception of those areas which became new focal points for a whole complex of industries, the overall impact of the new factories thus tended to prove somewhat less than might be imagined. Furthermore, the

management of the newer industries seemed generally to prefer an indirect to direct involvement in local politics, choosing to leave the bulk of local decision-making power in the hands of the modified traditional elite. In sum, the most important effects of the introduction of modernized and large-scale industry into the provincial consumer-cities of the nation in the postwar period were not so much the obvious, direct ones as the less obvious indirect ones: such as the transformation of the internal character of local small enterprise and the revolution in social values sparked by juxtaposition of old and new organizations and personnel.

In particular, we can observe a gradual penetration of metropolitan-based control into the management of local small businesses, and a growing tendency for local small enterprises to affiliate themselves with larger, centrally-administered business organizations. With the increasing importance of mass-production and advertising in the national market, small manufacturers have been able to maintain their enterprises as profit making concerns only by affiliating with their larger metropolitan rivals, permitting their more backward facilities to be used for that part of the manufacturing process in which the input of manual labor is relatively high. Agency and licensed factory outlet contracts have become a common device to cut down on the number of intermediary wholesalers and distributors that used to bridge manufacturer and consumer, with the result that the gap between affiliated and non-affiliated small businesses in the provincial cities has been noticeably widened.

Another symptom of the changes that have swept across many of the provincial cities and the small businesses housed within them is the gradual decline of youth and neighborhood group activities. In their heyday, of course, it was the small business community that provided the leadership and organization for these groups. The white-collarization of large segments of the old small business community, however, as well as a shift of the organizational preferences of the remaining small businessmen away from neighborhood to trade associations (in the case of shopowners, from neighborhood shopowner to special trade associations) have served to undermine the chief supporting element in the traditional neighborhood group. Unlike their counterparts in rural areas, urban neighborhood associations generally are divorced from production activity, as a consequence of which their organizational strength was never on a par with that of the village neighborhood group. There was, none the less, a certain regular, if somewhat limited, scope for their activities—including fire fighting, public sanitation and hygiene, and festivals. An increasingly efficient public services administration has, however, been slowly replacing these traditional groups

in many of the provincial cities and towns of Japan in the postwar period—and it is only as informal organizations, as vehicles of neighborhood and kinship ties, that the old-fashioned neighborhood and youth groups have continued to function. That this kind of traditional tie is not dead might seem surprising. The fact is, however, that the white-collarization of a large portion of the old business class in the provincial consumer-city has not been accomplished without the help of a new and more subtle chain of contacts and influence—one not necessarily under the control of the old city elite—which has served to lure the new generation away from the traditional occupations of their families and into the world of the salary-man. Needless to say, the revitalization of this network of contacts and influence owes much to the continued traditionalism of the value structure still current among the businessmen, laborers, and clerks of the city.

The coming of modern industrial organization to the provincial consumer-cities has been more directly in the affect it has had on the pattern of consumption in these cities, most conspicuously on the organization of retail trades. The postwar years have seen the rise of concentrated “downtown” areas, within which are included both centralized retail outlets and recreation facilities (movies, *pachinko* parlors, etc.). At the center of each of these downtown complexes there is an inevitable department store or two (Tokushima has two of these giants), simultaneously creator and manifestation of the new buying preferences of the local population. A survey of consumer attitudes in the city of Tokushima reveals a number of interesting points about the new mode of consumption that has made its appearance since the war. At least among the younger shoppers of the city, there has been a marked decline in loyalty to the neighborhood retailer; no longer do consumers feel ashamed to parade past their neighborhood electrical appliances dealer with a radio purchased at considerable savings in a downtown department store. At the same time, shopping has become for many residents of Tokushima more a recreational pastime than an onerous chore.

In accounting for this transformation of the traditional pattern of consumption, the presence of large numbers of white-collar and blue-collar workers transferred from the great metropolitan areas to work in the new factories and offices recently established in Tokushima is of no little importance. Television and other organs of mass communications have tended to build up the Tokyo white-collar family as the model of modern and luxurious consumption habits—but the spread of the metropolitan white-collar mode of consumption could not actually be achieved until the presence of transplanted ex-Tokyo-residents in substantial number permitted

the kind of day-to-day contact necessary for the local consumer's vague envy and admiration of his big city counterpart to be translated into something approaching reasonable reproduction of the metropolitan life style.

At this point it should be mentioned that there is little grounds for assuming, as previous commentators generally have, that it has been the bureaucrat-white-collar element in the traditional consumer-city that has let the way in popularizing metropolitan consumer tastes. This function seems, rather, to have been assumed by the managerial and office-workers dislocated from their positions in small businesses as the latter proceeded along the path toward modernization. The traditional white-collar (bureaucrat) class was as conservative as its income and status were high; even within the traditional prewar social context, this class was always connected with the authoritarian tendencies in the culture. In the postwar social milieu, these same white-collar elements tended to identify with a kind of bourgeois and individualist ethic, in which personal freedom, liberal education, and democratic mass-communications forum were envisioned as the ranking priorities: the "popular" culture, tied as it is to commercialism, advertising, and a blatant worship of consumption for its own sake, has always been regarded by this authoritarian and academically snobbish white-collar class in a very negative light. Similarly, the apparently rationalized and bureaucratic organizations in which they find employment are permeated with the type of old-fashioned patronage relationships that were universally current in prewar days.

The mass culture of the postwar period has elicited its most impressive response in the old-fashioned consumer-cities among the businessmen, laborers, and clerks connected with the rapidly changing small business world—most particularly among office workers, and the suburban farming population becoming ever more dependent on the city for work. In a sense the inheritors of prewar mass culture, these people have seen in the collapse of the traditional culture, with its characteristic dependence on small, tightly-knit ecological units (most obviously, the family) an opportunity for the unhindered expression of their long frustrated material ambitions. From this position they have most easily responded to the consumption-oriented popular culture of the postwar years.

The traditional white-collar class, trapped in the cogs of the machinery of a rationalized and modern administrative-productive apparatus, was to prove in the end much less receptive to the new high consumption mass culture of the postwar years than the logic of the situation would suggest; it was rather an aggressive minority of *nouveau riche* and other elements of the population which had been most affected by the postwar small-busi-

ness revolution that adjusted most readily to the new values in the provincial cities of Japan.

VI. THE EXPANDING METROPOLIS

The economic and social changes of the postwar period were to prove equally important for the metropolitan centers of Japan. A complex of inter-related factors pushed Tokyo's growth rate to a level even higher than it had been before the war, in the first place, the ultimate outcome of Occupation economic and political policy was to restore the importance of politically-connected businessmen in the economic structure of the country. Secondly, as a result of the augmented role of the central government in the national economy, a highly centralized nexus of political, economic and administrative power, reinforced by the traditional type of business-government interconnection, grew up in the urban centers of postwar Japan, with a predictable effect on the rate of expansion of the metropolitan areas. Finally, the wave of modernization and technological improvement that passed over Japanese industry in the period after the outbreak of the Korean War served to increase dramatically the proportion of managerial and administrative personnel (*vis-a-vis* personnel engaged directly in production) employed in heavy industry, with the result that much of the managerial and administrative work formerly assigned to personnel located at production sites in the non-metropolitan areas had to be reassigned to a concentrated managerial-administrative nucleus in the metropolitan centers. The consequent swelling of the ranks of the metropolitan white-collar class served in turn to increase the scope of economic activity of the many small businesses in the metropolitan centers which catered to the consumption needs of the white-collar classes. Which in turn generated. . . . Such seems to have been the nature of the metropolitan expansion of the postwar years.

The increasing concentration of administrative power and population in the metropolitan centers of Japan in the postwar period has had the additional result of bringing large areas of land originally peripheral to the urban complex within the sphere of direct metropolitan economic and social control. On the most obvious level, vast tracts of land lying outside the original city limits began to be developed as suburban residential districts, populated essentially by white-collar families, and, in fact, dating for the most part from the 1920's when the first prototype of the modern white-collar class made its appearance. It was in this same decade that the network of private commuter railroads that currently links downtown Tokyo with its residential suburbs to the east and northwest began to be

constructed; by 1932, the suburban expansion of metropolitan Tokyo had already proceeded to the point where the city limits had to be enlarged to include all of the area currently administered as city districts (*ku*).

The postwar growth of Tokyo brought the city to the limits of physical possibility, overreaching not simply the old city lines but even the *ken* boundaries surrounding the metropolitan area. Moreover, the postwar suburban expansion of metropolitan Tokyo was no mere continuation of the prewar residential area expansion: unlike such prewar suburban districts as Seijō-gakuen, or Denenchōfu, which attracted residents chiefly by virtue of their relative spaciousness and cleanness and cleaner air, the "new" postwar residential districts seem to be mainly inspired by the desire to escape the skyrocketing land and house prices of "downtown" Tokyo. Paradoxically, the suburban expansion of the postwar years has become associated with an unprecedented housing shortage, a mammoth transportation tie-up and a constellation of other problems generally connected with sudden and excessively rapid urban growth.

Another effect of the excessive growth of metropolitan Tokyo has been a shift in the commuting pattern of the city residents; while the overall population of the city has climbed steeply, the number of "inner city" residents has actually declined. Of the estimated 750,000 men and women employed in the two major downtown wards (*Chiyoda-ku* and *Chūō-ku*), little more than 140,000 actually live within the ward boundaries; the remaining 610,000 make their way downtown from suburban homes in the morning, and flow out of the inner-city in the evening; leaving the central business districts empty and deserted—a kind of urban no-man's land. A similar pattern has established itself even in Tokyo's chief small-business heartland, *Taitō-ku*. To a certain extent, this effect might be considered the outcome of the "downtown-ization" of the inner-city, one of the results of which has been to expel homeowners from the central wards of the city. Of equal importance, however, has been the rapid increase in the number of white-collar type offices and businesses in the downtown area—and increase which has been achieved at the expense of the small, independent business which used to dot the area. Paralleling this white-collarization of downtown business enterprise in general has been a gradual white-collarization and commuterization of the manpower employed in downtown small businesses, achieved through the sacrifice of the more traditional live-in laborer. Perhaps most conspicuous, however, is the increasing divergence these tendencies have generated between the central wards, on the one hand, with their white-collar employees commuting in from the western suburbs, and the eastern districts of downtown

Tokyo, on the other hand, which still draw their labor supply for the most part from local ward residents.

The suburban "invasion" of the postwar period has taken several forms, if we are to judge by Tokyo's experience. In some cases, pre-existing but independent small cities or towns in the periphery of the metropolis have been bit by bit overrun with commuter housing. In other cases, suburban housing projects or Levittown have been erected *en masse* in relatively unpopulated farming districts on the outskirts of Tokyo. In the former case, we find the suburban, residential character of the community superimposed over an older, residual social structure, usually centered upon small-scale commercial activity. The social structure generally assumes a complex aspect in this type of situation, with the population falling into two overall categories, the one consisting of local (small) businessmen, and the laborers and clerks employed by them, and the other comprised of the bulk of postwar white-collar "emigres" from the city, who commute daily to their downtown jobs. In addition, we can expect to find a certain number of laborers who commute to work in the industrial eastern wards of central Tokyo, as well as a locally employed white-collar contingent, and even a residual farming population. In terms of ideology and life-style, the local businessmen and farmers tend to hold more traditional attitudes and favor a more traditional kind of life-style, while the commuting white-collar population will generally support a more modern and urban set of values, accompanied by a corresponding mode of living. Somewhere between these two poles fall the locally-employed clerks, laborers, and white-collar workers. Possessed of quite different and even contrary values, these various elements are nevertheless compelled by the very fact of their mutual proximity to associate with each other, and the resulting contrasts in everything from social functions to shopping and clothing preferences have tended to create among the "locals" a somewhat stereotyped view of the commuting section of the population. Among the aboriginal businessmen and farmers of the community, a generally conservative and anti-urban bias tends to be offset by a realistic assessment of the degree of self-interest this section of the social structure holds in the continued suburbanization of the area. As owners either of land or of business establishments, they are the obvious beneficiaries of the steep rise in land-prices occasioned by the postwar suburban housing boom. Unlike the local propertied classes, however, the aboriginal laborer, clerk and white-collar population derives no benefit at all from the steady rise in the price of land, and in fact indirectly suffers from the increased rents and commodity prices that have not been offset by any widened job market or boosted pay scales. There has

been a tendency, however, for this segment of the local population to identify its interests with those of propertied class that affords it its employment, and we find, consequently, a certain degree of willingness to accept postwar developments wholesale as the outcome of a generally favorable pattern of land improvement.

As emigres from the metropolitan colossus, the commuting white-collar class shows as a rule virtually no interest in the affairs of the suburban community in which circumstances compel it to live. Having arrived in the community at separate and unrelated times, and finding themselves scattered at random over a wide terrain, there is little likelihood that they would feel any ties to the traditional local community. Put most concretely, the long distances they must commute each day to work all but eliminate the possibility of their having sufficient leisure to make a place for themselves in the neighborhood social order, even if the desire to do so were there. The feeling of "belonging" to the local community is consequently lacking; more often than not, the town in which the white-collar commuter makes his home is regarded by him as little more than a kind of "bedtown," the nightly return to which means nothing more than an interruption of "real" life downtown. For the typical white-collar family, downtown Tokyo provides for more than simply a job. If at all possible, a "downtown" school will be chosen for educating the younger members of the family, in preference to the "second-rate" local school—even though this often means hours of daily commuting for the child in question. Going "downtown" for shopping and recreation has also become a source of pride for the suburban white-collar household.

It would be a mistake to conclude from what we have said above, however, that the two substrata comprising the suburban community live in complete isolation from each other. For the *paterfamilias* of a typical white-collar household, home might indeed represent little more than a "bedtown"; but for his wife, the round of daily shopping and other such activities makes a certain degree of interaction with the local population impossible to avoid. Such association, it is true, often results in a hardening of antagonisms; but it would be a mistake to overlook the increasing sense of mutual identification that such contact has succeeded in creating. For it must not be forgotten that the local farming and business population is more than slightly anxious to guide its younger sons (older sons as well when there is no significant property to be passed on) along the road to wealth and status afforded by a white-collar career. Dependent on an aspect of the economic order which is in the process of decaying, and very much under the spell of the mass media's ecstatic portrayal of the joys of

the suburban salary-man's life, it should come as no surprise that the more prosperous elements in the traditional suburban community should be increasingly anxious to assimilate themselves into the white-collar class, with obvious consequences for the social order in these hybrid settlements.

In contrast with the pattern described above, the Levit-towns and housing projects that have become so characteristic of the suburban landscape since the war sprang into existence in a few short years of intensive construction, initiated with the establishment of the Japan Housing Corporation (*Nihon jūtaku kōdan*) in 1955. As a mass phenomenon, apartment-living is a creature of the postwar years, and is still limited essentially to the metropolitan cities. The lack of privacy implicit in the traditional wooden architecture, in which individual rooms are only minimally articulated, has been commonly recognized as a serious obstacle to the growth of bourgeois individualism in Japan; by this logic, the growing popularity of apartment housing would appear to be the obvious occasion for a rapid revolution in social values. In fact, however, the type of apartment housing that has sprung up in response to the housing shortage and suburban expansion of the postwar years has failed to guarantee even a minimum of privacy for tenants: anyone who has had the experience of living in one of these buildings will remember how everything going on in a neighboring apartment can be overheard simply by putting one's ear to the wall, and how the sound of a neighbor's footsteps, resounding on the concrete stairway, would so often keep one awake at night.

Of equal importance in mitigating the impact of apartment-living on the traditional culture have been the gregarious and neighborly instincts of the suburban housewife and her young children. In general, this network of community association reaches the apartment-dwelling housewife through the friendships established by her children: more often than not, she will be better known as "Tarō's mommy" or "Miss Hanako's mother" than as "Mr. Yamada's wife" or "Mrs. Ogawa." Then there will be the inevitable problems with garbage-disposal, or with the arrangement of a suitable play-area for the children which sooner or later will become the basis for an informal type of neighborhood association. Innocent and uncontrived though such associations may be in their origin, the sharing of complaints and airing of petty triumphs which forms the content of much of the conversation in these relationships can be counted upon to wear down, piece by piece, whatever legitimacy the artless housewife had previously ascribed to her status: and in place of the original fatalistic self-content characteristic of the newly married young wife there emerges eventually a more aggressive, competitive ideology, which demands for one and all the priv-

ileges and comforts of the most successful households in the neighborhood. In this fashion, the glamorous high-consumption mode of living portrayed in the mass media as the ultimate end of white-collar life seeps into the public consciousness through the aroused imaginations of the younger housewives. Of course, not all suburban housing projects fall exactly within the pattern suggested above: the institution of apartment-dwelling is in itself too new to have achieved more than a minimal kind of uniformity and predictability. Nevertheless, the effect of this new type of residential format upon the values of the white-collar class has been dramatic, and the response outlined above seems to be a fairly universal and unvarying one.

Nor has the situation in the downtown white-collar office to which father commutes everyday been stagnating as "Mrs. Ogawa" and "Hana-ko's mommy" go about the business of succumbing to the competitive, high-consumption ideals of suburban life. With the onward march of technological innovation, and the computerization and rationalization of management, the white-collar class as a whole, particularly its lower echelons, find their jobs increasingly mechanical and repetitive. Decision-making becomes more and more concentrated in the hands of the higher-ups. Trapped within the folds of ever larger and more complex organizations, the creativity and talent of the individual becomes more and more difficult to mobilize. Work, for the average white-collar employee, becomes more a simple source of income than a vocation (*Beruf*) more an emblem of social status than a calling. The job is seen increasingly as a test of patience, a necessary evil required to support the pleasures that will come after the office is shut down at 5 P. M. To a certain extent, socializing within the company—including the organization of company sports and provision of on-site recreational facilities for company employees—is maintained, but it is clearly the anonymous pleasures of the evening hours that hold the main attraction for the contemporary salaryman—as is reflected, curiously enough, in the rise of miniature bar and amusement districts—small copies of more famous downtown adventure spots—in the suburban shopping center. Within this setting, our temporarily liberated commuter is able to take his pleasure in the company of friends of his choosing, be they colleagues from the office, old associates from school, or simply acquaintances picked up in the course of previous evenings' entertainment. Even for the solo night adventurer, there is the company of professional hostesses to be had for a nominal compensation. Whatever form the evening's recreation may take, however, the kind of dependence on the circle of colleagues from the office characteristic of the salaryman of old is fast disappearing:

in its place is appearing a more general and interchangeable kind of associational pattern, delimited only by a vague feeling of white-collar class identity. This last point is important, though; no matter how dispersed and open-ended the circle of evening comraderie, connection with a reputable firm or organization is an unwritten requirement. The consequence of this practice is that a kind of social control can be exercised over the length and breadth of the white-collar class quite transcending the limitations of the direct, personal influence of company colleagues: association can be free, without endangering the scheme of values motivating our free-wheeling salaryman, or in any way threatening the stability of his personality; the scope of social contact can be enlarged without impinging upon the priority of loyalty to the company or employer.

An evolutionary process in many ways similar to what we have been discussing in connection with the sleek and modern big business enterprises of contemporary Tokyo has also overtaken many of the traditional-type small enterprises of the city. With upgrading of management techniques in these small businesses, there has appeared a marked tendency toward the white-collarization of the life-style of small business executives. Even among the shopowners of downtown Tokyo—a stratum historically connected with a preference for living on the premises of its enterprises—this trend had made itself felt, and many of the owners of wholesale houses and Ginza retail shops have shifted their domiciles to inner suburban areas and become commuters like their big-business white-collar counterparts. This step in itself represents a rather significant concession to urban white-collar culture on the part of this most traditional of business elites: but the process does not end here, for the younger sons of the family are now being pushed along the road to a successful white-collar career for themselves, while the eldest son, who will inherit his father's business, is now commonly given a college education in the hope that the contacts made there with future illuminaries of the white-collar world will prove someday useful in the advancement of the family business interests.

At the same time, the clerks and laborers employed in these small enterprises are following the example set by their bosses and setting up homes for themselves distant enough from the shop to require commuting. In the process they have exposed themselves much more than before to the influences of mass culture, with its emphasis on competitive consumption, and results have been for them a good deal more dramatic than they were for the more stabilized traditional propertied classes.