

BRITISH VIEWS OF INDIA AND ARGUMENTS ON THE RAJ*

— An Essay Towards a Theoretical Framework —

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CONCERNING THE British views of India and arguments on the raj, many books and papers have been published recently.¹ On the whole, these works are intensive studies of specific aspects of this complicated subject. What is presented here is an argument of a different kind. It is a rough outline of my understanding of the subject as a whole. It deals with a set of concepts abstracted from the historical facts from the latter half of the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, and will show with logical consistency how I tackle the subject.² The concepts are three typological constructs concerning the historical development of British thought on India and on the British rule. In other words, we are dealing with three idealized types of thought which are constructed so as to correspond logically to three periods of the history of the raj. The concepts are of course of a hypothetical nature and are expected to serve as tool concepts, or as a frame of reference, for further analysis. They will be of some use in the study of Indian economic history and of the development of nationalism as well.

What follows is not, therefore, a description of the historical facts but an explanation or a clarification of my hypothetical concepts.³ To bring out my point concisely, I have omitted quotations. The argument is presented in three

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¹ Among them, I owe much to the works of Professor Eric Stokes (*The English Utilitarians and India*, Oxford, 1959) and Professor Ainslie T. Embree (*Charles Grant and British Rule in India*, London, 1962).

² This paper is based on my studies of William Robertson, William Bolts, William Jones, Charles Grant, Richard Jones, James Mill, Henry Maine, Evelyn Baring, James F. Stephen, and so on. The following are papers of mine related to this topic. They are all in Japanese. "Baden-Powell kenkyū josetsu" [Baden-Powell's works: a study], *Aoyama keizai ronshū*, Vol. 14, Nos. 1 and 3 (1962); "J. F. Stephen no seiji shisō: jiyū no hihan, teikoku no yōgo" [J. F. Stephen's political thought: attack on liberty, defense of the empire], *Shisō*, No. 498 (December 1965); "William Jones no Indo-ron to Indo-tōchi-ron" [William Jones's arguments on Indian civilization and British rule], *Tōyō bunka kenkyūjo kiyō* [The Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture], No. 44 (November 1967).

³ To make this point clear, I use the present tense in the following. This does not, of course, mean that I am discussing about present-day problems.

parts. The first (1.0, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3) deals with the British views of India and the second (2.0, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3), with the British arguments on the raj. Concerning the typological arguments in the first two parts, historical congruency is considered in the third part (3.0, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3).

Throughout this paper, two terms, "British" and "European," are used sometimes interchangeably, as are "Indian" and "Asian." The reason for this loose usage is twofold. First, the British-and-Indian case sometimes serves as a model or as a main source of information for broader consideration on the European-and-Asian level. Secondly, the British in India often considered themselves as Europeans rather than as specifically Britishers, and they considered the natives of the subcontinent as Asians rather than as specifically Indians. And, of course, we are concerned here with the history of British thought.

1. 0

No European view of Asia could exist isolatedly—as something that was absolute or objective. When the Europeans came into contact with Asia and Asian people, they wanted to understand what Asia was, because it was different from Europe, and their method of doing so almost inevitably started with a comparison with Europe. The Europeans understood Asia by comparison with Europe, and they understood themselves through observation of Asia. Thus their image of Asia was closely connected with their self-image and these formed their *Weltanschauung*. Also, it should not be overlooked that this comparison was usually accompanied by an evaluation, or estimation, of the relative merits of the East and the West. From this point of view, the following three models or types of European views of Asia are abstracted from the complex reality in history and composed with European attitudes toward Asia in mind.

1. 1

The first type of view is characterized by a lack of principle in comparison and evaluation. East-West comparisons, with discussions of merits and deficiencies, are made sporadically, but there is no overall logic or system of evaluation which sums up the whole in theoretical consistency. Of course, for each comparison or evaluation, some concept or measure of universal applicability is essential. But the concepts or measures are generally vague or very abstract ones—such as truth, justice, peace, order, virtue, beauty, prosperity, and so on—and when put together, they only form a confused cluster. A clear, logical comparison and evaluation of the East and the West as a whole, therefore, is impossible and Europeans are well aware of it, though they might have general, somewhat chaotic, impressions of Asia, together with their preference—preference, for instance, for their native to the alien land.

Since there is no objective system of interpretation of the differences that exist between Europe and Asia, it is necessary in this view to accept the fundamental plurality of the world. The history of the world is in this case explained—

or rather, described—in a multi-linear way, so that Asia becomes, together with Europe, one member of this plural world. In other words, there are no axes of co-ordinates by which to determine the relative position of European and Asian civilizations, which are accepted as being on an equal status for this and no other reason. If Europeans know and can say nothing more than that Asia exists there as something different from Europe, they cannot but accept or tolerate its right to exist as it is. They are compelled to pay due regard to Asian things, traditions, history, and culture and often to suspend their judgment even when something is unpleasant to them.

The European view of Asia of this type is therefore nothing more than observation and criticism by an outsider who does not much care for a unified, systematic interpretation of the whole world. It takes the form of miscellaneous descriptions of a different world and is fundamentally connected with a negative intellectual attitude characterized by hesitation in being actively concerned with any reform in an alien society and culture.

1. 2

The second type of view is characterized by a firm belief in the universal validity of some unified, systematic way of understanding the world. The differences between Europe and Asia become explicable by reference to a goal—very often defined by arguments concerning civilization—which has been established on the basis of the existing state of affairs in Europe, and therefore is soon to be, or has already been attained in Europe, but is supposed to be common to all humanity. Europe is now the model or the pioneer, and the East-West difference is now evaluated as that of inferiority and superiority, the wrong and right state of affairs, or barbarism and civilization.

It should not, however, be overlooked that all the peoples in the world are considered to be equal in the sense that they stand in the same relationship to the common goal. It is true some have almost attained it and others are still far from it, but what has been possible for human beings in one part of the world is believed to be so in others. The East-and-West difference evaluated as above, is not of an intrinsic, fundamental nature. It is now a phenomenon which will possibly be overcome by some way or other.

The history of the world is explained in conformity with the idea of progress, and in many cases some theory of human history of a uni-linear type is considered as being applicable not only to Europe but also to Asia. The difference in value between their present conditions becomes convertible into a difference in time through this general theory. Asian inferiority, barbarism, or its wrong state of affairs is translated as backwardness in the advancement of civilization or as a time-lag in the scale of social progress, and it becomes the task of humanity to overcome this backwardness or time-lag.

Asians themselves may not look at the matter in this way, nor recognize the "task" as a humanitarian task which bears most directly upon them. But since the Europeans' belief is very firm in the postulation that their goal is common

to all humanity and that their way of understanding the world has universal validity, they very optimistically expect that even though Europeans have at present to dispel ignorance and disseminate truth, the time will come when Asians will think in the same way as Europeans, and will face the "task" and perform it themselves. Thus Asians and Europeans are both walking on the same road that leads to the same goal and in this sense they are fundamentally of the same nature and should be treated on a footing of equality.

One should not forget, however, that the main feature of this type of European view of Asia is the disparagement of Asian things, traditions, history, and culture, or the sweeping denunciation of the present state of Asian society. This is of course connected with a very positive or aggressive intellectual attitude. A lofty mission to civilize the savage, backward peoples is readily accepted with a typical optimism as to the response of these peoples.

1. 3

The third type of view resembles in some points the second one. There are axes of co-ordinates by which the relative position of Europe and Asia is to be determined. A common goal is set for the whole of humanity, which has been extracted from the present state of Europe and is firmly believed to be valid everywhere on earth. The East-and-West difference is evaluated as that of inferiority and superiority by reference to this goal.

But the peoples on earth are not considered to be equal, for what has been possible in Europe is not believed to be necessarily so in Asia. Asians have racial defects—or, fundamental defects inherent in their society and culture—because of which they hardly understand what is clear to Europeans. A handful of them may understand it all right, but by nature they cannot attain, as a people or as a nation, the European level and keep it for themselves. Asian backwardness is innate in its peoples or in its civilizations. To overcome its miserable conditions completely is impossible. The civilizing "task" for humanity is simply a product of illusion. If there can be any task for humanity, it is the task of relieving or alleviating the misery and of pushing the Asian peoples a little nearer to the European level or to the goal for humanity, which task cannot, however, be performed by Asians themselves, for they do not understand it.

From this point of view, the history of the world is again to be explained in a multi-linear way. A uniform theory of history is impossible, and stagnancy is now the peculiarity of Asia, while progress is the mark of Europe. Asians and Europeans are walking on different roads which will never join, and the difference which exists between them is not to be translated into a time-lag. It is of little purpose to denounce Asian things, traditions, history, and culture simply to set them aside. They should not be disregarded, for although they have many defects, these defects are inherent in them, cannot be eliminated, and so deserve careful study. The intellectual attitude of Europeans with this type of viewpoint is mixed. It is positive in the sense that they have no doubt about their criticism of Asia and about their task in Asia, but in another sense it is negative, for they have

no more the passion and aggressiveness of a reformer, which is the feature of those holding the second type of view. There is a limit which cannot be surpassed, and the optimism as to the response of Asians disappears, with the task becoming a burden. It should also be noted that although the Europeans do not disregard the customs of the land and do study them carefully, the tolerance, the restraining of hasty judgment, which is the feature of the first type of view, is no more to be found here. Arrogance takes the place of tolerance and pessimistic apathy replaces aggressive passion.

2. 0

Next to be considered are the arguments concerning the British rule of India, especially the British arguments concerning the principle of government in India and for the justification of the raj. Needless to say, these were the arguments and not the reality. They certainly beautified or glossed over the reality. But it is also unquestionable that, as such, they played an important role in history. In the following, three types of these arguments are presented, which are logically congruous respectively to the three types of European views of Asia.

2. 1

If the fundamental plurality of the world is accepted and Asia is one of its members—nothing more or nothing less—just as Europe, and Asia's right of existing as it is is indisputable, then the principle of European government of India is necessarily to pay due regard to its culture and to preserve its old institutions. Very general, abstract catchwords like justice, order, or prosperity are all right as a guiding principle, but to try to introduce a sudden change advocated by modern European theories of government, legislation, or political economy is out of the question. One may talk about the rule of law, but the law itself should not be changed. *Laissez-faire* might be proposed, but only in the sense that Government should not meddle with the working of traditional society but leave good old things alone. In short, as there can be no theoretical principle of government which is true everywhere on earth, Europeans should govern in Asia as the Asians do.

Why then should Europeans, not Asians, do this business of government in Asia? Is there any special moral or any other meaning in the foreigners' raj in India? There is no answer to the first question and the answer to the second is in the negative. Rather the questions themselves are lightly dismissed. If Europeans happen to hold power over Asians, this does not require special explanation, for power itself need no justification no matter who holds it, the real question being whether the power is exercised properly or not. A universal, theoretical criterion for this last question is typically nonexistent. There may be abstract ideas like justice, prosperity, and so on, but on the whole judgment on the question should be passed case by case empirically—in the case of foreign rule in Asia, the important point being whether or not the power exercised is soundly based

on the established customs of the land. Therefore, as long as the present state of European government in Asia is good and sound in this sense, and discontent about the alien character of the raj does not come to the fore, the fact that the power is held by foreigners is believed to need no special explanation. It is merely one case out of many foreign rules in history, which could be beneficial, like that of Alexander or Akbar, as well as harmful. It is of interest that to make the raj beneficial, a careful survey and minute study of the customs of the land becomes indispensable for the foreigners, and this is one reason why the first type of British argument for the raj is closely connected with the Orientalist school of learning.

The British argument of this type demonstrates that European rule in Asia is permissible, not that it is necessary. The British may govern India, but there is no particular reason that they should do so. From the moral point of view, the British rule is therefore considered as a mere accident. "Providence" may be referred to, but this is with stress on the inscrutability of it. If special justification is necessary for foreign rule, the matter is left entirely to God's care. "Providence" simply provides, in actuality, a veil over the accidentality or fortuitousness. Thus this type of argument is very incomplete, in the sense that it cannot free itself from this absence of cause.

It is also to be noted that when a foreign rule is justified by the argument above, the factual grounds are supplied by the present state of that government. In other words, as long as the present state is all right, the argument continues to hold good. A foreign rule can, therefore, be justified by this argument provisionally but repeatedly without any time limit. But the self-assertion of the foreign rulers toward the future cannot be very strong in this case—Providence is inscrutable and the future is uncertain. So, in a word, justification of the raj is of an incomplete and indefinite nature.

2. 2

If there is a universal goal for humanity, by reference to which Asia is ascertained to be at an inferior or backward stage, the government in Asia should perform the humanitarian task and pursue a definite policy of correction and improvement. To put it more concretely, it should pursue a policy of Europeanization, even Anglicization, for the superior or advanced stage is already reached in Europe. One may not always find a perfect model in the British institution itself, but all the same the advocated policy is based on a universal principle which is derived from the European experience. Asian things, traditions, history, and culture are all rubbish. They simply constitute a world of superstition, which will crumble once the light is introduced. The minute study of such a world is irrelevant to policy making. The cardinal point is clear recognition of the universal goal of advancement and the proper selection of the means for attaining the end.

Asians, who have long lived in this world of superstition, do not understand what should be done or for what purpose they should do it. Only Europeans do. Then it follows that the humanitarian task of civilizing Asia should necessarily

be committed to Europeans. Here European rule is given a justification which is believed to have an objectivity, a universal validity. European, not Asian, rule is necessary for quickly overcoming Asian backwardness. Europeans are now filled with confidence, feeling a special purpose for their being in Asia as the rulers. The more miserable Asian backwardness, Asian barbarism is depicted, the more vivid the task of the Europeans in Asia becomes, and the more convincing the justifying argument of their rule. "Providence" is now not a synonym for inscrutability, for human reason can perceive a careful scheme in it.

It follows from this argument that European rule in Asia can not and must not be democratic in principle, although it can and must be educational. Foreigners should not try to pretend to represent the governed. The government should not always be operated in conformity with the wish and consent of the people. It should be aggressive and oppressive to the wrong customs of the land. Once Europeans begin to govern in Asia as Asians do, the government itself ceases to be justified.

But this does not and should not continue without an end. The argument for justification is related to a purpose, the approach to and achievement of which is the test to verify the argument in concrete reality. In other words, as long as Asians are uncivilized and cannot civilize themselves, and as long as this backward condition is being improved, the argument continues to hold good, and when the "civilizing mission" ends with completion of the purpose, the justification of the past foreign rule will finally be established, and the justification of foreign rule itself will happily disappear. So this type of argument for the raj works for a limited—the shorter, the better—span of time.

2. 3

If there is a universal goal for humanity, which is already or almost attained in Europe, but in Asia its attainment is far from possible, then the government in Asia must pursue a policy of partial or selective Europeanization. For prudent, realistic policy-making along this line, one must first discern what is possible from what is impossible, as well as what is necessary from what is unnecessary, in Asia. It should not be overlooked that the policy worked out from this discernment necessarily has two aspects. The one is the above-mentioned partial or selective Europeanization. The other is the partial or selective preservation of Asian culture and institutions, the preservation being made not because these are really worth preserving, but because there is no other realistic choice, or there is no special necessity for a change. It is noteworthy that in this case lack of necessity is sometimes confused with impossibility, or that Europeans consider something possible but unnecessary as something impossible, for they forget that necessity often makes possible something which seemed impossible. In this case, the preservation or the Europeanization will become unconsciously very selective.

Clear discernment, careful selection, prudent policy-making, with a full understanding of the meaning of the humanitarian task to be performed in Asia, is supposed to be possible only to Europeans. Here European rule in Asia acquires

for its justification a rigid argument, which has objectivity or universality, though most probably Asians can not understand it. As a superior race, Europeans are to shoulder the responsibility of ruling over Asians. Europeans, not Asians, can discern what is necessary, what is possible, in Asia. The more debased the Asian innate quality is considered to be, the more serious the Europeans' task in Asia becomes and the more rigid the argument for justification. If Europeans suddenly abandoned their task and left, the anarchy and misery peculiar to Asia would come back and spread unchecked!

It goes without saying that the European rule, as justified by such an argument, should not be democratic in principle—it should not be based upon the wish and consent of the people. Nor should it be educational in the full sense. One must not be a visionary idealistic teacher, for there is only a limited possibility of education, which limit may have already been reached. The expectation for future possibility has nothing to do with this argument for justification.

The argument is concerned with the present, not with the future. It is related to the innate quality, not to the acquisition of new qualities. In other words, if the present state of Asia under European rule is better than Asia would be when left to itself, European rule is justified to keep things at this higher level, or rather at this highest possible level. It is clear that time is irrelevant to this kind of argument. There is no term for termination of European rule in the argument. On the contrary, there is a clear claim of permanency for this rule. The self-assertion of Europeans toward the future is therefore very strong in this case—they are destined to rule in Asia perhaps for ever!

3. 0

Three types of European views of Asia, together with three types of European arguments concerning the European rule in Asia logically corresponding to each of the above three, have been clarified. To what historical conditions, to what historical reality in Europe, in Asia, and in the world, are each of the three pairs of the types of thought most congruent? This is our next point of consideration.⁴ Of course, thoughts and ideas have their own history, and any thought which played a prominent role in one period of history, does not suddenly disappear leaving nothing to the next. Sometimes, a thought survives beyond its period of prominence and plays a different role in a new form in the next period. But we are not concerned here with such aspects of the history of thought. Thoughts and ideas are now treated broadly as a superstructure, and from this point of view historical meaning is given to our hypothetical typologies, from which a rough theoretical frame of reference is to be developed.

⁴ Some characteristics of these types of thought might be connected with social background or career of those who held that kind of thought. But it is not the purpose of this paper to explain people's thought in terms of their personal background—to give factors which built up their personality and made them always think in a particular way. Here we are concerned with the historical conditions which pick out a particular type of people with their particular type of thought and make them play an important role in a particular period.

3. 1

Until the end of the eighteenth century, European concern with Asia was preoccupied with the import of the "riches" of the East. This meant, in the concrete, exotic products of Asian industry and Asian soil, or products peculiar to a traditional culture and tropical climate, which of course were quite different from that of Europe. After the establishment of British rule in Bengal and in South India, Europeans obtained a large non-commercial income in India, but this income was again based on the traditional social structure of Asia, and for its realization in Europe the import of the "riches" of the East was in any case indispensable.

The source of wealth for Europeans was therefore found in existing Asian conditions with their peculiarities and their historical background. The Europeans' fundamental interest lay in preserving in essence, not in destroying, the status quo of Asian society and economy. Asia had its value because it had existed as something different from Europe and as such it should be paid due regard. Commercial capital or merchant capital works in a parasitic way. It might introduce a new system to get the riches of the East, but a radical reform in Asian society and economy was wholly unthinkable. One might even plunder, but one must not revolutionize. It was the land of pagoda-trees. One might shake them, but one must not chop them down to plant other trees.

It is also to be noted that at the beginning of the raj, the British could not feel certain of the future of their new position in India. There were rival nations of Europe still active in the East, and the potential danger was not obviated. The first success of the British was not the materialization of a preconceived plan of subjugating the Indian subcontinent, nor were there any such plans to follow after the first success. The so-called "dual government" showed how ambiguous an idea the British generally had about their new position in India. Their rule itself was not internally stabilized at all, and the British were in no position to take aggressive measures toward the existing social order in India.

It is clear that the first type of European view of Asia and argument on the raj was most congruent to such historical conditions.

3. 2

After the Industrial Revolution, the clamor of the British industry for the market in Asia became louder and louder. The Asian market seemed to be disappointingly narrow when compared with the tremendous size of its population. Not only did Asia produce almost all the goods it required for itself, but it exported many commodities to Europe, among which was included the produce of its handicraft. There was in Asia a world which was different and separate from Europe, not easily organized into a system of international division of labor, not easily absorbed into one universal world.

For the British, such a state of affairs was not tolerable any more. The existing Asian condition was wrong. Asians could not well appreciate the excel-

lence of the British merchandise. If they did appreciate it, the human propensity to exchange one thing for another was obstructed or repressed. It seemed that all these things were caused by Asian barbarism, backwardness, and poverty. Consequently, Asia was for the British no more a world full of the riches of the East. It was not the land of pagoda-trees, but of wrong customs, deplorable superstitions, and miserable poverty, and for humanity's sake, these must be eliminated. Asian society and economy should be remodelled and should advance toward the common goal of human civilization. As a natural consequence of this advancement, it would follow that Asia would take more and more European manufactured goods and give in exchange more and more products of the land marketable or realizable in Europe. In short, Asia had to be instructed in what civilization was. Light should be introduced forcibly into the darkness.

On the other hand, it was clear that the British manufacturing industry acquired the supreme position in the world through the Industrial Revolution and the British could apparently defend this position for ever simply by advocating the universal principle of *laissez-faire* and by conveying the gospel of civilization throughout the world. No other strategy seemed necessary, the British felt secure, could be happily idealistic and could freely talk about the termination in the future of their rule in Asia, for there was no dangerous rival who threatened their supremacy.

At the same time, internal stability was firmly established in India under British rule and the British could confidently be aggressive to the traditional social order, for no one seemed to endanger the raj. It should not also be overlooked that the difference between Asia and Europe, or Asian backwardness, appeared to be so great that the British could light-heartedly perform the civilizing mission in Asia, for they did not have to worry about the very remote future when the difference might become smaller. The British could not forecast the outcome of their endeavor. It was not unreasonable to expect that the new Asians who grew up under the influence of European civilization would be obedient and cooperative to the European rulers. For the Europeans, Asia was thus a plastic material which could be molded into any form they liked offering no troublesome resistance.

It is clear that the second type of European view of Asia and of argument on the raj was most congruent to such historical conditions.

3. 3

When the British supremacy was challenged by other nations of Europe and the intense rivalry, the race for colonial possessions began in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it was no more possible for the British to be confidently idealistic. Their attitude stiffened. They made every effort to make their empire greater, they strengthened their defenses, and they thought there was no other choice. Their Asian possessions had to be most cautiously, most warily guarded from coveting rivals for centuries to come.

On the other hand, the response of Asia to the Western impact turned out

contrary to the rosy expectations of the British. Asia was far from plastic, it had its own Self which was not easily bent. The British learned lessons from the great rebellion of 1857-59 in their own way. Asian traditional social order did not readily succumb to the civilizing impact of European rule, and it was dangerous to be engrossed in an illusion of human progress and to follow simply an outright aggressive policy toward backward Asian culture and society. Neither did the new Asians who received a Europeanized education come up to the British expectation. They were not always cooperative, nor obedient to the British raj, which they began to criticize impudently, utilizing the superficially comprehended knowledge of modern European liberalism! It had to be made clear that the old sentimental idealism was now quite out of place, and that preservation of traditional Asia, though partial or selective, was unavoidable or even necessary. One had to face up to the realities of Asia under colonial rule in the period of international rivalry.

It should also be borne in mind that the simple laissez-faire policy was no more a sure guarantee of safety for the British interests in India. It was necessary not only to open up the whole of India and to combine it with British industries in a mutually complementary way, but also to secure in India a favorable outlet for British capital and to protect the invested capital all the time. This meant that Europeanization should still be a fundamental policy, but that what was required was not total Europeanization. To make an entire replica of Europe in Asia was not, for the British, a correct policy at all. They thought that it was neither possible nor necessary, and that Europeanization should be carefully kept partial or selective. It is natural that British economic policies along such a line invited many criticisms, for they were frequently incompatible with the economic nationalism which was growing rapidly among the new Indian intellectuals.


In all these circumstances, it might reasonably be supposed that the British sought to hold firmly in their own hands the right of final decision regarding what was possible and what was necessary, and to defend themselves in a stiffened attitude from all Indian criticisms. It is clear that the third type of European view of Asia and argument on the raj was most congruent to such historical conditions.

4. 0

The above treatment is to provide a framework for a more comprehensive study, and it is difficult to condense it further. But it will be of some use to pick out the main points and to clarify their meaning with the help of diagrams.

The first type of European view of Asia might be illustrated by Figure 1. There are no axes of coordinates by which the relative positions of the present state of Europe (*E*) and of Asia (*A*), as well as their histories which lead to their present states (the curved lines), are to be defined. The world is plural and the East and the West are to be treated on a footing of equality. The attitude of Europeans toward Asia is characterized by reservation and tolerance, and their principle of government in Asia is preservation of its tradition. There is no positive justification for the raj and the term of validity of the justifying argument is indefinite.

Fig. 1



This type of European view of Asia and argument on the raj was most congruent to the age of great monopolizing companies trading with the East.

Figure 2 represents the second type of European view of Asia. There are axes of co-ordinates common to the whole of humanity, and the course of European history from the past to the future (curved line PP') is given a universal meaning. It is regarded as representing the general course of human progress, and the present state of Asia (A) is located somewhere on this course. Between

the present state of Europe (E) and that of Asia, there is a great difference, the difference of superiority and inferiority, and this difference in value (vv') is translated through the general law of human progress (PP') into a difference in time, or, into a time-lag (tt'). Europe and Asia should, however, be treated on a footing of equality, for they are walking on the same course that leads to the same goal. The Europeans' attitude toward Asia is aggressive, intolerant, and optimistic, and their principle of government in Asia is Europeanization. There is a positive argument for the justification of the raj, and the term of validity of this argument is of a limited nature. This type of European view of Asia and argument on the raj was most congruent to the age of industrial capital after the industrial Revolution.

The third type of the European view of Asia is diagrammed by Figure 3. There

Fig. 2





Fig. 3



are also axes of co-ordinates common to the whole of humanity, but the courses of European history (PP') and of Asian history (QQ') are shown by different lines which represent different laws of history—that of development and that of stagnation. Difference in value between the present state of Europe (E) and that of Asia (A) cannot, therefore, be translated into a time-lag, and the fundamental equality of humanity is rejected. The European attitude toward Asia is arrogant, apathetic and pessimistic, and their principle of government in Asia is partial or selective Europeanization combined with partial or selective preservation of Asian tradition. There was a leap to a slightly higher level recently in the course of Asian history (cf. Fig. 3). This leap was made possible by the help or rather under the compulsion of the European rulers, and to maintain this higher level, continued European rule is requisite. If the European rule should suddenly be removed, Asia will go back to its characteristic lower level (fall to the point Q''). The justifying argument for the raj is very rigid in this case, and there is no term for termination of the validity of this argument. This type of European view of Asia and argument on the raj was most congruent to the age of imperialism.

The typological discussion above is presented to prepare a working hypothesis for the study of East-West interplay in modern world history. But it might be added here that the discussion will be of some use for the consideration of contemporary problems by helping to clarify the ideological background of similar present-day arguments.