

of whether or not the actual functionings of the *nenkō* wage system during interwar years differed from those of intrafirm wage structure based upon the Electricity Industry Formula during postwar years. For myself, I am not yet prepared to attempt an answer to this extremely delicate question. (Mataji Umemura)

The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction: Twenty Years of Cooperation for Agricultural Development by T. H. Shen, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1970, xiv+278 pp.

The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) came into being at Nanking in October 1948 as a cooperative agricultural organization between both nations based on the China Aid Act. Since then over twenty years have passed, and during this time, with the withdrawal of Nationalist China to Taiwan, the scope of JCRR's activities has been restricted to the area of Taiwan (including Quemoy and Matsu). This book records the JCRR's activities over the past twenty years, illustrating one case of what international cooperation can be.

The book is divided into four parts. The first part, "Background and Organization," comprises five sections outlining the origins of JCRR, its policies and program, its organization and staff, the program operation and budget analysis. The second part, "Groundwork in Taiwan," reviews agricultural rehabilitation and reforms carried out in the early 1950s and the plans for new development, for instance, land reform, the reorganization of farmers' associations and the agricultural plans and achievements.

The third, and main, part of the book, "Major Projects," comprises thirteen sections in total which elaborate on most of the projects that have been implemented in Taiwan. In detail, it covers agricultural education, research, and extension, land use and soil conservation, water control, plant industry, animal industry, forestry, fisheries, agricultural marketing and export, agricultural statistics and economic studies, agricultural credit, rural health and family planning, JCRR assistance to Quemoy and international technical cooperation. The fourth and final part, "Evaluation," looks at the results of the past twenty years of activities, drawing out causes of success, investigating program failures, and offering a future prospective.

The author, Dr. T. H. Shen, has been actively playing a leading role in JCRR from its inception up to the present day. At China-United States Agricultural Mission (see below) during the preparation for JCRR's foundation, he was an associate spokesman for the Chinese; after the foundation he became one of three Chinese commissioners of the JCRR (two others were Americans), and after the death of Dr. Chiang Mon-lin up until the present day he has been serving as JCRR chairman. After aid from the United States came to an end in 1965, JCRR seems to have stood at a turning point. On this occasion, as a man on the scene who can best review the past and look into the future, after the death of Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, it seems there is no person more ideally suitable than Dr. Shen.

In a sense, it may be said that the course the author had followed in the past was a course leading to agricultural cooperation between Nationalist China and the United States. He specialized in plant breeding science at Cornell University in the United States, returned to his motherland and became a professor of Nanking Uni-

versity, served time at the National Agricultural Research Bureau, and then, during the war, fulfilled an office connected with the wartime food bureau.

Speaking of Nanking University, together with an agricultural course at Nanking Higher Normal School, the University was the focal center after 1914 for modern agricultural science in China. Most of those involved had studied in the United States, and in particular there were many graduates from Cornell University. At the same time, foreign professors from Cornell University played an important role in the earlier stages at Nanking University. Among the graduates of Cornell University who came to China and centered their activities around Nanking University were Mr. J. H. Reisner, first dean of the agricultural faculty, Mr. L. H. Bailey, a famous American agriculturist, Mr. H. H. Love who engaged in crops improvement for a number of years, and Mr. J. L. Buck, known as the author of *Land Utilization in China* (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937).

The Chinese crop joint improvement program, inaugurated in 1926, which is mentioned in passing in the author's Preface to this book, was a joint venture of the Rockefeller Foundation International Education Board, Cornell and Nanking Universities. This program marks the beginning of the author's experience in Sino-American agricultural cooperation. According to the author's autobiography (*Zhongnian zishu* [Speaking on middle age] [Taipei: Zheng Zhong Bookshop, 1957]), that program established joint experimental stations at churches and universities in Central and North China, and there plant breeding was taught by professors despatched every year from Cornell University.

Dr. R. T. Moyer, then head of the agricultural department of Oberlin School at Taiku, Shansi Province, one of the joint experiments, had been the author's classmate at Cornell University. The relationship of official cooperation, established between these two, was to continue through into the time of China-United States Agricultural Mission and JCRR. (Mr. Moyer served as a commissioner of JCRR between 1948 and 1952.) At the same time, Dr. James Y. C. Yen's Mass Education Movement, which was said to have strongly influenced the birth of JCRR, was receiving agricultural education from Nanking University, and Dr. Shen also visited there at least once a year. Dr. Yen later worked as a commissioner of JCRR from its establishment until 1951. So far as the personal relationships surrounding the author are concerned, reference of course should be made to the National Agricultural Research Bureau, but for the purposes of this brief work they will have to be omitted.

From the preceeding we can understand that the establishment of JCRR in 1948 was based on personal relationships as well as experiences in China-U.S. agricultural cooperation dating back before World War II. The leaders of JCRR were men who had been central figures in Nationalist China's modern agricultural science and who had prior experiences of cooperation with the United States. In this sense, this book, which narrates JCRR's activity over twenty postwar years, can be read as a scene of history of agricultural cooperation between Nationalist China and the United States. As a Chinese and as a person, like the author, interested in agricultural problems, I read the book with this expectation. If we are to search for some significance in a study of JCRR, one important point must be a reflection on these endeavors to modernize Chinese agriculture forwarded under cooperation from abroad and led by Chinese students studied abroad.

In October 1945, when the eight-year struggle against the Japanese came to a successful conclusion, Nationalist China asked the United States for cooperation in order to map out a program for postwar agricultural reconstruction. The result was

a mutual decision between the two nations to establish China-United States Agricultural Mission. Upon dispatching American experts to China in June the following year, President Truman wrote Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek saying that any plan for cooperation in economic development between the two countries should include agriculture, the major source of income for such a great proportion of China's population (see p. 257). Not only China, but in fact all of postwar Asia cannot be considered without taking into account agricultural problems.

The China-United States Agricultural Mission for eleven weeks visited all regions of China including Manchuria and Taiwan, which had just been reincorporated under the Chinese regime, and as the result compiled a report (China-United States Agricultural Mission, *Report of the China-United States Agricultural Mission* [Washington, D.C.: Department of Agriculture, 1947]; and also in Chinese, *Gaijin Zhongguo nongye zhi tujing, zhongmei nongye jishu hezuotuan baogaoshu* [Means to improve China's agriculture—report of the China-United States Agricultural Mission] [Shanghai: Shangwu Yin Shu Kuan, 1947]). This report, covering ten categories of recommendations on agricultural reconstruction, is indispensable as source material for understanding the Nationalist Chinese Government's recognition of its agricultural problems.

According to the present author, Dr. Shen, most of the recommendations made by the Mission have been put into practice in Taiwan by JCRR, with the exception of nine centers of agricultural education, research, and extension, which was recommended to be established throughout China. (pp. 12-13) Furthermore, he notes with interest that, with the exception of birth control, all remaining items were also put into practice on Mainland China under the Communist Administration. However, he stresses the point of difference that land reform was carried out under compelled force on the mainland while it was pursued with peaceful methods on Taiwan.

These differing understandings on land reform may be seen as a fundamental issue, and in this respect, that the above report shows little concern over the issue is of significance. The only reference made is to certain reforms in tenancy. Instead, what is stressed in the report's conclusion is that China's agricultural production can be significantly increased by applying modern science. In this the report is in sharp contrast with Communist China's policy emphasizing land reform from the very beginning. Criticism against the report as overestimating technology was made even by many Americans, some of whom were probably influenced by Mr. J. L. Buck (a member of the Mission). (See Melvin Conant, Jr., "JCRR: An Object Lesson," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 9 [May 2, 1951], pp. 88-92. Furthermore, that there was much criticism from the U.S. side against JCRR is carried in: Chiang Mon-lin, "Nongfuhui gongzuo jiben sixiang zhi yanjin" [JCRR's basic operation concepts and their development], in idem, *Mon-lin wencun* [Collected essays of Mon-lin] [Taipei: Zheng Zhong Bookshop, 2nd ed., 1968].) Against such criticism, refutation was of course made by the JCRR side, but afterwards, it seems that JCRR began seriously considering land reform problems, and the progress they subsequently made is reported in detail in this book. The reader might be interested to learn how this policy realignment came about at JCRR, but unfortunately the book does not touch on this matter.

Among the author's many writing, *Agricultural Resource of China* ([Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951]; and also in Chinese, *Zhongguo nongye ziyuan* [Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua chuban shiye weiyuanhui, 1952]) and *Agricultural Development on Taiwan since World War II* ([Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964]; and also in Chinese, *Taiwan nongye zi fazhan* [Taipei: Taiwan Shangwn yin shu guan, 1963]) together with the present volume form a three part whole of the author's view of

Chinese agriculture. *Agricultural Resources of China* was written during the period when the author was working at the National Agriculture Research Bureau on Mainland China. After rewriting a few parts, it was published from Cornell University when the author had an opportunity to visit the United States.

According to the author, the purpose of its writing was to "explain the development of Chinese agriculture over the last fifty years and note points to be improved in the future, thus providing material for a comparison with agriculture under the Communist Administration," and "From this work, we will be able to understand that the life of farmers recently under Communist Administration does not match their life in Min Kuo 24-25 (1935-36) before the war against Japan." (T. H. Shen, "Zai Taiwan chuqi yu chuxi liangnong huiyi" [In an earlier Taiwan period and attending FAO meeting], *Zhuanji wenxue* [Biographical literature], Vol. 15, No. 4.) Leaving aside questions of propriety, it is fair to say that the above expresses the attitude of the author consistent through all his three works above mentioned. In line with this attitude is the author's understanding of the political significance of U.S. aid to China from the present volume: "Communism was capitalizing on the poverty and miseries of the Chinese peasantry, it was felt that the most effective way to steal the Communist thunder would be to solve the agrarian problem through peaceful reforms carried out with the technical and financial assistance of China's wartime ally and traditional friend, the United States." (p. 13) Starting from an ideology of "to steal the Communist thunder," it is difficult to assume a posture enabling sincere reflection on past failures or digging deeply into Chinese agricultural problems, and this cannot but be a disappointment to the readers.

In order to avoid duplication with *Agricultural Development on Taiwan since World War II*, most details before 1960 have been omitted from this book, particularly so in the second part, "Groundwork in Taiwan," and the third part, "Major Projects." The book devotes much space to information on activities promoted with JCRR's assistance, enumerating concrete programs, and stressing the many programs executed under the leadership of American advisors. For example, the structural reorganization of Farmers' Association in Taiwan was carried out with advice from Professor W. A. Anderson of Cornell University; the educational improvement at the colleges of agriculture of the National Taiwan University was suggested by Professor Leland E. Call, dean of the college of agriculture of Kansas State College; and the same can be said for the field of technical innovation.

In the fourth part, "Evaluation," reflection is made on some of JCRR's failures, one of which concerns the introduction of the Peking duck. (pp. 243-44) JCRR imported 300 eggs of this duck type from Long Island, New York in 1954, and planned to spread them throughout Taiwan. However, it subsequently came to light that the required fodder was costly and that traditional duck pasturing was not suitable for the bird. The market for this duck, it was also discovered, was quite small compared with the native ducks. Thus it was realized that only a very limited number of people would purchase the Peking duck and could pay for its costly fodder. Eventually the plan was scuttled.

The point receiving the highest praise from the author is the close cooperation rendered by American Commissioners and advisors, which, he stresses, made the existence of JCRR itself unique. For instance, of five total commissioners, two are American, and policy decisions follow a rule of unanimous, not majority, approval. Although there were some differences of opinion among commissioners, cooperation between both parties was carried out in close harmony. However, no detailed ex-

planation is offered about how decisions were reached or what points elicited the differences.

Many readers might expect from the author, as a career staff member of JCRR, some insights into the above subject in less diplomatic language. What he does mention is that the United States does not try to force through its own will, nor is JCRR expected to become Washington's "rubber stamp." (p. 16) He goes on to positively state that, due to fears of being controlled by the United States, many other developing countries in Asia have been reluctant to follow such closely cooperative measures as did JCRR, and yet in the case of JCRR it became clear that there was no basis for the fear. (p. 9) If this be the case, am I the only person who considers that if the author had given us more detail on this point, the book could have been more persuasive?

In the Preface to the book, Dr. Shen recollects: "The first expression of my interest in Sino-American agricultural cooperation was an article I wrote entitled 'How Can America Best Help China?' which was published by *Millard's Review* in July, 1920. . . . Whether the realization of this dream in the 1920s instead of a quarter of a century later would have altered the history of China is now an academic question. It is a question, however, that the reader of this book may often ask himself." (pp. vii-viii) I agree with the opinion that throughout Asia any programs in economic cooperation should always include agriculture. In this sense, JCRR may be regarded as a test case.

Although there never was sufficient time to carry out activities on Mainland China, on Taiwan they have been granted the time they needed, and this book carries the relevant record. Whether the efforts were successful or failed will and ought to be judged by the readers themselves in light of their own feelings as to how international cooperation can best be handled. I would like to add finally that for this purpose the book can, in fact, supply relevant data. (Chen Ren-duan)