

POSTWAR CHINA'S VIEW OF JAPAN

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THE MODERN AND contemporary history of China is, in a sense, the history of Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. The high points are well known: In 1915 Japan imposed her Twenty-One Demands on China sparking a wave of anti-Japanese activity throughout the nation. Japan's dispatch of troops to Shantung Province in 1927 and 1928 as well as the September 18 Incident (Mukden Incident) in 1931 were important factors in the growth of a full-scale resistance, culminating in a Chinese decision to wage war with Japan after the July 7 Incident in 1937. With the termination of World War II in 1945, China was finally able to bring to a close its extended history of resistance against Japan.

Unfortunately, however, this did not mean that the state of confrontation existing between China and Japan was dissolved. Even after 1945, China found it necessary to maintain its previous critical posture toward Japan, this time characterized by a sense of distrust in Japan's postwar democratization and a vigilant guard against the revival of Japanese militarism. In the following, this author, using Chinese sources and adopting a Chinese viewpoint, tries to develop a general idea of why the above is so, and secondly, to determine what has been the substance of Chinese criticism of Japan.

I. POSTWAR CHINA'S DEMAND FOR THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF JAPAN

On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allied powers, and China rejoiced. For a full fourteen years, from the September 18 Incident in 1931 through the July 7 Incident in 1937 and up to 1945, China had experienced the ravages of war, its land and people directly exposed to the aggression of the Japanese forces. Having thus endured prolonged suffering, China's joy at victory was all the greater. Naturally enough, moreover, it was China, victim of Japan's imperialistic system and militaristic thought, which was the most vehement of the victors in demanding the democratization of Japan.

On August 15, the day of the Japanese surrender, Chiang Kai-shek made a speech, which became famous for a phrase "don't meet force with force" [7]. In this speech, broadcast in China and worldwide, Chiang Kai-shek demanded that Japan's "warlike military clique" strictly and faithfully fulfill the surrender terms and thoroughly renounce aggressive ambition and armed force. "The good people" of Japan, he added, while "by no means enemies," must awaken to and correct the "errors and crimes" they were "beguiled into committing by the military

clique." Chiang Kai-shek further demanded that Japan fulfill the surrender terms prescribed in the Cairo and Potsdam declarations strictly and faithfully, and thoroughly reform the Japanese people's "notion of divine right" and "aggressive ambitions," elucidated earlier by Tai Chi-t'ao in his writings on Japan [40].

Even after Chiang's speech, the Kuomintang repeated this demand. Chao Nan-jou, for example, in the Kuomintang-affiliated daily *Chungyang jihpao*, insisted that Japan must eliminate its militaristic thought, as well as the traditional Shintoism it had been maintaining for two thousand years, and politically, it must overthrow the emperor system, and economically, it must reform its land system and revise its capitalist system [12]. Another set of demands were contained in a resolution calling for Japan to make peace, adopted by a national convention held under the auspices of the Kuomintang [32]. Divided into categories, the political demands included the abolition of the emperor system, establishment of a democratic government by the common people, and dissolution of all non-government secret organs. Economically, the resolution sought the dismemberment of Japan's latent munition industries, centered on the metal and chemical industries, limitation of industrial levels to those of 1928-30, controls on imports, and a ban on the import of raw materials for weapons manufacture. Militarily, demands centered on the achievement of a thoroughgoing implementation of the war renunciation article of the Constitution, and denial of an army, navy, air force, and secret police. Finally, in the ideological sphere, the convention advocated total rejection of militaristic and aggressive indoctrination, and destruction of Shinto shrines, which had served as imperialistic symbols.

Left-wing intellectuals generally favored the same demands as the Kuomintang on the issue of the democratization of Japan. Kuo Mo-jo, for example, gave top priority to the "absolute abolition" of the emperor system, "the scourge of the democratic movement." Secondly, he called for a "thorough reform" of the Japanese educational system in order to root out its "deeply imbedded feudalism, emperor worship, and intense militaristic thought." And thirdly, he favored "some form of revolutionary change" in land and capital, which in the existing economic system constitute a major obstacle to the democratization of Japan [22].

The Chinese Communist Party's demands concerning the democratization of Japan were not significantly different from those mentioned above. Commander-in-Chief Chu Tê of the Liberated Areas Anti-Japanese Army, for example, sent memoranda to the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, clarifying the position of the Chinese Communist Party to the effect that it would withhold its right to speak out on the question of demands toward Japan. It also made clear that the Chinese demands would be based on the Potsdam Declaration as well as on China's treaties with the Allied powers [10, pp. 31-32]. Moreover, a *Chiehfang jihpao* editorial of September 14 of the same year named as war criminals such leaders as the following, according to category: Among "military leaders," Araki, Doihara, Tōjō, Terauchi, and Okamura; among "imperial family members, senior statesmen, and high-class bureaucrats," Fushiminomiya, Nashimotonomiya, the Emperor, Konoe, and Ugaki; among plutocrats or zaibatsu leaders; Ikeda, Fujiwara, Nakajima, and Ayukawa; among "reactionary politicians,"

Arita, Matsuoka, Hashimoto, and Tokutomi; others from among "the military police, secret service, and the active elements in the occupied areas" [8]. The editorial demanded severe punishment of these war criminals and overall reform of the Japanese political, economic, and cultural structures they represented.

The above were the immediate postwar demands of both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party with regard to the democratization of Japan. To summarize:

First, both parties strongly demanded the abolition of the emperor system, as both Chao Nan-jou and Kuo Mo-jo placed it before everything else in importance. At the time, however, as we shall discuss later, a distinction was made between the emperor system as a system and its existence as *kokutai* or the national polity. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party also differed in the way they pursued the Emperor's responsibility for the war. Both vehemently insisted on democratization in the areas of Shintoism and education, where emperor worship was taught and militarism inculcated.

Secondly, the attribution of responsibility for the war to the Japanese military clique was pursued with intense anger. The Chinese demanded the abolition of not only the armed forces and conscription system but also the whole munition industries nourishing Japan's military power. This demand was of course based on the surrender terms prescribed in the Potsdam Declaration and other statements.

Thirdly, the Chinese sought to attach responsibility for the war not only to the military but also to the bureaucrats and politicians, demanding a reform of the bureaucratic system and democratization of the political parties. These were strong demands, as we shall see.

Fourthly, blaming the imperialistic and military nature of Japanese monopoly capital and the zaibatsu, they demanded a land reform to root out the feudal land holding system prevailing in Japanese farm villages. In this instance, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party differed as to whether the zaibatsu should be regarded as the moderate faction or the main force of Japanese imperialism, and accordingly whether their democratization should be limited to "reform" or pushed to the point of "revolution."

Fifthly, they demanded far-reaching democratization to eliminate other feudal and military elements in the social, ideological, and cultural fields. They particularly protested against Japanese right-wing organizations and fascist thought, and strongly demanded an improvement in the status of women.

Behind these stern demands was the fierce hatred, acquired by the Chinese people during the war, toward the "Japanese military clique, bureaucrats, zaibatsu, and villains called *rōnin* (meaning persons released from office or adventurers)" [28, p. 63] who invaded China and committed outrageous crimes against its people. Still, many Chinese people emphasized that the Japanese people should not be hated as enemies, as was noted in the above-mentioned broadcast by Chiang Kai-shek. A few examples are articles by Ni Hai-shu, Chêng Sên-yü, and Hsia Yen, all appeared in *Kaizō hyōron* [33] [5] [15]. These people expectantly awaited the democratization of Japan by the Japanese people, the masses,

and hoped for friendship with a democratized Japan. In this way the prewar Chinese view of Japan, which conceived of true friendship between Japan and China becoming possible only after the extinction of Japanese militarism and imperialism, seemed to have been handed down intact after the end of the war.

As is well known, Japan abolished its old Constitution after the end of the war, making a new start as a peaceful country with the promulgation of a new Constitution on November 3, 1946. In accordance with this new Constitution, Japan completely disarmed itself. The zaibatsu were dissolved by the anti-monopoly act (Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, April 14, 1947) and land reform carried out by the land reform law (Second Amendment of the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law, and the Owner Cultivator Establishment Special Measure Law, October 21, 1946). Democratization of the educational system was advanced by the Fundamental Law of Education (March 31, 1947). And the democratic movement was promoted by the public office prohibition ordinance (the Imperial Ordinance No. 109 of 1946, January 4, 1947). Thus, the democratization of Japan progressed, or at least, it should have progressed. Yet, from the standpoint of China which, as we have seen, sought far-reaching changes for Japan, this democratization process did not seem to penetrate sufficiently to radically and fundamentally transform Japan from the prewar militaristic society it had been. Criticism to the effect that the democratization of Japan was a mere show was heard from a wide spectrum of viewpoints extending from left to right in China, at least until 1947 or 1948.

In the following, I should like to pursue further the Chinese criticism of Japan's democratization in the postwar period, keeping in mind that while the Kuomintang and the Communist Party did differ, their criticisms were also equally severe in many respects.

II. CHINA'S CRITICISM OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR DEMOCRATIZATION

A. *General Criticism*

More than a year after the new Constitution was put into practice, Japan received the visit of Chang Ch'ün, one of the Kuomintang leaders. Just before his return home on September 10, 1948, Chang Ch'ün made a broadcast in Japanese entitled "Nihon no minasan e" [To the Japanese people] [1, Sept. 11, 1948]. An account of his trip was also carried in the *Takungpao*. In both the broadcast and the article, he lauded Japan's democratization subsequent to the promulgation of its new Constitution, saying that after three years of Allied occupation Japan was completely disarmed, the Emperor had lost his divine attributes, moderate politics and decentralization had been achieved, and the people had been given democracy and freedom. However, even Chang Ch'ün who evaluated Japan's democratization most highly at the time said, "However, the key to democratic government does not lie only in establishing or reforming system or legislation. . . . I strongly feel that it is easy to reform system and legislation which are tangible, yet difficult to reform minds and thought which are intangible" [1, Sept. 11, 1948]. It was

Chang's hope that the Japanese people would "thoroughly carry out ideological revolution and psychological construction." In other words, Chang Ch'ün judged that while postwar Japan had undergone general democratization in the tangible fields of systems, and laws and regulations, it had still not achieved thorough-going democratization in the truly important intangible areas of thought and psychology. The fact that such criticism was tendered even by Chang Ch'ün of the Kuomintang right-wing, is indicative of the strong sense of vigilance and apprehension with which the Kuomintang generally viewed Japan in those days.

Before Chang Ch'ün's visit to Japan, for example, there had been some trouble, referred to as the Shibuya Incident, involving maltreatment of Chinese residents in Japan. The *Chungyang jihpao* subsequently labeled Japan a hypocrite: While on the one hand thanking Chairman Chiang for his statement "return good for evil," Japan was in fact "returning evil for good." Thus, it warned, the militaristic thought and sense of superiority of the Japanese people are "extremely dangerous."

Also with regard to the economic rehabilitation of Japan, pushed by MacArthur headquarters, the Kuomintang extended its support, in a statement by the chief of Foreign Affairs Department (February 13, 1948), on the condition that sufficient guarantee measures against a revival of Japanese military force be worked out. This stipulation revealed the same apprehension and guardedness toward Japan that emerged in the case of the Shibuya Incident.

This being the case with the Kuomintang, it goes without saying that Chinese intellectuals in general in those days showed an even stronger sense of distrust in the democratization of Japan. The *Takungpao*, which had published Chang Ch'ün's account of his Japan trip carried a rebuttal by Liu Ta-chieh [41, Oct. 15, 1948]. Liu emphasized the danger of such optimistic views of Japan as that of Chang Ch'ün, warning that Japanese reactionary and secret societies, right-wing organizations, and old military cliques were secretly instilling Shintoism and militaristic thought, propagandizing the possible outbreak of a U.S.-Soviet war, and planning to exploit such a war to restore Japan to its previous international position. Liu Ta-chieh, concluding that this situation had been brought about because the United States had changed its initial occupation policy into one of "assisting Japan" by supporting the former zaibatsu and bureaucrats, warned that Japan was a "dog" for the United States, and therefore a "tiger" for China.

In addition, Pu Fêng offered the following criticism of Japan's democratization after the promulgation of the new Constitution:

Of course, I do not mean that there was no "reform" at all in Japan after the end of the War. However, what is called reform is invariably related to just the outer garment of Japan's democracy and peace, not the substance. . . . We do not know whether fundamental change has taken place during the past three years in the areas most responsible for Japan's aggressive war. [36]

Yeh Hsiang-yang, too, argued that the Japanese military and financial cliques, fired by a desire for "revenge," were desperately conspiring to rearm Japan in an effort to revive a policy of aggression. Thus, he warned, Japan is "a time bomb in Asia" [46].

Along with Liu Ta-chieh, Pu Fêng, Yeh Hsiang-yang, and other intellectuals,

the Chinese Communist Party also sharply criticized the manner in which the democratization of Japan was being carried out. The Communist Party singled out the United States for particular criticism, saying that the country was actually hindering the democratization of Japan. For example, a declaration announced in commemoration of the twelfth anniversary of the July Seventh Anti-Japanese War by the Chinese Communist Party jointly with various factions including the Democratic League, offered the following criticism: "The policies of the U.S. Government and the U.S. Army headquarters toward Japan are not designed to carry out the Potsdam Declaration but to upset it, and not to demilitarize and truly democratize Japan, but to cause Japan to be undemocratic and to continue in its militaristic ways" [17, pp. 40-42].

The *Hsinhuashê shihp'ing* also protested that the United States was trying to maintain the Japanese zaibatsu through its policy of cancelling reparations and contributing to Japanese economic rehabilitation. Furthermore, it charged that, by introducing or amending various laws and regulations regarding police, labor, public peace, and university control, the United States was attempting to suppress the democratic movement and destroy Japan's chances for democracy, independence, and a peace-oriented economy, turning Japan into an American "colony and military base" [18, p. 37].

More precisely, what were the criteria and substance of China's sharp criticism of Japan's democratization as it developed in regard to such issues as the emperor system, political parties, the zaibatsu, and land reform? Let us take up Chinese criticism of these questions one by one, beginning with the emperor system.

B. *Criticism of the Emperor System*

As already mentioned, it was abolition of the emperor system that Chao Nan-jou and Kuo Mo-jo felt had top priority among Chinese demands relating to the democratization of postwar Japan. According to Chao Nan-jou, this was for the following reason: "The emperor system is the very frame of Japanese militarism. Internationally, it becomes the impetus for aggression. Domestically, the Emperor is the very prop of dictatorship. Therefore, this system must be overthrown by all means" [12].

To be sure, left-wing intellectuals and the Chinese Communist Party had generally the same critical view of the emperor system. Ssü Mu, for example, criticized it as follows:

The Emperor himself was always controlled by the financial and military cliques. Still, he was the most responsible person in Japanese politics, and sovereignty lay with him. Grave events were decided upon at the "Imperial conference" in which the Emperor participated personally. This indicates that the Emperor was the core of Japan's feudalistic, despotic dictatorship. [38, p. 32]

Li Ch'un-ch'ing moreover considered that the emperor system was a product of Japan's attempt to develop capitalism on a feudalistic basis at the time of the Meiji Restoration. He argued that the emperor system "represented the interests of the landed and moneyed classes, and inseparably linked the Japanese bourgeoisie with the feudal system," and that it constituted a "bureaucratic organization" in

which "civil" bureaucrats and "military" cliques served as the "henchmen" of Japanese "militarist feudal imperialism" [23, pp. 30-36].

Accordingly, Li Ch'un-ch'ing, Ssü Mu, and others, like Chao Nan-jou, insisted on the abolition of the emperor system. At the same time, the left-wing forces of China were severely pursuing the Emperor's responsibility for the war, so that when it was ignored at the Tokyo Tribunal, they registered strong protests.

But the right-wing faction of the Kuomintang did not try to pursue the Emperor's war guilt. This was probably due to the fact that the Kuomintang considered that the emperor system as a system should be distinguished from its identification with the national polity. Chiang Kai-shek said that "the fate of the Emperor is a problem to be decided by the Japanese people themselves." Chao Nan-jou, who called for abolition of the emperor system, also said, "The problem of overthrowing the emperor system and that of abolishing the emperor are fundamentally dualistic. The former must be achieved without fail, but the latter should preferably depend upon a decision by the Japanese people themselves" [12].

Thus, both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party took severely critical view of the emperor system in the post-Meiji Restoration era, though they differed in their ways of pursuing the question of the Emperor's personal war guilt. The Chinese Communist Party and the left-wing intellectuals in particular also maintained their critical posture toward the emperor system under the newly-promulgated Constitution considering that the traditional emperor system had been preserved there in a new form. Ssü Mu, for example, argued that the Emperor's having been described as "the symbol of the state and of the people's unity" was uniquely designed to "secure the Emperor's lofty, mysterious, and vital position." He further charged that the supreme power conferred upon the Emperor by the new Constitution was hardly different from that prescribed in the old imperially granted Constitution with the exception of his prerogative of supreme command over the Army, Navy, and Air Force [38, pp. 38-39].

P'an Shih-hsien also said:

Under the new Constitution, the Emperor is still the symbol of Japan. The Japanese national polity centered on the unbroken line of emperors has not been changed at all. Although the Emperor's limitless political power has been restricted and the words "sacred and inviolable" have been struck out, the Japanese people's faith in the Emperor has not been affected at all. In the future, Japan will still remain a country centering on the Emperor, and it is not impossible for such persons as Nobunaga and Ieyasu to appear again and repeat the "restoration" or "revolution," utilizing the national polity of the absolute monarchy. [35, pp. 192-93]

Thus, he expressed his fear of revival of Japanese militarism under the emperor system.

A clearer difference in views with respect to Japan between the Kuomintang right-wing faction and the Chinese Communist Party emerged after the former's escape to Taiwan. Their difference was evident in views of the emperor system, too. Wu Hsi-tsê, for example, said as follows in the 1960s:

Although the emperor system was maintained, its substance was revised markedly. Among the succession of orders given by MacArthur, relatively important were

the elimination of education pertaining to imperial influence, removal of the restrictions on criticism of the imperial family, confiscation and nationalization of the Emperor's property, abolition of State Shinto, and remodeling of the Imperial Court. These were all designed to revise the position of the Emperor. After the new Constitution came into effect, the Emperor's position and official power were changed distinctly. . . . The Emperor was no longer sacred or inviolable, and for this reason the thought of the Japanese people was also significantly liberated. [45, pp. 3-5]

This view taken by Wu Hsi-tê differs considerably from those of Ssü Mu and P'an Shih-hsien. It can be said that in this divergence is contained the political and ideological confrontation between the Nationalist Government in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. However, even Wu Hsi-tê, who takes this moderate view, says, "Even the Emperor sometimes forgets the difference between his past and present positions and does things which arouse public discussion" [45, p. 8]. Thus, he fears there is a possibility that the Emperor may get involved in politics as he did in the past. Moreover, he warns that the Japanese public's psychological tendency toward emperor worship can be recognized in the fact that publications designed to encourage reverence for the Emperor are popular. Thus did the Chinese people, criticize and fear the Japanese emperor system both before and after the war.

C. *Criticism of Japan's Postwar Political Parties*

The Chinese, especially China's left-wing forces, were distrustful not only of the emperor system but also of Japanese politics and political parties in general in the postwar period. For example, Chiang Ch'ing-hsiang, while admitting that democratization in Japan had been pushed to some extent in the political field, resulting in relatively prominent Japanese militarists and jingoists being branded as war criminals or expelled from public office, nonetheless argued that "the old social structure, which is the internal basis for oligopolistic control, still remains generally unchanged" [6]. The political parties, he noted, except for the Communist Party which had newly emerged from the underground, were nothing more than reincarnations of the old political parties. Mei Pi-hua warned that although Japanese militarism appeared to have been rooted out with the postwar purge of the Japanese military cliques, cast in the "role of victims," this was only superficial, and there was the possibility of a militarist revival because the military elements were still connected with the old prewar forces preserved intact, such as landowners, zaibatsu leaders, bureaucrats, and political parties [30].

Therefore, China levelled the following severe criticism on the Japanese political parties such as the Jiyūtō, Minshutō, and the Socialist Party "democratized" in the postwar period.

Dealing first with the Jiyūtō, the Chinese were well aware that the predecessor of the Jiyūtō was the Seiyūkai, which the Chinese people remember well in connection with the Tanaka cabinet and the "Tanaka Memorial." The Tanaka cabinet, headed by the Seiyūkai, had been criticized and hated from well before the war for its role in causing the Tsinan Incident and intervening in the Chinese Revolution as part of its policy of "conquering Manchuria and Mongolia, China, and the world," as it was put in the notorious Tanaka Memorial. China saw the

postwar Jiyūtō as a continuation of the aggressive Tanaka cabinet and the Seiyūkai, appearing under the cloak of "freedom and democracy" [41, Apr. 15, 1947]. Therefore, to China, or at least to the left-wing forces in China, the Jiyūtō was largely a party of reactionary large landowners, plutocrats, and bureaucrats secretly desirous of achieving the objective of the Tanaka Memorial, and a reactionary force trying to block land reform as much as possible and to maintain the emperor system [38, p. 64].

Next, the Minshūtō. In China, it was a commonly held view that the Minshūtō was the former Minseitō, just as the Jiyūtō used to be the Seiyūkai. In the eyes of China, therefore, "the Minshūtō mainly represents the interests of Japan's heavy industry enterprises. In fact, it does not differ markedly from the Jiyūtō in the sense that both represent the interests of the Japanese ruling class, except that there is between the two parties the traditional confrontation continued from the days of the Seiyūkai and Minseitō" [4]. Furthermore, Ching argued, in a *Wenhuaipao* editorial, that "the modified capitalism advocated by the Minshūtō is nothing but a slogan put up by monopoly capitalists to deceive the people" [3].

Thus, to China it appeared that these reactionary Minshūtō and Jiyūtō parties had formed the Jiyū-minshūtō, the Liberal Democratic Party, in order to once again give free play to their ambitions, and to strengthen their reactionary camp, controlling the Diet. Receiving support from international reactionary forces, the Chinese thought, these reactionary elements would throw Japan into a third world war [3]. In addition, China feared that the conservative, reactionary Liberal Democratic Party might serve as a cover and stimulus to mushrooming right-wing fascist organizations. Li Ch'un-ch'ing, for example, said that there were seven hundred fascist organizations throughout Japan, with a total of two hundred thousand members, calling for the absolute safeguarding of the emperor system and an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and pro-American stand. He said that they included an organization called the Shimbei-hakuitō (pro-American philanthropic party), and that these militaristic, fascistic elements were secretly in contact with the intelligence division of the General Headquarters of the U.S. Forces in the Far East [23, pp. 127-29]. Li thus manifested the same vigilant attitude as before the war against the recurrence of Japanese fascism.

Unlike the Jiyūtō or Minshūtō, the Japan Socialist Party was favorably viewed by Lin Chêng-ch'i among others. He found it to be "the political party with the strongest democratic tendency ever seen in Japan to date. It is trying to build its basis among the masses who truly love democracy and peace" [25]. However, other critics, considering the predecessor of the Socialist Party to be the prewar Shakai-taishūtō, directed their criticism accordingly.

Ssü Mu, for example, criticized the Socialist Party as follows: "An offshoot of the Shakai-taishūtō, it is a party consisting of Parliamentary revisionists who often compromised with large capitalists and sold workers and farmers" [38, pp. 66-68]. Mêng Hsien-chang also charged that the Japan Socialist Party, while on the one hand taking an anti-feudalistic and anti-monopolistic stand and claiming to be a party of the workers and farmers, also called for the firm maintenance of the emperor system and capitalistic development centering on landowners,

thus falling to the level of an aristocratic labor group opposing farmer-oriented land reform [31]. Kao Lin-tu said that the Socialist Party is a speculating, opportunistic political party made up of petit bourgeois and in constant turmoil. Only an "indirect employee" of monopoly capital, it plays the role of a buffer or barrier between the Liberal Democratic Party and the people [20]. The Chinese left-wing forces, which considered for a part of the postwar period that the Communist Party was the only truly democratic party in Japan, thus passed the above severe judgment on the Socialist Party as well as on the Jiyūtō and Minshutō.

D. *Criticism of the Japanese Plutocracy (Zaibatsu)*

China focussed its postwar attention and criticism not only on political parties but also on the zaibatsu and land reform. The Chinese left, especially the Chinese Communist Party, had said before the war that the zaibatsu was the force behind Japanese imperialism, "pulling the strings controlling the Japanese militarists' foreign aggression" [38, p. 89], moreover, "it not only provided the impetus for the war, but also played the major role in carrying out and maintaining it" [6]. The Chinese rationale in insisting on the complete dissolution and democratization of the plutocracy, therefore, was to hit at the actual masters of Japanese imperialism.

Yet how did postwar democratization of the zaibatsu actually fare? Chiang Ch'ing-hsiang said:

Of course, the plutocrats suffered considerable losses from the final stages of the war through the defeat. For example, they lost many of their privileges in the control of raw materials needed for their industries, and had most of their colonial properties confiscated. Yet these losses, brought about by the defeat, did not at all weaken the monopolistic power they wielded in Japan. Indeed, far from being weakened, the plutocrats were able to replace these losses with the huge profits they had put away during the war, and this with a lot to spare. [6]

Chiang thus focussed his criticism on the fact that the Japanese zaibatsu still continued to maintain their monopolistic control power even after the end of the war.

Ssü Mu also thought that many Japanese industries still remained unchanged. He said, "The Japanese plutocrats are smeared with blood, but they have not been hit in a tender spot, nor have their sharp tusks and nails been pulled out. They are like fierce tigers playing dead" [37, pp. 41-42]. Thus was Ssü Mu apprehensive, much as he was before the war, about a comeback of the zaibatsu.

As to the "dissolution of the zaibatsu" to be effected by the anti-monopoly law, Ssü Mu also thought that the legislation was in itself "extremely inconsistent," and that even this kind of "reform plan tended to go no further than an administrator's desk because of Japanese Government sabotage and General MacArthur's lack of sincerity" [38, p. 88]. P'an Kuang-tsu maintained that Japanese monopoly capital, far from having been dissolved by the "dissolution of the zaibatsu," was actually still vigorously expanding in a different form [34, p. 13].

Lin Huan-p'ing's analysis of Japanese banking capital dispelled the illusion that it had been democratized after the end of the war by showing that in spite of

the reorganization and the opening of its shares to public, it was actually still in the hands of the zaibatsu groups. Thus, he argued, since industrial capital and medium and small enterprises follow banking capital, and given banking capitals' connection with the Bank of Japan which is state and bureaucratic capital, "the two parties, one consisting of banking capital or plutocrats and the other state capital or bureaucrats," are united into one and control Japan as before [26].

This kind of criticism came not only from the Chinese Communist Party and left-wing intellectuals but even from the Kuomintang, which before the war had regarded the Japanese zaibatsu as a moderate faction and had hoped to be able to cooperate with it.

This can be illustrated by the fact that both the statement made by the Kuomintang's Foreign Affairs Department Chief Wang on February 13, 1948 and the Kuomintang statement of April 14 of the same year approved the United States' plan for economic aid to Japan provided sufficient guarantee measures would be taken to prevent the revival of Japan's military strength. Another example is that in the 1948-49 period Kuomintang-controlled economic organizations, including various industrial associations in Shanghai, the Domestic Product Manufacturers Association, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, and the Hong-kong Committee for the Movement Against Aiding Japan's Industrial Recovery, complained of the threat of Japan's economic recovery and started a movement to oppose this, saying that trading with Japan under the zaibatsu, which was basically the same as before the war, might well result in the same colonial economic relationship as before, i.e., "Japan for industry and China for agriculture." To be sure, Kuomintang criticism of and opposition to the Japanese postwar zaibatsu was soon replaced by a sense of threat from Communist China following the intensification of Nationalist-Communist confrontation and the Nationalist Government's flight to Taiwan. This led the Kuomintang Government to seek closer ties and economic cooperation with Japan. However, it is necessary to point out here that even after fleeing to Taiwan, the Nationalist Government did not entirely drop its guard; it maintained a watchful eye on the military nature of the Japanese zaibatsu.

E. *Criticism of the Land Reform*

China was also generally very critical of Japan's postwar land reform, pointing out the inconsistencies it contained. Quoting Sung Yüeh-lun, for example:

This land reform law was a remarkable achievement in principle, and if it had been carried out to the letter, it would surely have dealt a serious blow to the feudalistic forces entrenched in Japanese farm villages. In fact, however, the situation over the past year turned out quite contrary to expectations. This resulted in large part from the fact that the Japanese reactionary forces suddenly began to raise their heads with the support of MacArthur, and were able to both directly and indirectly influence the course of the land reform. The law stipulated that the real reform power was to be held by the Agricultural Land Commission. However, this commission, in spite of a requirement that it include the participation of farmers, actually remained in the hands of landowners, and besides, it was secretly supported

by local government offices and the police. Needless to say, the influence of the landowners was predominant. The land reform plan was quite incapable of producing any meaningful results; its main function was to provide a face-saving front for the Allied Forces. [39]

Ssü Mu's critique of the first land reform legislation (1945) of Japan was followed by another of the second land reform law (the Second Amendment of the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law given above), in which he noted the following defects: Firstly, resident landowners were permitted to retain one *chō* (2.45 acres) of land, giving rise to the fear that it might serve as a base for landowners to recover their former influence. Secondly, the land reform law applied only to arable land, and did not include extensive forests or wasteland. Thirdly, no consideration was given to water rights belonging to arable land, making it possible for landowners holding water rights to still maintain their hold on tenant farmers. Fourthly, landowners had obtained considerable speaking rights on the Agricultural Land Commission. Ssü Mu was also critical of the fact that even this limited land reform law was not satisfactorily put into effect, since it lent itself to connivance on the part of American and Japanese authorities in the landowners' manipulation and sabotage.

The Chinese left-wing camp took the view that farmland reform was only superficial, like the democratization of the emperor system, political parties, military clique, zaibatsu, etc., and that the feudalistic land system and the influence of landowners from before the war had been essentially preserved as they were.

The Kuomintang Government, after its flight to Taiwan, compared Japan's land reform with its own in Taiwan and found it satisfactory: "Japan's farmland reform resembles the land reform carried out by our country in Taiwan. Though not covering such a wide range as in our country, it was no doubt carried out earnestly and thoroughly, and achieved remarkable results" [45, p. 123].

Yet even those who had shown such favorable appraisal pointed out that during the land reform, the landowners resisted the reform stubbornly, that mountains, forests, and fields were excluded from application of the reform law, and that landowners' influence was left intact in the farm villages. These spokesmen expressed a desire to see greater "efforts" made toward the land reform, suggesting that even in the Kuomintang Government there lingered a sense of distrust with regard to Japan's land reform much as there did with regard to Japan's economic recovery and plutocracy.

III. CRITICISM OF JAPAN BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

A. *Criticism of the U.S. Policy toward Japan*

The Chinese, especially those in the left-wing factions, in their critical examination of Japan's post-Constitution democratization came to the conclusion that the main reason for Japan's democratization being no more than lace and frills was to be found in U.S. policies in Japan. Specifically, they noted that the United

States, in "trying to achieve its ambitious plan of dominating the Far East" through its occupation policy, was quietly protecting such old guard forces of Japan as the zaibatsu, landowners, bureaucrats, and political parties, while "monopolizing and aiding Japan" [24, p. 2].

Chêng Sên-yü noted that the U.S. policies in Japan included: (1) working for mass penetration of American capital in Japanese industries by purchasing shares and investing in individual companies; (2) enhancing the Emperor's prestige and strengthening the core of militarist Japan; (3) embellishing the Cabinet while overlooking the activities of fascist elements; (4) maintaining the traditional system of exploitation by aiding the zaibatsu and landowners, and fostering the production of munitions; (5) treating war criminals leniently and being lax in carrying out purges; and (6) oppressing Japanese progressive forces and obstructing their efforts at reform.

Ssü Mu thought that the United States, after announcing its new policy toward Japan in March 1947, began to more openly impose its views on Japan in order to advance its ambitions to dominate the Far East. In the area of economics, Ssü Mu considered:

The United States came to invest in Japan and to expand industrial production under U.S. supervision by utilizing Japan's inexpensive labor, industrial facilities, and market experience and by seizing raw materials from the Far East. It further strove to monopolize the Far Eastern market through Japanese goods manufactured by the Japanese plutocracy and under U.S. supervision, trying thus to make Japan serve as its tool in squeezing the peoples of East Asia. [37, pp. 54-55]

In response to this, "Japanese monopoly capital followed the United States' aggressive policy, building up its strength under U.S. aid, in an effort to recover its past glory" [19, July 7, 1958]. With this accord of ambitions achieved between the two countries, Japan, as the "general manager" under U.S. supervision, became a "tool for aggression" in cooperation with the U.S. scheme to monopolize the Asian market.

From a military view-point, China was aware that,

Japan has sufficient land to station large U.S. Army units and construct many bases for the American Army, Navy, and Air Force. Japan also has huge munition industries and various kinds of materials, which will allow the United States to resolve the supply problems in the country's war of aggression. . . . In addition, Japan is a source of vast human resources, including numerous "victims of the war" who can boast extensive training and war experience. [23, p. 117]

Moreover,

Japan together with the Ryukyu Islands, forms the most important part of the U.S. "defense line" in the Western Pacific . . . and Hokkaidō in Japan is a Far Eastern strategic point adjacent to the Soviet Union. In the past, Japan was an anti-Soviet Axis power, and the tendency to regard the Soviet Union with hostility is deep rooted in the Japanese ruling class. [37, pp. 55-57]

China thus argued that, for the above considerations, the United States decided to develop Japan as its "best military base" for aggression in Asia as well as an anti-Soviet "vanguard" and "anti-Communist base."

On July 7, 1950, one year after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, a *Jênmin jihpao* editorial commemorating the July Seventh War of Resistance against Japan noted:

American imperialists, taking advantage of the as yet not fully constructed strength of the Japanese people, and utilizing the reactionary forces in Japan, are trying to make Japan a reactionary stronghold for opposing the peaceful and democratic forces in the Orient and intervening in the liberation movements of the various peoples of Asia. They are trying to change Japan into a military base in anticipation of their aggressive war in the Orient, and it is their intention to have the Japanese people risk their lives for them in their war of aggression.

China, perceiving the final target of U.S. aggression in Asia to be nothing other than control of China itself, directed its criticism at the U.S. policy of northward and southward invasion into China. The Chinese thought that the United States was following the steps of imperialist Japan, in an attempt "to occupy Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, thus creating a bloc encircling the People's Republic of China from north to south before actually invading China, and provoking a third world war" in its attempt to dominate the world [43, p. 4].

Then, it was the Korean War in 1950 that had affirmed the Chinese conviction of this "wild and unreasonable plan" of the United States to invade Asia and dominate the world.

B. *Criticism of the Korean War and Japan's Rearmament*

The Korean War broke out in June 1950. In November, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army entered the war, and the "anti-U.S., aid-Korea, and fatherland-defense" movement developed in China on a nationwide scale. After Special Envoy Dulles' visit to Japan in January 1951, the United States speeded up efforts to conclude a peace with Japan. In response to this, a movement sharply opposing a separate peace treaty between the United States and Japan arose in China. Aware that the rearmament of Japan was being rapidly promoted with the support of the United States, China developed a nationwide movement to oppose Japan's rearmament.

As is well known, Japan played an important role at the time of the Korean War, providing bases for the United States. China protested repeatedly: "During the Korean War, Japan was a military command post of the 'Allied powers' for the invasion of Korea. The country also served as a rear supply and transportation base for the U.S. forces invading Korea" [44, p. 24].

"Ninety per cent of U.S. weapons and vehicles were repaired at Japanese arsenals. U.S. air units flew from Yokota Air Base in Japan and bombed Korean cities" [16, p. 30].

"During the Korean War, Japanese military ports were occupied by U.S. fleets. . . . If American had not had a supply base like Japan close to the Asian continent, it could not conceivably have carried out operations in Korea" [23, pp. 118-19].

The Korean War experience thus imbued the United States with the idea that Japan was the most suitable as well as the biggest military base and anti-Com-

unist stronghold it could have. A *Jênmin jihpao* editorial of September 3, 1953 asserted, "Soon after the outbreak of the Korea War, the United States hastened to make efforts for the rearmament of Japan while expanding Japan's munitions production to serve the United States' aggressive war in Korea." To China, it was clear that,

during the Korean War, when the United States realized it could not exercise its influence as it pleased, and decided to "extricate" itself from the battlefield in Korea, it suddenly hoisted that notorious slogan, "Asia through Asian hands," by which it was hoped such personalities as Shigeru Yoshida, and a group of exiles including Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek, Quirino, Bao Dai, and Philbul could be used to accomplish the aggressive aims which the United States was unable to achieve by its own power. To the United States at this time, therefore, a revival of Japanese military forces seemed to offer the most lucrative and rapid return on an investment in the war. [19, Sept. 3, 1953]

It was with the above in mind that China developed its movement in opposition to Japanese rearmament, together with its anti-U.S. and aid-Korea campaign.

Furthermore, China raised a severe protest against a military cooperation between Japan and the United States, apprehensive that such structure of military collusion would become legal and definitive through the San Francisco Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

C. Criticism of the Peace Treaty, the Security Treaty, and the Revival of Japanese Militarism

The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were signed in September 1951. In December of the preceding year, that is 1950, China had already voiced its opposition, in Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's statement, to such treaties, emphasizing that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which the People's Republic of China had not participated, was invalid, and that a separate peace treaty by the United States designed to militarize and rearm Japan was illegal and in violation of such Allied agreements as the Cairo and Potsdam declarations. Demanding that the occupation forces withdraw from Japan, China, in a series of official announcements, continued its opposition to the treaties. Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, for example, in 1952 when the two treaties came into effect declared:

[The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty] is only a treaty reviving Japanese militarism, a treaty of hostility toward China and the Soviet Union, a menace to Asia, and a preparation for a new war of aggression. These treaties and agreement are deeds of betrayal of the Japanese nation and an American contraption for enabling it to establish over-all military, economic and political hegemony over Japan. . . . Japan has become a U.S. military beachhead in the Far East. The whole economy of Japan has become an appendage to the economy of the U.S.A. and is compelled to serve the latter's war preparations. A militarist and fascist Japanese regime, nurtured by the U.S. Government, is being revived and is growing. . . . [9, pp. 21-22]

To Chinese observers, this re-emerging Japanese militarism reached maturity when Japanese rearmament was officially declared on July 1, 1954 with the solicitation and encouragement of the U.S. Government and through the efforts of

the Yoshida government [23, p. 114]. Thereafter, Japan manifestly expanded its militarization under the guidance of the Kishi government formed in 1957. When the Kishi government forcibly imposed revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 over strong popular opposition, China concluded: "The Japan-U.S. treaty of military alliance . . . will make her [Japan] a full-fledged member of the aggressive U.S. military bloc, to be completely integrated into the U.S. atomic strategic system as an outright accomplice in its aggression and expansion in the Far East" [14, p. 125]. In China's view, Japan shrewdly preserved its prewar imperialistic structure at the end of the war with U.S. support, tacit or otherwise, through the Korean War became the biggest U.S.-controlled military base in Asia, began to revive and develop militarism under the Security Treaty, and with the revision of the Security Treaty, became a "full-fledged member" of the aggressive military bloc.

China further maintained that Japanese militarism was of a continuation of the prewar variety, leading to wars of aggression at intervals of ten years or so, through which colonies and markets are acquired. Liu Ch'u, in a *Jênmin jihpao* commentary, stated that the Japanese capitalism was thus imbued with a strong military coloring, and it comfortably fell in step with U.S. aggression as it advanced from the Korean War to the civil war in Laos and then to the Vietnam war, pursuing its rapid development "behind U.S. tanks" and amid the smoke of gunpowder and a hail of bullets [19, Sept. 18, 1961].

It was thus natural for China to feel that Japan had once again come to entertain the ambitions it had enunciated in the Tanaka Memorial, and which lay behind the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" scheme of the militarists before the war.

In October 1958, for example, a *Jênmin jihpao* commentary offered the following criticism after Prime Minister Kishi had made a statement accusing China as an "aggressor" in connection with the Quemoy and Matsu incidents, and declaring that in the interest of Japan's security, it was essential that Korea and Taiwan do not fall into the hands of the Communists:

Kishi had let the cat out of the bag when he said Taiwan and Korea were essential to Japan's "security." The Chinese people are very familiar with such utterances: this was the piratical logic used by the Japanese militarists—from the time of Tanaka to Tojo—when they invaded China. Before the incident on September 18, 1931, they said that "Manchuria and Mongolia are Japan's lifelines." After that, they said that North China was essential to Japan's "security." Does not what Kishi has said sound exactly the same?

This piratical logic of Kishi's is not directed against the peoples of China and Korea alone. For, if according to this logic, Chinese and Korean territories are essential to Japan's "security," the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia, and even Australia and other countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific can also become essential to Japan's "security." The peoples of the Asian and Pacific countries still remember Japanese imperialism's aggression against these countries behind the smokescreen of "anti-communism" and "the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." Now Kishi is again raising the banner of "anti-communism" not only at home but also in other Asian countries. What else can this mean but a revival of "the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere"? [13, pp. 42-43]

Later, in November 1969, when Prime Minister Satō said at his talks with President Nixon that Taiwan is an important factor for the security of Japan and that Korea is indispensable for the safety of Japan, it was understandable that China felt compelled to rebut this furiously, and to demonstrate the significance of the Satō's statement as a vivid indication of the revival of Japanese militarism.

D. Criticism of the Japanese Advance into South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia

Thus did China perceive the re-emergence of Japanese militarism turning its restless eyes of aggression first in the direction of Korea and Taiwan, as it had done before in the prewar period.

Japan, at the urging of the United States, held talks with the Republic of Korea in October 1951. It was evident to China, as put forward in a *Jênmin jihpao* editorial of December 28, 1962, that, in holding these talks, Japan was pursuing its secret ambition of "retracing its earlier path of aggression in Korea." According to Kuo Mo-jo, behind such Japanese moves was the "vicious plot" of the United States aimed at forming a "northeast Asian military alliance," using Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, but especially Japan, as "tools" for achieving U.S. objectives in Asia [21, Nov. 20, 1965].

However, the Japan-Republic of Korea talks tended to be inconclusive and failed to reach any substantial agreement because of the complex conflict of interests and the stern opposition from the Japanese and Korean peoples.

A group of Japanese monopoly capitalists, however, unrestrained in their desire to invade South Korea en masse, tried their hardest to bring the talks to a settlement, putting forward the argument that South Korea is the "lifeline" of Japan [19, Dec. 28, 1962], and diffusing slogans about "Japan-Republic of Korea economic cooperation" and "economic aid." At the same time, the Pak government of South Korea "tried to use the help of the group of Japanese monopoly capitalists to bail itself out of its own political and economic crises" [27]. In November 1965, after the inauguration of the Satō cabinet, the talks suddenly came through, notwithstanding the opposition, and the Japan-Republic of Korea Treaty was concluded. China, which took the conclusion of the treaty to mean accelerated development of both U.S. aggression in Asia and the revival of Japanese militarism, severely protested. P'êng Chên charged, for instance, "The Japan-Republic of Korea Treaty' is a supplement to the Japan-U.S. 'Security Treaty system' and indicates that the American imperialists are at a crucial stage in the expansion of their aggressive war in Asia. That this is also a crucial stage for the Japanese reactionary faction is clear from its decision to openly participate in the United States' war of aggression out of its desire to advance further the revival of militarism" [21, Mar. 27, 1966].

Again, following the conclusion of the Japan-Republic of China Peace Treaty in 1952, China saw the revival of Japan's prewar imperialist desire for colonial control of Taiwan. The Chinese press criticized Japan for enthusiastically following the lead of the United States by first conspiring in the "two-China plot" and the scheme to "stabilize Taiwan within the free camp"; secondly, by supporting

the independence movement in Taiwan trying to create "Taiwan as an independent nation"; and thirdly, by forming a "northeast Asian alliance" and a "northeast Asian anti-Communist network" including Taiwan and South Korea, which would place Taiwan under the control of Japan [11].

"This wild plot to invade Taiwan again accords with the way Tanaka once tried to 'separate Manchuria and Mongolia from China' and fabricate 'Manchoukuo'" [42].

China, with the vision of Japan establishing footholds in Taiwan and Korea, and ambitiously expanding the limits of its aggressive imagination to include Southeast Asia, especially during the Kishi and Satō cabinets when the Japanese intention of recreating a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" surfaced, let its apprehensions be known:

The Japanese militarists led by Nobusuke Kishi are trying to control Taiwan from which they expect to extend their influence to Southeast Asia, and once again realize the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" which was smashed before . . . Eisaku Satō not only regards Southeast Asia as a market for Japan, but also advocates a foreign policy of "maintaining freedom and establishing peace." This clearly shows that there are Japanese militarist elements anxious to have connections with Southeast Asia. [19, Nov. 25, 1964]

Before the war, it was well known that Japan was underdeveloped capitalist country inherently deficient in basic materials and markets. It was for this reason, judged the Chinese, that Japanese capitalism from the beginning had to engage in successive barbarous overseas wars in search of raw materials and resources as well as markets and colonies. The Chinese also noted that even after the war, Japan was able to obtain abundant resources from Southeast Asia, through utilization of war reparations, capital aid from the United States, and the promotion of capital exports including investments and loans. The Japanese, Hsiao Li maintained, strove to revive the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" of the past by promoting trade, expanding markets, and "establishing spheres of influence for Japanese monopoly capital, thus accelerating the rate of their economic penetration" [19, June 22, 1965].

Given these views of Japan, it is natural for China to be wary of Japanese attempts to advance into Southeast Asian countries under the banner of "development" or "economic cooperation," and to be apprehensive that Japan is trying to repeat the kind of appeal formerly made to China for "economic cooperation" which led to Japanese domination and colonial control. China presumes that these slogans are designed to establish for Japan an economic bloc in Southeast Asia to facilitate implementation of its policy for colonial expansion by providing raw materials from Southeast Asia and promoting industrial growth in Japan" [2]. It is also understandable that when a voice is heard in Japan saying that Southeast Asia and the Malacca Straits are the country's "lifelines," China tends to read here the ambition of Japanese militarism arbitrarily expanding its own "lifelines." Furthermore, when Japan asserts that it must check "the spread of communism in Southeast Asia" or prevent "communist infiltration" for the freedom and peace of Southeast Asia, China cannot help but see here a modern version of the grasping

Japanese imperialism of the past which so grandiously espoused a "joint defense against communism," nor close its eyes to the fact that Japanese monopoly capital has already begun to add a distinct political coloring to its economic aid, elucidating its militaristic nature.

Accordingly, there was little China could do after the Satō-Nixon talks at the end of 1969, but conclude that "Japanese militarism has revived," and persistently repeat its opposition to the revival of Japanese militarism by pointing out salient facts such as the re-emergence of zaibatsu control in Japan by such major prewar plutocracies as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, the rise of a Self-Defense Force and munition industries several times larger than before the war, the publication and diffusion of militaristic textbooks, films, and discourses, and vigorous activity on the part of fascist elements.

E. Resistance of the People and Japan's Future

In China's view, Japanese monopoly capital, though it rapidly recovered after the Korean War and attained a full-scale development after revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and in spite of its successful resuscitation of militarism, is still beset with several contradictions.

First, there is the contradiction existing between Japanese monopoly capital and American monopoly capital, in spite of their partnership. This state of confrontation applies with other imperialist countries as well.

The *Jênmin jihpao*, in its editorial of April 16, 1966, stated:

The so-called "agreement of interests" between Japanese and American monopoly capital is temporary, whereas confrontation and contradiction between the two are serious. . . . In addition, competition between Japan and such imperialist countries as Britain, France, and West Germany, in their struggles for markets, is more intense than ever.

A second more serious contradiction derives from the increasing racial awareness and strengthened resistance of Southeast Asians to Japanese monopoly capital since World War II. In China's view, these awakened Southeast Asian peoples cannot readily forget the Japanese militarism of the past, nor will they readily relax their guard or lessen their resistance to Japanese monopoly capital, nor are they about to desist in their struggle for national independence. It is inevitable that Japanese monopoly capital will someday meet with these Southeast Asian peoples' struggles for liberation.

A third area of contradiction derives from the Japanese people themselves who, for all their proximity to Japanese monopoly capital, have awakened remarkably and mounted a gallant resistance to monopoly capital and militarism. Following the war, the Japanese people suffered unprecedented humiliation under the prolonged occupation or semi-occupation of the United States. This, combined with their direct experience of the world's first atomic bomb has made them intensely antiwar and desirous of peace. Against the United States, therefore, they have engaged in numerous bitter struggles for "independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality," and have also fiercely resisted Japanese militarism in league with the United States, again seeking to eliminate war and demanding peace. The Japanese

people's struggles against the Japan–Republic of Korea Treaty and the revision of the Security Treaty were not only unprecedented in Japan but also “uncommon even in the history of struggles by the peoples of the world” [11]. The Japanese people's resistance has thus earned the deepest respect of China.

Of course, the struggle of the Japanese people will not be easy. Powerful Japanese monopoly capital and militarism, like “all reactionary factions,” cannot be expected to just “spontaneously step down from the stage of history,” nor will they easily be overthrown, either. Therefore, the future can be seen to offer two possible alternatives to the Japanese people.

One is the way to independence and peace, that is, to freedom from the state of semi-occupation by the United States. It means attaining a position of independence and autonomy, the prevention of the revival of militarism, and devotion to the peace of Asia and the world. . . . The other way is to follow the path of the Yoshida administration of the past. In other words, it means explicit or tacit contentment with subservience to the United States, a revival of Japanese militarism, increasing entanglement in the U.S. policy of aggression, i.e., “Asians fighting Asians,” and thus endangering the peace of Asia and the world. [19, Feb. 26, 1955]

Which of the two paths will the Japanese people follow? The public resurgence of Japanese militarism has put more difficulties in the way of the Japanese people. However, “the Chinese people firmly believe that the Japanese people will be able to drive American imperialism from their country, and realize their desire for independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality” [29].

China firmly believes that the principal tendency of world history at the present moment is the revolution. It is undoubtedly on the basis of this conviction that China extends the above appeals and expectations to the Japanese people. Of course, China is aware that Japan has undergone a militaristic revival and become a stronger imperialist country than before the war. Yet it would seem that China is now trying to deal with Japan with much the same optimistic revolutionary outlook it maintained during its anti-Japanese war, when it held steadfast to its belief in the defeat of Japanese militarism and the victory of both the Japanese and Chinese peoples.

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