

DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEAS OF THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

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MANY OF ECONOMIC slogans appearing in recent Chinese literature have their origin in the economic ideas of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60). The examples of such slogans are, "develop large, medium, and small scale industries simultaneously," "aim at an overall development of forestry, cattle, fishing, and subsidiary industries around the axis of grain production," and "agriculture as the foundation and industry as the focus." The last of these was issued in the Tenth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in September 1962; it derived from the policy of "simultaneous development of agriculture and industry" introduced at the time of the Great Leap Forward. In other words, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the successor and an advancement over the Great Leap Forward.

Earlier, I stated in another article that a new line of socialist construction, first taken in 1956, was given its theoretical framework in 1958, and fourteen years later in 1969, that line began to take firm root at the organizational level as observed from the Ninth National Congress of the CCP in April 1969 [8, pp. 163-80]. It is now clear from a review of the developments of the last year and a half since then that the policy of the Great Leap Forward, after its earlier setback, has started gaining firm root among the masses.

They say that China has a proverb, "Whatever is first born is always ugly in appearance" [11, pp. 12-13]. Indeed this early policy was not a pleasure to behold. It led to a profusion of criticisms perhaps the result of excessive kindness or contempt, from within and without. Prevalent were such denunciations as "fanaticism of the petit-bourgeois," "destruction of the planned economy," "concentration camps of the people," and "deformation of the industrial structure." The situation was further aggravated by the Cultural Revolution, which gave rise to another series of criticisms including such condemnations as "a revolution led by green youths" and even the theory that Mao Tse-tung was suffering from softening of the brain.

It would seem, however, that now this "first-born" fruit, in the short space of just over ten years since 1958, has emerged from its ugliness and begun to shed its rustic vestiges and to emerge in naive but full youthful splendor, revealing its unlimited potential for the future. By contrast, the overly kind critics have over these ten years displayed the ugliness of their old age—the U.S. invasion of Vietnam, the dollar crisis, "domestic revolutions" and in Japan, the threat to existence posed by industrial pollution, economic domination of weaker nations

abroad, and the fear of trade liberalization erratically coupled with the attitude of aggression. A day may come when the achievements of the Chinese masses during the period between 1958 and the present day will be regarded as highly or even more highly than the successful land reformation of 1947-52 brought about from below to mark a great epoch in history, symbolic expression of which was the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

Now just what are the features of a beautiful, vigorous, rustic maiden concealing infinite potential? Industrialization centering on construction of agriculture and nature by the masses has become the pattern, and is the major factor in the organization of people's communes aimed at the elimination of specialization in the creation of versatile collectivist groups, in the revitalization of indigenous technical thought based on the principle of self-reliance and in the formation of a commune-type state.

I. WHAT THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD MOVEMENT ACHIEVED

In order to see the Cultural Revolution as a product of the Great Leap Forward, it may be necessary to begin by analyzing the latter. As I have already suggested, I think that herein lies a key for unravelling the complexities of the Cultural Revolution.

A. *Everything Starts with the Construction of Farming Villages by the Peasants*

This movement originated with the construction of whole farm villages as places where peasants would both engage in production and pursue their living; it was not intended as agricultural construction in the narrow sense of the word. In 1956 and 1957, the peasants became increasingly frustrated with the collectivization of agriculture and the delivery systems for agricultural products. To deal with this situation, the Central Committee of the CCP in August 1957 launched a campaign of socialist education for the peasants throughout the country. Through this movement, the peasants became more positive in their activities for socialist construction, and in the autumn, began to participate in the campaigns for the construction of large-scale irrigation facilities, production of organic fertilizer, and forestation. Prior to collectivization, 20 to 30 million peasants would devote one or two months to repairing irrigation facilities every winter in order to prepare for spring planting. Thanks to the above-mentioned three movements, however, during the period from the winter of 1957 to the spring of 1958, more than 200 million peasants joined forces, contributed their efforts day after day for as long as several months. Each peasant spent an annual average of fifty to one hundred days in these movements.

In July of the same year, the movement broadened to include campaigns for deep soil cultivation and soil improvement, and developed into operations for the readjustment of arable lands. Subsequently, it gave rise to a full-scale soil survey, which, for the first time in Chinese history allowed a huge land mass of more than 100 million hectares to be surveyed by the peasants, who classified it according to criteria of fertility and rate of ripening, and thus laid the primary

foundation for land readjustment. Other movements were added, such as that for the improvement of agricultural tools and that for the selection of higher grades of seeds. This experience of the peasants has been summarized in the "Eight-Point Charter of Agriculture" [22].

The latter maintains that a stable agricultural development may be achieved by soil (especially soil improvement and deeper soil cultivation), fertilizer (the rational application of fertilizer), water (conservation of water in the soil and the construction of irrigation facilities), seeds (improvement of seed varieties), density (rational density of planting), plant preservation (prevention of insect pests and plant diseases), technical innovation (improvement of agricultural machinery and tools), and good management. The agricultural development involved here is based upon the traditional Chinese system of agriculture characterized by intensive cultivation and production, meaning in other words a refusal to accept such foreign agricultural technology as those of Liebig and Michurin. One can appreciate the merits of the irrigation and land readjustment of the Great Leap Forward, in that it provided a basis for the introduction of a system of high-yielding varieties and multi-cropping.

Technically agricultural production is a reflection of the reproductive capacity of the soil. Tests have been conducted on new systems of crop rotation on certain types of bean species and green manure. The results of these tests have been compiled into a study by Ting Ying which appeared in *Hungch'i* in mid-1961 [23]. Here, we should pay particular attention to the fact that it provides the future image of an entirely new system of crop rotation as a system for preserving the fertility of soil in agriculture. I am referring to the three-thirds system determined as such by the "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes (Wuhan Resolution)" in December 1958 [19]. According to the resolution, the total area now being utilized for food production should be made available in the future for a triple purpose, namely one-third for food and cash crops, another third for green manure and pastures, and the last third for forestry, horticultural products, and water cultures (fish and lotus plants). Professor Kumashiro, an authority on agricultural technology, has pointed out the merits of this long-range reorganization of farm villages, which he regards as more than just decoration pieces of the Great Leap Forward [11, p. 13].

"By these means," the resolution on the people's commune questions stated:

Firstly, it will be possible to greatly economize the use of water, fertilizer and manpower, and to considerably increase the fertility of the soil;

Secondly, full use can be made of every mountain, river, forest and the pasture, and the comprehensive management of farming, forestry, animal husbandry, farm side-lines and fisheries can be greatly developed;

Thirdly, *our natural environment will be transformed and the whole country beautified.*

This is a great ideal that can be realized. People's communes throughout the countryside should work to realize this aim. (italics added) [19, p. 496]

An important point to note in connection with the idea of overall rural reorganization is that the peasants' power to control mountains, rivers, swamps,

and ponds has been considerably enlarged. Before 1957, the major efforts for the construction of irrigation facilities tended to be large-scale work done by state investment, but the peasants' movement for the construction of large-scale irrigation facilities succeeded in getting the central authority to adopt, in March 1958, its three priority programs for irrigation, which essentially demand priority for small-scale irrigation, water storage and construction by agricultural cooperatives. In the case of small-scale irrigation facilities initiated by a people's communes, the right of use of the water facilities is to be acquired by the commune. Also, afforestation by a commune shall assure it forest rights. As mountains, rivers, swamps, and ponds are of even more importance for agriculture than cultivated lands, expansion of the power of the collective community of peasants over these natural areas would be sufficient to produce correspondingly more favorable conditions for agricultural reproduction.

B. Development of Peasant Industries to Meet the Local Need for Agricultural Producers Goods

In the beginning of the Great Leap Forward, urban industries were not capable of satisfying the growing demand for production tools and other equipment which were essential for carrying out large-scale afforestation and irrigation projects. Under the prevailing policy of priority on heavy industries, large factories and plants in urban areas did not produce such goods as carts and shovels needed for agriculture, forcing the peasants to manufacture them themselves. To make a wagon, such things as iron, machinery, and coal were needed. Such requirements set in motion waves of growing demand from one industry to another, and led to the production by farm villages of raw and finished materials. Thus evolved the small-scale industries of the Great Leap Forward period. At its peak, there were 3 million factories, two hundred thousand of which survived the process of readjustment to remain as well-established ones [21].

The Wuhan Resolution on the people's communes in December 1958, introducing a policy of industrial construction hand in hand with agricultural production stated as follows:

Industrial production in the people's communes must be closely linked with agricultural production; it should first of all serve the development of agriculture and the mechanization and electrification of farming; at the same time it should serve to meet the demands of commune members for staple consumer goods, and serve the country's big industries and the socialist market. [19, p. 496]

Table I gives a brief description of changes taking place. Illiterate peasants fabricated iron without modern facilities, using methods even a steel mill engineer would not be familiar with. Forced to use whatever materials were available to them, they had to rely on their own effort and creativity. This was the beginning of the development of "indigenous technology." People who had been farmers up to the day before were making steel or working as road-side construction workers. It was no longer possible for a person to remain an exclusively agricultural worker. This was the very beginning of the evolution of "people with myriad skills."

TABLE I
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF PEOPLE'S COMMUNE INDUSTRIES
DURING THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD

Year	All Capital Goods	Capital Goods for Agriculture	Consumer Goods (%)
1954	18.96	5.88	77.08
1958		55	
1959		40-50	

Source: R. Kojima, "Daiyakushin seisaku no saihyōka: nōson kōgyōka o chūshin ni" [A reassessment of the Great Leap Forward: with special emphasis on industrialization of rural villages], *Ajia keizai*, Vol. 8, No. 12 (December 1967), p. 27.

Note: Handicraft industries only for 1954. Percentages for 1954 are in terms of total output. For other years, it is not known what the percentages actually represent.

The above phenomenon is rarely seen in an industrialized urban society where specialization and division of labor prevail. The fact was that a channel for rural industrialization was opened in farm villages thanks to the movement for agricultural construction and along with it a number of new principles emerged. These principles rapidly made their way into the cities during the Great Leap Forward, replacing then prevailing principles based on the division of labor. In view of the limited space, I shall limit myself to a discussion of the influence of these principles on the relations between agriculture and industry in urban areas.

C. *Beginning of Urban Ruralization*

In September 1958, Mao Tse-tung made the following statement on the occasion of a visit to the Wuhan steel mills.

An enterprise as large a scale as the Wuhan steel mills should be able to be gradually transformed into an integrated industrial complex. This complex should be engaged not only in the production of various kinds of steel, but in industrial activities in the fields of machinery, chemical products, and construction as well. Furthermore, it should undertake such activities as agriculture, commerce, education, and military training, in addition to its industrial activities. [7, Sept. 29, 1958]

In fact, however, there were no urban enterprises engaged in agricultural production during the Great Leap Forward. Because the initiative in integrating agriculture and industry came from farm villages and not industrial cities, its implementation in cities had to wait further evolution of Chinese society.

II. PROGRESS AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

At this point, I should like to review the development of agriculture and how the most fundamental principle of the Great Leap Forward had rooted after the Cultural Revolution.


A. *Construction of Nature and Agriculture*

1. *The general trend of agricultural production*

In view of the fact that no statistical figures on the Chinese economy have

been released since 1960, we have to rely on foreign estimates in discussing agricultural production. Estimates are as numerous as the number of individuals who make them. Accordingly, I shall give only the highest and lowest estimates (Figure 1). The straight lines are drawn by myself to highlight certain trends.

Fig. 1. Grain Production in China, 1952-1971



Sources: "Wu estimates" are taken from Wu Yuan-li, *The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 146. "Swamy-Burki figures" are from S. Swamy and S. J. Burki, "Foodgrains Output in the People's Republic of China, 1958-1965," *China Quarterly*, No. 41, January-March 1970, p. 62. "US Consulate estimates" are from *Current Scene*, Vol. 4, No. 20 and Vol. 5, No. 21. "Official figure" for 1970 is from Edgar Snow's interview with Chou En-lai which originally appeared in *Epoca*, February 28, 1971, figures of which were cited in the *Economist* (Gt. Britain), March 13, 1971, pp. 38-39. "Official figure" for 1971 was revealed in *Jênmin jihpao* editorial of January 1, 1972.

Notes: Lines (a), (b₁), and (b₂) are added to indicate trends.

I tend to think that the "Swamy-Burki figures" for 1964 and 1965 are too high. A key factor to be taken into account in any consideration of Chinese agricultural development should be how to interpret trends rather than absolute figures. Discussions on the figures themselves in an attempt to find out whether they are near the truth or not would be of little significance under the present availability of necessary data. I would be inclined to endorse Swamy-Burki figures in terms of trend indicative values, which would suggest that China has entered the stage of agricultural revolution.

Recently, China reported its highest results ever in terms of food production, i.e., abundant crops for nine consecutive years [7, Dec. 31, 1970]. There were also numerous reports from special districts, counties, etc., that the guidelines given in "National Program for Agricultural Development" had been surpassed.

Such development was unheard of in China before. Since 1962, there have been no reports of mass starvation. This is, indeed, a remarkable achievement for China where tens and hundreds of thousands of people used to die from hunger every year. The guidelines, first introduced in January 1956 in draft form and later revised twice, was issued as a formal document in April 1960. According to these guidelines, average grain production per ten ares should be increased from the present target figure of 120 kg to 300 kg for areas north of the Yellow River and Ch'inling, from 154 kg to 373 kg in the areas south of the Yellow River and north of the Huaiho, from 300 kg to 600 kg in the areas south of the Huaiho, Ch'inling, and Pailungchiang. According to T'an Chên-lin's statement on April 9, 1960, 28 per cent of the counties were reported to have achieved their target levels [7, Apr. 7, 1960]. Since then reports have been scarce.

Table II gives a summary of recent reports. The fact that suburban districts

TABLE II
FULFILLMENT OF GUIDELINES GIVEN IN "NATIONAL PROGRAM
FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT"

District	Degree of Guideline Fulfillment, Year of Fulfillment	Sources: <i>Jênmin jihpao</i>
Shanghai	For 5 consecutive years after 1966	Dec. 24, 1970
Peking	Three years after 1968	Dec. 24, 1970
Chekiang	1970	Dec. 24, 1970
Tientsin	1970	Dec. 30, 1970
Kwangtung	Over 90% of cities and counties	Dec. 24, 1970
Fukien	43% of cities and counties	Dec. 26, 1970
Hopeh	33% of cities and counties	Dec. 19, 1970
Szechwan	8% of cities and counties	Dec. 27, 1970
Heilungkiang	7% of cities and counties	Dec. 27, 1970
Anhwei	42% of all production brigades	Dec. 19, 1970

Note: Percentage of cities and counties in each province fulfilling the guidelines were calculated on the basis of administrative districts as given in the 1962 edition of *Chunghua jênmin kunghokuo hsingchêng ch'ühua chients'ê* [Summary edition of the administrative districts of the People's Republic of China], reprinted by Daian in Tokyo. Since then there seemed to have been some changes in the administration districts.

like those of Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin have achieved good records is not so significant in view of their favorable local conditions, whereas certain other cases of target fulfillment at the provincial level are quite significant, given the presence of mountainous areas low in productivity. Kwangtung, Anhwei, Hopeh, and other provinces are expected to fulfill their target quotas in the near future.

2. Factors supporting agricultural development

Agricultural investment policies for the period of readjustment (1961-65) up to the present may be divided into three stages. Likewise, the sectors of agricultural investment may be roughly classified into three categories:

- (a) Investment in forestation, irrigation, and consolidation of land foundations;

- (b) Replenishing of soil capacity by natural fertilizers and crop rotation, and introduction of high yielding crops;
- (c) Increased use of chemical fertilizers, irrigation equipment, tractors, and other agricultural machinery.

During the Great Leap Forward, investment began with item (a) and was followed by developments in the other areas. Materials and equipments in category (c) tended to be largely supplied by industries in agricultural villages. After entry into the adjustment period, from 1961-64, priority was given to investment in group (c) although supplies for this purpose from village industries decreased. For example, there was a marked increase of investment in the field of chemical fertilizers, from 2 million tons in 1960 to 10 million tons in 1966, with similar increases seen in other areas in this category. For item (a), on the other hand, a sharp decrease in investment was reported with some news of recovery heard starting around 1964. The impression is that since 1969 the factor of collective peasant labor has again been playing a central role in agricultural investment.

Stagnation in forestation and irrigation works, as these rely on collective labor, indicates that the organization of the people's communes has loosened. Modern investment can only be implemented selectively. During the adjustment period, priority for investment had to be given to the fertile delta areas. There was also the gradual emergence of policies for the formation of specialized zones for production, such as rice-field areas for rice cultivation and cotton producing areas for growing cotton plants. The trend was beginning to deviate from the policy of "overall development around the axis of food production" for each area.

In the midst of these developments, the Tachai Brigade of Shansi Province made its appearance. This brigade raised its production record from 176 kg per ten ares in 1952 to 577 kg in 1962, in spite of the disadvantage of being located in a mountainous barren area in the yellow soil zone.

The main features of its evolution are:

- (a) Irrigation, and land development on the basis of self-reliance and collective labor (more than eighty days spent annually);
- (b) Development of a collective economy (cooperative labor and equal distribution);
- (c) Scientific application of the Eight-Point Charter of Agriculture; and
- (d) Organic combination of livestock raising and agriculture.

Most essential is labor for foundation or agricultural-bed construction by scraping mountain sides and the creation of terraced fields. All of these characteristics are indicative of the direction of agricultural construction dominant during the Great Leap Forward.

In November 1965, a national exhibition of Tachai agricultural models was held. Most of the models revealed the same manner of collective labor investment put forth to create cultivated lands and produce higher yields, while simultaneously managing multi-purpose enterprises, as the Tachai Brigade. The Tachai Brigade had been the standard-bearer for new farm villages at the time of the Cultural

Revolution. Ch'ên Yung-kuei, the brigade leader, was elected to the CCP Central Committee at the Ninth National Congress of April 1969. Since the Cultural Revolution, there has been an increasing number of Tachai-type models every year, but it is since 1969 that a broader campaign was launched to spread and learn from the example of Tachai.

Heilungkiang Province held a conference for studying the Tachai example early in 1970, and actually set its annual production targets at the conference. In the provinces of Szechwan and Kwangtung, a resolution was passed to "go further forward by launching a people's campaign to learn from the Tachai example." In the midst of this national effort, *Jênmin jihpao* of September 23, 1970 carried a fresh editorial calling for people to follow the example of Tachai in agriculture. Since early winter in 1970 it appears that extensive campaigns have been carried out to construct foundations for agricultural fields. It is reported that in Tientsin a mass movement to construct irrigation facilities for agricultural fields is underway in an effort to improve the alkaline soil [7, Dec. 30, 1970]. From Shantung Province, there are reports that "popular movements for soil improvement, fertilizer production, irrigation works, and forestation are underway throughout the province" [7, Dec. 24, 1970].


B. Industrialization of Rural Areas

1. Reorganization of industries around agriculture

Figure 2 shows the trend of total industrial output in China. As finished products as well as semi-processed and raw materials and fuel are included in the value of gross output, there is double counting in the total. For details of methodology and criteria, refer to [9]. The size of China's industrial production at the end of 1970 is expected to be double that of 1958. What is more important than the general trend is the change in the structure of the industry. There are two features worthy of note here.

First of all, it may be assumed that the industrial structure, fairly well organized in terms of quality, standards, and new varieties of products, began to be effectively formulated around 1965. This was the period when China became capable of mass-producing materials and parts which were scarce as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet economic assistance. A good example of this development is the production of various types of tractors in many parts of the country from around 1965. Other instances would be the development of petroleum and chemical industries. The shortage of materials and parts necessary for those industries related to the agricultural production and defense materials was thus being overcome. The second feature to note is the change in the composition of industry. The sectors showing the greatest development since the adjustment period are petroleum, chemicals, and those industries producing goods necessary for agricultural production. National priorities were evident in the slogan, "set industry on the track of supporting agriculture." Next after these fields were the industries producing machinery and equipment, including agricultural, precision and various plant machineries and consumer durables, where there was also relatively rapid development. The third group, in which development was some-

Fig. 2. Total Industrial Production in China, 1952-70



what slower, comprised steel, lumber, electricity, and transportation and communications. We can thus state that there was a structural change in Chinese industry in terms of its composition, with more emphasis placed on agriculture-supporting industries.

Since 1969, however, we have witnessed fresh developments, notably rapid progress in small-scale industries accompanied by an overall upsurge of the economy.

2. Stratification of regional industries on a county basis

Table III summarizes production trends for central and regional industries in three sectors. The term "regional" here is perhaps vague. I use it to refer to industrial activities undertaken below the provincial level.

This table indicates that rapid progress has been made since 1966. In fact such progress had been reported as far back as 1964. In 1970, several provinces adopted policies designed to promote regional industries. Table III shows extraordinary production growth for small steel mills during the Great Leap Forward, yet this was in fact the result of construction begun by autonomous movements with little relation to agricultural production, and may even have been a cause for the failure of the Great Leap Forward policies. Presently, steady growth is

TABLE III
DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIES IN CHINA

Year	Power Generation Capacity			Crude Steel Production			Nitrogenous Fertilizer Production		
	Total (1,000kw)	Small-scale Facilities (1,000kw)	Share of Small-scale Facilities(%)	Total (1,000 tons)	Small-scale Mills (1,000 tons)	Share of Small-scale Mills (%)	Total (1,000 tons)	Small-scale Plants (1,000 tons)	Share of Small-scale Plants (%)
1949	1,854 ¹	5 ²		(90)					
1953	2,350 ¹			(100)		(5)	226		
1957	4,454 ¹	20 ³	0.4	163 ⁶		2.9	630		
1958	6,386 ¹	152 ⁴	2.3	3,080 ⁷		27.8	810		
1959	9,834 ¹	400 ⁵	4	4,720 ⁷		35.5	1,330		
1960		520 ⁵	(5)	6,450 ⁷		35			
1962		(300)		(400)		(4.8)			12 ⁸
1965		(900)		(600)		(5)	(6,000) ^{13*}	(900)	(15)
1966	(12,800) ^{9*}	(1,500) ^{10*}	(11.8)*	(20,000)	(2,500) ^{12*}	(12.5)*	(7,500)	(3,000)	43 ⁸
1970									

Sources: 1: Total power generation capacity prior to 1960 is obtained by adding the capacity of small-scale generation facilities to the government published figures for facilities generating more than 500 kw.

2: Paper by Chü Chien, *Chungkuo nungpao* [China agricultural news], 1959, No. 24, p. 16.

3: "Tsoushang nungts'un tienhua tê tsuich'ienhsien" [Keep the front line of agricultural village electrification], *Chungkuo nungpao*, 1958, No. 17, p. 14.

4: *Jênmin jihpao*, January 26, 1960.

5: Paper by Liu Han-p'o *Hungch'i*, 1960, No. 13.

6: *Jênmin jihpao*, June 24, 1957.

7: Official government figures.

8: *Jênmin jihpao*, June 2, 1970.

9: Estimated from fragmentary reports.

10: Calculated by adding individual province totals.

11: Estimated from reports on other industrial sectors.

12: Estimated from a report revealing there are 500 small-scale steelmills in the country, *Kuangming jihpao*, May 14, 1970.

13: Estimated by addition of relevant figures in various sources.

Note: Figures without parentheses are taken from Chinese sources. Figures in parentheses marked * are estimation based on some reliable, published sources. Figures in parentheses alone are without reliable sources.

being recorded in other sectors, namely, power generation, and production of chemical fertilizers, cement, coal, and agricultural machineries, marking a significant difference from the trend in the Great Leap Forward.

According to the available figures, the ratio of production by small-scale factories as against total production at the end of 1970 was 12 to 13 per cent for steel and power generation facilities, and 30 to 40 per cent for cement, chemical fertilizers, iron ore, and coal. The ratio for local production of agricultural machinery and tools was already two-thirds of the total in 1966, and the present ratio could be somewhere around three-fourths.

Formation of a stratified industrial system is another feature. Among the industrial sectors being built up by people's communes or production brigades, are power generator facilities, coal, processing of agricultural products, repair shops for agricultural machinery, while those under county control include factories for agricultural machinery, electric generators, all sorts of electrical machinery and appliances, primitive machine tools, fertilizer plants, and ironworks.

It is reported that county-operated agricultural machinery factories have been built throughout more than 90 per cent of the country, while small-scale ironworks are said to have been constructed in three hundred cities and counties [7, Dec. 27, 1970]. In China, there are 2,300 counties with an average county population of three hundred and seventy thousand. A county's integrated machine factories will also be in charge of producing the equipment and facilities for the factories of people's communes and brigades, as well as being engaged in the production of dynamos for power plants and other electric machinery and appliances. A county may be said to be the nucleus for factory construction for the people's communes and production brigades. A special district or a province, which is superior to a county, is engaged in production of such key item as tractors, high-grade machine tools, power-driven machinery, and equipment and facilities for chemical fertilizer plants and steel mills.

During the Great Leap Forward, industries of all sectors were brought down to the commune level. In this respect, recent developments are characterized by relative steadiness and caution. This kind of stratified industrial system is being formed not only in the plains provinces but also in many other mountainous provinces throughout the country.

3. *Heavy emphasis on the industry supporting agriculture*

Jênmin jihpao of December 27, 1970, in its run-down of local industry construction, commented that, in accordance with Chairman Mao's general line of national economic development such that "agriculture should be the foundation and industry the leading factor," the correct direction must be upheld, in constructing regional industries, that industry should support agriculture, and small and medium size factories should be extensively developed to serve agriculture. In some of the pioneer counties such as Chaotung County in Heilungkiang Province and Tsunhua County in Hopeh Province, 82 per cent and 80 per cent of all the commune factories in these respective counties are in the sectors selected by the criterion of direct relationship to agricultural production [5, p. 86].

Whether factories should be built in farm villages or not has been a debated question in terms of socialist ideology. Even when there is unity on a policy to build factories in farm villages, it becomes a point of dispute in terms of the class struggle in the farm village as to whether or not industries for goods related to agricultural production should be chosen. Apparently, the counter-argument always given here is that such industries are not profitable because of their seasonal variability.

For these three to four years, small-scale power generation facilities, chemical fertilizer plants, and agricultural machinery factories were the three main fields for small-scale village industries. Since around 1969, however, construction at the village level of plants and factories supplying various materials and fuel to above-noted three fields of industries also became prominent. They included such industries as coal, steel, and cement.

These industries demand transport facilities for handling large bulk traffic. To produce one ton of crude steel, for example, eight to ten tons of commodities must be moved in bulk. It is therefore certain that construction of transport facilities will become a target of coming programs. In Honan Province, 650 km of light railway had already been built before April 1970 [7, Apr. 9, 1970]. Similarly, there have been reports of road construction. In Kwangtung Province, over 5,000 km of provincial roads were built in mountain areas over the past two years making many people's communes in the area accessible by car [3]. Similar reports have come from Chekiang Province. Automobile factories have been built in twenty-seven provinces, cities, and autonomous districts, producing cars suitable to local conditions. This movement is undoubtedly supported by the development in construction of transport facilities.

Thus the growth of industries directly supporting agricultural production led to accelerated construction of industries such as fuel and materials, which in turn stimulated expansion of transport networks, thereby a cycle of economic development seemingly nearing completion.

Above we have considered recent trends toward industrialization in rural villages as compared to developments in the Great Leap Forward. What we are seeing, in my estimation, is a system approaching completion, in which agricultural construction is conducted with emphasis on the construction of agricultural field foundations on the basis of inputs of collective labor, and in which counties and people's communes take the main responsibility for supplying the necessary producers' goods. This basic pattern of development is the same as that of the Great Leap Forward period. We should not overlook the fact, however, that local small-scale industries have recently made far greater technical progress than they had in the Great Leap Forward period.

C. *Ruralization of Cities*

During the early stages of the Cultural Revolution as part of the May 7 Directives issued in 1966, Mao Tse-tung called for the ruralization of cities, along with his suggestion for the industrialization of agricultural villages. Ruralization had already been tried in Tach'ing, the new emerging petroleum city in the North-

east region, even before Mao Tse-tung's directives. The idea was for workers and their family members to take part in agricultural activities. The case of the Tach'ing oilfields, though said to be a model of ruralization, is actually a new city built in a wasteland area with understandable difficulty in transporting food and vegetables, making ruralization more plausible from the standpoint of need.

Recently, however, there have been reports of another case, that of the old, large city of Shenyang [7, Dec. 28, 1970]. Sixty per cent of the total population of Shenyang live within the city limits (population figures for 1957 gave 2,410,000). Two years ago, all groups and all the population of this city began a campaign to engage in agriculture, and at present, it is said that they are basically self-sufficient in foodstuffs and vegetables. The people in the outlying areas are also said to have constructed small-scale industries and be struggling against the tendency to place priority only on industry and on the cities. It is not yet clear whether these campaigns are aimed merely at increasing agricultural production in the district, or whether they are experiments to create a system similar to industrialized agricultural villages in which every person does both industrial and agricultural work.

There is another case of a petrochemical plant in Hanku, Hopeh Province, at which workers have been cultivating the surrounding sterile alkaline soil, since 1966, with such success that they are now able to produce surplus rice for the government [7, May 7, 1970]. At the plant the workers reportedly made use of scrap materials such as scrap iron to produce spades, hoes, carts, and other agricultural tools with which they were also able to construct irrigation facilities. The development of agriculture has also increased production in the subsidiary businesses engaged in by workers' families. The question now is: What sort of development is it going to take place from hereon?

III. CONSTRUCTION OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC SPHERES AND PEASANT POWER

A. *Comparison of the Soviet Union and China*

Traditional thinking on the development of socialist society has tended to be based on *uklad* theory. There has been an assumption that the government under the dictatorship of the proletariat should control the state-run sector of economy which is administrative plateau of the whole economy, and through such a development, state capitalism, and individual and collective economies will be gradually incorporated into the state-run economy. It is anticipated that the differences between cities and agricultural villages as well as between intellectual labor and physical labor will also dissolve in the course of this development. Therefore, it has tended to be justified in terms of policy for other *uklad* economies to act as support for the development of the state-run economy or on occasion even sacrifice themselves for the latter.

China has boldly challenged this idea. According to Dr. Jack Gray of Glasgow University in Great Britain, Mao Tse-tung made the following severe criticism of the agricultural policy of the Soviet Union, "Soviet agricultural policy has always

been bad—it drains the pond to catch the fish” [4, p. 16].

The source of this quotation is not given, though it was most likely from a Red-Guard newspaper during the Cultural Revolution. There have been a number of official statements endorsing this remark. In the seventh clause of a treatise, “On the Question of Agricultural Co-operation” of July 31, 1955, which was a turning point in China’s move away from the Soviet model of socialist construction, Mao pointed out that the Soviet Union in the course of its development suffered serious shortages of both food for its urban population and agricultural resources for industries experiencing considerable difficulties in its efforts at industrialization [17, p. 424]. Mao’s real intention may lie in the following remark, “In dealing with financial and economic problems, we should devote 90 per cent of our energy to help the peasants to increase their production. Only then should you consider using the remaining 10 per cent of your energy to collect taxes from the peasants. If you work hard at the former, the latter will be easy” [7, Dec. 14, 1970].

The following statement, although it was not transformed into a concrete policy, was to have considerable influence later on.

As China is a great agricultural country, with over eighty per cent of its population in the villages, its industry and agriculture must be developed simultaneously. Only then will industry have raw materials and a market, and only so will it be possible to accumulate fairly large funds for the building up of a powerful heavy industry. [15, p. 294]

The significance of the above remark lies in the fact that it was made at a time when the prevailing policy was one of priority on heavy industries. It is well known that during the Soviet Union’s economic construction period, rural villages were forced to pay for the development of heavy industries through biased price policies and high rental charges to the tractor stations. How do the policies adopted by China since Liberation compare to these?

First of all, land reformation considerably raised the amount of income which went to the peasants. Before Liberation, 40 per cent of total peasant income from agriculture and subsidiary industries would be taken away from them in the form of rent for tenancy and taxes [12, p. 44]. Since Liberation, only 10–15 per cent has gone to the government as taxes, the remaining 25–30 per cent being left to farmers as extra income. This difference, in terms of 1952 prices, amounts to 14–15 billion yuan. Total industrial output in 1952, for comparison, was 83 billion yuan.

Other measures are implemented every year in an effort to close the “price-scissors” and improve the economic position of the peasants. The resulting increase in peasant income is shown in Table IV. The annual average of added income for the First Five-Year Plan is somewhere around 2.1 billion yuan. State investment and loans, respectively, averaged 1 billion and 800 million yuan annually, that is, an increase of 18 to 19 billion yuan annually in terms of total income as compared to the pre-Liberation period.

Significant amount of funds, however, were still siphoned away from villages

TABLE IV
INCREASE IN PEASANT INCOME: REFLECTION OF CLOSING "PRICE-SCISSORS"

Year	Increase in Peasant Income (Billion Yuan)	
1953	1.78	Average—2.1 (Allowances made for duplications in compiling peasant receipts)
1954	2.18	
1955	1.97	
1956	2.71	
1957	3.82	

Sources: T'ungchi kungtso tzüliaoshih [Reference material room of T'ungchi kungtso]. "Chiehfanghou ch'üankuo kungnugyeh shangp'ing chiako chientaoch'a pienhua [Changes in national scissor price differentials for industrial and agricultural products in the post-Liberation period], *T'ungchi kungtso* [Statistical work], 1957, No. 17, p. 6.

to cities through the price mechanism. The government held agricultural product prices low and industrial product prices high in order to increase state revenue although the price gaps had been narrowed. The state revenue from food and textile industries alone amounted to 25 billion yuan during the First Five-Year Plan, which happened to be equal to the total capital investment for basic industrial construction during the same period.

There were other channels for absorbing the resources from agricultural villages. Major factories were located in coastal cities such as Shanghai, Tientsin, and Ch'ingtao at the time of Liberation. Many of these factories were then engaged in processing, depending mainly on imports for both raw materials and equipment. With severance of economic relations with capitalist countries, it became necessary for big factories to look for raw materials within Chinese territory. The result of this was the concentration in large cities of the kinds of products such as cotton, oil seeds, and wheat, large part of which had previously been processed in farm villages. The impact of this was not only that rural and city handicraft industries went bankrupt, but a situation in which by-products from agricultural processing tended not to find their way back into rural areas, causing, for example, a shortage of fodder in agricultural villages. In 1957, a directive was issued to disperse food processing factories, then excessively concentrated in urban areas [13, p. 3].

In other words, the Chinese peasants had come to earn much more income than in pre-Liberation days, but they were still obliged to suffer an outflow of their capital and resources into urban industries. This system proved to be a failure during the Great Leap Forward.

B. *Relations between Industry and Agriculture after the Great Leap Forward*

As has been stated previously, it was the considerable labor-input of the collective peasants which became the driving force of the Great Leap Forward. Available data in terms of value are given in Table V. The value amount produced by volunteer peasant labor in 1958 was larger than the total amount of investments in 1956. Now this sort of investment inevitably gives rise to some degree of demand for capital investment. How was this capital procured? At the time

TABLE V
CONSTRUCTION OF IRRIGATION FACILITIES DURING THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD

Year	Volume of Irrigation Work Done in Million Cubic Meters of Earth Moved	Value of Irrigation Work Done in Million Yuan (Using Unit Cost of 0.3 Yuan/Cu. Meter)	Planned State Investment for All Fields in Million Yuan
1952	660	200	3,710
1956	2,590	780	13,990
1958	58,000	17,400	21,440
1959	13,000	3,600	26,700

Note: Irrigation work is expressed in terms of volume of earth moved. The figures for volume of irrigation work are taken from R. Kojima, "Daiyakushin seisaku no keisei katei" [Formation of the Great Leap Forward policy], *Ajia keizai*, Vol. 10, No. 12 (December 1969), p. 57. Values are calculated by multiplying unit cost by volume. The unit cost is the cost required to move one cubic meter of earth, with 0.3 yuan per one cubic meter being the lowest cost available. For unit cost, see R. Kojima, "Jiminkōsha kenkyū no ichi hōhōron ni tsuite" [A new angle for the study of people's commune], *Ajia keizai*, Vol. 9, No. 12 (December 1968), p. 43.

of the revision of the agricultural tax system, the viewpoint that a larger part of the tax amount should be left in the hands of the people's communes for their use won out over the view advocating that the state should use agricultural taxes to increase its revenue [25, p. 64].

Secondly, there was a reform of the financial system. Budgetary and financial controls for industry had been transferred to the regions by the end of 1957. There are various interpretations concerning this problem, but it may be assumed, as I do, that the transfer of controls was made necessary by requests from the collective peasants' activities.

Thirdly, there was the increased accumulation of wealth by the communes themselves. We do not know how price operations actually worked. Agricultural investment reached 10 billion yuan per year in 1958, as compared to 2 billion yuan before the Great Leap Forward.

In response to this, it seems that policies for the centralization of rural capital were again pushed by the Liu faction during the transition period. One such policy was the program to nationalize tractor stations [24]. The idea of this plan

TABLE VI
SHIFT IN CENTRAL AND REGIONAL SHARES OF BASIC CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT AS OBSERVED IN NATIONAL PLANNED INVESTMENT

	1957	1959 (projected)
Investment by the Central Government	80	57.3
Regional Investment	20	42.7

Note: Calculations are made on the basis of S. Ishikawa, "Shihon chikuseki to gijutsu sentaku" [Capital accumulation and choice of technology], in *Chūgoku keizai hatten no tōkeiteki kenkyū: III* [Statistical studies of the Chinese economic development—III], ed. S. Ishikawa (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1962), p. 76.

was to return to the state what had been transferred from state ownership to the people's communes during the Great Leap Forward. It would be worth-recollecting in this connection what function this policy had in the case of the Soviet Union.

Another instance was the 1962 proposal of the Liu faction to raise commodity prices by 50 per cent [6, p. 22]. After first being rejected it was apparently reintroduced in September 1963. Although the proposal is unclear on which commodity prices should be changed, the main effect of such price hikes would be on consumer goods as heavy industrial goods are usually out of the general circulation for monetary transactions. In other words, the effect of price operations would be a centralization of funds.

C. *The Relations of Agriculture and Industry after the Cultural Revolution*

After 1969 and especially most recently, collective peasant labor input has become a driving force in the campaign to construct agricultural fields by following the example of Tachai, much as had been the case during the Great Leap Forward. Accordingly, the demand for capital investment will grow in the same form as it did during the Great Leap Forward. Table VII is fragmentary, but it should, I think, indicate the above-mentioned tendencies. Certainly, it does show that the ratio of the regional share in investment increased very sharply, in comparison to the adjustment period.

But how are these funds to be procured? It has been made clear that in terms of price policy, efforts to close the blades of the "scissors" will continue as before [1, p. 79].

TABLE VII
PAYMENT SHARE OF PEOPLE'S COMMUNES IN REGIONAL
CONSTRUCTION FOR RURAL ELECTRIFICATION

	Payment Share of People's Communes for Electrification by Large-scale Power Network		Payment Share of People's Communes for Construction of Small-scale Generation Facilities	
	Area	%	Area	%
Adjustment period	nation's average (1965) ¹	25(?)	nation's average (1965) ¹	25
After Cultural Revolution	Honan Province (1965) ²	50	Tibet (1965) ⁷	25
	North of the Huaiho (1969) ⁴	local funds constitute major source	Chekiang Province (1969) ³	85
	Yükan County in Kiangsi Province (1969) ⁵	60	Yungch'un County in Fukien Province (1969) ⁶	90

- Sources: 1: *Pekin shūhō*, 1965, No. 42, p. 23.
2: *Jênmin jihpao*, December 19, 1969.
3: *Jênmin jihpao*, December 28, 1969.
4: *Jênmin jihpao*, October 29, 1969.
5: *Jênmin jihpao*, November 10, 1969.
6: *Pekin shūhō*, 1970, No. 10, p. 5.
7: *Ajia tsūshin*, November 5, 1965, p. 4.

However, in view of the fact that light industrial products still constitute 50 per cent of the nation's total exports, though the rate is in the process of decline, it may be assumed that delivery prices of agricultural products will not be raised significantly as this would mean higher raw material costs for many of China's exportable goods. Rather, it may be expected that a policy will be adopted to lower industrial good prices.

It is presumed that, inasmuch as the emphasis is on regional industries, the excessive extraction of agricultural raw materials from rural areas, common during the First Five-Year Plan, will not reoccur. Accordingly, it may be expected that agricultural areas will be better off.

A major future consideration will very likely be that of how to dispose of the capital accumulated by communal and county industries. Figures for 1959 show that 40 per cent of the accumulated communal capital was produced by commune industries [7, Jan. 17, 1960]. It may be expected that if a major part of profits accrued is made available for use by the peasants or counties, regional industrial prospects will be brighter, provided the tendency to raise consumption does not become dominant.

Judging from present circumstances, a danger to be guarded against in the future will be the emergence of a tendency "to emphasize subsidiary industries at the expense of agriculture." This is the kind of thinking that could arise from an over-development of regional industry leading to a widening of the gaps among communes and counties. Such kind of thinking has already been reported in some regional areas [10, p. 52]. Prevention of such a development will depend upon whether or not it is possible to check the tendency toward bureaucratization among commune and county leaders.

IV. THE SHAPE OF CHINESE "MODERNIZATION"

(a) The thrust of Chinese development is toward industrialization of farm villages and ruralization of urban areas. Accordingly, China will not pursue the historical course of: modernization → industrialization → urbanization.

(b) Chinese development is a process by which peasants and workers will seize major control of the land, economy, technology, and education. It is a process by which the peasantry will accumulate ever greater savings and increasingly expand their control over nature. In Japan, a parallel development of industry and agriculture is being advocated. Factories in urban districts are prompted to move to the countryside. However, the main factor here is the exploitation of peasants as a work force by capital, which brings about domination of the peasantry and the nationwide deterioration of environmental conditions. This is caused by the lack of control by the area inhabitants over the administration of the factories.

(c) The industrialization of China is being conducted for the purpose of developing agriculture and the natural environment. Japanese industrial development, on the contrary, is steadily destroying nature and agriculture.

Is it possible that something created for the development of agriculture, as

in the case of China, can produce technology which tends to destroy that agriculture? The Chinese would say, "No." Now, the way to a new type of industrialization has been discovered.

How can we explain the different course of evolution followed by Japan and China? To answer this, it becomes necessary to reconsider the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution as the starting points of China's new course of progress in the context of the entire history of the Chinese revolution.

Colonial control clearly brings about the following three results:

- (1) Depredation of wealth;
- (2) Destruction of nature; and
- (3) Degeneration of culture or human alienation.

In Japan it is only recently that the national populace has come to recognize the evils of industrial pollution. The harm inflicted upon China by the capitalism before the Liberation was far more vicious; it was exploited by a group of enterprises which rendered China so helpless and full of industrial wastes and misery. It thus became the task of the Chinese revolution to save the country from these three forms of deleterious acts. The success in 1949 only provided a first step toward the resolution of the problem.

It is said that the wealth plundered by four big Kuomintang families between 1928 and 1945 was as much as 20 billion dollars in the values of these days [2, p. 128]. The damages and depredations inflicted upon by Japanese militarists between 1937 and 1945 are said to have totalled 50 billion dollars [20, p. 74]. The industrial equipment removed from the Northeast region by China's socialist neighbor, the Soviet Union, was valued at 2 billion dollars [18]. It was for this reason that Mao Tse-tung, just before the Liberation of China, answered those who advocated the introduction of foreign capital from the United States and Britain by saying:

Would the present rulers of Britain and the United States, who are imperialists, help a people's state? Why do these countries do business with us and, supposing they might be willing to lend us money on terms of mutual benefit in the future, why would they do so? Because their capitalists want to make money and their bankers want to earn interest to extricate themselves from their own crisis—it is not a matter of helping the Chinese people. [16, p. 417]

Soviet assistance had at first been regarded as the expression of goodwill but later came to be considered as a case of exploitation. It was probably in 1956–57 that the thinking of the Party Central Committee underwent this change. In 1957, Liu Yün criticized the Soviet Union citing its name [14, pp. 1400–1408], and Chang Hsiang-po stated that imported equipments were several times more expensive than domestic ones [7, June 7, 1957].

The construction activities of the peasantry, on the rise since the winter of 1957, caused more "doubts" in the mind of the Chinese leadership about the Soviet Union, causing the distrust to affect the Chinese behavior at the national policy level. As stated previously, prices of agricultural products were still low even after Liberation, although there had been some improvement. Agricultural products constituted 70 per cent of exports. Meanwhile, China imported from

the Soviet Union machinery and equipment costing two to five times as much as domestically produced equivalents. Accordingly, the savings of a greater amount of capital by the peasantry as well as their advance into enterprise operations, including small-scale ones, acted to counterattack the flowing out of the Chinese wealth. Furthermore, the utilization of domestically produced equipment and facilities as well as the use of their own technology became an official national policy. In other words, the Great Leap Forward campaign was in part designed to once and for all put an end to the depredation of China by foreign countries.

The havoc wrought to nature was astounding, devastating mountains, forests, water, etc. China's forest area was only 8 per cent of its national territory, and only 1.8 per cent and 0.7 per cent, respectively, along the basin of the Yellow River and in Shantung Province. Japanese invasion is reported to have destroyed 2 million hectares of forests. It was the land reform program that took away forest privileges from landowners. Subsequently, forestation became possible thanks to collectivization and communization. From this country of bare, woodless hills, there came forth a vision that China could and should be given a beautiful natural environment covered with flowers and greens.

It was during the Great Leap Forward that the rediscovery of traditional culture was made. There are always some who, in the process of studying a foreign language, forget their own country and look down upon it. An example of this phenomenon is the introduction of Michurin's agricultural methods. It was in the early 1950s that all other agricultural technology except Michurin's were subject to criticism, although after 1957 such is no longer the case.

It was the Great Leap Forward that made it clear that for agricultural development to succeed, there was really only one course—that of establishing new system on the basis of traditional agricultural technology. There can be no doubt that peasants' practice gave rise to new values and principles. As early as 1959 it was proposed that a new Chinese agricultural theory be constructed based on the experience of the peasants [7, Mar. 6, 1959].

The Great Leap Forward must have truly been a magnificent campaign designed to accomplish a long-held aim of the Chinese revolution, the definitive elimination of the colonial value system. The abolition of this entrenched value system can never be accomplished without the erection of a new value system rooted in Chinese tradition.

A focal point of interest in the coming years after the Cultural Revolution will be the way in which the Chinese people cultivate and develop the new principles and values acquired during the Great Leap Forward.

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