

However, Japan never made any real attempt to tackle the problems inherent in the second stage. The administrative dominance, which had been supported by the concept of unity of government and education, led to a situation in which administration reigned supreme in a uniform conformity devoid of politics. As a result, people neglected the search for those policies necessary for an underdeveloped country to continue its advance past the second stage of development after the industrial revolution. The same was true of educational improvement, where attempts to solve the problems which an underdeveloped country should have faced after its take-off were abandoned. Among these problems were the dynamic structuring of "Japanization" and "Westernization" and the reorganization of education based upon the principles of freedom and uniformity. The result of this neglect can be seen most clearly in the confusion accompanying the expansion of the university system and the entrance examination hell.

There were indeed efforts made to build education from below, by the masses who ought to have been sovereign in educational revision, both by a group of people advocating liberal education in the Taishō period (1912–1925) and by a movement belonging to the socialistic movement. Yet these failed to bear fruit, the former because it lacked a historical perspective and the latter because it inclined excessively to political ideology.

Moreover, these struggles to revise education ended in a collision between political education from above, which had been growing more rigid since the Meiji era, and leftist political ideologies. The victory of the former put Japanese education firmly on the road to destruction, and education crashed along with politics.

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This then, albeit very rough, is a brief summary of Dr. Nagai's perspective. In actual fact, the three factors of Japan's spontaneous historical development, Japan's nature as an underdeveloped country, and Japan's non-Western culture are most flexibly employed in his discussion, sometimes as a framework for ordering the various social conditions surrounding education and sometimes as a framework for structuring and understanding the problems of education itself. Naturally, the meaning involved in each concept varies greatly depending upon the era being analyzed and the problem dealt with.

The essays included in this book demonstrate the effectiveness of the frame of reference which comprehends education from early in the Meiji period to defeat in World War II as one uninterrupted process from take-off to crash. While those included in Part II deal with specific problems in a detailed and concrete way, these also provide a magnificent relief of Dr. Nagai's grand perspective.

(Yoshihiro Shimizu)

*Shina kōsenryoku chōsa hōkoku* [Report on the investigation of China's war potential] edited by Mantetsu chōsabu [Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company], Tokyo, San'ichi shobō, 1970, 582pp.

#### INTRODUCTION

*Shina kōsenryoku chōsa hōkoku* [Report on the investigation of China's war potential] is a report compiled in 1940 by the Research Department of the now defunct South

Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu) and printed in 10 separate volumes in the latter half of the same year. It was not made available to the public, however, and since only a very limited number of copies were sent to Japan, it was believed impossible to obtain a complete copy of the report. But in 1970, a newly compiled edition was published. Although the report is not in the complete original form, it is one large volume containing 582 pages.

#### I. RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF MANTETSU DURING TOTAL WAR

Before discussing the report itself, let us first have a glance at Japan's political situation and the position of Mantetsu's Research Department in those days.

In the 1930s, Japan began escalating its military aggression into China which was marked by the outbreak of the Liutiaokou Incident (in 1931) and the Lukowkiao Incident (in 1937). At the same time the national economy was being more and more militarized.

Already in 1931, the Important Industries Control Law was enacted and by September 1937, three control laws including the Munitions Industry Mobilization Law were enacted one after another. In April of the following year, the National General Mobilization Law was put into force.

In order to maintain the wartime economic system and to develop the munitions industry, economic control at home had to be intensified. It was vital at the same time to streamline the governmental structure in the colonial countries to secure the supply of vital strategic materials. It was under such circumstances that formation of the Japan-Manchuria Economic Bloc, Japan-Manchuria-China Bloc System, and finally the establishment of a cooperative economic bloc embracing Greater East Asia including Japan, Manchuria and China as a part of Fundamental National Policies (July 1940) were advocated. A comprehensive plan for overall control and management of goods and services in Japan, Manchuria and China was formulated.

Under such circumstances, it was natural for the Research Department of Mantetsu, a management company in Manchuria, to be asked by the government to conduct a survey prior to the establishment of a structure incorporating Japan, Manchuria and China in order to cope with total war.

As is well known, the Research Department of Mantetsu was inaugurated by the first president, Shimpei Gotō, simultaneously with the founding of the company. The activities of the Research Department were as important as Mantetsu's railway management and industrial development, and these together constituted the three main activities of Mantetsu. It was unprecedented not only in Japan but also in West European countries, which had experience in colonial control, to create such an extensive and systematic research machinery within an enterprise. There is not sufficient space here to make a comprehensive description and analysis of the department in order to indicate the chief characteristics and historical role that it played. But it may be said that the department produced sound academic results as the research machinery of a colonial management company. Basically, however, the department had been a sort of "General Staff Office" to draft colonial policies and, at the same time, it was closely related to the Kwantung Army since it is clear that it had been studying topography for military use and collecting military information, thus, serving military purposes as well.

In the latter part of the 1930s, however, the Manchurian development programs of

the Kwantung Army had reached an impasse and the Zaibatsu, which had been excluded from participation in Manchuria, was asked to make capital advancement into Manchuria. Concurrently, the position of Mantetsu began to decline. In December 1937, the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation was established, and when Mantetsu had to transfer all the projects except railways and coal mining to this new company, its system naturally had to be retrenched and remodeled. But in 1937, Yōsuke Matsuoka became president of Mantetsu. In his effort to tone down the complaints that had been mounting within the company over the retrenchment and remodeling and its failure to advance into North China, and also to demonstrate the position of Mantetsu on the continent, Matsuoka inaugurated the so-called "Great Research Department" to carry on the spiritual legacy of Shimpei Gotō.

This research department was headed by Seijirō Tanaka, who had the status equivalent to a vice-president, and included three sections: General Affairs, Coordination and Research Materials, and four research offices: General Economy, Law and Jurisdiction, Northern District, and Resources. It also had under its control, the research office of the Hsinking branch, Northern Manchuria Economic Research Institute, research office of the Tokyo branch, Northern China Economic Research Institute, and research office of the Shanghai branch, as well as three branch offices in New York, Paris and Berlin. It also embraced all the academic machinery of Mantetsu, as well as Dairen Library, Central Laboratory, Geological Research Institute and Agricultural Experiment Station.

Its annual budget at that time was said to have been about 20 million yen (5.7 million dollars) and had a maximum of over 2,000 staff members. At the time when the organization was expanding many leftist students and scholars who were suppressed as members of anti-war or socialist movements at home, joined it as staff members.

Thus, the Research Department of Mantetsu planned and executed an overall survey to cope with total war. According to Young,<sup>1</sup> its survey projects are said to have numbered as many as 287 in fiscal 1939, 514 in fiscal 1940 and 143 during the first half of 1941. Examples of major coordinated projects include the following (periods of survey within brackets):

- (1) Project on inflation in the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc (1940-41).
- (2) Project on the reorganization of the wartime economy (1941-42).
- (3) Project to determine the availability of strategic resources for Japan in the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc (1939-41).
- (4) Project on the location of industry (1939-43).
- (5) Project to review the general war potential of China (1939-41).

## II. SYSTEM AND ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE RESISTANCE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE

The investigation of China's war potential was one of the comprehensive survey themes undertaken during the days of total war. According to an explanation given in the appendix to this report, "the mission of Mantetsu's Research Department was to conduct the survey, based on which the new order to East Asia may be built." (p. 92) It also said that in order to successfully achieve this task the study must

<sup>1</sup> J. Young, ed., *The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1907-1945: A History and Bibliography* (New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1966).

include not only the factors that may promote construction of such an order but also the various adverse factors that may hamper or destroy such a program. The Chinese Resistance Investigation Committee was organized in June 1939 in order to study the negative factors, that is, the forces resisting Japan.

Headed at first by the coordinating section of the Dairen Head Office, the committee was organized by mobilizing the research office of the Shanghai branch, Northern China Economic Research Institute, the research office of the Tokyo branch, and the No. 2 and No. 3 research sections of the Head Office. But the actual survey was conducted mainly by the Shanghai Office because it had branch offices in Nanking, Hankow, Canton and Hong Kong, and thus was in the most convenient position to engage in such activities. Moreover, the planning and drafting of the survey program was done mainly by Takeo Itō, director of the Shanghai branch office, and Kō Nakanishi of the same office. Similar surveys had already been conducted by the office.

Beginning in the fiscal year 1940, the Shanghai Office took over the committee's management and the chairman of the committee was also changed from the chief of the research department at the head office to Takeo Itō of the Shanghai Office. Thus, the committee was operated from Shanghai, with the research staffs at Dairen, Peking, and Tokyo often meeting together. More than 30 members of the staff were said to have participated in this survey. Among them were many researchers who have made important contributions in the academic world in the postwar period, such as Kanesaburō Gushima, Toshio Hiradate, Tōichi Nawa, Kazuo Nonomura, Misaburō Kawasaki, Seirin Ishidō, Shōtarō Ozaki and Kōhei Ohgata.

According to recollections by some of the participants, Kō Nakanishi is said to have played a vital role in the research activities of the committee, while Takeshi Miwa contributed greatly to liaison and control. In particular, Nakanishi is said to have done outstanding work.<sup>2</sup> The Shanghai Office had a total of some 300 staff members and its budget was approximately 3 million yen (850,000 dollars). It is said that selected personnel were assembled under the direction of Itō.

In October of the year the committee was organized, it made its first interim report. In March of 1940 the second interim report was made. These reports were presented at two meetings held in Shanghai. Numerous individual reports were also compiled in the meantime. These reports have been compiled as the "All-Inclusive Materials for Fiscal 1939" and this is the part now under review. The committee continued its activities until 1941 so that those given here are only part of the results of the surveys. In 1941 another all-inclusive report was published as well as many other partial works, but none of them are available. The vast materials related to Mantetsu that were kept in Japan are said to have been seized by the Occupation Forces, and the bulk of them are said to be piled up in the basement of the U.S. Library of Congress, except for a few that are being utilized.

The materials kept in Manchuria were requisitioned by the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, it is impossible in Japan to have an overall perspective of the committee's activities. The work by Young is devoted mostly to a list of publications related to Mantetsu but also contain some of the materials related to the investigation of China's war potential.

According to Kō Nakanishi, all the data used in the research had been taken from

<sup>2</sup> T. Itō, *Mantetsu ni ikite* [My life with Mantetsu] (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1964). K. Nakanishi, *Shi no kabe no nakakara* [From inside a prison] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1971).

newspapers and magazines that were available in China in those days. None of the special or secret information obtained through special channels or from the military or Foreign Ministry sources was used. The committee, of course, did not even have in its possession any special data or information obtained from the Nationalist Party or the Chinese Communist Party.

Judging from the methodology used by Nakanishi and other members of the group, it might have been unnecessary for them to collect detailed information from the enemy side; still, it can be readily imagined that there must have been some information of this sort supplied by military sources or through the collection of public information from Hong Kong and other branches.

### III. METHODOLOGY OF SURVEY ON CHINA'S WAR POTENTIAL

The overall composition and the personnel in charge of each volume were the following:

First Volume: General introduction (1)—Investigation methods and general conclusion on China's war potential, by Kō Nakanishi

Second Volume: Politics (2-I)—China's internal political situation during wartime, by Kō Nakanishi

Third Volume: Politics (2-II)—On the Communist Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, by Jōchi Tsugane, Otojirō Ogura

Fourth Volume: Wartime economic policy (3-I)—Transportation, by Shunji Iwaki

Fifth Volume: Wartime economic policy (3-II)—Commerce and trade, by Yasushi Kumagai, Tadayoshi Kishikawa

Sixth Volume: Wartime economic policy (3-III)—Currency and finance, by Kiyoshi Katō

Seventh Volume: Wartime economic policy (3-IV)—Public finance, by Kazuo Hayashida, Kō Nakanishi

Eighth Volume: Economy of Interior China (4-I)—Agriculture, by Masayoshi Ishikawa

Ninth Volume: Economy of Interior China (4-II)—Industry and mining, by Kōji Katayama

Tenth Volume: Foreign aid (5)—Aid to China by major nations, by Kanesaburō Gushima

Detailed statistical tables are attached at the end of each volume, including "Assistance given to Chang Kai-shek by foreign countries in terms of monetary value," "Southwestern Traffic Map," "Major imports through the major ports in Southwest China by calendar years and their percentages in total Chinese imports," "Major exports through the major ports in Southwest China by calendar years and their percentages in total Chinese exports," "Budget by each province (1936-37)," "Goods supplied to Chang Kai-shek regime by allied powers," and "Chiang regime's country-by-country exports."

The best part of this book is the first general introduction compiled by Kō Nakanishi. This volume contains the methodology of the survey, an outline of China's wartime economy and an analysis of the world situation. The presentation of the methodology of the survey is especially valuable.

According to Nakanishi, it is meaningless to merely compare the existing military or economic power of Japan and China in order to compare the power of the two

countries. Rather, attention should be given to the "qualitative difference," such as that Japan is a modern nation and China is a semi-colonial nation. In China, the war against Japan was arousing the concern of not only national capitalists but also landlords, and the nation as a whole. Moreover, the continuation of resistance against Japan was proving to be an enormous shock to the society that, Nakanishi anticipated, would help reorganize the old political and economic structure—to help modernize the country. That is, China's power of resistance was being created during the course of war and this power contained the elements for sudden strengthening of resistance. He believed, therefore, that "the role of politics that is helping these changes to take place and the changes in the economy under such circumstances will have to be fully analyzed."<sup>3</sup> Thus, he observed the formation of resistance power in five phases, that can be summarized as follows:

(1) The weakness of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country—China is a sort of "joint" colony of the major powers and its economy is based mainly on a dispersed and scattered agricultural economy. As long as China is under such circumstances, it will easily surrender in a war fought with foreign countries.

(2) National development during 100 years—After the First World War China was capitalized to some extent, and national capitalists, working class and modern petty bourgeoisie have emerged. This was the springboard for the power of resistance to emerge and such power was formulated through the rivalry between these new elements and the above semi-colonial and semi-feudalistic elements.

(3) Agricultural society with vast land and abundant supply of goods—China is vast in area and has a teeming population, and although scattered, it has an abundance of goods. Since the cities are not closely related economically to rural areas, farming villages can be self-sustaining without the cities. This is because China is backward, but at the same time, this is the economic backbone for its "long-term resistance" and "protracted war." If China has the political force that can utilize this situation, she can make the best use of this advantage.

(4) External condition—China needs goods and arms from abroad, but the powers' participating in China can be divided into two: (a) Britain, United States and France are assisting China in order to control China and also to check Japan's advance, and (b) the Soviet Union unconditionally extends assistance as one of its activities for the attainment of a world revolution. In either case, however, foreign assistance is meaningless unless China has its own power of resistance, and aid would then become secondary in importance.

(5) Management of occupied land and guerrilla warfare and politico-economic war—In the important cities and in the vast farming districts under occupation, a fierce struggle will develop between Japan and China over how to obtain the support of the public as well as over the supply of goods. Although not specifically pointed out, it is implied that through this struggle, management of the occupied land by Japan would encounter difficulties.

The above analysis of the war against Japan is basically the same methodology of analysis conducted by Mao Tse-tung in his *On Protracted War* (May 1938), and *On the New Stage* (October 1938). These two epoch-making theses by Mao Tsu-tung can be summarized briefly as follows: The war against Japan will become a long and

<sup>3</sup> K. Nakanishi, "Chūgoku kakumei no arashi no nakade" [In the midst of China's revolution] *Rekishī hyōron*, 1970, No. 8, p. 86.

trying war of attrition, but the ultimate victor will be China. He based his conclusion on the fact that it is specifically a war of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the Nineteen Thirties.

That is, (1) Japan is a powerful imperialistic nation while China is a semi-colonial and semi-feudalistic nation and this makes war inevitable and also impossible for China to win quickly. (2) But this war is an aggressive war for Japan, and because of its reactionary and barbarous character, Japan is bound to lose, while, for China, it is a national liberation war, and because of its progressive and just character, as well as by the accumulation of 100 years of liberation movement, China will ultimately win the war. (3) While Japan's territory is narrow and lacks resources, China's land is vast and abundant in resources, and thus China can sustain a protracted war. (4) Japan will face international opposition, but China will obtain widespread assistance. Thus the war will go through three stages of defense, strategic stalemate and counter-offensive and victory. The most important stage is the second one of stalemate, or the period of China's preparation for the counter-offensive. Whether China will become an independent nation or a colony will depend on how China will fight during this second stage. And the decisive condition for winning the war is the formation of the anti-Japanese united front based on collaboration between the Communist and Nationalist parties.

It might have been natural, because of his background, for Kō Nakanishi to compile the book's general introduction in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's method of analysis. As described in detail in the recently published biographical introduction to a present-day history of China,<sup>4</sup> he left East Asia Common Culture University (Shanghai) before graduation in order to engage in the anti-war movement. He joined the Chinese Problem Study Group of the Proletarian Science Study Institute and then joined the Research Department of Mantetsu, where he engaged in the study of Chinese problems and compiled the *Mantetsu chōsa geppō*. At the same time, he participated in the anti-war movement under Communist Chinese leadership by joining a faction different from the one of Hotsumi Ozaki. The above-mentioned Mao Tse-tung theory is said to have greatly encouraged the Chinese public who were lamenting the then national decline of China. Nakanishi also seems to have been moved greatly by these theses. Nakanishi was about 30 years old then, but is said to have had profound knowledge of Chinese matters.<sup>5</sup>

A large amount of space has been devoted to the methodology of the general introduction, because this methodology is maintained throughout the following volumes although they have their own respective features.

#### IV. CONTENTS OF REPORT

The second volume (Politics I) presents an overall analysis of the China's political situation. As explained in the general introduction, the formation of the power of resistance was believed to depend on the role played by politics; that is, the mobilization of the public by the political parties. But there are two qualitatively different ways to achieve this—one by the Nationalist Party and another by the Chinese Communist Party. The former will depend on compulsory conscription and the latter

<sup>4</sup> K. Nakanishi, op. cit., 1969, No. 1—1971, No. 3—4.

<sup>5</sup> K. Gushima, "Watashi no Mantetsu jidai" [My experiences in Mantetsu], in *Rekisho to jimbutsu*, 1972, No. 1.

will rely on a public movement based on direct interest. The volume closely examines how the public movement was developing in different areas as well as by classes of workers, capitalists, landlords, petty bourgeoisie and farmers. In this case, the basic class that could be mobilized was farmers, but those who led them were laborers and national capitalists. It is suggested that the leadership of public mobilization would gradually be transferred from the Nationalist Party to the Chinese Communist Party.

What is especially interesting is the analysis of the Nationalist Party. It is seen as a party formed by landlords, national capitalists (including comprador bourgeoisie) and petty bourgeoisie and is built on a very intricate and complex structure. The party is composed of various factions including "Cheng-hsueh faction" (led by Huang Fu and others), "Wang Ching-wei faction," "Sun Ke faction," "Europe-American faction" (Sung Tzū-wên and K'ung Hsiang-hsi among leaders), "C. C. faction," "Lan-i-she (blue shirt) faction," "local military faction," and each of them has their own characteristics and respective attitude towards Japan based on their social background.

Big capitalists among the national capitalists were categorized as a peace-seeking faction and medium-small capitalists were said to be those in favor of strong resistance against Japan.

The third volume treats the situation in base areas and guerrilla zones under the control of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. The method used here in the survey is to "utilize the Chinese documents and articles, in order to grasp their attitudes." (p. 151) Theses by such Communist Chinese leaders as Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Chen I, Lo Fu as well as *Wen-hsien*, *Shi-lun-tsung-kan*, *Tsun-pao*, *Chien-hsien-shang* and other Communist Chinese data were quoted abundantly, and almost no analysis was added to them. The intention maintained throughout is to introduce a true and accurate picture of the situation, and thus they provide valuable data for use today. At times, however, there are such comments or analysis as "public peace and order in occupied districts in North China depends mainly upon dealing with the Eighth Route Army" (p. 151) and "positive activities of the Eighth Route Army are merely helping the permeation of the Soviet policy to communize China." (p. 163) The impression that during the survey they also tried to obtain information about the enemy cannot be evaded.

The volumes on the wartime economic policy are devoted to a detailed survey report of the Nationalist Party's policies on construction of transportation, commerce and trade, currency and finance, and fiscal measures. During this period there were such publications as Tomoyuki Ishihama's *Jūkei senji keizaitaisei ron* [Introduction of wartime economic structure in Chungking] (1942) as well as individual research projects conducted by Tadao Miyashita, Yoneji Masuda and Tōji Iida, but the volumes under review probably were the most comprehensive study of the wartime economy under the Nationalist Government. In the study of prewar China, these volumes provide valuable data to fill in the blank about the Nationalist Government in those days.

The fourth volume presents characteristics of the transportation network construction by the Nationalist Government during wartime, as well as an outline of railways, highways, shipping and aviation. In order to increase the power of resistance, economic development of Southwest China had to be pushed vigorously. But a prerequisite was to secure transport routes in order to supply war materials and construction materials as well as a means to export its products abroad. Thus the importance of railways and highways (in particular, the Yunnan-Burma route for automobiles) became greater among the transportation network construction programs. But in executing these



programs, the report points out the problem of the dependence on conscripted workers who were almost in the condition of feudal servitude.

The fifth volume describes the process of trade policies adopted by the Nationalist Government along with the progress of the war. With the fall of Wuhan and the retreat to Chungking, the major transportation routes were lost, the cost of transportation rose, the money market was depressed and wartime trade encountered great difficulties. Thus, trade was nationalized and the structure of commerce was forcibly reorganized. The direct factors behind such a movement were the barter trade contracts concluded by the Nationalist Government with foreign countries. These barter trade contracts were concluded because of the desire to obtain loans (for arms supplies) from abroad. The contracts included the four major products of the country—Chinese wood oil, tea, hog bristle and mineral products (tungsten, antimony and tin)—as guarantee, since China's international balance of payments had been aggravated and maintenance of its Fapi currency value became difficult. When seen from another viewpoint, such trade contracts represented a special form of development by the foreign powers' control of China's raw materials supply.

The sixth volume includes the policies of maintaining the value of the Chinese Fapi note, on which the life and death of the Nationalist Government hinged, and includes an analysis of financial relations between the Chungking district on which Chang Kai-shek relied heavily, and Shanghai, which was abnormally prosperous through speculation as well as a discussion of the growth of inflation in the interior districts. It is pointed out that through reorganization of the financial structure, Chang Kai-shek's dictatorial control advanced and the country's semi-colonial and comprador nature became stronger.

The seventh volume makes clear the real nature of the wartime Nationalist Government's revenues and expenditures, and compares them with those of Japan. In doing so, it points out that, while the Chinese partisan war-resistance structure, based on rural economy, had room for economizing the cost of war and minimizing consumption, it was unavoidable for Japan to suffer major exhaustion if the war was drawn out. It also pays critical attention to the Nationalist Government's fiscal policy of escalating the debenture and currency issues and its heavy tax policies.

The volume on the economy of interior China deals mainly with agricultural, and manufacturing-mining industries in the Southwest districts under the Nationalist Government.

The eighth volume is the one which draws closest attention in this work. Masayoshi Ishikawa, the author of this section, pays special attention to the fact that the war against Japan drastically changed the rural society of China and that this was the major factor behind the formation of the power of resistance. That is, while the war caused immeasurable human and material damage to the rural districts, the farming villages that had been the outlet for imported merchandise and the places where raw materials had been seized, were changing into modern villages working out their salvation by their own efforts. That is, Chinese farming villages were heading toward modernization while suffering great pains in the process. To measure such developments, the following is pointed out:

- (1) Along with the shift of political and economic activities to the interior districts, the old structure of production was changed, productivity raised and modernization of the farmers' consciousness promoted.

- (2) The fall of the coastal districts which resulted in the soaring prices of industrial

products and a sharp drop in prices of farm products pushed farmers into extreme difficulty. But the development of cottage industry on farms and the conversion from cash crops to food production gradually improved the farming villages' potential capacity for self-supply. Transfer of national capital to the interior also resulted in modernization of farm villages through building of medium-small factories.

(3) Although hampered by old social conditions, such farm remodeling policies as improvement of water utilization and agricultural finance were introduced, and land development and settlement movements were promoted.

(4) Movements to boost production and efforts to form cooperative societies required far-reaching public mobilization, and these activities led to the problem of the democratization of farming areas.

And finally, the significance of public mobilization for the power of resistance is emphasized and it is concluded that the basic element fighting the war was not the "political leaders" of the Chang Kai-shek regime, but rather the "public" volition itself.

The ninth volume explains the state of manufacturing and mining industries in Southwest China—steel-making, machinery, coal mining, copper mining, electric power, chemical and spinning industries, and the industrial cooperative movements in interior districts. Through the transfer of coastal factories to the interior and their reconstruction, how the influence and control of the national capital was boosted is explained clearly.

The volume on the foreign aid is an analysis of the roles of major countries in the formation of China's power of resistance. Written by Kanesaburō Gushima, this explicitly analyzes the international situation surrounding China in those days.

Describing the aid to China by major nations, including commercial relations, he says that they are classified into two aspects: one consisting of assistance given directly to China and the other intended to check Japan, and thus to assist China indirectly. Then, the motives for each major country assisting China is observed. For America, it was to secure the potential future market of China and also to defend the important southwestern Pacific region as a source of material supplies. For Britain, it was intended to defend the vast interests she had in China, and for France, it was to defend its interests in China and also to defend Indochina, and for Germany, the biggest interest was to boost trade with China. The Soviet Union, however, had a fundamentally different interest from that of other countries. She was interested in reducing Japan's potential to fight the Soviet Union, to promote construction at home, to boost the power of Communist China, and also to obtain the supply of strategic materials from China.

Irrespective of motives, certain conditions were required to make aid or trade with China possible. Among them were their domestic circumstances, the degree of their power of restraint against Japan, their international relations and the external supply channels within China—each of these were studied carefully.

Assistance to China by foreign countries was realized only when the motives and conditions regulating its execution were historically united and adjusted. Based on such a point of view, an analysis is presented of the assistance given by the major countries during the period from July 1937, when the war against Japan began to escalate, to June 1940, when France unilaterally surrendered.

## CONCLUSION

As observed in the foregoing chapters, this book is a comprehensive and overall survey report of China's politics, economics, and international relations immediately after the expansion of the war against Japan. Using the methodology of Mao Tse-tung's *On Protracted War*, the report tried to suggest the recklessness of escalating the war against China, by indicating that the power of resistance in China was in the formation of the anti-Japanese united front which would become even stronger.

The Research Department of Mantetsu played the role of "General Staff Office" for the formation of colonial policy in China. Moreover, the department was asked to conduct a survey for execution of the total war. It is noteworthy that such a report was compiled under such circumstances.

In spite of the fact that Mantetsu's Research Department was within the framework of a colonial development company, it had a tradition of conducting very scientific surveys as symbolized by Takeo Itō. It also had a comparatively liberal atmosphere as compared with the situation in "mainland Japan," and also was receptive to democrats and Marxists who fled from suppression at home. Such organs of the department as the *Peking Mantetsu geppō*, *Mantetsu Shina gesshi*, or *Mantetsu chōsa geppō* carried many of the achievements produced in such a liberal atmosphere.

Kō Nakanishi, who was one of the key members in compiling this book at the department, had this to say: "In the midst of Japan's wartime system, it was possible, through one's work, to maintain a scientific and conscientious research attitude, and, by making the best use of the internal strife within the ruling class, to support progressive and anti-war sentiment and try to present the truth to the Japanese."<sup>6</sup> He thought that he had to do so while working for the Research Department. Nakanishi engaged in the compilation of the survey with unusual enthusiasm because of such intentions.

Evaluation of this book will also have to be made from the standpoint of the practical role that it played. Nakanishi and his colleagues are said to have visited and held many gatherings to report on this investigation on China's war potential during the June-July period of 1940 at various military and governmental institutions such as Ministry of the Army, Army General Staff, Ministry of the Navy, Navy General Staff, Cabinet Ministries, Headquarters of the Kwantung Army and General Headquarters of China Detachment. They are said to have hinted at the disadvantage of continuing the war and the need of politically settling the Chinese problems, and it seems that they impressed their audiences.

Such activities were possible because Japan's political and military situation was already in a stalemate. Because of the defeat at Nomonhan, conclusion of the Russo-German non-aggression treaty and the failure of the Japan-Germany Alliance, Japan's external policies were in utter confusion, and the Japanese forces were fighting a desperate battle and the war was likely to become a prolonged one. Both the military authorities and the Government were trying to find a way to overcome the stagnation and, in this sense, these reports drew their attention. At the same time, however, it was impossible under the very strict control of speech to inform the Japanese public of the truth.

<sup>6</sup> Nakanishi, *op. cit.*, 1969, No. 9, p. 78.

As Nakanishi said after the war, Japanese imperialism was destined to be unable to use a scientific survey. Following the formation of the Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance and the escalation of the war into the Pacific War, pressure began to mount against this kind of survey and oppression of the members engaged in the study began. Hotsumi Ozaki was arrested in October 1941 and Kō Nakanishi was arrested in June 1942. With the Cooperative Society Incident of November 1941 as the turning point, more than 40 members of the staff of the Mantetsu's Research Department were arrested in September 1942 and August 1943, and thus the department virtually collapsed at this stage.

As Kiyoshi Noma, one of the staff members of the department said after the war, "in the research and study to be conducted within the structure of military oppression intended for colonial control, it is impossible to exceed the limits of the system. It could never be a positive and genuine resistance against the system. . . . [It] could be a very conservative sort of a resistance against politics but could never be a guiding factor in politics."<sup>7</sup>

Hikotarō Andō's evaluation of the investigation is more critical. He says that this investigation might have been the maximum resistance in those days, but "their work had no relation to the suffering of the Chinese people, and moreover, they may have benefited the military strategies." Ultimately, they must be called "basically Chinese studies for imperialistic purposes."<sup>8</sup>

In any case, let us hope that by scrutiny and evaluation of the historical role of an outstanding survey conducted within the limits of Mantetsu's structure, people will either positively criticize the results of the Chinese studies handed down from those days, or make the best use of them. (Yoshio Kawamura)

<sup>7</sup> K. Noma, "Chūgoku nōson kankō chōsa no kikaku to jisseki—Chūgoku mondai kenkyū niokeru shukanteki 'zen-i' to sono genkai" [On the survey of customs in Chinese farm villages—Subjective 'goodwill' and its limit in the study of Chinese problems], *Rekishi hyōron*, October 1964, pp. 7–8.

<sup>8</sup> H. Andō, *Nihonjin no Chūgokukan* [Japanese view of China] (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1971), pp. 111, 114.