

CONTINUITY IN INDONESIAN STYLES OF POLITICAL RULE

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POLITICAL POWER in Indonesia was transferred from Sukarno, the revolutionary, to Suharto, the military man, during the turbulent years of 1965 and 1966. Since then it has been commonly asserted that the two men evidence not only different personalities but distinctly contrasting styles of political rule. Sukarno was labeled a shouting orator, Suharto is the "smiling general." While the ex-president preached revolutionary ideologies, the incumbent negates ideology and advocates "development." While the former tolerated communism, the latter has been a staunch anti-Communist. The points of contrast stretch on at length. Despite these differences, however, it is equally necessary to note the common features which have marked both men's political styles. It is accordingly the continuity in style which this article will examine, hopefully discovering in the process several salient features of contemporary Indonesia's patterns of rule.

I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A significant number of studies have appeared in the past regarding the lines of thought and policies of Indonesian leaders.¹ More recently Feith and Castles even attempted to codify various levels and streams of "Indonesian political thinking."² Yet there is still very little written on their style of rule, methods used by the leaders to communicate to the masses. In 1973 an attempt was made by B. Anderson to show the significance of an aspect of such style of rule, or the significance of political monuments in the context of what he termed as "indirect" political communication [1].³ Hopefully this article will investigate more fully and articulate Indonesian patterns of political communication flowing from the elite to the masses.

The phrase "styles of political rule" can be taken to mean the forms and

¹ Major works include: George M. Kahin [16]; Herbert Feith [7]; J. D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (London: Penguin Press, 1972); Bernhard Dahm [5]; Peter C. Hauswedell, "Sukarno: Radical or Conservative? Indonesian Politics, 1964-5," *Indonesia*, No. 15 (April 1973); O. G. Roeder [23]; Howard P. Jones [15]; Peter Polomka [22]; and also confer Sukarno [27].

² See Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970).

³ For studies in Indonesian styles of government, see Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in *Indonesia*, ed. Ruth McVey (New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area Files, 1963); idem, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," *Indonesia*, No. 6 (October 1968); and Donald Hindley, "Dilemmas of Consensus and Division: Indonesia's Search for a Political Format," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 1969).

methods used by the political elite of a nation in ruling their country, or—put differently—the means by which they achieve a certain set of objectives for that land. Such means obviously will vary according to the nature of the national objectives. The primary national objectives to be studied in this article are national unity and policy execution;⁴ while the primary means for achieving them are the use of symbols and the creation of organizations. It should be noted at the outset that these two objectives often overlap; they are quite hard to distinguish, being so complementary in nature. The objective of national defense, for example, should promote both unity and policy execution, as should the objectives of carrying out revolution and development. Formulation and execution of economic policies, on the other hand, is more easily distinguishable; it falls into the category of policy execution. And promotion of patriotism clearly belongs to the sphere of national unity.

In mobilizing to attain its objectives, the ruling elite must employ both effective symbols of rule (non-organizational means) and organizational techniques adequate to win the confidence of the masses. The emphasis on one or the other generally depends on both the objectives of rule and the specific political characteristics of the country and era concerned. Situations where organizational means are likely to have only limited effectiveness probably may call for an emphasis on symbols, with rulers not only utilizing slogans but promoting prestige projects and encouraging personality cults. Certain leaders, on the other hand, may depend on extra-constitutional, while not necessarily unconstitutional, structures and offices which function as ad hoc or customary legislative, administrative, and judicial organs. This type may be designated respectively as constitutional and extra-constitutional means of rule.

Sukarno and Suharto will be compared within this conceptual framework, with special attention being given to the former's Guided Democracy period (1959–65) and the latter's Pancasila Democracy period (1966 to the present) and to their styles of domestic rule rather than foreign conducts. The comparative attempt will also include a brief analysis of the presidential speeches delivered each August in commemoration of the nation's independence.⁵

Observers of Indonesian politics are often struck by the frequent use of political symbols. Both Sukarno and Suharto have been given to dressing policies in attractive slogans or to coining acronyms out of phrases. The whole nation, in fact, evidences an affection for such sloganeering, though it is not easy to identify the causes behind this trait. Some have noted that leaders in nations with low levels of education often use slogans and catchy words to more effectively promote understanding of goals and policies. This alone is hardly an adequate explanation, however, since there also are countries with even lower educational levels where "slogan politics" is not seen.

There would generally seem to be two kinds of symbols, one supporting

⁴ For discussion of these two categories, see, for instance, James S. Coleman [3, pp. 98–100].

⁵ The discussion here proceeds without making a distinction between the idiosyncracies of a leader and those of his government. Both are often interlocking, and it is hardly possible to draw a meaningful line between them.

national unity and the other undergirding policy execution (i.e., the two objectives of political rule noted above). It is not always easy to decipher to which category a given slogan belongs; the same slogan can be used to serve both unity and policy purposes. Despite this limitation in definition, clear distinctions are apparent, and of particular interest is the fact that Sukarno and Suharto have used contrasting *policy* symbols while sharing *unity* symbols.

The two presidents also have employed a similar approach to the problem of organization. Here four key points will be discussed. First, both have attempted to maintain Javanese rule without slighting non-Javanese elements in their political and governmental organizations. Second, both presidents have consolidated the existing political forces into three groups and attempted to govern the nation on the basis of their cooperation. Third, both have attempted to use the government bureaucracy, national and local, as the basis of their respective government party. Fourth, though calling for strict observance of the 1945 Constitution, both set up extra-constitutional offices to carry out key legislative, administrative, and judicial tasks. The first two points, it should be noted, belong primarily to those organizational methods used to foster national unity, while the latter two serve the purpose of aiding in policy execution.

II. SYMBOLS OF UNITY

A. "17-8-45 (August 17, 1945)"

The most important symbol of national unity devised by Sukarno was probably a set of numerical figures—17-8-45, the date independence was declared by Sukarno and Hatta. It was essentially an arbitrary choice, since that date marked only the beginning of an independence struggle which culminated on December 27, 1949. Yet the August 17, 1945 symbol has been most effective—and pervasive. The numbers are used, for example, in the national coat of arms, which had a garuda, a legendary golden eagle of Javanese mythology. The garuda is depicted to have seventeen feathers on each wing, eight feathers on the tail and forty-five on the neck [10, p. 9]. The emblem of the Home Affairs Ministry incorporates sprays of rice and cotton, symbolizing "social justice"—and the rice ear has forty-five kernels and eight tufts, while the cotton bolls and leaves together number seventeen.⁶ The enthusiasm about these numbers reached its climax, when the government document on the Eight-Year Economic Plan was published in 1960 in the form of 8 volumes, containing 17 chapters and 1,945 paragraphs [17, p. 154]. There also is a private university in Jakarta called August 17 University. And on that day great festivities are staged throughout the nation, with President Sukarno during his years of power always stirring up audiences with the charismatic Independence Day speeches of which only he was capable.

⁶ Likewise, the emblem of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) includes a rice ear that has forty-five kernels and eight tufts, and a cotton branch that has seventeen bolls and seventeen leaves.

This symbol has been inherited and further utilized by Suharto. Possibly to avoid the inevitable comparisons with Sukarno's more effective oratory, Suharto always makes his Independence Day speech, not in front of a big audience, but in the Parliament—and always one or two days before the independence celebrations. But the grandeur and nature of the occasion remains unchanged. The symbol also has appeared in various new incarnations, including the emblem of GOLKAR, a military-backed political organization which made its first official political debut at the time of the 1971 general elections. Its sign includes a rice ear with forty-five grains, a cotton plant with seventeen bolls, and a banyan tree (the symbol of "nationalism") with eight ivy vines hanging from it.

B. "*The 1945 Constitution*"

Equally important as a symbol has been the 1945 Constitution. Adopted in August of that year, it remained a provisional constitution until Sukarno made it the formal basis of the state by presidential decree in July 1959. He thereafter used it to enlarge his own presidential powers and to promote national unity, a fact supported by the great number of times he referred to the Constitution in each Independence Day speech. In the 1959 speech alone, Sukarno made fifty-two such references; in 1961, thirty-two.⁷ (See Table I.)

Nor did his successor, Suharto, discontinue this practice. Indeed, in his very first Independence Day speech after becoming acting president (August 1967), he made some fifty-five references to the Constitution. And though the frequency decreased in subsequent speeches, the practice itself did not stop. Sixteen times he made such references in 1969, six times in 1971, and twenty-five times in 1972. As he said as chairman of the Cabinet Presidium after depriving Sukarno of power in March 1965: "The true desire of the entire nation was to return to the strict execution [of the 1945 Constitution] Despite the contention that the 1945 Constitution had been valid ever since 1959, its execution had been side-stepped from prelude to finale by the September 30 Movement and the Communists" [9, p. 14]. He was, in other words, proclaiming himself the sole legitimate patron of the Constitution.

C. "*Pancasila (Five Principles of the Nation)*"

Pancasila also has become a national symbol. Its use dates to an impromptu speech made by Sukarno before the Preparatory Committee for Independence on June 1, 1945, near the end of the Japanese occupation. As he recalls in his *Autobiography*, the idea of developing Five Principles to undergird national life was given him by divine inspiration: "In friendless Flores, spending incalculable hours under my private tree pondering," he writes, "the actual formation of this God-sent inspiration which has since been termed *Pantja Sila*—five principles—came to me. I do not say I created the *Pantja Sila*. What I did was to dig way

⁷ As the length of the speeches selected here do not vary greatly, they are not adjusted for uniform comparison. The failure to standardize the length of speeches may be justified in part by the fact that some words such as "development," "economy," and "revolution" appear in higher frequency in some shorter speeches than in other longer speeches.

down deep into the soil of our traditions and I came up with five beautiful pearls. . .” [27, p. 197].⁸ The phrase actually refers to the five principles of belief in God, nationalism, humanism, popular sovereignty, and social justice.

Though each of these principles may seem lofty in its own right, analysis shows them, as a group, to be highly contradictory, lacking logical consistency—an eclectic collection of principles helping support Sukarno’s subsequent calls for “unity in diversity.” Sukarno’s real need was for a slogan to integrate the diverse races, cultures, ideologies, and religions co-existing in the expansive territory inherited from the Dutch [16, p. 123].⁹ A concept like the Five Principles fits that need and after years of promotion came to be seen by the populace as an ideal indivisible from the 1945 Constitution.¹⁰ It is expressed, for example, in the national coat of arms in the form of a shield with five fields, a star, the head of a water buffalo, a banyan tree, a chain of links, and sprays of rice and cotton. And Sukarno posted the emblem on all government offices throughout the country, as well as in hotels, shops, restaurants, and even on street signs. Although almost leaving Pancasila out of his 1959 and 1963 Independence Day speeches, he referred to it seventeen times in 1961 and eighteen times in 1965.

Suharto also uses Pancasila as a symbol of national unity. He mentioned it some ninety-four times in his speech of August 1967, for example! In his efforts to win acceptance and legitimacy, Suharto, then still a general of obscure reputation, has had to emphasize the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila perhaps even more than Sukarno did.¹¹ Only thus could he convince the nation that the military was the legitimate protector of the spirit of independence. Suharto changed the date of Pancasila Day from June 1 to October 1, the day the September 30 Movement was crushed.¹² But always he made clear his intention of basing his New Order on Pancasila. Even the national broadcasting system (RRI) now ends its broadcasting day with the Song of the Pancasila.

⁸ For the full text of Sukarno’s speech on Pancasila made on June 1, 1945, see, for instance, [25, pp. 7–34].

⁹ Another important reason for Sukarno’s advocacy of Pancasila lay in the urgent need to refute the Moslem cry for the establishment of an Islamic state for post-independence Indonesia. For Sukarno’s reinforced stress on Pancasila after 1959, see, for instance, [24, pp. 21–29] and [26, pp. 9–10].

¹⁰ In fact, Pancasila was subsequently incorporated into the preamble of the 1945 Constitution.

¹¹ This point was discussed by the writer in greater detail elsewhere. See [19, pp. 175–77]. For the military’s reasoning of “dual function” see, for instance, Indonesia, Department of Information, *The Military in Indonesia*, special issue 061/1971 (Jakarta, 1971); and A. S. Nasution, *ABRI Penegak Demokrasi UUD 45* [The armed forces of the Indonesian Republic: the holders of the democracy of the 1945 Constitution] (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1966).

¹² For the year 1967 the Pancasila Day was still held on June 1. For Suharto’s speech on Pancasila, see *Pidato Pd. Presiden Republik Indonesia Pada Peringatan Hari Lahirnja Pantjasila, 1 Juni 1967 di Djakarta* [The speech of the president of the Indonesian Republic at the memorial day of the birth of Pancasila on June 1, 1967 at Jakarta], Penerbitan Khusus No. 454 (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1967).

III. POLICY SYMBOLS

A. "Revolution" and "Development"

Sukarno and Suharto have pursued differing policies, but they are alike in their penchant for sloganeering those policies. For Sukarno, the key word was "revolution" (*revolusi*); for Suharto it is "development" (*pembangunan*). Sukarno loved the word "revolution" more than any other, a fact evidenced by his well-known observation that "I am among those who have fallen in love with the romanticism of revolution. I am inspired by it and fascinated by it."¹³ He enjoyed his title of the Great Leader of the Revolution, and in January 1963 he

TABLE I
FREQUENCY OF CERTAIN TERMS USED BY SUKARNO AND SUHARTO
IN THEIR INDEPENDENCE DAY SPEECHES, 1959-74

	Sukarno Period				Suharto Period			
	1959	1961	1963	1965	1967	1969	1971	1974
Terms favored by both:								
Pancasila	5	17	1	18	94	27	16	24
1945 Constitution	52	32	0	2	55	16	6	25
<i>gotong-royong</i>	18	3	8	1	6	6	10	1
<i>musyawarah</i>	4	3	6	0	7	6	2	0
Terms favored by Sukarno:								
revolution	164	114	234	156	5	0	0	0
(to) struggle	32	70	32	32	13	13	6	12
Guided Democracy	14	11	17	1	0	0	0	0
I	122	188	196	38	5	46	56	12
I (in intimate form)	8	3	5	61	0	0	0	0
Terms favored by Suharto:								
development	15	3	7	2	51	44	140	123
economy	37	5	26	14	70	42	84	35
(to) implement(ation)	20	35	9	9	48	36	61	75
Pancasila Democracy	—	—	—	—	21	1	0	0
New Order	1	18	0	0	37	10	13	4
Length of texts (pages)*	56	58	49	49	74	42	47	50

Sources: For 1959-65, [14]; and for 1967-74, [21] published every year by the Department of Information.

Note: Original Indonesian words are listed below; some derivatives are also counted: 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945), revolution (*revolusi*), Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin), I (*saya*), I (in intimate form) (*aku*), development (*pembangunan*), economy (*ekonomi*), (to) implement(ation) (*melaksanakan, pelaksanaan*), Pancasila Democracy (Demokrasi Pancasila), New Order (Orde Baru, Ordening Baru).

* An average page contains approximately 270 words.

¹³ This remark was expressed in his 1960 Independence Day speech, whose text may be found, for example, in [14, p. 254].

named the presidential advisory organ for securing internal peace the "Revolutionary Leadership Advisory Council" (Sukarno was chairman). On establishing a political fund in 1964 to raise revenues for confronting Malaysia abroad and engaging in construction projects at home, he labeled it the "Revolutionary Fund" (Dana Revolusi). Foreign Minister Subandrio, Sukarno's closest confidant, advocated "revolutionary diplomacy."¹⁴ Sukarno's Independence Day speeches were quite naturally filled with the term (234 references to "revolution" in the 1963 speech) as well as by such equally emotional words as "struggles" and "fire" (see Table I). Indeed, the very titles of his speeches bear evidence of this love of the phrase, for he spoke on: "The Re-discovery of Our Revolution" (1959), "The Path of Our Revolution" (1960), "Revolution, Socialism and Leadership" (1961), and "The Cry of Indonesian Revolution" (1963). First letters from each of the words in the titles also were often used to make up new slogans such as Djarek (1960), Re-So-Pim (1961), and Gesuri (1963).¹⁵ The Great Leader of the Revolution loved symbols—and first among them was the word "revolution" itself.

Suharto also has employed symbols, but his favorite seems to be the word "development." Content analysis of his Independence Day speeches illustrates this point vividly. From 1967 on, use of words like "revolution" and "struggle" has declined markedly while that of such terms as "development," "economy," and "implementation" has sharply risen. "Development," for example, appeared 140 times and "economy" 84 times in the 1971 speech, and the word "implementation" was used 75 times in 1974. Suharto also named his October 1968 cabinet the "Development Cabinet" (Kabinet Pembangunan). Development has become a slogan. And his five-year plans since fiscal 1968 have been called *Repelita*. Even the postage stamps have extensively mobilized to *Repelita*. Furthermore, political party mergers promoted from 1971 to 1973 resulted in the "Development Democratic party" and the "Development Unity party." Suharto obviously relishes the word "development" as much as Sukarno did "revolution."¹⁶

B. "Guided Democracy" and "Pancasila Democracy"

In order to more fully realize his "revolution," Sukarno began talking about

¹⁴ See, for example, Subandrio, "Revolutionary Diplomacy," in *Indonesia on the March*, Vol. 2 (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1968); and Frederick P. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965; President Sukarno Moves from Non-Alignment to Confrontation," *Indonesia*, No. 2 (October 1966).

¹⁵ Perhaps the most important of all Sukarno's Independence Day speeches was the 1959 speech in which Sukarno declared his Political Manifesto (Manifesto Politik) later to be known as "Manipol."

¹⁶ The Indonesian Nationalist party (PNI), the Indonesian Christian party (PARKINDO), the Catholic party (PK), the Murba party (PM), and the League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence (IPKI) were grouped into the Development Democratic Group, while the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Indonesian Muslim party (PARMUSI), the Indonesian Islamic Association party (PSII), and the Islamic Education Movement (PERTI) joined to form the Development Unity Group. Later in January 1973 the two groups changed their names to the Indonesian Democratic party and the Development Unity party, respectively.

"Guided Democracy" (Demokrasi Terpimpin) in 1959. He pointed out that Indonesians had traditionally employed their own unique decision-making method (*musyawarah*) based on a consensus (*mufakat*). He contended that the Western principle of majority rule introduced in the 1950s was inappropriate for Indonesia since it made the will of "half-plus-one" that of the whole. Powerful leadership, he added, was essential if the process of *musyawarah* was to function—thus justifying his presidential decree abolishing the 1950 Provisional Constitution, which had adopted Western-style democracy, and reinstating the 1945 Constitution, which provided for much stronger presidential prerogatives [27, pp. 278–79]. The new system he called "Guided Democracy" and the newly appointed legislature he labeled the "Gotong-Royong" Parliament (DPR-GR), a phrase indicative of mutual help customs in traditional Javanese villages. Both of these phrases subsequently became policy symbols, a fact indicated by their frequent inclusion in his Independence Day speeches.

It is of extreme interest that Suharto too, though allegedly having destroyed Guided Democracy, devised essentially the same decision-making process under the label "Pancasila Democracy" [23, pp. 154–64]. In his August 1967 speech, Suharto simply rephrased Sukarno, noting that "Pancasila Democracy means using *musyawarah* to arrive at a consensus" [21, 1967, pp. 17, 20].¹⁷ Army Major General Ali Murtopo, leading thinker in the Suharto regime, also denied the principle of simple majority rule when he said in 1971 that "Western-style democracy with its 'half-plus-one' majority rule does not fit Indonesia; we need 'half-plus-one-plus-x' form" [2]. He too was doing little more than copying Sukarno's approach. As a matter of fact, the entire new system has come to seem very much the same as the old Guided Democracy, particularly in view of the way the nine political parties were pressed to merge into two from 1971 to 1973 and the way the marriage law was enacted in 1973 through the intervention of the military after great parliamentary confusion.

IV. ORGANIZATIONS FOR UNITY

A. *Javanese Rule*

Politics often is plagued in Indonesia by factional tensions between two regional and ethnic groupings—the Javanese and the non-Javanese.¹⁸ The former occupy about 70 per cent of the total population and play the dominant role, while the latter must accept a secondary place. Despite the overwhelming majority position occupied by the Javanese, however, the balance between the two is extremely

¹⁷ Table I reveals that Suharto's speeches of 1969, 1971, and 1974 make next to no references to "Pancasila Democracy" as such. Yet there are high-frequency uses of "Pancasila" and "democracy," the latter being used fifteen times in the 1971 speech and ten times in the 1974 speech.

¹⁸ With regard to conflicts between Java and the Outer Islands, see J. D. Legge, *Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia, 1950–1960* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961); and Leslie H. Palmier, *Indonesia and the Dutch* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

important to national unity. Thus, constant attempts are made to balance personnel. Until 1956, for example, the Javanese president, Sukarno, was balanced by a Sumatran vice-president, Hatta. After Hatta resigned from vice-presidency in 1956, the post remained vacant for several years, but the balance was maintained when Sukarno named Lieutenant General Nasution, also of Sumatra, defense minister and, concurrently, chief of staff of the armed forces. Nasution was long referred to as a most influential figure representing the armed forces, though Sukarno at last demoted him in 1964 and promoted General Yani, a Javanese, to the post. Some have interpreted this move as ending the balance, but it is also quite possible to see it under another light: since Sukarno already had appointed non-Javanese Chairul Saleh and Leimena to important posts in November 1963 and named Javanese Subandrio to deputy premier that same year, he may have thought that the promotion of General Yani would help restore the balance.

The principle of balanced Javanese rule was inherited intact by the Suharto government. From the very outset, following the September 30 Incident and the death of General Yani, Suharto the Javanese rather than General Nasution, who had the high popular esteem, assumed the presidency. Instead, Nasution was named chairman of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS)—the body that had been instrumental in extinguishing the Sukarno regime—from 1966 to 1968. And when that assembly's immediate tasks had been accomplished and Nasution's role in it had become less conspicuous, President Suharto gave his other post—that of the minister of security and defense—to General Panggabean of Sumatra in another effort to maintain ethnic balance. After giving a high post to the Sumatran, in 1973, he nominated Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, a Javanese, to the long vacant vice-presidency. Furthermore, the 1970 Election Law represented a significant concession by the Javanese to the non-Javanese whereby the number of elective seats in the Parliament (DPR) was divided almost equally between Java and the Outer Islands.¹⁹ Such a consideration of inter-ethnic balance in Indonesian politics may well be the most important step for any leader in trying to maintain national unity.²⁰

B. *NASAKOM and the Tripartite System*

The system which supported Sukarno, referred to as NASAKOM, stood for the country's three powerful political groups: the Nationalist party, Nahdatul Ulama (a Moslem party), and the Communist party.²¹ Sukarno's idea in forming

¹⁹ Article 7 of the 1970 Election Law No. 2 stipulates that Java is to control 184 of the 360 elective seats of the Parliament, while the Outer Islands control 176 seats. This may be contrasted by the proportion in the 1955 elections which gave 172 seats to Java but only 85 seats to the Outer Islands.

²⁰ A stimulating analysis of the Indonesian military factional conflicts is given, for instance, in Crouch [4, pp. 1-5].

²¹ A similar political picture can be found in Malaysia, where the ruling Alliance party is a coalition of three ethnic political groups, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress

such a system was eclectic; he wanted to form a patron organization that would embrace all conflicting elements. If three political organizations with divergent ideologies are to be kept in balance, the leader of each organization dare not ignore any other organization lest his organization may be forced out. It was for this reason that Sukarno included the three elements in such offices as the Gotong-Royong Parliament, Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, and the Supreme Advisory Council (an advisory organ to the president).²²

The September 30 Incident in 1965 destroyed one of these three forces, the Communist party, even as it gave birth to Suharto's New Order, an order which amounted to the removal of Sukarno, the eradication of the Communists and the establishment of military power. Restrictions were placed on the activities of political parties but Suharto quickly began advocating the creation of three major groups: (1) GOLKAR (functional group) controlled by the military, (2) the "Material Development Group" made up of the Nationalist party and other nationalist elements, and (3) the "Spiritual Development Group" consolidated around Nahdatul Ulama and the Indonesian Muslim party (PARMUSI).²³

Following the July 1971 general elections these three groups came to be called, respectively, GOLKAR, the Development Democratic Group, and the Development Unity Group. In 1973, the terminology was changed to GOLKAR, the Indonesian Democratic party, and the Development Unity party. Just as Sukarno reorganized the Gotong-Royong Parliament's ten existing parties into three groups through the Party Simplification Law of 1960, so Suharto moved in 1971 to require that all legislators belong to one of the three groups named above. He has subsequently enforced the tripartite system even more rigorously than did Sukarno.²⁴

To the question of why Indonesia's presidents have thus created systems that demanded the cooperation of three groups, one can only make a conjecture. The most likely answer might be that with *three* groups, conflicts, though apt to

(MIC). The Alliance party managed to include six minor parties in the National Front in the face of 1974 general election, bringing about an overwhelming victory.

²² At the time the 283-member Gotong-Royong Parliament was established in 1960, party representatives occupied a total of 130 seats, of which PNI controlled 44, NU 36, and PKI 30 seats. The same three parties controlled six out of forty-five seats of the Supreme Advisory Council. Chiefs of the three parties took deputy chairmanship of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly. Incidentally the assembly's fourth deputy chairmanship was given to an army representative, an indication of the army's criticism of the NASAKOM and Sukarno's concession to it.

²³ Concepts of "material development" and "spiritual development" appear in the government document as early as in 1967. See [11, pp.25-26].

²⁴ There were 152 functional representatives in Sukarno's Parliament of 283 members, but unlike Suharto's Parliament they were not united as one group. For this reason they are treated here as minor groups. The military representatives in Suharto's Parliament are treated as an integral part of the GOLKAR. The Suharto government's support of a tripartite system is fittingly illustrated in the front cover of *Indonesia Magazine* (No. 14, 1971), which featured "Reform of Political Structure," depicting a trotting *troika*, representing the GOLKAR and the two amalgamated parties.

occur, are not likely to become bitter and divisive. The two-party system is inclined to produce a Western type of "half-plus-one" majority rule, whereas the tripartite system is more apt to induce "half-plus-one-plus-x" majority rule, an Indonesian way of democracy.

V. ORGANIZATIONS FOR POLICY EXECUTION

A. *The Bureaucracy as the Party in Power*

The Nationalist party, to which Sukarno once belonged, reportedly had a registered membership of some 3.5 million in the early 1960s, the core of these people being local government employees. It is quite natural for any developing government party to turn to the existing bureaucracy for organizational assistance. And this is just what this party did, so much so that the bulk of its early members were government bureaucrats—or *prijai* (later they came to be called *pamon pradja*) [7, p. 139] [6, p. 154]. Indeed when this party won the first general election in 1955, it was even nicknamed the *lurah* party because it had rallied the support of *lurah* ("chiefs") of *desa* ("villages"), men who represented the lowest level of the bureaucracy [7, p. 432] [6, p. 172].

The reform of the government bureaucracy or "retooling" was Sukarno's persistent call after 1959. His objective was to dismiss public servants who did not uphold the 1945 Constitution and the Guided Democracy. This ideological purification process in effect worked to make the bureaucracy the government party [17, p. 155].

Once the Suharto regime had taken control, it too found it necessary to restructure the political system in order to consolidate its own patron elements. And Suharto too would, in time, turn to the bureaucracy for aid. His first task, however, was to eradicate all undesirable organizations, forbidding ideologically oriented political parties.²⁵ After squashing the Communist party on March 12, 1966, Suharto suspended the activities of the left wing of the Nationalist party (usually referred to as the ASU group, represented by Ali Sastroamidjojo and Surachman), arresting those party members who were alleged to have been involved in the September 30 Incident, just as he did the Communists.²⁶ The PARMUSI, organized in February 1968 with the obvious backing of Suharto, also followed this anti-Communist line. Leading circles in the military, meanwhile, gave some thought to also aligning with these anti-Communist elements at first, but after 1969 changed their strategy in order to be prepared for the 1971 general elections and decided to throw support behind GOLKAR alone.

²⁵ Confer Herbert Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," *Indonesia*, No. 6 (October 1968).

²⁶ For the 1971 elections there were 2,123,747 persons ineligible to vote. See Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, "Daftar E.N.R.I. jang tidak berhak memilih, Tiap Daerah Tingkat I di Seluruh Indonesia" [The list of the citizens of the Republic of Indonesia who have not the rights to vote: by first-level provinces in the whole Indonesia], mimeographed, July 29, 1971. These included those involved in the September 30 Movement of 1965, PKI members, and their suspects.

The consolidation process continued when, on December 4, 1969, Home Affairs Minister Amir Machmud issued a decree forbidding functional group members of local assemblies from joining political parties. Then the national conventions of both the Nationalist party held in March 1970 and the PARMUSI in October that year were interfered with by special teams (OPSUS) led by then Brigadier General Ali Murtopo, an intelligence officer and "number one advisor" to Suharto; they were forced to choose party presidents suitable to the military. It was not enough, however, for the military to seek these political parties; it also made enthusiastic efforts to strengthen the GOLKAR primarily by encouraging members of the bureaucracy to join it.²⁷ From the end of 1970 onward, all functional groups such as local government officials, members of police branch offices and of neighborhood vigilante groups (HANSIP) were pressured to belong to the GOLKAR, and all the government buildings throughout the country began displaying GOLKAR emblems. In the central government, moreover, the various ministries were organized into individual government workers' leagues, with all of them joined at the top in a National Government Workers' League. The core unit of the league was the one in the Home Affairs Ministry (KOKARMENDAGRI), led by Home Affairs Minister Amir Machmud, an individual who also served as chairman of the General Elections Committee.

As the 1971 election day approached, organizing efforts expanded to also bring family members of government workers into GOLKAR. On April 26, a Jakarta convention for heads of neighborhood organizations was attended by no fewer than twenty thousand persons. Even the *lurah* was allegedly directed to rally support for GOLKAR, much as Sukarno had made the Nationalist party into a so-called *lurah* party during the 1955 elections. It was hardly surprising then that GOLKAR won 272 of the 360 seats at stake. They received 62.8 per cent of the total votes cast—an overwhelming victory.

B. *Rule by Extra-Constitutional Organs*

Both Sukarno and Suharto advocated strict observance of the 1945 Constitution; yet both were adept at positing much of real power in extra-constitutional organs and allowing constitutional bodies only limited power. The Constitution gives the president extensive prerogatives, including the power to make or veto law bills, to appoint and dismiss ministers, to command the armed forces, and to declare, if he feels it necessary, a state of emergency giving presidential decrees the same status as laws passed by the legislature. Moreover, since the president is elected by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which usually meets just once every five years, he is not responsible to the Parliament (DPR). The Parliament does have the formal right to convene a special session of the assembly, but that option has never been effectively exercised due to the great difficulty of quickly convening its six hundred to nine hundred members. The president's

²⁷ See Nishihara [18, pp. 17–23]; R. William Liddle, "Evolution from Above: National Leadership and Local Development in Indonesia," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (February 1973); and idem, "The 1971 Indonesian Elections: A View from the Village," *Asia*, No. 27 (Autumn 1972).

post was made further secure by the fact that he could continue to be elected to successive five-year terms.

Nor were these provisions the total source of Sukarno's extraordinary strength. After a state of emergency had been proclaimed in 1959, all seats in the DPR and the MPR became appointive, thus making them even more vulnerable to presidential whim. Then, in 1960, in order to avoid the inefficiency caused by inter-party strife, Sukarno appointed a Parliament made up of 150 functional representatives and just 130 party adherents, thus assuring a perpetual parliamentary majority in his favor. And finally, in 1963, the Provisional MPR made Sukarno "President for Life," making its own puppet-like role all the more apparent in the process.

The traditional Indonesian decision-making process of *musyawarah*, which Sukarno advocated and through which he assured support for himself, was exercised in the cabinet formation too. There had been twenty-five ministers in the cabinet immediately preceding July 1959, but when the "Work Cabinet" (Kabinet Kerdja) was formed in July, the number was increased to forty-three, and then to seventy-seven in the "Double-Demand Cabinet" (Kabinet Dwikora) set up in September 1964. The ultimate came in September 1965 with the selection of 103 members to the so-called "100-Minister Cabinet." By then the cabinet had lost its administrative nature; it had simply become a gathering of representatives from various fields.

It has already been pointed out that Sukarno tried to hide administrative inefficiency behind a façade of eloquent oratory. He also resorted to use of the National Front, a mass organization of his supporters, and he created several new bodies such as the Cabinet Presidium, as inner cabinet, made up of his confidants; the Supreme Operational Command (KOTI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (BPI). The National Front, set up in September 1961, grew out of a Political Manifesto (Manipol) passed two years earlier. Based on the principle of Guided Democracy and headed by Sukarno himself, it served to channel revolutionary activity, of both a spiritual and material nature, into modes of cooperation with the government. It was a genuine patron organization: vertical in structure; embracing nine political parties, mass organizations, and functional groups; and supported substantially by government financial aid. In March 1962, for instance, it convened a Convention in Support of the Three National Directives, attempting thereby to support the government's policy of liberating West Irian, and in August of the same year a Convention in Support of Takem to express enthusiasm over Sukarno's latest Independence Day speech, "An Address of the Victorious Year" (Takem). It has even been suggested that Sukarno's aim in creating the National Front had been to eventually make it a political party thereby establishing a one-party dictatorship [15, p.245].

Among Sukarno's supporters, the three deputy premiers were his closest confidants—Saleh, Subandrio, and Leimena. Sukarno himself noted in his *Autobiography*: "Immediately underneath me is the presidium, a triumvirate of the Deputy Prime Ministers Subandrio, Leimena, and Saleh. They are my assistants.

When trouble hits, I first call the presidium for their comments" [27, p. 283].²⁸ Some suspect that Saleh and Subandrio both had eventual designs on Sukarno's own post, but whether that was true or not there is no denying that both exercised much power. Saleh held such posts as minister for mining and industry and (concurrently) minister of coordination for industrial activities (thereby controlling all other ministers in similar fields), chairman of the 1945 Generation, and chairman of the Provisional MPR. He was also active in the National Front.²⁹ Subandrio served as foreign minister from 1957 to 1966, organized and became director of the Central Intelligence Agency (BPI) in 1960 and served concurrently as deputy commander of both the Supreme Operational Command (KOTI) and the Supreme Economic Operational Command (KOTOE) (see below). His authority thus spread across foreign relations, external economic relations, external and internal intelligence activities. His competition with Saleh for ascendancy was keen.

Other examples of Sukarno's use of extra-constitutional bodies include the KOTI and KOTOE. The first of these began in December 1961 as the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian. But when its West Irian functions had been completed it was renamed the Supreme Operational Command (Presidential Decree No. 142) and was empowered to decide on and execute national policy of the highest level. Indeed, once the president had designated a certain task as that of the KOTI, its power became absolute, whether in the area of politics, economics, social affairs, culture, or military matters [28, pp. 1, 4]. The Supreme Economic Operational Command (KOTOE) was similarly powerful. Founded in 1962, it was given supreme authority for coordinating, integrating, planning, and executing economic affairs.³⁰ It was dissolved and absorbed in the KOTI in December 1965, but the important point here is the way in which Sukarno transferred constitutional powers to so many extra-constitutional organizations.³¹ It was the only way he had of maintaining either order or authority when formal organs of rule fell into disarray.

Despite his unquestionable strength, Sukarno remained incapable of controlling one element in national life—the anti-Communist military led by Nasution. Suharto in this sense is in a more favorable position than Sukarno. He came from the military, and his inferior oratory has thus been offset by his control of

²⁸ Saleh assumed the post in November 1963 following the death of Djuanda.

²⁹ According to an informed source, Saleh claimed that he was the one who provided the most influence upon Sukarno in formulating the concept of Guided Democracy. See Jones [15, p. 434].

³⁰ The KOTOE commander was Sukarno himself, assisted by Subandrio, Leimena, and Saleh as deputy commanders.

³¹ Added to the extra-constitutional KOTI and KOTOE during Sukarno's era were the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) set up in 1964, headed by Sukarno and assisted by Subandrio, Leimena, and Saleh; the Frontier Areas Economic Development Command (KOPEDASAN) organized in 1963 and headed by Subandrio; the Self-Reliance Command (KOTARI) established in September 1965 and commanded by Sukarno, just to name a few more. Numerous such organizations came into being, making one wonder how these organs were functionally coordinated.

that force. This does not mean, however, that Suharto has been able to rule the country by constitutional organizations alone. To the contrary, he too relies on many extra-constitutional bodies. Among typical examples are Presidential Personal Assistants (ASPRI), the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN), the Special Operations Team (OPSUS), and the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB).

Suharto was appointed first commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) in May 1962, a post that also made him acting army commander. His influence soared following the September 30 Incident in 1965, when Sukarno also named him commander of the Restoration of Security and Order (October 2) and defense minister (October 16). One of his first steps in these posts was to surround himself with several aides as "brain trusts." And as a result, when Suharto became the acting president in March 1967, he already had thirteen officers serve in a private capacity as his personal assistants (SPRI) [22, pp. 132-56]. Although they should have limited their activities to giving ideas (since they were technically private staffers), it was said that Suharto's confidence in them gradually led to their participation in actual "decision-making." Some of them even attended cabinet meetings, exerting influence through speeches that far exceeded the "supplementary" statements they were supposed to make. The personal staff soon became, in effect, the functioning cabinet. Although they were designated once more as private aides (ASPRI) in June 1968, and though their number was reduced from thirteen to five, their authority apparently remained great.³²

It should be noted that members of the ASPRI acted not as a group but as individuals. Among the most influential were Army Major General Ali Murtopo, who was in charge of political intelligence, and Army Major General Sudjono Humardhani, the man responsible for economic affairs. Because of his unusual political ability in efficiently dealing with a wide variety of issues, Ali is sometimes suggested as a future candidate for the presidency. He organized his own Special Operations (OPSUS) as an ex-intelligence officer, and is said to have organized new Suharto factions in parties and newspapers prior to the 1971 election. Although the size and scale of the OPSUS is unknown, it probably was his role as its leader which caused Suharto to put him in charge of logistics for the General Elections Committee (LPU) in 1971. He also acted at that time as a campaign manager for GOLKAR. Such trouble-shooting was a carry-over from the Sukarno era, when Army Brigadier General Muhammad Sabur, chief of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, Sukarno's bodyguard, played a similar role. Sukarno reportedly enjoyed communicating his desires implicitly through Sabur—so much so that the word "Saburism" was coined to describe this pattern of communication [22, p. 135].³³

³² In response to student protest against the ASPRI in July 1970, Suharto pointed out that they did not participate in cabinet decisions and that their chief mission was collecting information and presenting divergent viewpoints. But criticism against the ASPRI's powers mounted steadily until the Jakarta riot in January 1974 forced President Suharto to finally dissolve the ASPRI system.

The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) is another powerful extra-constitutional body which has functioned under Suharto, comparable to the Central Intelligence Agency (BPI) under Sukarno. The BPI was taken from Subandrio's grasp in December 1965 and reorganized into Suharto's own National Intelligence Command (KIN) in August 1966. Under Suharto it then came to be called the BAKIN, was placed under the Ministry of Defense and Internal Peace for a time, and finally was made directly responsible to the president in December 1969. It has been directed since then by Joga Sugama (1969-70) and Sutopo Juwono (1970-January 1974), both members of the ASPRI. The deputy director of the BAKIN is Ali Murtopo.

Other former members of the ASPRI who later assumed important positions in the Suharto government include Major General Alamsjah who was appointed director of the state secretariat; Brigadier General Sudharmono, later named chief cabinet secretary, and Major General Surjo, who was placed in charge of the state budget. That Suharto put so many of his confidants in important state positions vividly demonstrates the difficulty he encountered in ruling through the existing constitutional bureaucracy.

A final extra-constitutional body deserving of note is the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB). Established in December 1965 to restore order after the September 30 Incident, its members subsequently became thought police, concerned not only with those involved in the incident but with activities of political party members and public workers. At the time of the 1971 election it even helped screen the candidates. It took stern measures against the 1973 anti-Chinese riot in Bandung and the ostensibly anti-Japanese Jakarta riot in January 1974, ignoring the existing police machinery in those areas. And most of those arrested by the KOPKAMTIB were tried in the Special Military Court (MAHMILUB), which is a controversial procedure since the offenders could have been tried in ordinary courts of law.

In March 1973 the MPR outlined the status and functions of the "supreme national organs" (Resolution No. 6), stipulating that the "supreme bodies" should consist of the president, the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), the Parliament, the Board of Audit, and the Supreme Court [13, pp. 11-15]. Such organizations as the ASPRI, OPSUS, BAKIN, and KOPKAMTIB thus fell outside the "supreme bodies." Yet, with the exception of the ASPRI which was dissolved after the riots in January 1974, each of these bodies continues to occupy a pivotal position. Controlled in large part by the Suharto faction (or the Diponegoro Division), even (in the case of the KOPKAMTIB) directed by Suharto himself, they still dominate official life.

VI. FUTURE OF SUHARTO'S RULE

The two Indonesian presidents thus have a surprisingly high degree of common features in terms of their symbols and organizational setups for national unity

³³ For an example of Sabur's admiration of Sukarno, see Sabur, *Bung Karno and Indonesia* (Jakarta, n.d.).

as well as for policy execution. It seems that prior studies of Indonesian politics have placed excessive emphasis on the contrasting features, or elements of discontinuity, between the two presidents. While not denying such discontinuity, one may arrive at a more profound understanding of Indonesia's political culture by throwing some light on the other aspect of it, i.e., the continuity. To summarize the principal points: (1) Both Sukarno and Suharto use identical symbols for attaining national unity; (2) they have differing policy symbols but both form new acronyms out of initials of phrases or slogans; (3) they both emphasize the procedure of *musyawarah* as a means of arriving at *mufakat* ("consensus") and pay minute attention to the factional balance among various ethnic groups; (4) they both welcome the coexistence of three political power groups; (5) they both place the existing bureaucracy at the core of their respective supportive political bases; and (6) they both fail to make full use of existing administrative machinery, turning to newly created organs to achieve consensus and implement policy measures. In terms of frequent uses of symbols for national unity, Suharto as well may be called a "solidarity maker," the phrase Feith used originally to describe Sukarno [7, pp. 113-22].

The style of rule in Indonesia is not at all unique to this country. Any political elite attempts to unify the country and execute programs through the use of symbols. Marcos of the Philippines advocated a plan called "A New Society" to achieve unity and implement policies in 1972 when he declared martial law. In the same manner, Rahman of Malaysia tried to promote national integration by the slogan "racial harmony," while Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore advocated a "multi-cultural society." Nor are the Indonesian organizational features unique among Asian countries. In any polity, the formal organization is never identical with the substantive one, giving rise to other organizations which yield real and actual power. It is quite common to set up ad hoc organs when existing bureaucracy fails to accomplish its intended objectives.

What then accounts for such continuity in styles of rule of both the Sukarno and Suharto governments? One explanation may be that in Indonesia which is basically a young nation and a big, multi-racial one, national integration inevitably commands priority, for which political symbols are found most efficacious. It should be noted that such political styles are bound to continue regardless of the personalities of the Indonesian presidents. Another explanation may be that Suharto simply has decided to follow the basic style of rule from Sukarno. Suharto may well have thought that it was more advantageous for him to continue using much of what Sukarno had created during the twenty years of his reign, especially the last several years, than to destroy it and create his own style of rule completely anew. If the governed retain their concept of rule, the leadership may attain greatest effectiveness by continuing to utilize the same style.

Whichever explanation may hold true, there remains an important question of: from what source Sukarno himself sought his style of rule. He maintained, as has been shown already, that he had given many years including his solitary years on the Flores during the Dutch rule to a formulation of Pancasila. He explained his concept of Guided Democracy as the traditional Javanese village decision-

making process applied at the national level. The prototype of Guided Democracy certainly finds its place in Indonesian history, but the origin of the Five Principles is not quite so evident.³⁴ Both the Budi Utomo Movement since 1910 and the Taman Siswa Movement exercised a certain influence on Sukarno in his formulation of the concept of power.³⁵ Sukarno was not a forerunner of these nationalistic movements but instead was a child of them. In this sense Sukarno was a successor to the Javanese style of rule.

The sloganizing of various policies, political events, and historical incidents originates in this country prior even to World War II. The Taman Siswa Movement advocated many slogans, such as "order and peace" and "exercising great arts through active mind," the last of which is said to signify the year 1922 when this movement first started [29, pp. 161-62]. This corresponds to the fact that the report of the Eight-Year Economic Plan in 1960 consisted of 1,945 paragraphs constituting 17 chapters in 8 volumes. It is also possible that the frequent use of slogans by the Japanese military during its occupation had some effect upon Sukarno's postwar rule. Sukarno's advocacy of Pancasila is in fact quite similar to the 3-A Movement advocated by the 16th Army Propaganda Group dispatched to Java. The slogan brought about such organizations as the 3-A Youth Training Center and the 3-A Technical School, in a similar manner in which the August 17 University was established. Such Japanese military-sponsored mass organizations as the 3-A Movement, the Putra (National Total Force Mobilization Movement), and the Java Service Society were in fact quite similar to Sukarno's National Front and Suharto's GOLKAR. There are also similarities in function and composition between the Central Advisory Council under the Japanese occupation and the People's Consultative Assembly under Sukarno and Suharto. Both are supreme organs of the time but more in name than in reality. The Japanese military administration in Java aimed at incorporating into the Central Advisory Council divergent ethnic interests of overseas Chinese, Arabs, Indians, and mixed bloods as well as indigenous Indonesians. Similarly Sukarno and Suharto have had divergent political interests represented in the People's Consultative Assembly. Since Sukarno occupied the highest positions given to Indonesians in these military-sponsored organizations, it is entirely conceivable that he was considerably influenced by the way they operated. Recent studies on Indonesia tend to emphasize the impact of the Japanese occupation on the Indonesian Armed Forces and note common characteristics

³⁴ The Indonesians appear to favor the number five. In November 1944, a half year before Sukarno spoke of Pancasila, he had advocated "Panca Dharma" (Five Duties) for the Indonesians in facing the Pacific War. In March 1968, the Provincial MPR passed a resolution on "Panca Krida" (Five Tasks) for the new cabinet to fulfill in combatting post-Sukarno situations. See [5, p. 283] and [12, p. 45].

³⁵ See Akira Nagazumi, *The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918* (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1972); Ruth McVey, "Taman Siswa and the Indonesian National Awakening," *Indonesia*, No. 4 (October 1967). For the Javanese concept of power, see Benedict R. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. Claire Holt (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972).

which exist between the Japanese military rule and the Suharto government [8, pp. 89–100]. It may be closer to the truth, however, to see the Japanese military occupation as exercising its impact on Sukarno, subsequently passed on to Suharto. Examinations of the two presidents alone may not sufficiently prove the point that they both follow the traditional Javanese style of rule. More time is needed to determine the extent of continuity with the indigenous Javanese style.

What is important at the moment rather is the future prospect of the Suharto government as examined from the viewpoint of style of rule. Reportedly, Suharto is willing to serve the presidency for three additional terms (fifteen years) after his present term expires in 1978. The period corresponds to that of the "Twenty-five-year Plan to Accelerate Modernization" as advocated by Ali Murtopo in the platform of the GOLKAR [20, p. 28].³⁶ If this plan for development should fail to proceed smoothly, what style of rule may Suharto then adopt? Would he continue to distinguish himself from Sukarno and advocate "development"? Sukarno united the country through his oratory, made himself the symbol of national unity, and carried out many projects to demonstrate the fruit of the "revolution" precisely at a time when economic plans were falling apart and national unity was threatened. In other words, he promoted the cult of personality and prestige projects. Some claim that a similar tendency is detected in Suharto, indicating the "Sukarnoization of Suharto" [20]. This merits examination.

The cult of personality was promoted at all opportunities by Sukarno. His philosophy and policies were called Sukarnoism; the "Sukarno Bridge" was constructed over the Musi River in Palembang, South Sumatra in 1965 by Japanese war reparation funds; the highest mountain in West Irian was renamed after Sukarno in 1962 to commemorate the "liberation" of that part of the country; and the "Sukarno Front" was newly organized in February 1966 to support him. That Sukarno was made the president for life and the Great Leader of the Revolution by the Provisional MPR in May 1963 should also be seen under the same light. The frequency of the first person singular (*saya*) in his Independence Day speeches is far greater than that of Suharto's (see Table I). It is also noteworthy that he used another more intimate form of the first person singular, *aku*, in 1963 and 1965. Suharto does not make use of the *aku* form in speeches. But Suharto seems to like the nickname of Pak Harto, as Sukarno was called Bun Karno. Further, circulation of Sukarno money has been forbidden since about 1971, and postage stamps with Suharto's picture are in use. These moves may be seen as part of Suharto's maneuver to promote his own cult of personality.

Intent on achieving the Indonesian revolution, Sukarno promoted construction of various monuments to commemorate it. They should be classified as symbols for policy execution in the context of this article. On top of the tall National Monument (Monas) constructed in Jakarta's Merdeka Plaza in 1961 there is

³⁶ Also confer Ali Murtopo, *Dasar-Dasar Pemikiran tentang Akselerasi Modernisasi Pembangunan 25 Tahun* [The basic ideas on the acceleration of modernization and development in the coming 25 years] (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1972).

a gold flame-shaped ornament to symbolize the revolutionary fire. The same applies to the monument in commemoration of the "liberation" of West Irian in the same city's Banteng Plaza. In order to enhance national prestige Sukarno built a sports stadium for the Asian Games with aid from the Soviet Union, as well as the ten-story Hotel Indonesia with the reparation funds from Japan. Finally, in 1965, he attempted to build an international headquarters building for newly emerging countries with Chinese aid. Being totally useless projects in terms of Indonesia's economic strength of the time, they were prestige projects to enhance the image of Sukarno and, ultimately, of the nation. It is interesting to note that Suharto also wishes to promote prestige projects on the theme of "development." Some of the examples are the annual Jakarta Festivals, the Bina Ria amusement center (including a computer-operated gambling area and a bowling alley), a big ice-skating arena, and a group of high-rise hotels in Jakarta. In 1971, Mrs. Suharto posed the idea of building a "Mini Indonesia" after Disneyland, but the plan was severely criticized but implemented.³⁷ This project is another prestige-enhancing plan in development orientation. Hotels and amusement facilities may appear as visible signs of development to the eyes of the general populace. But one also detects deception and irrelevancy of such "development" projects.

In case Suharto's economic plans fail to achieve their objectives he may encourage the cult of himself even more strenuously than in the past in order to maintain national unity, although his personality would constrain him from changing into an emotional advocate of revolution. "Development" was and is the legitimate basis of his authority, and any deviation would be costly. He would therefore be likely to continue to create new development slogans, while reinforcing unity symbols such as "Pancasila" and "the 1945 Constitution."

³⁷ For an insightful interpretation of the National Monument, the West Irian Liberation Monument, and the Mini-Indonesia Project, see [1, pp. 61-72].

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