

CHINA'S URBAN PLANNING: TOWARD DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT URBANIZATION

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MODERNIZATION and industrialization in Western Europe and the Soviet Union proceeded simultaneously with rapid urbanization. The center of New China's economic policies since 1949 was the construction of heavy industry. What is urbanization like in contemporary China? Have urban problems arisen? These questions to be discussed in this paper have been virtually ignored in the past.

I. FROM CONSUMER CITIES TO PRODUCER CITIES

In March 1949, right before liberation of all China, the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee met and decided on post-liberation political and economic policies. At this meeting Mao Zedong pointed out:

The center of gravity of the Party's work has shifted from the village to the city. . . . Only when production in the cities is restored and developed, when consumer-cities are transformed into producer-cities, can the people's political power be consolidated. [42, pp. 363, 365]

On March 17, 1949, the *Renmin ribao* (People's daily) editorial also stated as follows: Old China's cities were all consumer cities. Although the cities were exploited by imperialism, they acted as exploiters toward the rural areas. Therefore, let us remove the antagonism between the cities and the rural areas, and speedily restore the productivity of the cities.

Old China's cities can be divided into the following three categories:

(1) Feudal consumer cities with a long history (Beijing [Peking], Xian, Kaifeng, etc.). Hardly any modern industry existed. Urban planning was characterized by castle walls and lattice style streets.

(2) Semi-colonial cities (Shanghai, Tianjin). Foreign settlements formed independent kingdoms. The situation was one of uneven development with slums spreading around settlements where buildings were crowded together. Shanghai was known as the "paradise of adventurers," and at the entrance of Huangpu Park a notice read "No dogs and Chinese allowed."

(3) Colonial cities (Changchun, Dalian, Harbin, Qingdao). Japan, Russia, and Germany deliberately constructed cities for the purpose of colonial manage-

This article presents a condensed description of post-1960 urban planning. For fuller discussion, please refer to my articles [31] [32]. In this article Chinese is romanized according to contemporary Chinese usage (*Pinyin* system).

ment. In China's Northeast area, Japan's Guandong Army and the South Manchurian Railroad Company carried out large-scale urban planning.

After liberation China started urban planning on the principles: "From the cities serving the ruling class to the cities serving the people," "from consumer-cities to producer-cities." These principles have remained consistent to today. However, concrete urban policies have brought about great changes.

The time between 1949 and 1952 is called the period of economic recovery. During this period, land reform was completed and bureaucratic capital nationalized. From 1953 the First Five-Year Plan marked the shift from recovery to construction. The center of the plan was the construction of heavy industry and across the nation large-scale construction of industrial bases began.

In order to start urban construction the following laws and regulations were promulgated:

- (1) Suburban Land Reform Regulation (November 11, 1950) [85, pp. 93-95].
- (2) Provisional Regulation for Taxation of Urban Housing, Land and Property (August 8, 1951) [85, pp. 139-41].
- (3) Provisional Law for Capital Construction (January 9, 1952) [86, pp. 75-90].
- (4) Law for Requisition of Land for National Reconstruction (December 5, 1953) [87, pp. 86-90].

Also, urban planners were trained and administrative organizations prepared. This problem is discussed in detail by Liu Xiufeng [37].

When urban construction began, two problems arose due to insufficient urban planning. The first was the tendency of excessively rapid construction. In order to carry out urban remodelling in a short period of time, construction was accelerated everywhere and construction funds were wasted. Again, the lack of a master plan produced confusion such as constructing housing within industrial areas [13]. Second was the fact that urban plans fell behind the speed of industrial construction.

In August 1954, the First National Urban Construction Conference met. This conference summarized the past several years' urban construction and decided on the following urban guidelines for the First Five-Year Plan period:

New China's cities must serve socialist industrialization. Urban construction must be advanced on a priority basis in order to serve the basic tasks of the First Five-Year Plan. [58]

Cities were divided into four categories according to the degree of industrial construction: (1) new industrial cities; (2) cities to be enlarged in proportion with industrial construction; (3) cities with little industrial construction where public facilities exist; and (4) medium and small cities. New industrial cities received priority.

Such construction principles reflected the view that "the speed of development of socialist cities is inevitably determined by the rate of growth of socialist industry" [16]. The Soviet Union's urban planning was the model, and the idea prevailed that urban planning "must reflect the new era's greatness and beauty"

[33]. As a result, there was a strong predilection in urban planning to construct large cities everywhere. The urban policies of this period gave no consideration to rural planning. Concerning the peasants, the *Renmin ribao* stated only that the expropriation of farmland "should be propagandized as the peasants' glorious responsibility in the process of socialist industrialization" [67].

II. THE RISE OF URBAN PROBLEMS

A. Development of Inland Industrial Cities

During the First Five-Year Plan period, the restoration and enlargement of coastal cities as well as the construction of inland industrial cities advanced. Eight hundred and twenty-five major projects,¹ including 156 dependent on Soviet aid, were carried out and 530 of these were located inland [69]. As a result, the percentage of industry concentrated in the coastal areas gradually declined from 77 per cent in 1949 to 73.1 per cent in 1952 and 67.9 per cent in 1956 [59] [69]. The distorted colonial economy which concentrated industry on the coast was gradually improved.

While reconstruction of cities with a long history proceeded, at the same time industrial cities came into being in uninhabited areas, for example Yumen (Gansu Province, oil), Yichun (Heilongjiang Province, forestry), etc. The overall situation in urban construction is shown in Table I-III. Various urban facilities were provided. For example, the number of cities possessing water systems increased from 86 to 112 between 1952 and 1957. The number of cities possessing sewer systems increased from 115 to 148 in the same period [1].

In each of twelve cities, eleven to twenty big projects received construction priority. Six cities had more than twenty-one priority construction projects. The investment for public utilities, in eighteen cities including Taiyuan and Xian occupied 68 per cent of total investment for public utilities [1] (Figure 1).

TABLE I
THE POPULATION AND THE NUMBER OF CITIES AND TOWNS (1953)

	Number of Cities	Population (10,000 people)
Cities administered by central and provincial government	166	4,353
Small cities*	256	779
Towns†	5,144	2,594

Source: Calculated from [54].

* They can be considered to be county capitals and commercial and industrial areas with populations above 20,000 without municipal administrations.

† They can be considered county capitals and residential areas with populations of 2,000-20,000. Many exceptions are included.

¹ According to Provisional Law for Capital Construction (*jiben jianshe gongzuo zhanxing banfa*), distinction was made between the two kinds of projects.

TABLE II
THE NUMBER OF CITIES BUILT DURING THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

	Municipalities	Industrial Towns
Newly built	13	25
Large-scale expansion	48	6
General expansion	61	120
Cities that carried out urban planning	156	
Of these, cities that completed the plan	47	22

Source: [64].

Note: Some industrial towns are sufficiently large to establish city administrations.

TABLE III
INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CITIES OF DIFFERENT SCALE

	1952	1957
Over 3,000,000 people	1	3*
1,000,000-3,000,000	8	11†
500,000-1,000,000	15	20
100,000-500,000	81	90
Under 100,000	54	52
Total	159	176

Source: [55].

* Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin.

† Shenyang, Wuhan, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Harbin, Lüda, Nanjing, Xian, Chingdao, Chengdu, Taiyuan.

Fig. 1. Important Construction Cities in the First Five-Year Plan Period




Note: Public enterprise construction was mainly advanced in the above eighteen cities [1].

B. High Speed Urbanization

Large-scale industrialization brought about high speed urbanization. Between 1953 and 1957 the urban population increased from 77,670,000 to 92,000,000 [1] (Figure 2). The number of big cities with populations exceeding 1 million

Fig. 2. Ratio of the Urban Population to Overall Population




Sources: [1] [55] [61].

Note: The reason that the increase in urban population in 1955 is relatively small is that the urban population was mobilized that year to return home and engage in agricultural production. In Shanghai and Tianjing alone, the net exodus reached 700,000 people, and the majority returned home to the countryside.

increased from nine to fourteen (Table III). Between 1952 and 1955 the urban population increased 26 per cent but the average increase for ten industrial cities including Shenyang, Changchun, Luoyang, and Xian was 51 per cent [53].


As a model of an industrial city, I would like to discuss Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu Province. Lanzhou was a consumer city with a long history and a livestock trading center for products from Gansu and Qinghai. After liberation, Lanzhou was planned as a heavy industrial city specializing in oil, chemical, and mechanized industries. An industrial district was constructed in Xiku and Anning, ten to twenty kilometers from the old city [11]. As seen in Figures 3 and 4, the scale of the city was rapidly enlarged. As a result, despite the fact that the planned population of Lanzhou for 1960 was 640,000, the actual popu-

Fig. 3. The Development of Lanzhou City



Source: [11].

Fig. 4. The Area and Population of Lanzhou City



Source: [11].

Note: The city was again expanded in 1959 [50, Sept. 21, 1959]. The original city had a population of 900,000 and area of 541 square kilometers. The additional suburban area had a population of 300,000 and an area of 9,137 square kilometers.

lation in 1956 was 660,000 [19]. Also in other industrial cities, the actual population exceeded the planned population (Table IV).

Three causes can be considered for this increase in the urban population. First, the rate of natural increase of the population rose due to rising living standards and improvement in environmental hygiene. In Beijing there was a natural increase of 504,000 between 1950 and 1956 [57]. In Harbin the population increased from 1,030,000 to 1,480,000 between 1952 and 1956,

TABLE IV
ACTUAL AND PLANNED POPULATION IN MAJOR CITIES

	Actual Population (1956)	Planned Population (10,000 people)
Harbin (a)	131	120 (—)*
Lanzhou (b)	66	64 (1960)
Xian (b)	106	100 (1960)
Taiyuan (c)	81	66 (1958)
Luoyang (new town) (c)	13	7.5 (1960)

Sources: (a)=[70]; (b)=[19]; (c)=[73].

* Unknown.

of which 196,000 was a natural increase [70]. Second, the number of workers increased and many workers migrated from other areas. However, this was an increase of the productive population. In Harbin, between 1952 and 1956, the number of workers, teachers, and students increased by 70,000; most came from areas other than Harbin [70]. Again, of the 8,900 workers of the Xian Northwest Construction Administrative Bureau, 4,900 were from outside Shaanxi Province (Xian is its capital) [73]. Third, there was an influx of the rural population into the cities. Workers' families and peasants from disaster-stricken areas poured into industrial cities. This represented an increase of unproductive population, namely, dependents. Forty-four thousand peasants poured into Harbin in November and December 1956 [70]. According to a survey of fifteen large cities, the rate of increase of the dependent population was greater than that for the basic population (Table V). The increase of dependents in the cities signified the decrease of productive workers in rural areas.

TABLE V
THE STRUCTURE OF POPULATION IN FIFTEEN CITIES

	1953		1956		Increase in Population (10,000 People)
	People (10,000)	%	People (10,000)	%	
Basic population	280	20	385	22	105
Service population	220	16	233	13.3	13
Dependents	800	57	1,050	60	250
Total population	1,400	100	1,750	100	350

Source: [73].

Note: Not included in basic population, service population and dependents is the floating population, capitalists, soldiers, and criminals undergoing labor reform.

As a result of such an increase in the urban population, a series of urban problems arose such as shortage of public facilities, housing, and commodity food. According to the calculation of the State Construction Commission, a total of 558 to 695 yuan in construction costs (for housing, public enterprises, etc.) was required for each additional person in the urban population [73].

I would like to briefly explain here the Chinese method of determining projected urban population. The population in towns and cities is classified in three categories: (1) basic population, (2) service population, and (3) dependent population. In addition, there are the military, criminals undergoing reform through labor, and a mobile population. The projected urban population is obtained from the following formula on the basis of the method of labor balance [75].

$$N = \frac{A}{1 - (B + C)}$$

N : the total urban population,

A : the basic population,

B: the ratio of service workers to total population, and

C: the ratio of dependents to total population.

The basic population is determined by the position of productive power projected for the city. The service population is calculated on the basis of the number of people needed to provide various services. The dependent population decreases if women participate in productive labor (this later becomes clear in the urban people's commune movement).

C. *The Influx of the Rural Population to the Cities*

Among Chinese workers, the percentage of temporary workers (peasants) is great. According to a 1955 survey, 10.1 per cent of the workers in the industrial sector and 44.3 per cent in capital construction sector were temporary workers [60]. Since construction projects were lengthy, construction workers settled in the cities and, accordingly, their families also moved to the cities. The State Planning Commission fixed the rate of workers with families at 50 per cent. However, in reality, more than 65 per cent of the workers were accompanied by their families [72]. As a result, a housing shortage developed. Also, peasants in disaster-stricken areas deserted their land and moved to the cities. Since urban wages were higher than peasant incomes and cities provided welfare facilities, the flow of peasants into the city did not cease.

This became a major problem during the First Five-Year Plan period, and nearly every year the government issued directives to prevent the rural influx to the cities.² According to the report by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Central Government (April 30, 1957),³ between October 1956 and April 1957, 570,000 peasants flowed into industrial cities. The majority were youth and adults, including a considerable number of party members. As a result, the Central Committee and State Council had no choice but to issue the December 18, 1957 Directive Concerning Prevention of Blind Exodus of the Rural Population (*guanyu zhizhi nongcun renkou mangmu wailiu de zhishi*). While urging peasants to return to their homes and carrying out relief in disaster-stricken areas, it set up roadblocks on the main highway to force peasants to turn back. Afterwards laws were issued concerning both the employment of temporary workers and strengthening control by means of the family registration.⁴ The basic method to solve the problem as stated in a *Renmin ribao* editorial of this period was to convince peasants that it was a mistake to thirst for the urban life and to slight

² The dates that directives were issued are following: July 25, 1952; April 17, 1953; March 12, 1954; December 30, 1956; March 2, 1957; May 13, 1957; December 18, 1957; and February 25, 1958.

³ See, Ministry of the Internal Affairs, "Guanyu zaiqu nongmin mangmu wailiu qingkuang he chuli yijian de baogao" [Report on the situation of and opinion for handling the blind flow of population from rural disaster areas] [81, pp.106-11].

⁴ See, State Council, "Guanyu ge danwei cong nongcun zhong zhaoyong linshigong de zhanxing guiding" [Provisional regulations concerning all units' hiring temporary workers from the countryside] [82, pp.481-83], and "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hukou dengji tiaoli" [Population registry regulations of the People's Republic of China] [83, pp.204-16].

agriculture. From this it is evident that the government had no basic solution to prevent the peasant influx into the cities.

The problem of peasant influx into industrializing cities is fundamentally a problem of how to handle excess rural labor power. In capitalist countries, peasants flowing into cities are employed as low wage labor. China, however, could not choose this method. At that time some Chinese officials (for example Vice-premier Bo Ibo) thought that since agricultural mechanization would generate a large surplus of agricultural labor power, these people should open up new lands [29]. Mao Zedong, on the other hand, insisted that rather than allow the flow out of existing villages, labor power should be reorganized within the villages, and various economic activities such as subsidiary work, livestock, and industry should be developed [7, pp. 578, 674, 756, 887]. The attempt to realize Mao's plan culminated in the Great Leap Forward (1958-60).

D. *Housing Problems*

Due to rapid increase in the urban population, a variety of urban problems arose. Consider, for example, housing.

After liberation, a large housing need arose. One cause was the need to ameliorate extremely inferior pre-liberation housing conditions. Another was the need for housing construction in new industrial cities. Houses constructed with government funds in the decade after 1949 totaled 163 million square meters [38]. However, despite such vast construction, nationwide 10 per cent of employees and laborers faced housing shortage problems; situations existed in which several families lived together in a single house or married couples had no house to live in [48]. As shown in Table VI, in various cities, the residential area per person was decreasing, and the living situation was deteriorating.

Shortage of housing resulted from several causes. One is that large numbers of old houses were demolished, as the repair and supervision of existing housing was slighted and urban reconstruction received priority. In Lanzhou, Taiyuan, etc., one-fifth of the original housing area was demolished [35]. In Ningbo, Kaifeng, etc., the demolished area exceeded that of newly constructed houses [1]. The *Renmin ribao* editorial of June 26, 1956, pointed out that the cause of the housing problem is the increase in the industrial population [25]. For example, in Yumen, after liberation, while house increased 3.96 times, the number of workers increased 11.6 times. In Shenyang, houses increased by 31.2 per cent while the number of workers increased by 217 per cent. The editorial suggested solving the housing problem by building houses with government funds while at the same time building private housing. In reality, in the three areas of railroads, mines, and weaving, 82,000 private houses were built between 1952-56 [6]. Laws were also consolidated.⁵

However, the *Renmin ribao* editorial of December 18 stated that the June 26 editorial in the year before was in error [71]. The migration of workers' families

⁵ See, "Fangzhi zhigong zijian gongzhu jianzhu zhuzhai zaxing banfa" [Provisional laws for weaving factory workers to build houses by the do-it-yourself and public support methods] [80, pp. 442-47].

TABLE VI
THE POPULATION AND HOUSING CONDITION IN MAJOR CITIES

A. Population (10,000 people)			
	1949	1956	Rate of Increase (%)
Beijing (a)	209	412	97
Shanghai (a)	414	558	34.8
Wuhan (a)	89.7	145.2	61.9
Xian (a)	46	105	130
Harbin (b)	103	148	43.7
Lanzhou (c)	21	71	240
B. Residential Area (10,000 m ²)			
	1949	1956	Rate of Increase (%)
Beijing (a)	1,374	2,046.5	49
Shanghai (a)	2,359	2,682	13.6
Wuhan (a)	364.1	444.2	22
Xian (d)	225	512	128
Harbin (b)	328	428	30
Lanzhou (c, e)	65	114	75
C. Residential Area per Person (m ²)			
	1949	1956	Rate of Increase (%)
Beijing (a)	6.57	4.97	-24
Shanghai (a)	5.70	4.81	-16
Wuhan (a)	4.06	3.06	-25
Xian (d)	2.9	2.6	-10
Harbin (b)	3.18	2.89	-9
Lanzhou (e)	3.1	1.6	-48

Sources: Calculated from a, [57]; b, [70]; c, [11]; d, [73]; and e, [52].

Notes: 1. Harbin data are for 1952 rather than for 1949.

2. The residential area in Beijing and Shanghai is gross residential area, in other cities net residential area (i.e., living area).

3. In 1956, the living area per person in 175 cities was 3.5 square meters. The average in large cities was 3.2 square meters, in medium and small cities it was 4.9 square meters [1].

from rural to urban areas was the cause of housing problems. Even if housing was supplied for workers' families, the vicious cycle only repeated itself. Moreover, if everyone brought his family to the city, it meant approving the change from rural producers to urban consumers, the burden on the workers themselves was heavy, and so was the damage to agricultural production.

No measures carried out during this period such as the private housing system, construction of single person housing, and the home-visit and holiday system for workers provided a basic method for solving the housing shortage. It seems the Chinese government began to realize that after all the housing problem was a rural problem. However, the government was not yet aware of why women in the cities ended as consumer rather than producers. It was the urban people's

commune movement (1958–60) which clarified the relationship between women's participation in productive labor and urban problems.

E. *The Phenomenon of Waste in Urban Construction*

Waste became a big problem in two areas: land expropriation and construction fund. Urban construction land was usually rich suburban farmland. However, since at the time of land expropriation, the practice was common to "expropriate more and use less" and "expropriate earlier and use later," rich farmlands turned into waste-land, damaging agricultural production. One result was the problem of peasants changing occupations. On January 24, 1956, the State Council issued Notification on Correction and Prevention of Waste in Land Expropriation for National Construction. According to this notification, 40 per cent of the 67.3 square kilometers of land expropriated over several years in the cities of Wuhan, Changsha, Beijing, Hangzhou, Chengdu, and Hebei Province was wasted.

The cause of this excessive land expropriation was that urban planning standards were too high. For example, while the average living area per person in China then was 3.5 square meters in the cities, the standard of 9 square meters per person was adopted in line with Soviet urban planning standards [1]. In Chengdu, capital of Sichuan Province, while the overall building-to-land ratio (the percentage of area under construction) was 70 per cent, the building-to-land ratio among the city's new buildings was only 28–32 per cent [43]. Again, according to the May 8, 1957 *Renmin ribao* editorial, there even were cases in which land was expropriated by deception which incited peasant discontent [74].

In 1955, Li Fuchun (vice-premier and chairman of the State Planning Commission) reported: "For several years, we have neglected the difference between two kinds of standards, productive and nonproductive construction. Standards for nonproductive construction were set far too high for the level of our country's economic development. . . . In construction of new industrial cities, too, there were many cases in which standards were set too high, modernization was sought too quickly, or the appearances of cities was over-emphasized."⁶ Therefore, on July 3, 1955, the State Council issued Directive on Thoroughly Absorbing the Principle of Economizing in Basic Construction in the Last Half of 1955 and drew up standards for nonproductive construction and urban planning [72, pp. 387–91].

F. *Summary of Urban Planning*

Although as indicated the First Five-Year Plan produced great results, at the same time rapid urbanization gave rise to urban problems. There are two articles summarizing the First Five-Year Plan period's urban planning and urban policies [1] [64]. These articles specify the following defects in urban planning, particularly subjectivism and formalism divorced from reality and from the masses. (1) Over-emphasis on long range plans to the detriment of short range plans. Mechanically adopting Soviet approaches to urban planning wasted construction

⁶ See, the report by Li Fuchun, "Guanyu fazhan guomin jingji de diyige jihua de baogao" [Report on the First Five-Year Plan for National Development], compiled in [79].

funds. (2) Emphasis on beauty and slighting economy. They sought merely theoretical radial symmetry and so-called artistic effects. As a result, large-scale engineering work was required and huge amounts of old housing were demolished. (3) Too many high-rise buildings were constructed. (4) Thinking of constructing big cities, they built industrial areas away from old towns and cities. As a result, large construction funds were needed for public facilities and worker commuting was inconvenient.

The Cao Yanxing article and the Wang Wenke article criticized dogmatically following Soviet urban planning, but did not criticize fundamental principles of earlier urban planning. Neither did these articles at all discuss the relationship between urban and rural problems. In fact, at that time, one urban problem was shortage of grain and subsidiary foods.

G. *The Problem of Food Supply*

In order to realize industrialization, it is necessary to supply the cities with large quantities of food commodities. As in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, in China, too, food shortages arose in the cities. Here I will discuss subsidiary food items such as vegetables, meat, eggs, etc.

The following are the reasons for the shortage of subsidiary foods: (1) Due to the rise of the urban population, consumption increased. (2) The influx of the rural population into the cities. (3) Excessive expropriation of suburban farmland.

Vegetables supplied to the cities accounted for only 74 per cent of 1953 requirements and 82 per cent in 1954 [14]. The shortage of vegetables did not improve thereafter; in fact, the percentage of vegetable supply dropped to 50–60 per cent in the spring of 1957. The result was that between January and April 1957, when 155,000 tons of vegetable were transported by railroad to such cities as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenyang from producing centers such as Shandong, Henan, and Guangdong Provinces, the damage rate was as high as 10 per cent [26]. In China, since railroad transportation was already a bottle neck, this adversely affected transport of other goods.

In 1958, due to the development of local industries, vegetable shortage was also evident in small cities and new industrial areas. In addition, since public dining halls were established, the vegetable consumption in rural areas also increased. In this situation, the only way to insure vegetable supply in the cities was suburban agricultural development [27]. And in June 1959, at the Conference of Subsidiary Food and Handicraft Producers in Large and Medium Cities, the principle was established of urban self-sufficiency in vegetables [50, June 30, 1959].

In 1958, various cities enlarged the area of their administrative control. For example, the area of Shijiazhuang, capital of Hebei, increased from 364 square kilometers to 3,134 square kilometers, and its population from 620,000 to over 1 million [9]. In August 1959, Chongqing (population 2.2 million) achieved subsidiary food self-sufficiency [3]. However, with the post-Leap frustration, suburban agriculture ceased to be emphasized. For example, in Shenyang, hog breeding was forbidden as "adversely affecting hygiene" and the city received

food and vegetables from seventeen provinces. It was not until after the Great Cultural Revolution that self-sufficiency in vegetables was attained in large industrial cities like Shenyang [51].

III. REVISION OF URBAN POLICIES

In order to confront the urban problems which arose during the First Five-Year Plan period, urban policies were revised.

On May 8, 1956, the State Council issued Resolution Concerning Several Problems for Reinforcing Construction Work in New Industrial Areas and New Industrial Cities [80, pp. 106–12]. Its contents can be summarized as follows: (1) The scale of cities has become excessively large and industry has become excessively concentrated. Therefore, from now on, the scale of newly constructed cities will be limited in general to between several tens of thousands to over one hundred thousand. Where conditions are suitable, it is fine to construct cities with a population between two hundred thousand and three hundred thousand. When there is a special need, the construction of a city of more than three hundred thousand will be individually considered. Also, from 1956, regional planning will begin in ten areas across the nation. (2) In planning cities, at the same time that the location of industrial districts is planned, the location of residential districts should be determined. The approach of emphasizing long range plans and slighting short range plans must be changed. In order to eliminate confusion in urban construction, supervision of construction will be reinforced. In 1956, directives will be promulgated on Law for Supervising and Directing City Construction and Law for Systematizing Urban Planning. (3) For each kind of public works, a responsible administrative organization will be established. (4) Standards of municipal construction and criteria for design will be set.

In 1957 two directives were issued on April 8,⁷ and on June 3.⁸ These two directives pointed out the following: (1) Since construction standards are too high, lower them. (2) Remake urban planning. Economize land for construction and return some land to the peasant. Make full use of existing buildings, public facilities, etc. (3) Economize raw materials and reduce construction costs.

Again on January 31, 1958 the State Construction Commission and the Ministry of Urban Construction issued Notice Concerning Several Targets of Urban Planning and revised its specific indicators.⁹


The urban planning for Xiangtan City (Hunan Province, 1957 population 130,000) was revised as shown in Figure 5. The 1956 plan was based on overall reconstruction of the old city area. The 1957 plan lowered its sites and reduced

⁷ See, Ministry of Urban Construction, "Guanyu 1957 nian zai chengshi gongyong shiye zhong kaizhan zengchan jieyue yundong de zhishi" [Directive concerning development, production increase and the economizing movement in urban public works in 1957] [81, pp. 91–97].


⁸ See, State Council, "Guanyu jinyibu kaizhan zengchan jieyue yundong de zhishi" [Directive concerning one step forward development, production increase and the economizing movement] [81, pp. 82–86].







⁹ Refer to [83, pp. 180–82].

Fig. 5. Revised Municipal Plan of Xiangtan City Planned in 1956, 25 year plan, the population of 200,000, planned residential area: 24 km².



Planned in 1957, 15 year plan, planned population of 310,000 for the area east of the river, planned residential area: 5.4 km².



- | | | | |
|---|---------------------|---|------------------------|
|  | Industrial district |  | Experimental railroads |
|  | Storage district |  | Piers |
|  | Park and green belt |  | Roads |

Source: [64].

the scale of the city. Urban planning for hilly areas was made compact (Figure 5). Liuzhou City (Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) was a new industrial city to be constructed during the Second Five-Year Plan period, but there, too, urban planning was revised [36] [50, June 9, 1958]. Xian was a city given priority in construction during the First Five-Year Plan period: Between 1949–56 its area expanded from 13.2 square kilometers to 70 square kilometers. However, 27.9 square kilometers of this was empty space. For this reason, it was resolved that for five to ten years to come the scale of the city should not be enlarged and urban planning should be revised [65] [50, May 14, 1957].

IV. URBAN PEOPLE'S COMMUNES

A. *The Great Leap Forward and the Rearrangement of Productive Power*

It was Mao Zedong's "On the Ten Major Relationships" which thoroughly reevaluated Soviet-type heavy industrialization policy and proposed a new economic policy.¹⁰ In this speech, Mao stated that only when China develops light industry and agriculture and accumulate funds, it can remarkably develop heavy industry. For this purpose, China should make better use of coastal industries and emphasize the development of local industry.

In 1958, the Chinese government for the first time began to be aware of the fact that urban problems are in fact rural problems. Shi Tian stated: "When studying the problems of scale of development of cities, it is impossible to consider cities individually. We must begin with the population of 600 million. . . . When determining the scale of development of cities, we must guarantee the development of industrial production, and pay attention to workers' livelihood as well as guarantee the development of agricultural production and pay attention to the peasants' life" [52].

From the latter half of 1957, the Chinese government conducted a series of reforms. As a result, the power of local governments was enlarged. The process was as follows: (1) On November 15, 1957, the State Council issued Regulations Concerning Improving the System of Industrial Administration (*guanyu gaijin gongye guanli tizhi de guiding*) [82, pp. 391–97]. (2) On April 11, 1958, the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party and the State Council issued Several Resolutions Concerning Industrial Enterprises Going to the Countryside (*guanyu gongye qiye xiafang de jixiang jue ding*) [83, pp. 331–32]. (3) On June 9, 1958, the State Council issued Regulations Concerning Improving the System of Tax Administration (*guanyu gaijin shuishou guanli tizhi de guiding*) [83, pp. 265–69]. (4) On September 24, 1958, the Central Committee and State Council issued Regulations Concerning Improving the System of Planning Administration (*guanyu gaijin jihua guanli tizhi de guiding*), and Regulations Concerning Improving the Method of Inspecting Designing Duty Papers of Capital Construction Items Above Fixed Amounts (*guanyu gaijin xiane yishang jiben jianshe xiangmu sheji renwushu shenpi banfa de guiding*) [84, pp 96–98] [68].

¹⁰ See, [21, 1977, No. 1], and confer the report by Liu Shaoqi at Second Plenum, Eighth Central Committee.

At the same time as these innovations were going on, peasants began to develop dynamic mass movements in irrigation construction, afforestation, and fertilizer production [30]. Against this background, the Second Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress adopted a progressive economic policy. Its aim was the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture, and central and local industries, development of rural industry, and reduction of the differences between urban and rural areas.

During the Great Leap period, industrial location policy and urban policy changed greatly. First, a new system of distribution of productive power was proposed, dividing the entire nation into seven cooperative economic regions and constructing an independent industrial system in each [40]. Second, reduction of the differences between urban and rural areas began to be considered the basis of urban planning.

Cao Yanxing stated in his article [2]: "When we consider industrial systems, we need to pay attention to the question of all-round development of the local economy. In the future, it will be necessary to comprehensively develop industry and agriculture of an area. We should never again have an agricultural area which specializes in supplying food and vegetables to an industrial area, nor an industrial area which is dependent on outside agricultural supplies. If we adopt the method of letting large industrial areas and large cities develop blindly and depend purely on outside agricultural supplies, we will surely suffer for it in the future." Further, he stated that "industry should be decentralized in units throughout the nation (cooperative districts, provinces), and concentrated at certain points. [In other words, big decentralization, small concentration.]" He proposed the following urban planning guidelines: (1) Establish industry in medium and small cities, towns, and villages. (2) Limit the size of cities to several tens of thousands or to two or three hundred thousand. Establish no new industry in big cities. Integrate big cities and suburban rural people's communes. Construct satellite cities around big cities, but this method cannot really overcome the shortcomings of big cities. (3) Decentralization of industry is also good from the perspective of national defense. And Cao stated that "if we consider industrial distribution according to the above principles, we cannot only reduce the scope of cities but can eliminate the differences between urban and rural areas and create conditions for the transition to communism."

B. *Rural Planning*

Chapter 25 of The Draft National Program for Agricultural Development, issued on January 23, 1956, referred to the improvement of rural housing [50, Jan. 26, 1956]. Later, during the Great Leap Forward, people's communes were established and rural industry developed. Public dining halls and day care centers were also established, and women came to participate in productive labor. Such changes required improved living conditions in rural areas. In short, rural planning became a necessity. On December 10, 1958, the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee adopted the Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes, which stated as follows concerning rural construction:

The existing old-style houses must be reconstructed step by step; townships and village and housing estates with parks and woods must be built by stages and in groups; these will include residential quarters, community dining-rooms, nurseries, kindergartens, "old people's homes," factories, threshing floors, livestock, sheds, shops, post and telecommunications offices, warehouses, schools, hospitals, clubs, cinemas, sports grounds, baths and public lavatories. [50, Dec. 19, 1958]

Following these resolutions, experimental rural planning occurred in various places. For example, in Zhejiang Province, in March 1959, Tongji University, Tianjin University, Nanjing Industrial College, the Urban Planning Design Institute of the Ministry of Construction Engineering, etc., designed composite urban and rural planning designs for eleven counties, twelve cities and thirteen people's communes [76]. In 1958-59, *Jianzhu xuebao* [Architectural journal] carried numerous reports of rural planning. Liu Xiufeng (minister of the Ministry of Construction Engineering) reported that experimental plans were implemented in 324 people's communes and 470 residential quarters of communes [39]. The characteristic features of this rural planning are: (1) Concentrate scattered natural villages. One living district consists of about one thousand houses, ten thousand people. (2) The residential district consists of a production area (factories, tractor stations, agricultural experimentation centers), public facilities area and residential area. However, there are few subsequent reports that such rural planning was put into practice, or that the construction of new living districts materialized. In many areas housing was improved, but the overall reorganization of communities did not occur.

The reasons why rural planning did not materialize, I think, are as follows: (1) Due to setbacks to the Great Leap Forward, the collective economy declined, rural industry was cut back and private plots revived. (2) It was unclear who was responsible for providing construction funds. (3) The planning was over-ambitious. The farming area was overly enlarged. The peasants did not accept collective housing and removal of tombs.

C. *Urban People's Communes and Urban Remodelling*

In 1958 people's communes were also established in cities. No detailed studies have been conducted on the formation and dissolution of urban people's communes. I intend to limit discussion to the problem of the relationship between urban people's communes and urban redevelopment.

Urban people's communes, when we pay attention to their nuclei, can be divided into three categories [41].

- (1) Communes established around state-run factories and mines.
- (2) Communes established around administrative organizations and universities.
- (3) Communes established around residents of street areas.

As an example of the third category, I will take the urban people's communes in Zhengzhou City, capital of Henan Province. The Qingzhensi Street, Guancheng District of Zhengzhou, was a slum area (Qingzhensi is a Moslem shrine). In May 1958, the women of the residential area initiated a small factory. Later,

since they also provided public dining halls and day care centers, more women began to be able to participate in productive labor. The traditional Chinese housing unit known as *siheyuan* ("quadrangle") has a courtyard and is separated from adjacent housing by a wall. The women removed the walls between houses employed for factories, dining halls, and nurseries. And in August 1958, the Red Flag People's Commune of Guancheng District of Zhengzhou City was established [5]. In Zhengzhou, 126 people's communes came into existence in 1958. Later they were combined and in 1960 there were seventeen people's communes (three with populations of over six thousand, ten over three thousand, four over ten thousand), including 126 subdivision communes and twenty-seven agricultural teams [18]. However, in comparison with rural areas, cities had various complex situations, and urban people's communes were treated with deliberate care.

Concerning the urban people's communes, the December 1958 resolution on the people's communes stated that "experiments should continue to be conducted in the cities." Later, in March 1960, at the Second Plenum of the Second National People's Congress, reports detailed communization experiences in various cities. At this conference, the representatives from the five big cities including Beijing and Shanghai described "the people's commune as the form of organization perfectly appropriate to the cities, too" [63]. As a result, national urban communization proceeded rapidly, and by July 1960, 79.3 per cent of the urban population had joined communes [12]. Again, the representatives from the five big cities stated:

Previously it was not possible for the cities to adapt to the great changes which occurred in such areas as production, exchange, distribution and livelihood. For this reason, future urban planning and urban remodelling must correspond with the new situation. The cities must be gradually and fundamentally remodelled.

In the above-mentioned Red Flag Commune in Guancheng District of Zhengzhou, inhabitants removed the walls between their houses as the first step in urban remodelling. The Red Flag Commune reportedly began reconstructing roads, repairing houses and constructing public facilities.

After the formation of urban people's communes, the earlier theories of urban planning began to be reevaluated. The following new tasks were added to urban planning: (1) Design small factories in residential areas. (2) Design small factories, public dining halls, service stations, etc. (3) Design farming areas and militia training grounds in cities. Jin Oubu insisted in light of these problems, that urban planning theory must be reevaluated [28].

However, after July 1961, the *Renmin ribao* ceased to report on urban communes. It seems that the urban commune's power diminished and they were dissolved. The *Jianzhu xuebao* of that period published two reports on urban remodelling plans by urban communes [24, 1958, Nos. 10 and 11], but it seems that they were never implemented. However, rural and urban commune planning included a unified approach to industry and agriculture as well as production and consumption. I think that this has great significance.

D. *The Situation of Ten-Year Construction*

The urban construction situation in the decade after 1949 was as follows [34] [49]: Construction proceeded in 2,195 cities, towns, and industrial areas in the entire nation. Of these, 167 were newly constructed, 124 were remodelled on a large scale. Also, urban plans were made for 184 municipalities and more than two-thirds of approximately 170 county seats. Rural planning was also conducted on an experimental basis. Regional planning proceeded in forty areas throughout the nation. In large and medium cities, the central areas and main streets have been remodelled.

V. DESIGNING REVOLUTION

A. *Residential Planning*

From 1959 to 1961, agricultural production greatly declined and the Chinese economy regressed. Economic policies were revised to approximate those in effect before the Great Leap Forward. The scale of capital construction was reduced, and 20 million workers returned to the villages from which they had come [56]. During this period, construction of satellite cities in the suburbs of big cities, new housing developments and slum remodelling continued. Shanghai, for example, constructed satellite cities such as Minhang and Wujing, built "new towns" such as Caoyang New Town one after another, and remodelled such typical slum areas as Fangualong (Pumpkin Lane) [66].

China's residential planning theories are based on the idea of the neighborhood unit (*juzhu xiaoqu*). "The concept of the neighborhood unit is universally adopted inside and outside the nation" [62]. The neighborhood unit is an idea first proposed in 1929 by C. A. Perry of the United States. However, this concept does not include urban agriculture and public welfare.

The *Jianzhu sheji ziliaoji* includes designs for various areas [45]. It may be called a comprehensive collection of construction theories of China prior to the Cultural Revolution. It contains detailed statements on urban housing areas and urban housing, but not a single page on rural housing area and rural housing. While referring to the design of large factories and hospitals, it contains not a single reference to small factories and clinics.

B. *The Designing Revolution Movement*

Beginning in December 1964, designing and planning began to be reevaluated. In April 1965 the National Planners' Conference met and summed up the movement of designing revolution. Its conclusions are presented in the *Remin ribao* editorial [77].


The following are examples of the planning revolution: (1) Economy of construction land. Redesigning the Beijing power plant with reduced expropriation of farm lands [50, June 28, 1965]. (2) Revision of road planning in Baotou City. According to immediate actual needs, road area was reduced and land and construction funds were economized [50, June 28, 1965]. (3) Design of

rural housing. Up to that time, planners had neglected improvement of rural housing. In the future they ought to respond to the urgent demands of the peasants [50, Oct. 19, 1965].

In any case, the most important event in the designing revolution was the construction of the Daqing Oil Field, the model of China's urban remodelling. In China in the past cities were constructed in the area adjacent to large oil fields. However, at Daqing, decentralized housing areas surrounded by farms were constructed. Women engaged in farming and began to run cooperative service industries. Worker families changed from consumers to producers [50, June 28, 1965, and March 3, 1966]. Daqing (in the vicinity of Anda City, Heilongjiang Province, population three hundred thousand) consists of three kinds of residential areas [47, 1972, No. 3]: (1) Worker towns—three locations with administrative organizations (Figure 6). (2) Labor-farming central villages—41 locations with 300 to 400 families each. (3) Residential points—107 locations one to two kilometers from the central village, 100 families each.

Red Satellite Central Village, for example, consists of the following: The

Fig. 6. Guidelines for Residential Areas in the Daqing Oil Field's New Village



Source: [24, 1974, No. 6, p. 8].

Notes: 1. Arrangement is made for the integration of industrial, residential, and agricultural areas.

2. At present there are more than 60 industrial-agricultural central villages and 164 residential points. To the present the Daqing Oil Field has reclaimed 21,330 hectares of wasteland, harvested 270,000 tons of grain and 365,000 tons of vegetables, raised over 50,000 horses, cows, sheep, and deer and over 60,000 pigs, producing 5,000 tons of meat of various kinds. Households comprising 55,000 people for 11 consecutive years have consumed no commodity grain from the state [8, May 8, 1976] [8, May 19, 1976].

central village and five residential points with 1,230 families, 5,500 people. Farmlands, 467 hectares. Factories including screw factory (supplies the whole oil field), food processing factory. Various public facilities. Dongbei Oil Academy (nine grades, 1,500 students).

The April 2, 1966 *Renmin ribao* reported that "the Daqing Oil Field is a new social organization which is a rural style city and an urban style village." It is said that Premier Zhou Enlai supported Daqing's urban planning [46]. This urban planning embodied the ideals of the urban people's commune.

VI. URBAN POLICY IN 1970s

A. *The Cultural Revolution and Rural Planning*

The Great Cultural Revolution which began in 1966 in the area of urban construction was a struggle over whether to adopt Daqing's urban planning model or earlier oil field urban planning methods. The approach of the Cultural Revolution is directly demonstrated in Mao Zedong's directive of May 7, 1966 (the May 7 Directive). In this directive Mao stated that as in Daqing workers should engage in agricultural production and peasants should also collectively run small factories. If the May 7 Directive was adhered to, it was believed that "it is possible to avoid the abnormal growth of cities and industry" [50, Aug. 1, 1966].

After the Cultural Revolution, medium and small-scale factories, mines and power plants were constructed in large numbers throughout the nation. Also, distribution of productive power at the national level greatly changed. First, Hebei, Henan, and Shandong Provinces achieved food self-sufficiency. Second, coal mines were started south of Chang Jiang (Yangtze River). As a result, the pressure on north-south railroad transportation diminished. Against this background, the effort began to construct "small but comprehensive local industrial systems" [20].

The special feature of local industry is its service to agriculture. The development of rural industry, progress in agricultural mechanization, reinforcement of collective economy, innovation in agricultural technology—such changes again required the reorganization of village communities. The *Jianzhu xuebao*, revived in 1973, presents five or six examples of reports on the realization of rural planning [24, 1975, Nos. 3 and 4, and 1976, No. 2]. Take the example of Huaxi Brigade, Huashi Commune, Jiangyin County, Jiangsu Province, in Chang Jiang plain. In 1964, this brigade made a fifteen-year plan for agricultural development and new village construction, and basically completed the construction in 1972. The twelve scattered natural villages were remodelled into one new village with 245 houses, 1,015 people. Farmlands were rearranged, and waterways constructed. In the new living area, besides houses, a food processing factory, agricultural machinery repair factory, and a four story building including a clinic, stores, meeting place, etc., were constructed simultaneously. (The map of Huaxi Brigade is unfortunately omitted.) The following characteristics are observed in these rural plans: (1) They are long-range plans unified at the pro-

duction brigade level. Peasants planned themselves. (2) The material basis of rural planning is the development of the collective economy. Construction funds are provided by the common reserve fund. (3) The existing forms of community became an obstacle to change in farming methods and to the development of agricultural mechanization. (4) Changes in housing styles and customs and manners such as removal of tombs are taking place.

Rural planning has only been realized in limited areas, but in the future it will materialize in various places. In addition, the fact that migration of population from existing villages is not taking place, deserves attention.

B. *Structural Changes of Cities*

Since the Cultural Revolution, structural changes have taken place little by little in the production and livelihood of the cities.

(1) Development of suburban agriculture. As a result of this, self-sufficiency of vegetables was achieved in large cities with populations above 1 million such as Beijing (8 million of which the urban population is 4.2 million), Shanghai (10.7 million of which the urban population is 5.6 million), Shenyang, and Changchun.

(2) Construction of light industry in heavy industrial areas. For example, the rate of self-sufficiency of daily necessities in Shenyang was 30 per cent before 1970, but after 1976 it rose to 80 per cent [47, 1976, No. 6].

(3) The revival of small factories in the cities. In comparison with the small factories during the Leap period, small factories after the Cultural Revolution are qualitatively superior (for example, they include electronics).

(4) The basic principle of urban policy became denial of large-scale urbanization with emphasis on construction of small cities and destruction of the differences between city and countryside.

In Shenyang, agricultural support groups were organized by nineteen units including the Shenyang Electric Company, Shenyang Auto Works, Shenyang Agricultural Machinery Bureau, etc. These agricultural support groups assist in the construction of rural industry in Xinchengzi District which is the rural area in the suburbs [23, pp. 12-17]. Again at the Eleventh Metallurgical Construction Company, while constructing a certain project in 1970 a debate arose over expropriation of farmlands. In the end the design was modified and the land was economized. The following measures were also taken to avoid reduction of agricultural production [23, pp. 29-32]: (1) Reclaim marshes and wasteland into farmland. (2) Carry out construction work under farmlands prior to spring tilling. (3) Use industrial waste water for irrigation. (4) Foster agricultural machinery technicians in the rural areas. (5) Reduce the use of temporary workers from rural areas.

In recent years, suburban fishing is developing. From the winter of 1973, there was extensive construction of breeding ponds in Nanjing, Nanchang, Hefei, etc. In 1974 the area of water employed for fish breeding in Beijing, Nanjing, and Hengyang occupied 94 per cent, 52 per cent, and 95 per cent of the usable water area [44]. To remodel water areas for fish breeding has become one aspect

of urban planning. Also, the development of suburban fishing has become a means of escape for excess suburban labor power. For example, 70 per cent of the labor power in the fishing team of Taohua Commune, Nanchang City was formerly involved in transportation work and so forth. At present, this situation has improved and they engage in fishing [44, p. 33].

Factories and mines, like the Daqing Oil Field, are proceeding with remodeling "new type mining areas which combine workers and peasants, and cities and villages." For example, at Yumen Oil Field, they have cultivated the Gobi desert near the field, and made 123 hectares of farmland. At present, the Yumen Oil Field has achieved self-sufficiency in staple foods, vegetables, and meat [47, 1974, No. 23].

In urban residential areas, women construct small factories and manage group welfare projects. In Fushun City, in 1971, 95 per cent of the workers' families participated in productive labor [50, Apr. 5, 1970]. Also, in Shanghai, while in 1966 the number of family members per worker was 2.7 (including the worker), in 1973 it was reduced to 1.7 [47, 1974, No. 1, p. 24].

In the areas of administrative organization, after the Cultural Revolution, a revolutionary committee was established at the city, district, and street levels. At present, in places like Xian, Yan'an, Shenyang, and Changchun, urban people's communes exist.¹¹ Many points remain unclear concerning the reality of urban people's communes.

C. *Urban Planning after the Cultural Revolution*

Since 1970, China has emphasized environmental preservation and comprehensive utilization of natural resources. The idea was born that urban remodeling is necessary for radical solution of pollution problems. Guo Huan's article developed the following new urban theory:

In setting up new industries we particularly heed their rational distribution. In accordance with Chairman Mao's directive, our industries are dispersed and widely distributed in the various provinces, while in a small locality the industries are concentrated and close to each other, and we have built many small towns. This is a strategic measure that helps reduce the differences between countryside and city, and also an effective way of solving the contradictions between developing industry and protecting the environment. Small towns possess the characteristics of both the city and the countryside and of industry and agriculture, are conducive to production, make life more convenient for the people and facilitate environmental protection. . . . We consider it incorrect to one-sidedly emphasize the favorable construction conditions of big cities, to place large and medium projects one after another in big cities, and to let the scale of cities swell more and more. . . . We pay attention to strictly regulating the size of today's cities. [17]


A concrete statement on urban planning after the Cultural Revolution is found in Hu Jiancheng's article [22]. He states:

Whether to carry through the principle of small city construction or to blindly construct big cities is a reflection of the two line struggle in urban construction


¹¹ Based on my observation in China in March 1976 and July 1978.

Fig. 7. Master Plan of Xinhui County Seat

(a) 1958 plan



(b) 1975 plan



Sources: [24, 1958, No. 8, p. 26] [24, 1975, No. 3, p. 9].

Note: Due to limitations of space the bottom part of the 1958 map and the top and bottom portions of the 1975 map are omitted.

planning. Some impostors of the Liu Shaochi and Lin Biao variety pushed the big city line of “*da, yang, quan*” (large-scale, Western style, and comprehensive), and some others confused and destroyed urban construction by constructing scattered industrial points.

Shashi City, Hubei Province, population 140,000, once planned a city of five hundred thousand, but after the Cultural Revolution it revised its planning to construct a small city emphasizing light industry and agricultural machine industry [18].

In planning the county seat of Xinhui, Guangdong Province, too, a struggle is said to have occurred over whether to build a large or small city [15]. As shown in Figure 7, the 1958 plan envisioned a large-scale remodelling of the old city, which included five-fold enlargement of the town area and expropriation of a large amount of farmland. However, the 1975 plan enlarges the town area in the northern hilly area, avoiding expropriation of farmland. On the 1975 planning map, “farmland” is marked, which demonstrates the fact that urban agriculture began to be considered in relation to urban planning. Before the Cultural Revolution, no farmland was marked in urban planning maps, reflecting the urban policy which regarded farmland merely as “empty lots.”

D. *Problems for the Future*

A quarter century has elapsed since China carried out its urban planning for modern cities. During that time urban policy has changed many times. And behind the changes were always changes in rural policy. In other words, urban problems were in fact rural problems. Since the scope of this paper is limited, I did not discuss rural planning sufficiently.

The following problems can be noted concerning the future of China's city planning: First, the concretization of past theory and practice of urban planning. I have already pointed out that there are problems in the *Jianzhu sheji ziliaoji* [45] which was reprinted without revision after the Cultural Revolution. Also, *Chengshi guihua zhishi xiao congshu* reflects to a considerable degree the policy which encourages building of small cities and emphasizes urban agriculture [4].

Second is the question of how to proceed with the redevelopment of the old town areas of big cities, for example, the alleys and former foreign settlements. And at that point, whether to make the urban communes “the basis for urban remodelling” (People's Commune Resolution, December 1958).

Third question is how to reconstruct Tangshan City (Hebei Province, population 1 million), completely destroyed by a great earthquake in 1976.

Fourth question is how to recover and remodel Xianggang (Hong Kong) and Aomen (Macao) which are developed as capitalist cities.

Fifth question is to what degree should existing cities be allowed to develop. At present, China's urban population is approximately 15 to 20 per cent of the national total. To what extent should the urban population rise as a percentage of the whole in the future?

China proclaimed in 1975 at the National People's Congress that “within this century, by comprehensively achieving the modernization of agriculture, industry,

national defense, and science and technology, we will advance our national economy to the front ranks of the world."¹² At present China is aspiring to high speed economic development. For that purpose, a large-scale petrochemical complex is under construction on reclaimed land in Shanghai's suburbs. I would like to pay attention to the impact such economic policies will have on urban and rural planning. Whether or not it is possible to achieve economic growth without further urbanization and while diminishing the three great differences is the problem that China directly confronts today.

¹² Refer to "Government Activities Report," by Zhou Enlai at First Session, Fourth National People's Congress.

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