

A RECONSIDERATION OF MAO ZEDONG'S THEORIES OF SOCIALISM

REIITSU KOJIMA

I. THE OWNERSHIP THEORY AND THE THREE MAJOR DIFFERENCES

U P until 1957, China followed a policy of building socialism by emphasizing heavy industrialization that was centered on factories imported from abroad. Under this policy, China could not halt the exodus of people from the countryside into the cities, because differences between the cities and the countryside had always been great in China. In the course of the evolution of that policy, a theory concerning ownership developed in China. The theory of ownership was based on the idea that the development of socialism in China could be gauged through the progress made in the gradual transfer of privately owned means of production to public ownership, in gaining acceptance for this practice and in making it commonplace. It has been said that the five stars in the flag of the People's Republic of China (PRC) stand for the five classes in China, and that the characteristic of each class is determined by its relation to the ownership of the means of production. Thus even the 1954 constitution, in its section on "implementing socialism," commented on the twin goals of socialist reformation and socialist industrialization as follows:

From the founding of the People's Republic of China to the attainment of a socialist society is a period of transition. During the transition the fundamental task of the state is, step by step, to bring about the socialist industrialization of the country and, step by step, to accomplish the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce. [3, p. 69]

The transitional period referred to above meant the period between capitalism and socialism. Since the Cultural Revolution, it has meant the period from capitalism to the completion of the building of a communist society. The first important task to be accomplished during the transitional period was to implement socialism by dealing with the various classes, such as the peasants, petty handicrafters, and national capitalists. These classes which labored under the system of the private ownership of the means of production were to be persuaded

This article is a portion of Chapter 1 taken from my book *Chūgoku no toshika to nōson* [China's urbanization and rural villages] (Tokyo: Ryūkei-shosha, 1978). Chapter 1 of the book dealt with the theme of socialist construction and urbanization. The postscript was added to deal with some of changes which have taken place within China since the book was published.

without antagonism to create instead a socialist system whereby all would work for the benefit of the people. The goal of socialist industrialization implied taking the factories and businesses formerly associated with the Guomindang compradore capitalists and foreign imperialists, and nationalizing them as well as strengthening their productive capacity. It was thought that the best way to advance socialist reconstruction was to develop the nationalized sector, by investing in designated cities and by giving priority to special industrial sectors (even if that meant that some existing sectors of the economy would have to be ignored).

A new situation in some agricultural villages upset this way of thought. Initially, the goal of the three five-year plans between 1953 and 1967 was based on the assumption that the construction of socialism would be completed soon with the input of productive forces from the nationalized sector. Unexpectedly, however, the rural peasants, who did not use modern tools or machines, actively formed cooperative farms and by 1956 they had completed the socialist reorganization of agriculture.

At the Eighth Party Congress held in August 1956, Liu Shaoqi made reference to this new situation by discussing "the contradiction between advanced production relationships and undeveloped productive forces." The task for the future, from this theory, would be to increase the productive capacity by any means. At the same time, with regard to this awareness of a new situation, the *Renmin ribao* dared to say,

China has basically completed the implementation of socialism. Therefore, the economic factors causing a contradiction between mental labor and manual labor and the differences of the two have already disappeared. [7, Apr. 8, 1957]

The theory of the three major differences refers to the differences between urban and rural, factory workers and peasants, manual and mental labor. The editorial did not refer to the theory of the three differences by name, but certainly as far as the differences existent between manual and mental labor, if the socialist reconstruction had truly been completed (not only in agriculture, but in petty handicrafts and in the state-private joint-owned businesses as well), these differences should have been abolished. If those differences had truly been abolished as the *Renmin ribao* stated, why were rural cadres, peasants, and petty handicrafters abandoning the countryside and heading for the cities?

Mao Zedong was one of those who saw the reality of the situation and criticized the ideas expressed above. A year later, he made his pronouncement on the issue in a statement which addressed the contradictions and responsibilities that still existed following the completion of building cooperatives.

What then is the principal contradiction now? . . . the principal contradiction is between socialism and capitalism, between collectivism and individualism, or in a nutshell between the socialist road and the capitalist road. The resolution of the Eighth Congress makes no mention of this question. It contains a passage which speaks of the principal contradiction as being that between the advanced socialist system and the backward social productive forces. This formulation is incorrect. [5, pp. 492-93]

Mao's pronouncement on this issue came at a time when many important events were taking place within the communist world. In March 1956, the Soviet criticisms of Stalin were unveiled, the incidents involving Poland and Hungary took place, and in China there were even anti-government movements by students and intellectuals. These were contradictions the existence of which could not be denied by the socialist societies. In February 1957, Mao wrote his pamphlet "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People." In the pamphlet he discussed these contradictions and analyzed their character.

The development of a situation overwhelming the existing socialist theory had continued. Beginning in 1958 came the Great Leap Forward movement in the countryside, a monumental undertaking in which tens of thousands of peasants participated in sharing farming tools, building irrigation works, planting trees, making organic fertilizers and promoting rural industrialization. The great energies unleashed by this movement were spread to the provincial cities as well as to the capital itself. Not only that, it also brought about major reorganization in the area of government planning and in the finance and currency system. The people's communes were also established. A major difference between the new people's communes and the earlier Chinese cooperatives or the Soviet kolkhoz was that the new people's communes represented a single structural organization in which the workers, merchants, peasants, students, and soldiers cooperated equally. This was in contrast to the Soviet kolkhoz and earlier Chinese cooperative farms which were based solely on agricultural production.

The new organizational form of the people's communes was outlined in the Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes issued in December 1958 as follows:

The development of the people's commune system has a profound significance. Namely, that China's agricultural villages are gradually being industrialized and further that the system of the communal ownership of the means of production is steadily advancing toward all people's ownership... It also means that we are on the road toward abolishing the differences between the city and the countryside, between factory workers and agricultural peasants, and between manual and mental labor. [7, Dec. 19, 1958]

In spite of these developments, none of the resolutions issued by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) until December 1958 made reference to either closing the gap or abolishing the distinctions referred to in the three major differences. The "resolution on the people's communes" mentioned above stated that the solution to the problem of abolishing these differences could be best achieved by the people's communes because they contained the optimum organization for doing so. The same resolution also pointed out the existence of a class struggle within China. As far as resolutions or statements issued by the leaders of the CCP concerned, it may be the first document to refer to the existence of class struggle in socialist society. A theoretical jump can be observed between the editorial of *Renmin ribao* published on April 8, 1957 following the successful completion of the cooperativization drive and the above resolution which is con-

cerned with the problem of solving the differences between manual and mental labor. In addition to helping spread the public ownership of property, the other major pillar of the people's communes was the potential role which they had in helping to abolish the distinctions which existed in the three major differences. With the help of this new theory, the people began to recognize more deeply the difference between the backward villages and the advanced urban areas.

Mao Zedong dealt with this problem by applying his theory to cities, which first appeared as a comment he made in 1961 concerning a Soviet textbook on economics which had been published in 1958. His comments on this textbook were compiled in the confidential document *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* [4]. The issue was raised in Chapter 35 of the textbook which discussed "the gradual transition from socialism to communism." The chapter had a section on "abolishing the substantial differences between urban and rural areas and the development of kolkhoz on the road to communism." Mao's comment concerning that section of the textbook read,

Rather than talking about the differences between urban and rural areas, why does the book emphasize that there is no need to decrease the role of the large urban areas? In the future cities should not be allowed to become too big. Residents of the large cities can be sent to the countryside, and small cities, as many as possible, should be constructed. [4, pp. 377-78]

In order to abolish the differences between the urban and rural areas and between workers and peasants, the equipping of peasants with modern machines like factory workers would probably become a major necessity. Reducing the role of the large cities seemed a fitting way to assist this process. The Soviet economic textbook called for the gradual development of large cities, for getting more material goods to the agricultural villages and in effect turning the rural peasants into workers. In that scheme the agricultural villages and rural peasants occupied a rather passive position whilst Mao's position deemphasized the role of the large cities. In concrete terms, Mao's approach meant that some of the support structures and citizen groups which benefited the cities would have to be removed. It was a matter of simplifying and decreasing the functions and bureaucracy of the large cities.

II. DEVELOPMENT AND DISSENSION OF TWO THEORIES

Beginning in the second half of 1960, because of the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the termination of Soviet aid, China entered a very difficult period and the economic difficulties which raised many contradictions affected the cities and countryside alike. The question became one of "what do currently accepted theories have to say about these contradictions?" At the open Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee held in September 1962, programs on the continued existence of antagonistic classes within a socialist society were adopted. The August 1956 resolution of the Eighth Party Congress was overturned and the "resolution on the people's communes" was endorsed instead. It was gen-

erally felt that class enemies still existed in a socialist society because of lingering influences from the old society. The most extensive treatment of this problem had been given by Liu Shaoqi in statements made in September 1959 to mark the tenth anniversary of the PRC and in July 1960 to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the CCP.¹

Mao, however, began to develop his own awareness of the contradictions within a socialist society. In an open letter sent from the Central Committee of the CCP to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in July 1964, Mao suggested the possible emergence of a new bourgeoisie in a communist party. After the total collapse of talks between the Russian and Chinese leaders in 1963, this became an important issue within the CCP and it was the subject of one of the open letters which was sent to the Soviet central committee. In a document titled "Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World: A Criticism of the Ninth Letter Issued by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party," it was pointed out that antagonistic classes and a class struggle still existed within Soviet society. Many examples were cited of cases taken from materials which had been made public in the Soviet Union. The examples included cases of the incomes of the highest Soviet leaders which were one hundred times those of the average citizen, as well as the misappropriation by factory and kolkhoz managers, etc. It was said that these new bureaucrats sought out representatives of the highest power-holders within the party for their own security. The highest party officials acted as their patrons. Khrushchev, it said, was one of these especially privileged people [6, pp. 13-16]. The important point, of course, was that such a new class also existed in Chinese society.

But let us look at the facts. Is our society today thoroughly clean? No, it is not. Classes and class struggle still remain, the activities of the overthrown reactionary classes plotting a comeback still continue, and we still have speculative activities by old and new bourgeois elements and desperate forays by embezzlers, grafters and degenerates. There are also cases of degeneration in a few primary organizations; what is more, these degenerates do their utmost to find protectors and agents in the higher leading bodies. [6, p. 24]


In November 1956, Mao introduced the story of a high ranking liberation army officer. In 1949 just after liberation, the officer claimed an increase in salary, saying "the liberation army has only simple vegetables cooked in salt water, while capitalist families have a varied diet, this is no good." Mao deplored his claim. The officer had just come through a revolution, but he nevertheless complained about the distribution problem and compared their meals with capitalist meals.

A comment on this problem was made in a talk given in January 1957.

One kind of problem arises among our own ranks. For example, some cadres now scramble for fame and fortune and are interested only in personal gain. In the discussion of the grading of cadres, there were instances where a cadre would not

¹ See Liu Shaoqi's report in *Hongqi* [2, 1959, No. 19, and 1961, No. 13].

Fig. 1. Different Approaches to Socialism



be satisfied with a rise of one grade, even a rise of two grades still left him weeping in bed. [5, p. 350]

In that same talk a report from a local cadre was introduced, which showed how the pay of some cadres was too high to be tolerated by the peasants.

In Mao's talk delivered at a meeting of party cadres on March 18, 1957, comments were made on the fading enthusiasm of cadres for their work.

They are clamouring for position and for the limelight, becoming particular about what they eat and wear, competing for salary and scrambling for fame and gain—all these tendencies are growing. I have heard that during the grading of cadres last year, some people burst into tears and made terrible scenes. . . . Our comrades should take note: Don't live on the power of your office, your high position or seniority. [5, pp. 436-39]

Not only those who sought fame and status were criticized, but also those who liked to dance or play mahjong. These talks predated by several years the essay made public in 1964.

Mao's theory of the contradictions within socialist society are shown in Figure 1 position numbers 1 to 3, while the points endorsed by Liu Shaoqi are numbers 1 and 2 only.

III. PRACTICE FOR THE SOLUTION OF THREE MAJOR DIFFERENCES

The theories numbered 2 and 3 (as shown in Figure 1) were used in the Cultural Revolution, and in real movements revolutionary groups tried to criticize those in power and to deprive of their authorities. Mao Zedong's May Seventh Directive was taken as the basis for policy decisions. The May Seventh Directive basically said that although workers engage in industry, they should also participate in military, political, and cultural activities. Likewise, peasants should not

only engage in agriculture but also should participate in industrial work and other spheres of activity just as the workers were instructed to do. Students, businessmen, and others were given the same instructions. The model for this innovative undertaking was the People's Liberation Army.

The *Renmin ribao* editorial of August 1, 1966 which launched the Cultural Revolution made Mao's May Seventh Directive the basis of the study of the works of Mao. It said:

Our goal is to gradually close the gap between the city and the countryside, between manual and intellectual labor, and between factory workers and peasants to promote urbanization and industry proportionately, to change intellectuals into workers, to change the working people into intellectuals, to achieve political self-determination and to raise a new breed of wholly developed communist human beings possessing political sense of a high-level.

The well-known "newly born things" which appeared during this period were also based on that sort of thinking; the barefoot doctors are a good example of a newly born thing. The criticism that "medical care has been confined only to the gentlemen of the cities," met with wide approval, because of the backwardness of medical facilities in the rural areas. At the time of liberation, there were ten thousand Western style doctors and five-hundred-thousand Chinese style doctors, but until 1956, the Chinese style doctors were not well treated by the administration. Yet in the rural villages there were almost no Western style doctors and that situation had not changed by the 1960s. The criticism that school education cultivated "the sons and grandsons of the bourgeoisie" was based on the theory of the three major differences, and as a result facilities for higher education were closed and the energy of the students was spent on carrying out the Cultural Revolution. The practice of having high school and junior high school graduates go out into the countryside and into the rural villages or border regions to work was also a result of this theory. There was an element to this, however, of using it as a way of solving the unemployment problem and also of meeting the needs of the economy by encouraging the development of agricultural villages. These newly formed practices were not undertaken as part of the ideal slogan, but were of economic necessity rooted in the social structure.

Another one of the newly born things was the policy of better troops and simpler administration. It was a policy designed to deal with the administrative structure and desk work bureaucrats who had grown in size and in number. Since the bureaucrats were reshuffled and discharged from their posts, revolutionary committees were created which combined both administrative and party functions under one head. It was hoped that this policy would also decrease the number of bureaucrats in order to release as many people as possible for productive labor, a very important point in the Chinese economic system where very little capital was available in the first place and where the system rested on productive labor. Politically, the policy was designed to halt the spread of bureaucratism.

Mao's comment on this point, also made in regard to the Soviet economic textbook, was that,

One favorable point concerning Europe is that each nation is independent and autonomic, therefore Europe's economy was developed rather early as a whole. China, on the other hand, has since the early Chin dynasty been a huge unified nation, creating the drawback to this condition that it gave rise to the development of bureaucratism. Bureaucratic controls tended to be tight and no independence in the local areas was allowed to develop. [4, p. 378]

Mao's reasoning appears to have been based on the following: The relatively stronger economic independence of local areas would prompt economic construction through a more efficient use of local resources. At the same time, it would prevent the rise of bureaucratism, and this policy would narrow the three major differences.

Bureaucratism easily grew in construction projects in the large cities. Mao advocated efforts to deemphasize the role of the cities. The current general policy of city construction, namely, "small concentration and large dispersion" (not to build many large cities, instead to construct many small cities throughout the country) was developed during the Great Leap Forward. It was strengthened as part of the Cultural Revolution's attempts to narrow the gap between the three major differences.

This point was discussed in an article by Guo Huan in *Hongqi*. He wrote:

China's industrial orientation policy is to follow the spirit of Chairman Mao's instructions that is, to avoid concentration and to instead disperse industry by moving it to small towns. This policy is a strategic attempt to narrow the gap between the urban cities and the rural villages and also to solve the contradiction of developing our industry while protecting our environment. This will help not only to make the cities and villages more cohesive, but also the lives of the workers and peasants will become more similar. [2, 1974, No. 9]

All of the newly born things discussed above were policies which arose during the Cultural Revolution as part of the attempt to solve the problem of the three major differences. Obviously these facts show the optimism offered in the April 8, 1957 *Renmin ribao* article discussed above about the completion of the socialist reformation and the solving of differences between mental and manual labor; it was clear that these contradictions had not been solved within Chinese society. Within the Chinese Communist Party, a point of bitter contention arose as to whether or not the gap between the three major differences had either widened or narrowed and in fact, whether or not the three major differences still existed was also questioned.

IV. PURGE OF THE GANG OF FOUR AND THE APPROACH OF HUA GUOFENG

Into the 1970s, the Cultural Revolution faction within the party wanted to see the policies of the Cultural Revolution continued, but from 1975 on divisions within this group began to surface and only one month after the death of Mao Zedong the Gang of Four were arrested. Following the arrests, Mao's successor Hua Guofeng began purging Cultural Revolution supporters, who were replaced

by old pre-Cultural Revolution cadres. He also called upon the intellectuals and technicians to put priority on construction. Clearly, it was no longer necessary to criticize the intellectuals and technicians as had been the case in the past.

University entrance examinations were held in December 1977. Revolutionary committees in the shops, factories, and schools were disbanded except those at the center, provincial, regional, county, and commune levels. Interestingly enough, the purpose of these changes was basically the same as during the Cultural Revolution which had caused the revolutionary committees to be set up in the first place; namely, to break the power of the old cadres and to install more revolutionary cadres. In order to remove the new cadres who had been installed during the Cultural Revolution, it was necessary to dismantle the revolutionary committees, to take away their powers, and to create new administrative organs. Only the medical field was untouched and the newly born system of medical administration seems to continue as before.

What was the policy, however, regarding construction in the cities and villages? That policy was outlined by Hua Guofeng in his political report delivered on February 26, 1978. He said:

In the process of industrialization, we must combine industry and agriculture, just as we must close the gap between urban cities and rural villages. We must follow the model of the Daqing oil field where workers' and managers' families engage in farming and subsidiary industries so far as conditions permit. There must be a renewed emphasis on construction in medium and small cities, and there will not be a concentration of new projects in the large cities. [2, 1978, No. 3, p. 16]

Numerous conferences to discuss national planning were held after the overthrow of the Gang of Four, and among these was the Daqing oil field conference which said that the system used at Daqing should become the model for economic development throughout China and a model for the future society which would be constructed. At the Daqing oil field conference in May 1977, Hua Guofeng said:

The families of the Daqing workers and cadres organized themselves to take part in production and have become an important force in building Daqing. According to conditions in the area, Daqing also undertakes agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, side-occupations and fishery, is increasing collective welfare step by step and has made itself an oil field of a new type, which has both industry and agriculture and combines town and country. All this contributes to narrowing the differences between worker and peasant, between town and country, and between manual and mental labor, to restricting bourgeois right and to preventing the emergence of a class of bureaucrats. [1, pp. 80-81]

The policies of avoiding concentration and instead dispersing cities, which were born during the Great Leap Forward and praised during the Cultural Revolution, can be clearly seen in Hua's remarks.

Nevertheless, whether or not this approach is in accord with Mao's comments made in the Soviet economic textbook to "send the urban residents to the rural

villages and build many small cities" is open to question. Mao wanted to halt the concentration of facilities in the large cities and to reduce their role. He emphasized the construction of middle or small scale local cities, instead. But he did not make clear the scale of the cities. We may suppose that there are two kinds of the city population size; from ten thousand to one-hundred-thousand and from five-hundred-thousand to two or three million. The problem is which scale of city would be emphasized. The different effect can be seen in closing the gap between the urban and rural areas in two cases. If their populations were set at the higher end of the scale, other problems would arise, such as whether or not it would still be possible to decrease the size of the bureaucracy.

Hua Guofeng's policies did not abandon the concept of closing the gap between the three major differences, even though his approach was different from that of Mao who wanted the role of the large cities diminished (a goal that would also break the hold of the urban classes who monopolized power in the cities) and who also wanted priority given to the construction of small cities in the rural areas. Perhaps Hua's approach dealt with the issue of industrial cities, but China's policies toward this approach are not yet clear and more time is required before we can judge exactly what China's current stand on this issue is.

Two problems which have been of concern to the Chinese recently are the lack of progress in decreasing the key role of the cities and in implementing bureaucratic reforms; two policies which Mao advocated and which became important during the Cultural Revolution. In addition, two new factors have emerged in the last few years. The first was the revival of university entrance examinations. In the past, recommendation to university was closely connected with the rustication of high school students. If in future university graduates do not become a privileged elite who enjoy a higher standard of living than the workers and their social status is lower than worker, the revival of the university entrance examination system will not necessarily create an atmosphere to look down on manual labor and the countryside, and rustication will continue with seemingly little opposition. However, if in the future university graduates come to dominate Chinese society, it will be the academic person rather than the manual worker who will be envied and it will be difficult to close the three differences.

The second new factor to emerge is the recent practice of constructing entire plant complexes for heavy industry. As this policy is put into effect, it is inevitable that certain areas of the country will begin to see a concentration of wealth, personnel, and power. The goal announced in the political report given at the National People's Congress in February 1978 was that by the year 1985 a total of 120 large plant complexes will have been constructed. For example, the plan calls for the construction of ten huge steel mills, each with a capacity to produce three to six million tons of steel annually; it calls for thirty electrical generating plants producing more than two-hundred-thousand kilowatts of power. Recently, the Chinese have shown an interest in nuclear generating plants.

Surely, these 120 new large-scale projects will call for a reorganization in the placement of industrial facilities throughout the country. Most likely many of the plants will be concentrated near some of the larger cities where abundant manpower is available.

Yet, another point to be considered is the emphasis on promoting science as part of the Four Modernizations campaign and whether or not the emphasis on science is compatible with closing the gap between manual and mental workers. An article in the journal *Hongqi* said,

Looking back on history, it is clear that science and technology have been linked with increases in production. The new viewpoints provided by science and the new invention provided by technology have often provoked serious revolutions. Present day science and technology supply us with an abundant material base with which increase labor productivity, strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, build socialism, and finally crush capitalism. The development of present day science and technology is absolutely necessary in order to expand agricultural production, to strengthen the abilities of the working classes, and to decrease the gap between the cities and the countryside, workers and peasants. [2, 1977, No. 7, p. 1]

The above remarks were written by a member of the journal, but it is a well-known fact that the author was most likely a high-ranking communist party official. The article raised the point that the development of science and technology would prepare substantial conditions for closing the gap between the three major differences. But it did not specifically mention that *only* the development of science and technology would be an element to close the gap. However, the theory expounded by the article is similar to that found in Chapter 35 of the Soviet economic textbook which was criticized by Mao Zedong. Great scientific and technological advancements in the modern age have been furthered by gigantic monopolistic capital and the state itself. At the same time, these advancements are backed by gigantic financial banks with a corp of specialists. If one examines contemporary Japan, it will be hard to deny that one of the functions of science and technology has been to foster a specially privileged social stratum. The article did not refer to this point. It seemed unaware of the fact that these differences continue to exist in a modern, advanced, industrialized society such as Japan.

If the article quoted immediately above is compared with the political report made by Hua Guofeng which was quoted earlier, it will be seen that the article of *Hongqi* does not advance from position number 2, of Figure 1 while Hua's argument is closer in substance to position number 3. It is perhaps too early to clearly evaluate the future course which this policy line will take.

POSTSCRIPT

It is clear from our present perspective that during the last half of 1978 the economic policies approved by the CCP as well as the makeup of the leaders at the highest levels underwent an important change. One of the major policy revisions was not to encourage the development of heavy industry but to give priority to agriculture. Hua Guofeng's long term economic plan which was adopted at the National People's Congress held in February 1978 was largely revised before being undertaken. Sweeping economic reforms were particularly noticeable, including the acceptance of foreign loans and allowing Chinese-foreign joint ventures. A three-year adjustment period to begin in 1979 was also adopted.

These policies were in fact approved by the CCP at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee held in December 1978.

A group centered on Chen Yun which appeared to hold even more "rightist tendencies" than Deng Xiaoping emerged. Chen Yun is famous for being passive equilibrium theorist. What's more, at the Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee held in September 1979, both Peng Jen and Zhao Ziyang were elected members of the central committee. Moreover, twelve high-ranking cadres who had been heavily criticized during the Cultural Revolution were elected to that committee. It is thus extremely important when attempting to evaluate China's future policies to realize that this group with "rightist tendencies" now holds great power in the CCP.

The question remains, however, as to what kind of socialist policies will be followed by this new group of power-holders. In a conclusion, the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress of August 1956 is now being reinstated, while that made in September 1962 is being put aside. The theme that classes still exist in China's socialist society is being almost denied and the policies of the once purged Liu Shaoqi are now being resurrected, to the point that it appears as if Liu's name and accomplishments will be officially restored. From the analysis, I have presented in Figure 1, it can be seen that position number 2 becomes dominant, and position number 3, which is directly related to the three major differences has been denied.

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee pointed out the existence of a minor number of anti-revolutionary groups. However, it almost denies the class struggle. It says:

As Chairman Mao has pointed out, the stormy class struggle by the mass on a large scale has basically been completed, and so when the class struggle is carried on within a socialist society its two major contradictions [antagonistic and non-antagonistic] must be clearly defined first, so that a correct approach can be taken in solving problems. [2, 1979, No. 1, p. 16]

A similar approach toward the issue of class struggle within a socialist society was taken up by Hua Guofeng in a June 1979 announcement made to the National People's Congress, an approach which was closer by one step to that of Liu Shaoqi. He said:

At the same time as we acknowledge that the task of carrying out the class struggle has not been completed, let us keep in mind that it will not be necessary to carry out a large scale struggle which would be disruptive to the nation and that a class struggle by the mass should not be carried out in future. Chairman Mao has taught us that the basic contradiction in a socialist society is that concerning productive forces and production relations and that concerning economic foundations and the superstructure, so that although differences in economic levels exist, the contradiction concerning them is fundamentally different in a socialist society as opposed to the old society. Our basic responsibility in working toward socialism has changed from liberating productive forces to creating and developing productive forces which are socialistic in their relations. [2, 1979, No. 7, p. 7]

From the above it can be seen that the emphasis is on the development of the

nation's productive force, an emphasis which is rather similar to that made by Liu Shaoqi at the Eighth Party Congress in August 1956. After coming to power, Hua Guofeng began to make revisions in the policies which were carried out until February 1978, adopting the new approach favored by the Deng Xiaoping group.

In the conclusion to the original article published above, I wrote that there were many gaps between the article of *Hongqi* and the political report made by Hua Guofeng which was quoted earlier. The specific points of comparison I had in mind were the concessions which Hua made to the policies which all along had been favored by the Deng Xiaoping group and his "right leaning" followers who had been severely criticized during the Cultural Revolution.

From the above discussion, it can be seen that the policies in effect from the time of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 to the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, as well as the resolution of the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee in September 1962 that antagonistic classes exist in a socialist society, all are denied totally. (Autumn 1979)

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