

BREAKDOWN OF CHINA'S POLICY OF RESTRICTING POPULATION MOVEMENT

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INTRODUCTION

A notable distinction between population movement in China and that in other countries is that the former has been regulated by administrative authority. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government worried that if nothing were done about population movement, the inflow of people into the cities might become so heavy as to disrupt order in the urban sector. In the following years, the government adopted a policy of controlling the movement of people which it carried out through a multifaceted regulatory system. These efforts resulted in the closure of the labor market as well as the control of population movement and distribution of manpower by administrative authority.


In this paper, population movement forced by administrative power is referred to as policy-induced movement, whereas that caused by economic factors or disasters is regarded as spontaneous movement. Policy-induced movement takes the forms of (1) redeploying employees of government agencies and state-run enterprises, (2) forced evacuation due to the construction of dams, and (3) compulsory migration to mitigate a labor surplus or solve political and security problems. In contrast, the most frequent form of spontaneous movement is migration in search of economically more favorable jobs. Also, flights from villages struck by disasters and suffering from other factors are common in China. The victims move to new land and settle for a while until they can return to their rehabilitated villages. This pattern of movement has been prevalent over the years.

This paper will analyze China's population movement over a forty-five-year period since the early 1950s by comparing policy-induced and spontaneous movement patterns.

I. OVERVIEW OF POPULATION MOVEMENT

It was with the third census in 1982 that China began to collect migration data. Due to inadequate definition, however, statistics at that time as well as in subsequent

Fig. 1. Population Migration Rates Based on Household Registration Statistics



Sources: [9, 1989 ed., p. 178] [9, 1991 ed., pp. 316-17] [9, 1992 ed., p. 280] [9, 1993 ed., p. 29] [9, 1994 ed., pp. 64-65].

Note: Inflow and outflow of population divided by total population.

censuses failed to present an overall picture of population movement. The only source of information about migration going back to the 1950s is statistics on changes in household registration monitored by the Public Security Ministry. However, these statistics also have some deficiencies in that they reckon as population movement only those cases where a migrant's change of residence is accompanied by the transfer of household registration. Therefore, for those migrants who move out of their place of home residence without transferring household registration, there exist virtually no statistics to accurately estimate their number.

With those statistical flaws in mind, Figures 1, 2, and 3 summarize the characteristics of population movement as recorded in the Public Security Ministry's household registration statistics over a forty-year period (1954–93).

The flow of population charted in Figure 1 manifests three characteristics. The first is the very high rate of movement in the 1950s. The inflow rate in 1954 stood at 3.8 per cent and outflow was 3.5 per cent; in 1955 it was 4.2 per cent and 4.0 per cent respectively. In 1956 it was 4.9 per cent and 4.6 per cent; in 1957, 4.3 per cent and 4.1 per cent; in 1958, 4.9 per cent and 4.7 per cent; in 1959, 4.8 per cent and 4.3 per cent; and in 1960, 5.0 per cent and 4.8 per cent.


By comparison, Japan's rate of movement between prefectures was 2.5 per cent in 1955, 2.6 per cent in 1957, 2.7 per cent in 1959, and over 3 per cent in 1961. During the period of high economic growth (1957/58 to 1973), the rate rose gradually from 3.2 per cent in 1961 to 3.8 per cent in 1965, and 3.9 per cent in 1968. During the subsequent three years, the rate was at most 4 per cent, reaching this level in 1969 and 4.1 per cent in both 1970 and 1971. The rate of movement slipped to 3.9 per cent in 1972 and continued to drop until it reached 3.0 per cent in 1979. In the 1980s it declined further and stood between the 3 per cent and 2 per cent levels [12, p. 47]. Japan's figures for the 1960s and 70s are among the highest by international standards. Judging from this fact, it is apparent that the rate of migration on the Chinese continent in the 1950s was very high by global standards, suggesting that China was a highly mobile society.

The second characteristic is that both inflow and outflow dropped below 2.5 per cent in the 1960s with the latter surpassing the former. The two rates, which should be equal theoretically, probably differ due to the time lag in the process of compiling the statistics. However, it should be noticed that only in the 1960s the rate of outflow exceeded that of inflow. This phenomenon seems to reflect the forced evacuation of urban residents which will be discussed later.

The third characteristic is that, despite the massive migration that has become a conspicuous social phenomenon after the mid-1980s, household registration statistics show that in the 1980s inflow and outflow rates declined from the levels of the 1960s and 70s. The reason is statistical; apparently spontaneous migration was not accompanied by changes in household registry and was not reflected in demographic figures based on household registration. Thus as discussed in more detail in Section V, these figures did not reflect reality.

Population flows in some administrative units at the province level are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 illustrates net inflow and outflow rates in frontier regions. Minus figures denote net outflow rate. The data used are for five-yearly periods, but they indicate general trends. There were great numbers of people flowing into the frontier regions from the mid-1950s through the mid-60s. In Inner Mongolia, for example, the inflow of registered people in 1960 reached 2.3 million, or more than 20 per cent of the region's population of 11.27 million, while outflow

Fig. 2. Net Population Migration Rates for Frontier Regions




Source: [9, 1989 ed., pp. 181-82, 192-93].

numbered 1.24 million, for a net influx of 1.06 million. An influx of people equivalent to 20 per cent of a region's population in one year is an unusual phenomenon.

Throughout the 1950s, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang Province, and Xinjiang region received migrants and settlers from coastal regions as well as densely populated provinces. These frontier regions were also hosts to hunger-stricken people during the three-year period (from 1959) of food crises. During the period of the Cultural Revolution that started in the late 1960s, these areas also received rusticated youth who were senior and junior high school graduates virtually forced out of urban registry into rural registry. The unusual figures reflect this movement.

In Figure 3, which traces population movement for three big cities, Tianjin and

Fig. 3. Net Population Migration Rates for Three Major Cities




Source: [9, 1989 ed., pp. 179, 183].

Shanghai show almost constant net outflows, with Shanghai registering a greater percentage than the other two cities. Relocation of factories from these two cities to inland provinces as well as the forced evacuation of surplus population from these cities accounted for this phenomenon. Beijing's high net inflow is understandable because this capital city contains major government agencies and universities as well as many state-run enterprises.

It should be noted that up to the mid-1960s Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang region, and Heilongjiang Province accepted more people from outside than did other regions, while Shanghai presented a sharp contrast by sending more people out than any other city.

The next theme of our analysis is migration from rural to urban areas. However, it is very difficult to provide a statistical overview of this movement for the entire

Fig. 4. Ratio of the Rural Labor Force (and Employees in the Primary Industry) to the Total Labor Force



Sources: [11, p. 3] [8, 1995 ed., p.83].

Note: The primary industry comprises agriculture, forestry, fishery, and livestock raising.

forty-five-year period, and our observations are thus based on alternative data. Figure 4 shows occupational structure changes in terms of the employment rate in the primary sector (i.e., agriculture, forestry, fishery, and livestock raising) and the percentage of the rural labor force. Since by definition the rural labor force includes those who engage in nonagricultural activities, the differences between these two kinds of rates would suggest a general trend of labor shift from rural to urban sectors.

The marked indent in the chart between 1958 and 1960 indicates an extraordinary shift of people to big cities during the Great Leap Forward. After 1960, how-

ever, the big cities could not afford to feed their swollen populations, and many people were forced to return to rural areas. In the 1970s, the primary industry's share of China's total labor force began to decline gradually, and the shrinkage reached 12 per cent between 1970 (81.0 per cent) and 1980 (68.9 per cent). The 1980s witnessed another drop of 8.8 per cent, from 68.9 per cent in 1980 to 60.1 per cent in 1990. The faster contraction in the 1970s indicates that contrary to general expectations, the phenomenon of shift away from agriculture was more rapid in the 1970s than in the 1980s. In other words, changes in the industrial structure were more intensive in the 1970s.

The other line on the graph, which traces the percentage of the rural labor force in the country's total labor force, shows that the pace of rural labor force contraction was much slower. This means that although a shift away from agriculture was occurring within the rural sector, the outflow of population to the cities were taking place much more slowly.

However, a closer look at this line for the rate of rural labor reveals an interesting fact. During the eight years between 1962 and 1970, the rural labor force decreased only modestly, from 82.5 per cent in 1962 to 81.7 per cent in 1970, suggesting that little urbanization was going on nationwide. In the 1970s, however, the rural labor force shrank by as much as 6.4 per cent from 81.7 per cent to 75.3 per cent during the decade. This contraction is markedly larger than the 1.6-point decrease from 75.3 per cent to 73.7 per cent during the subsequent decade of the 1980s. It is apparent that urbanization was faster in the 1970s than in the 1980s. This finding goes counter to the general notion that the movement of population into the cities was accelerated by the process of economic reforms during the 1980s.

Although a proper judgment of these figures requires discussion of statistical issues concerning migration into the cities, three points can nevertheless be confirmed: that there was heavy population movement in the 1950s, that the momentum of migration waned sharply in the 1960s and 1970s, and that shifts away from agriculture and employment in nonagricultural activities progressed steadily within the rural sector in the 1970s.

II. PHASE ONE (1950–60)

A. *Rapid Increase in Rural Labor Supply*

It is no exaggeration to say that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) owes the success of its revolution to land reform. Land reform brought about three drastic changes in the rural labor situation. First, landowners who were never previously involved in the act of farming were forced to start working on farms. It is estimated that the 20-million strong landowner class added 4–5 million people to the farm work force.

Second, rural housewives who had traditionally kept away from farm work began to engage in cultivation and harvesting. According to one report, 40 per cent of rural housewives in northern regions had begun working on farms by 1952 [20, p. 105]. This trend also augmented the supply of farm labor.

Third, the cities were faced with the question of which sectors should absorb about 8 million former soldiers and government officials who had lost their jobs with the breakup of the Kuomintang army and the Republic of China. This additional supply of labor caused the urban unemployment rate to jump to 23.6 per cent in 1949 and to be at the still high 13.2 per cent in 1952, according to an official announcement [10, p. 109].

As its first policy reaction to the bloated work force, the government announced its decision on the employment issue on July 25, 1952, followed by the announcement of policy measures to solve the rural labor surplus on October 31. The former was intended primarily to rescue the urban unemployed through such measures as continued employment of former government employees and teachers, with the exception of high-ranking officials, employment of jobless intellectuals after retraining, registration of the unemployed by district, and continued employment of private enterprise workers. Treatment of the former soldiers was the greatest headache, but it was decided basically to let them go home and engage in production under poor farmers' supervision. Some former soldiers, to whom this decision could not apply, became settlers in frontier regions, as did general urban unemployed people.

The policy measures in the October 31 notice regarding surplus rural labor were basically intended to solve problems within rural areas. New jobs would be created by accelerating irrigation works and promoting side businesses and handicrafts. Former landowners would be allotted pieces of land to work on, and idle farmers and surplus rural workers would be encouraged to cultivate waste land and hills and settle on those areas. Any surplus workers still remaining would be moved to the northeast and northwest regions as settlers under various plans. The central and eastern provinces had more surplus labor than others, and planned migration from these provinces was implemented. Planned migration of this type was tantamount to policy-induced population movement.

B. *Policy-induced Population Movement*

1. *Planned migration for settlement*

Intra-province settlement migration was frequent, but a more common pattern was migration to Heilongjiang Province, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang region. Among settlers in these frontier regions were ex-soldiers who had been organized into construction corps before being sent away. This type of migration is shown in Figure 2. In essence the northeastern and northwestern provinces were used to absorb the impact of massive unemployment.

2. *Policy-induced migration prompted by economic construction*

With the start of economic construction in the northeastern provinces in 1951, many corporate managers and engineers were recruited from many parts of China to Liaoning and Jilin provinces. Full-scale construction from 1953 onwards triggered considerable movement of these people to northeastern regions.

3. *Movement of industrial plants*

The government also adopted a policy of transferring industrial plants from Shanghai, home of light industries, to raw materials-producing inland areas. It was decided to site new spinning mills and food processing plants in inner areas where raw materials were available. This policy was designed to counter the American containment policy of blockading the Strait of Formosa and the seas off Shanghai with its Seventh Fleet.

C. *Spontaneous Population Movement*

There were three main currents of spontaneous population movement in the first half of the twentieth century. The largest was the movement of migrant workers who left their homes in such provinces as Shandong and Hebei in search of work in the northeastern regions. The second largest flow was from Guangdong and Fujian provinces to Southeast Asian countries. The third current was formed by migration into northwestern regions, such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, at times of disasters. The third flow was not very large, and the second dried up with the establishment of the new China.

In place of these three currents, the outflow from rural into urban areas has prevailed since 1950. However, as there was cumulative unemployment in the cities, the government had to take measures to curb this inflow. The first step was the directive of October 31, 1952. This was followed by directives to rural leaders instructing them to use publicity and persuasion to prevent the spontaneous outflow of peasants. Thereafter directives were issued in 1953 (April 17), in 1954 (March 12), in 1956 (December 30), and four were issued in 1957 (March 2, April 30, May 13, and December 8).

D. *Preventing the Outflow of Peasants*

1. *Legal measures*

Despite the many directives issued to discourage farmers from leaving their homes, the outflow of peasants to urban areas could not be checked through persuasion or the restriction of access to transport tickets. The government then decided to resort to legal measures. In December 1957, the State Council promulgated provisional regulations concerning the employment of temporary workers from the rural sector by institutional corporations. These stipulated the following: Corporations (in the cities) are uniformly prohibited from employing farmers moving into

the cities, without taking the proper procedures through labor administrative organizations. Agricultural collectives and government agencies and organizations in the rural areas should not arrange the employment of farmers in urban enterprises or in the mining and industrial sector. When temporary workers are needed in the cities, they should be recruited within the cities first. Only when urban workers are insufficient to meet the need will recruitment from the rural sector be permitted.

This regulation was intended to prevent the inflow of peasants into the cities. In addition, to prevent their outflow from the rural areas, in January 9, 1958, the government promulgated the household registration ordinance. Clause 2, Article 10 of the ordinance stipulated the following: When a citizen wants to move from rural areas to urban areas, he/she must follow the procedure of submitting to the household register organization of the place of his/her residence an employment certificate issued by the government labor administrative organization in the city, a school admission certificate, or municipal household registration management organization's permit to reside in that city.

The regulation said that without an employment certificate issued by a city or a school admission certificate, no farmer would be permitted to move to a city. This was similar to passport and visa requirements for movement between countries.

These two legal steps can be seen as restricting basic human rights regarding freedom of occupation and freedom of residence which are guaranteed by any modern country. It was these two freedoms that many modern nations loudly proclaimed, together with freedom of speech and of association, when they emerge from medieval fetters. The People's Republic of China was no exception. Indeed Clause 2, Article 90 of the first Constitution promulgated in 1954 stipulated freedom of movement and freedom of residence. However, China had to reverse these provisions only four years later. Faced with hordes of peasants flowing out of the countryside in search of jobs, the government had to resort to its administrative authority to prevent migration.

In explaining the household registration law, Luo Ruiqing made the following lame excuse on this point: "Regulations regarding restrictions of movement in the draft ordinance (e.g., restrictions on the unplanned outflow of farmers, household registration rules for national defense areas along the borders, and restrictions on the movement of citizens to foreign countries or for the period of their temporary stay in foreign countries) are all based on the concept that the government should allocate places of residence in an integrated way. These regulations are thus designed to protect the extensive democratic freedom of the people, and not to conflict with it" [4, p. 49].

2. *Systems to control population movement*

It proved difficult to check the flow of peasants into the cities simply by requesting rural leaders and corporate leaders in the cities to cooperate. Efficient preven-

tion with the use of administrative authority required the establishment of compulsory systems. The result was the household registration system and a food rationing system in the cities.

The establishment of the household registration system began at the first national public security conference held by the Public Security Ministry in November 1949 just after the founding of the nation. The main purpose of the system was to prevent counterrevolutionary movements and control public safety. The law for general urban residents took the form of the provisional regulation of urban household registration management, which was issued by the Public Security Ministry in July 1951. Article 5 of this regulation stipulated that any person wishing to change his/her household registration was required to report to one of the ministry's branch offices (i.e., a police station) at the place of destination within three days of his/her family head's report to the police station at his/her former place of residence about his/her departure. Article 6 also made it obligatory for a traveler to report to the police station in the place of his/her stay within three days.

Until then household registration in the rural areas had been under the jurisdiction of the Civil Affairs Ministry. In February 1956 the State Council changed the rule and put all matters regarding household registration and management as well as demographic statistics under the control of the Public Security Ministry. The council also set three basic duties for the household registration administration.

(1) Citizens' identification and control over their performance of rights and obligations.

(2) Supply of demographic statistics to the economic, cultural, and defense ministries whenever necessary.

(3) Detection of counterrevolutionary elements.

The urban household registration system was virtually completed in 1956-57. The start of registration of the unemployed in 1952, the implementation of a census in 1953, the introduction of the urban food rationing system in November of that year, and the preparation of voter registration lists for the National People's Congress and the reorganization of police stations at the grassroot level in 1954, all enabled the government to gain almost total control over the urban population through household registration. By contrast, as of 1956, most farming villages had only simple household registration systems, and only 3 per cent of them had a detailed registration system like that adopted in the cities [15, p. 128].

The full implementation of the household registration system in the urban sector had many implications. The labor market became nonexistent due to the lack of freedom of movement as well as to the system in which all jobs became available only through the arrangement offered by administrative organizations. With the closure of the housing and rental apartment markets, a system was introduced for supplying all new houses through places of work. Thus no houses were available to the unemployed. Without urban household registration, no jobs were offered, and

thus no houses were supplied without urban household registration.

In November 1953 a food rationing system was introduced for urban residents because of the short supply of commercial food from rural areas. The free food markets in the cities were gradually closed from 1954 onwards.

In other words, a new system was created under which food, jobs, and houses were supplied to those holding urban household registration and not to those flowing into the cities without urban household registration. This step, as well as two ordinances dated December 31, 1957 and January 9, 1958, helped to complete the legal and social system against the influx of people from farming villages. However, because of the growing momentum of the Great Leap Forward, it was only in 1961 that these measures were thoroughly implemented.

III. PHASE TWO (1961–76)

Having full control over population movement during this period, the government took the rare step of decentralizing the urban population into rural and frontier regions. This did not mean an end to spontaneous population movement however. There was still some movement similar to refugee outflows in the wake of disasters. However, none of these outflows were significant enough to mention, and the review here will start with the forced evacuation into the rural sector in 1961–62.


A. *Rapid Increase in Urban Population*

The Great Leap Forward was triggered by the irrigation movement in Henan Province in the autumn of 1957. As the movement expanded, a huge number of farmers poured into the cities. However, when the former Soviet Union broke its economic and technological agreement with China in July 1960 the momentum of the movement changed and the campaign failed. The collapse of the campaign revealed problems in many parts of the country and in particular the problem of the swollen unfed urban population.

After this setback, net nominal domestic material product registered yearly decreases of 21.5 per cent in 1961 and as much as 24.4 per cent in 1962 when compared with the 1959 product. The magnitude of these declines was equivalent to that which occurred in the United States in the Great Depression of 1929–30. Capital investment in the state sector shrank by 62 per cent in 1961 and by 44 per cent in 1962, each compared with the previous year. Investment value dwindled from Rmb 41.7 billion in 1960 to Rmb 8.7 billion (one-fifth of the 1960 level) in 1962. As a result, substantial unemployment occurred among migrants to the cities who were peasants who had moved into the cities in 1958–60 and were working mostly on construction sites.

The food production situation was even more serious. Production began to decrease in 1959 and reached a low of 135 million tons in 1960, down as much as 60

Fig. 5. The Number of Urban Workers and State Sector Employees, 1956–63



Source: [11, p. 3].

million tons from the 1957 level (195 million tons). It was only in 1963 that production recovered to the 1957 level. The main reason, apart from the inflow of peasants into the cities, was that too many farmers within the rural sector had been mobilized for steel production at the cost of farm work. Because of the sharp drop in agricultural production, the government was unable to secure the food rations needed for city dwellers.

Figure 5 shows increases in urban workers in 1958–60 in comparison with those in 1956–57 and 1961–63. Urban workers rose by 21 million in 1958, an increase of as much as 67 per cent over the previous year. The increase between 1957 and 1960 widened to 28.7 million. Of this number, 25 million workers are estimated to have been farmers who migrated to the cities. The city-registered population in 1960 was 30 million higher than in 1956. This indicates that the restrictive regulations

issued in late 1957 and in January 1958 regarding the employment of farmers in the cities were virtually ineffective. The reason seems to have been that urban household registration was granted with almost no restrictions.

From 1961 onward the government was confronted with the problem of how to deal with a swollen urban population and labor force. These years witnessed a sharp decrease in the commercial food supply and a decline in investment.

B. *Shrinking Urban Household Registration*

Under these circumstances, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party made a decision in June 1961 to reduce employee numbers. The decision called for the reduction of the urban population by more than 22 million in the three years to 1963, from the 129 million who were receiving rationed food as of the end of 1960. This step started in 1961 with the removal of urban household registration from 9.5 million urban workers by two methods: contraction of city-administered districts and deportation of migrant city dwellers to their home villages. The former method was implemented by raising the minimum population standard for qualified cities from over 2,000 to over 3,000 people. The size of suburbs was also reduced, and the areas outside this range were included in the rural areas. Residents in the new rural districts were transferred from urban to rural household registration, and their names were removed from food rationing lists.

Under this guideline, the Public Security Ministry issued an official notice about the handling of household registration transfers in April 1962. The notice demanded strict distinction between "ordinary movement" and forced deportation of peasants who had flowed into the cities during the period of the Great Leap Forward. "Ordinary movement" meant the shifts between cities which did not affect the number of rationed food recipients. In December the Public Security Ministry issued a directive calling for tighter control of household registration which strictly prohibited the movement of peasants into the cities while permitting the outflow of people from the cities into the rural areas. In the area of intercity movement, movement into Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, and Guangzhou was put under stricter control.

This process led to the establishment of a dual population movement system under which no shift in household registration from rural to urban areas was permitted, while intercity movement was permitted, with strict restrictions placed on movement into the five big cities. Migration from cities to villages was encouraged.

C. *Subsequent Policy-induced Movement*

1. *Movement for the construction of inland industrial zones*

The former Soviet Union's unilateral termination of the economic and technological agreement with China in July 1960 drove the two countries into military

confrontation. This antagonism cast a shadow over China's economic reconstruction in the 1960s. China adopted a policy of implementing major industrial projects in central and southwestern regions in 1963–64 in response to moves by the former Soviet Union to reinforce its military deployment in the areas along China's northern borders. China designated coastal areas as the first industrial zone; inner regions (such provinces as Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi) as the second industrial zone; and Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou provinces as the third industrial zone. In the third industrial zone which had had few factories, China began to construct munitions factories and railways. More than 50 per cent of new investment in the latter half of the 1960s was directed toward this zone. To carry out these projects, managers and engineers of state-run enterprises from many parts of the country also moved to this zone. But this movement, which was reminiscent of that to the north-eastern region in 1953–57, fell under the category of intercity movement.

2. *Movement during the Cultural Revolution*

The Cultural Revolution was a power struggle within the CCP that began in 1966 and ended in 1976. The revolution's policy of "rustication of urban youth," which was intended to settle urban young people in rural regions, had a major impact on population movement. Under the policy many urban young people were induced to give up their city registration to work in the rural and frontier regions in exchange for payment that was worth only six months wages for urban jobs. This step was ostensibly publicized as supporting underdeveloped rural areas with the hands of urban youth. The underlying policy motive, however, was to deal with the problems of surplus young labor, which could not be absorbed by the cities, by sending youth out into rural and frontier regions.

The policy of employing junior and senior high school graduates in rural or frontier regions was initiated in the mid-1950s, but the number of graduates thus employed was small. A similar policy was also attempted after 1961 when the urban population was slashed. But the cumulative number between 1962 and the first half of 1966 was 1.29 million, or less than 0.3 million in terms of the annual average. This accounted for only 1–2 per cent of the total number of people who shifted their household registration.

After 1966, however, conditions became very serious in the cities. There was a total of 10 million graduates in urban areas between 1966 and 1968. As the economy stagnated due to the disarray caused by the Cultural Revolution, those graduates could not find jobs, adding 10 million to the ranks of the unemployed [15, p. 145]. The policy of rustication of urban youth was contrived to solve this unemployment problem.

The economic stagnation in the urban sector is reflected in supporting data on housing construction. Under the urban housing supply system, employers constructed "public houses" and supplied them to their employees at low prices. As

mentioned before, the recipients were all holders of urban registration. The decline in new housing completions indicated the difficulty of securing new jobs in the cities. Annual urban housing completions during the ten years from 1961 dropped to less than half those of 1957 [8, 1983 ed., p. 357]. This fact illustrates that the reduction of the urban population was necessary in terms of housing as well.

Figure 8 shows the number of rusticated youth who had moved to rural and frontier regions after 1966. The number reached 1.43 million per annum during the eleven years from 1967 to 1977 which brought the cumulative total for the eighteen years from 1962 to 1979 to 17.76 million. These figures illustrate how difficult it was to force single young men to move even using government authority.

D. *Spontaneous Population Movement*

The government exercised full control over population movement during Phase Two as mentioned before. But did spontaneous movement die out? Movement from the rural to urban sector did cease, but there seem to have been many cases of flight into frontier regions even after 1959 due to a poor food situation in the cities, a condition which had constantly plagued the old China. No data are available to verify this assumption, but the following data sound convincing [15, p. 152]: "In the course of history after the establishment of a new China, there has constantly been spontaneous population movement. Whatever measures the government took, the effect was no more than causing a certain change in the direction of movement.... According to data from Heilongjiang Province, about 60 per cent of net settlers between 1949 and 1982 were spontaneous migrants." This suggests that there was a substantial number of spontaneous migrants even in the 1960s and 1970s.

IV. PHASE THREE (1977-84)

Domestic tension began to abate rapidly after the Vietnam War ended in defeat for the United States in May 1975. This was because the Chinese Communist Party had been using American aggression in Vietnam to stir up a sense of alarm in the people. With the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, the aftereffects of the Cultural Revolution also began to fade. These shifts in the big picture were accompanied by relentless economic change within the rural sector, leading to the breakdown of systems that had previously prevented the flow of rural people into the cities.

A. *Shift Away from Agriculture in the Rural Sector*

The key characteristics of the people's commune system, which was established in 1958, were not only an economic organization based on public ownership of land, but also the role of the communes as organs of political authority. From the

labor perspective, this feature was manifested in the use of this political authority to exercise total control over the labor force under the jurisdiction of the communes. Once the workers had been brought under political authority, the people's communes were able to use their authority to direct day-to-day work activities. Another implication of the system was the use of commune authority to control its members' movement of residence outside of the commune. The household registration ordinance, promulgated by the government in January 1958, functioned as an institutional guarantee to contain the peasants within the realm of the communes. In other words, the people's communes became vessels to keep a growing rural population within the rural sector. It was this containment of the rural population that enabled China to maintain its cities during the second phase.

However, the situation changed over the next dozen or so years. In the decade from 1961 to 1971, the rural population grew by 2.9 per cent per annum, while the urban population increased by only 1.5 per cent annually. As shown in Figure 6, the result was a rapid worsening of population pressure on the land.


Figure 6 shows trends in the area of farmland per rural household and in mechanical horsepower per hectare of farmland. It must be noted, however, that as the official statistics do not supply the number of farming households, the figures used here for rural households include nonfarming rural dwellers. Since it was impossible to separate farming and nonfarming rural households during the people's commune era, the State Statistical Bureau simply maintained statistics based on the total number of rural households. As a result, there is no other method that can be used.

In 1960, the average area farmed per household was 0.83 hectares. By 1970 this had fallen by approximately 20 per cent to 0.67 hectares. During the 1970s, the average declined by a further 16 per cent to 0.56 hectares. In other words, the average area of farms was reduced by about one-third over a twenty-year period. This is reminiscent of the situation that impoverished prewar farmers faced on the Japanese mainland (excluding Hokkaido) where they were called "five-tan farmers" (five tan = approximately 0.5 hectares).

On October 31, 1952, the Chinese government introduced a policy designed to solve the problem of surplus rural labor. In that policy, the government noted that there were only 0.24 hectares of arable land per capita, and that the rural labor surplus was a serious problem. The 1970 average of 0.56 hectares per household was equivalent to 0.12 hectares per person, which was about one-half of the 1952 level. Figure 6 shows how the use of farm machinery expanded rapidly after 1970. With this increase in mechanical horsepower, the labor surplus became even more grave.

Figure 4 shows how the percentage of workers employed in the primary industry began to fall sharply in the 1970s. At the same time, the figure shows that apparently the rural labor force declined far more gradually than the primary sector labor

Fig. 6. Farmland Area per Rural Household and Mechanical Horsepower per Hectare of Farmland




Sources: For farmland area: [18, 1980 ed., p. 5] [18, 1983 ed., p. 19] [18, 1985 ed., p. 120] [17, 1986 ed., p.5] [17, 1987 ed., p.5] [17, 1990 ed., pp. 27, 222] [17, 1991 ed., pp. 29, 236] [17, 1993 ed., pp. 44, 93] [17, 1994 ed., pp. 43, 51] [17, 1995 ed., pp. 63, 71]. For mechanical horsepower: [18, 1980 ed., p. 235] [17, 1987 ed., p. 218] [17, 1990 ed., p. 231] [17, 1993 ed., p. 243] [17, 1995 ed., p. 78].

force as a percentage of the total labor force. This suggests that acute population pressure on the land had started to drive a spontaneous shift into nonagricultural activities within the rural sector. This situation occurred because the dual household register system hindered the movement of rural people into the cities.

Within the rural sector, it was the commune enterprises that absorbed peasants.

Figure 7 traces the shift away from agriculture in Wuxi County, Jiangsu Province, which led the way in forming commune enterprises (which would subsequently become village and township enterprises). It is apparent from the graph that there was a marked shift into nonagricultural activities during the 1970s. Historically, this region had been the most densely populated part of China, and population pressure on the land was strong. Although the shift out of agriculture did not occur as rapidly in other regions during the 1970s, the Wuxi County case can be seen as evidence that China's rural sector had, by the 1970s, reached the stage at which the rural overpopulation problem could not be solved without some form of structural change to overcome population pressure on the land.

Fig. 7. Sector Employment and Economic Indicators in Wuxi County, Jiangsu Province: 1952-86




Source: [14, p. 195].

B. *The Urban Drift among Rusticated Youth*

Rusticated youth were young city-registered people who were converted to rural registration in an effort to keep them in the rural sector. As discussed earlier in this paper, the purpose of this policy was to reduce the cost to urban governments of providing these people with employment opportunities, food, housing, and other necessities. However, data published in recent times show that these people were slow to settle in rural communities and frontier regions, and that a significant number drifted back to the cities. This situation is apparent from Figure 8.

Since the raw data do not show totals for years before 1973, the average (the

Fig. 8. The Number of Rusticated Youth and Those Who Returned to the Cities



Source: [10, pp. 110–11].

dotted line in the graph) has been used for the years prior to this date. Peaks in the line showing the number of people sent into the countryside invariably coincide with periods when the extreme left was dominant. It is important to carefully study the trend between 1974 and 1977 during which the number of people returning to the cities began to gradually increase. Although the number returning to the cities is smaller than the number sent into the countryside, there is a correlation between the two. This trend indicates that there were those in the cities who used all kinds of pretexts and excuses to have their children (or siblings) allowed to return to the cities. This tendency for the majority of rusticated youth to drift back to cities for one reason or another after failing to settle in the rural sector continued for three years from 1975. It was in 1978 that the number returning to the cities first exceeded the number being sent into the countryside. Little more than a year after Mao's death in September 1976, most of the young people who had been driven into the countryside by propaganda were beginning to return to the cities. During 1978 and 1979, these young people staged a number of demonstrations in Beijing and Shanghai to press their demand that party committees in these cities should give them jobs and urban registration.

The numbers per se are not especially large (2.55 million in 1978, 3.95 million in 1979) compared with total registered population movement at the time (17.3 million in 1978, 21.94 million in 1979). The movement of rusticated youth was equivalent to 15 per cent of total movement in 1978 and 18 per cent in 1979. What is important in this context is the fact that the return of rusticated youth triggered the collapse of government policy to drive population movement which had been applied since 1961.

C. *The End of the People's Commune System*

The household registration law should have made it impossible for rusticated youth to return and live secretly in the cities. However, the statistics suggest that to a significant extent urban enterprises and agencies failed to enforce the law stringently. This had the effect of breaking down the system of policy-induced population movement from within. Yet this applies only to the rusticated youth, and not to the movement of rural people. The development that opened the first crack in the door for the movement of rural people into the cities was the termination of the people's commune system.

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CCP, which was convened in December 1978, brought a total change in state policy which in the following year led to the adoption of reform and open-door policies. These policy changes began with new agricultural policy adopted at the plenum, granting autonomy to farmers. Virtually overnight this policy led to the dismantling of the people's commune system.

As discussed earlier in this paper, the people's communes had the authority to

control rural labor in the name of collective management. With the collapse of the system, individual farmers regained control over the labor of their own families. Farming families became able to carry out farm work according to the wishes of the head of the household. Thereafter, the right to choose occupations within the rural sector was gradually restored.

The expansion of free markets inevitably triggered rural population movement. There was also a dramatic expansion of the range of occupations available in the rural sector. Previously the only enterprises had been those operated by people's commune committees and production brigades (which were under the control of people's commune committees). Now there was a proliferation of new enterprises including businesses operated by individuals, small enterprises started by cooperatives made up of several farmers, and shops. As illustrated by the example of Wuxi County, Jiangsu Province (Figure 7), there was a sudden shift away from agriculture in the rural sector, especially in coastal regions in the east.

This trend also induced rural people to move out of their counties and provinces. This challenged the household registration law which had been in force since January 1958. The government's first response was to grant partial approval for the movement of rural people into small cities up to county capital level. One of the factors that prompted this decision was a major easing of commercial food shortages thanks to excellent harvests in 1983 and 1984. The approval was announced in a directive concerning the movement of rural people into *jizhen* (towns), which was issued by the State Council in October 1984.

There are two types of *jizhen*. The first type is the "market town," which is a relatively large concentration of population in a rural area. The other is the *jianzhizhen* (officially designated town), which is a small city in terms of the administrative structure on which the town system is based. The *jianzhizhen* range from communities of around 3,000 people to cities with a nonfarming population of up to 60,000. The type of *jizhen* referred to in the aforementioned directive is not entirely clear, but the intended reference appears to have been to the small cities up to county capital level which can be regarded as within the range of *jianzhizhen*. The directive indicated that rural people could move to these communities. However, the government decided not to allocate rationed food supplies to the newcomers. The result was the creation of a new category of household called *zilihuliang hukou* (households that provide their own food requirements and do not receive rationed foodstuffs). People having this household registry are allowed to settle in small cities up to county capital level. The government's purpose in implementing this major policy change was to respond to the spontaneous movement of rural people.

Developments between 1977 and 1984 can thus be described as a process whereby spontaneous population movement broke down the framework for the government's regulated population movement.

V. PHASE FOUR (1985-)

A. *Peasants as Migrant Workers*

From around 1983 or 1984, the *Renmin ribao* began to carry reports concerning the phenomenon of rural people working outside of their provinces as migrant laborers. But even before this time there seemed to have been migratory movement of rural people who worked outside of their home counties, and this had begun after the breakdown of the people's communes. The trend expanded gradually over the next dozen or so years, and in 1993 and 1994 there were major waves of migrant labor. As yet there are no proper statistics concerning rural migrant workers, and the figures in Table I are based on scattered statistics that have been published sporadically.

TABLE I
MIGRANT LABOR FROM RURAL AREAS

	Temporary Residents in Urban Areas* (A)	Migrants to Urban Areas (Not Including Temporary Residents) (Million people)			
		Total (B)	From Anhui Province	From Jiangxi Province	From Sichuan Province
1982	6.57 ^a (0.66%)	2.00 ^d	0.12 ^f		
1985					
1988			0.055 ^f		
1990	21.35 ^b (1.88%)				
1991					1.225 ⁱ
1992				0.20 ^{**g}	1.96 ⁱ
1993a		51.40 ^d	5.00 ^f	3.00 ^g	5.00 ^h
1993b		64.50 ^e			
1995	47.58 ^c (3.95%)	80.00 ^j			

* Rural-registered population which has settled in urban areas for one year or more. Figures in parentheses show the percentage of temporary residents to total population.

** From January through June.

^a 1982 population census.

^b 1990 population census.

^c *Zhongguo xinxi*, February 19, 1996, p. 1.

^d Li Fan, "Waichu dagong renyuan de guimo, liudong fangwei ji qita—Zhongguo nongcun laodongli liudong yanjiu zhi er" [A study of rural labor migration in China, no. 2: The scale and destination of population movement out of the villages], *Zhongguo nongcun jingji*, 1994, No. 9, p. 31.

^e [3, p. 196].

^f [1, p. 53].

^g [16, p. 3].

^h [3, p. 198].

ⁱ [2, p. 43].

^j *Zhongguo xinxi*, July 1, 1996, p. 1.

The figures in column (A) refer to the "temporary resident population," which consists of people who have been settled in urban areas for one year or more but have household registration elsewhere. By 1995 the number of people in this category had risen to almost 4 per cent of the total population. The figures in column (B) refer to migrant workers who are not temporary residents. Two different figures are available for 1993 indicating that they made up 11.6 per cent (1993a) or 14.6 per cent (1993b) of the total number of workers with rural household registration. There are also figures for three individual provinces. In 1993, the percentages of the migrant labor force to the total labor force with rural registry were 20 per cent in Anhui Province, 21 per cent in Jiangxi Province, and 10 per cent in Sichuan Province. In all cases, the figures indicate that large numbers of peasants started to move into the cities as migrant workers.

B. *Definition of Mobile Population*

The movement statistics used so far have all been from the registered household population which can be monitored by the government. However, the resident population and the registered population began to diverge in the late 1970s. At first this resulted mainly from the movement of people between cities. For example, during a visit to China in 1980, the author was informed by Chinese sources that there were as many as 3 million married couples who were forced to live apart because of their work. The point was that, even if spouses resided separately because one partner had been transferred to a local city, it was customary for the couple to keep their family registration where they had registered, particularly when they had family registration in places like Shanghai or Beijing. As a result, a disparity arose between the number of actual residents and that of registered residents.

A "temporary resident" category was introduced for the third census in 1982. It was defined as consisting of people who had lived at least one year in their present place of residence but were not registered there, and people who had lived less than one year in a place but had already moved their family register there. In the 1987 extract population survey, the residence period was changed from "one year or more" to "between six months and one year." For the fourth census in 1990 the definition was again aligned with that used in the 1982 census.

The problem is that it is not possible to monitor population movement occurring over periods of less than one year with this concept because the increase that has occurred since the mid-1980s has been in the area of work migration by rural people over periods of less than one year. As the migration of peasants accelerated, scholars began to apply a new concept to surveys of population movement. The first population survey of this type known to the author was conducted in 1986 by the Ma Xia Group.

This survey, which covered seventy-four cities, was based on the definitions

TABLE II
DEFINITION OF MIGRANTION USED IN THE SURVEY UNDERTAKEN BY THE MA GROUP

	In Terms of Migrating Sphere	In Terms of Period	Relocation of Registration
Migration:			
(a) Legal migrants	Migration out of home villages, towns, or cities		Migration coincides with the transfer of registration
(b) Virtual migrants	Same as above	Residing at a place other than the registered place for one year or more	Migration without the transfer of registration
Movement:			
(c) Long-term movement	Same as above	Residing away from the registered place for one year or more	Movement without the transfer of registration
(d) Short-term movement	Same as above	Residing away from the registered place for one day up to under one year	Movement without the transfer of registration

Source: [5, p. 38].

shown in Table II [5, p. 38]. The difference between (b) and (c) is that while (b) appears to consist of people who have been away from their registered areas for a year or more and have registration relocation applications pending, (c) apparently consists of people who have not applied for registration relocation. Relative to the 1982 census's definition of "temporary residents," the former group is basically equivalent to the number of people moving between cities, while the latter approximately reflects movement from rural areas to cities for periods of at least one year.

It would be reasonable to conclude that movement patterns since the mid-1980s have been characterized by rapid increases in (c) and (d). These are reflected in the figures of column (B) in Table I.

Of the 100,267 people covered by the seventy-four city survey, 5,608 (5.6 per cent) were long-term migrants (at least one year), while 24,044 (24.0 per cent) were short-term migrants (one year or less) [5, pp. 57, 77]. These figures underscore the increase in the number of short-term migrants.

C. *Trend toward Part-Time Farming*

As indicated in Figures 4 and 6, the growth of the rural population since around 1970 has brought the average area of farmland per rural household close to the

minimum for farm operation. The area of farmland per household has continued to shrink, and by 1990 it was down to 0.43 hectares, or about one-half of the 1958 level. Figure 6 shows that mechanized horsepower was increasingly introduced onto these shrinking areas. The pressure to move labor out of agriculture thus increased with the passage of time. Until the mid-1980s, however, there were severe restrictions on the movement of migrant labor from the rural areas into the cities.

The situation that evolved in this environment was a shift away from agriculture within the rural sector. This change could also be described as a shift in the industrial structure of the rural economy. The absorbers of labor in this context were the former commune businesses, now known as "village and township enterprises." The percentage of the rural labor force absorbed into nonagricultural activities reached 10.8 per cent in 1980, 18.1 per cent in 1985, 21.5 per cent in 1988, 20.7 per cent in 1990, and 22.3 per cent in 1992 [8].

An analysis of the employment situation of the rural labor force in 1994 shows that 326.9 million people, or 73 per cent of the total rural labor force (446.5 million), were employed in the primary industry and 119.6 million (27 per cent) in other industries [17, 1995 ed., pp. 64–65]. Most of the people entering nonagricultural employment have stayed within their areas of residence. This is because most of the village and township enterprises are located in rural areas.

Rural communities in China have a three-layer structure: hamlets (former production units), villages (former production brigades), and *xiang* or *zhen* (former people's communes). An analysis of the siting of village and township enterprises shows that 80 per cent are located in hamlets, 19 per cent in villages, *xiang*, and *zhen*, and the remaining 1 per cent in county capitals which are above the *xiang* and *zhen* [13, p. 3]. This means that rural people who work in village and township enterprises do not move to the cities. Moreover, according to various sources, it is surmised that most farming households engage in agriculture on a part-time basis, and that one or two people in each family work for village and township enterprises.

Column (B) in Table I shows that 50–65 million migrant workers moved into cities in 1993. Assuming that a similar number did so in 1994, then of a total rural labor force of 446.5 million people, 41 per cent (120 million nonagricultural workers within the rural sector + 65 million seasonal migrant workers = 185 million) are employed in activities other than the primary industry. On this basis, the number working solely in the primary industry is 261.5 million, or 59 per cent of the rural labor force.

This leads to another question. With 41 per cent of the rural labor force working in nonagricultural activities, did it become possible to expand the operating scale of full-time farmers, bringing the incomes of people engaged solely in farming, forestry, fishery, and livestock production close to income levels in cities?

The answer is that farmers who became migrant workers returned little of their

land to their villages, thus contributing little to the expansion of average farming scale. Most either abandoned farming and allowed their farmland to deteriorate, or left the running of their farms to the old people or wives they left behind. This is confirmed by the results of a 1994 survey of rural migrant workers in twenty-eight counties. The survey covered twenty-eight *xiang* and 32,600 households, of which 395 were farming just enough land to meet their own rice requirements, 260 were renting part of their land to others, and only 163 had returned all of their farmland to their villages. Those who returned their farmland account for only 0.5 per cent of the total [7, p. 27].

Figure 9 sums up the relationship between the development of the village and township enterprises and the change in farm size. The vertical axis shows the total sown area divided by the number of rural households, while the horizontal axis shows the rural nonagricultural labor force as a percentage of the total rural labor force. The author compared the figures for 1985 and 1994. In principle the calculation of figures for the vertical axis should be based on the statistics for rural households which are engaged in the primary industry; however because these statistics were not available, the statistics for all rural households which included nonagricultural households were used instead. As shown in the graph, all trends are downward. This indicates that despite the growth of nonagricultural activities within the rural sector, the size of farms operated by farmers has continued to shrink.

The picture that emerges from above data points to the continuing expansion of the part-time farming in rural China. The size of farms is becoming progressively smaller, and farmers are increasing their incomes by working in village and township enterprises or are moving to cities as migrant workers.


D. *The Government's Policy toward Migrant Workers*

The natural movement of rural people into the cities began in the mid-1980s. In response to the irreversible outflow of rural migrants, in October 1984 the government relaxed its stance to some extent and allowed people to relocate their household registration to a small city or town at county capital level or below. However, there are still tough legal barriers to the relocation of household registrations to larger cities above the county capital level, and the government is still trying to stem the drift of rural people away from the countryside. The following directives have been issued with the aim of curbing the exodus of rural people [6].

On October 31, 1989, the State Council issued a directive calling for strict curbs on the excessively rapid increase in registration transfers. The directive stated that a target number of registration transfers would be included in national economic plans, and that efforts should be made to keep the number below the target level.

In April 1990 the State Council issued a directive calling for the appropriate administration of labor and employment. Regional and provincial governments

Fig. 9. Sown Area per Rural Household and Ratio of Nonagricultural Labor to the Total Rural Labor Force by Province: 1985 and 1994



Sources: For 1985: [17, 1986 ed., pp. 5, 71, 229, 231]. For 1994: [17, 1995 ed., pp. 63-65, 173].

Note: "Rural households" denotes total households in the rural areas which may include nonagricultural households.

were forbidden from easing the conditions for registration transfers or expanding the scope of interpretation.

In May 1992 the Public Security Ministry issued an emergency directive calling for the termination of sales of nonagricultural household registrations. The General Office of the Communist Party's Central Committee as well as the General Office of the State Council issued similar emergency directives in August. While regional governments had been raising large amounts of local government revenue by selling relocatable registrations, the directive placed a strict ban on this activity. Behind the issuances of these directive, one can detect the practices that had flourished in rural communities throughout China where household registrations were being turned into "commodities" that could be bought and sold. This phenomenon emerged from the interaction between restrictions placed on labor force movement and the massive economic shift toward an open labor market.

The above-mentioned policy statements to curb migration were implemented during 1989 through 1992. As shown in Table I, despite these measures, there were even bigger flows of population from the rural areas into the cities in 1993 and 1994. Government measures to regulate population movement under the household registration law of January 1958 appear to have lost any real effectiveness under the pressure from spontaneous population movement.

E. *Two-Tiered Labor Market*

People with urban household registrations are guaranteed access to food rations and jobs. Once a person is employed in the state-owned sector, he/she is also guaranteed medical insurance, the basic necessities of life, and extremely cheap housing. They also receive pensions after retirement. Rural people, who do not enjoy these guarantees, have been converging on the cities for the past decade. They have started to form a class of manual and informal sector laborers at the bottom of the labor market. Their occupations include unskilled construction work, peddling, repair work, rubbish collection, and home help. They take jobs that are dirty, dangerous, or hard. They have also started to form communities of people from the same regions on the outskirts of cities where regulations are enforced less severely. Low-paid workers are starting to form their own residential areas with names that reflect the home regions of the residents, such as Anhui Village for people from areas of Anhui Province, and Jiangsu Village for those from impoverished parts of northern Jiangsu Province.

In large and medium-sized cities, this situation is leading to the formation of a social class structure consisting of registered urban dwellers who enjoy excellent social guarantees, and a quasi-class of informal sector workers. Unlike major cities in many other developing countries, Chinese cities have not yet reached the stage of slum formation. However, it is apparent that residential areas for poor people, which were formerly unknown in mainland China, are starting to develop.


CONCLUSIONS

Population movement in China over the past forty-five years can be summed up as follows.

(1) The overall rate of population movement, both by policy-induced relocation under government compulsion and by spontaneous movement, is quite high by international standards. The migration rate for China's population was especially high in the 1950s and again since 1985.

(2) Throughout the past forty-five years, the government has sought to maintain order in its cities through policies designed to curb the inflow of population from rural areas. In the cities this has been achieved by creating a system that limits

Fig. 10. Characteristics of Population Migration in China



Note: The solid line denotes policy-induced migration. The dotted line denotes spontaneous migration. The double line denotes massive migration.

food rations, job opportunities, housing, and social security to those who have urban household registrations. In the rural areas the government ensured order by totally regulating the movement of the rural population under the people's commune system.

(3) However, the people's commune system began to break down in the 1970s due to population pressure on the land in the rural sector.

(4) Economic reform and the resulting shift to a market economy in various sectors triggered a massive influx of rural people into the cities from the mid-1980s onward. Government steps to curb this flow are now almost meaningless. In the 1990s, separate, nonintegrated labor markets have started to form in Chinese cities, as in major cities in many other developing countries. There is also the danger of slum formation.

(5) The "unlawful" influx of rural people into the cities reflects a further worsening of population pressure on the land. Farm size is steadily shrinking, and farming is increasingly becoming a part-time occupation.

(6) The characteristics of population movement in the 1950s, in the 1961–76 period, and after 1985 are shown in Figure 10. The solid line represents policy-induced movement, the dotted line spontaneous movement, and double line massive migration. Regions that have shown net outflow in the period after 1985 include Xinjiang region, Inner Mongolia, and Heilongjiang Province. The pattern of population flow has been totally reversed compared with the 1950s.

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